section 207 disability benefits in New York

2001However, the Supreme Court correctly determined that the plaintiffs receipt of benefits pursuant to General Municipal Law § 207-c is his exclusive remedy against his municipal employer (see, Braxton v City of Yonkers, supra; Nieves v City of Yonkers, 268 AD2d 412 ; O'Hare v City of New Rochelle, 249 AD2d 375 ).

2000Accordingly, while the Supreme Court properly granted the City’s motion to dismiss the complaint, it should have done so on the ground that the plaintiff’s receipt of General Municipal Law § 207-c benefits provided his exclusive remedy and barred any cause of action based on common-law negligence (see, O’Hare v City of New Rochelle, 249 AD2d 375 ; Damiani v City of Buffalo, 198 AD2d 814 ; O’Dette v Barton, 190 AD2d 1074 ; see also, Petendree v City of Yonkers, 270 AD2d 403 ).

2000Moreover, even in the unlikely event of a temporary cessation of benefits due, for example, to a delay in obtaining a physician’s report, any loss ultimately found to be erroneously imposed can be rectified by “back pay for benefits lost or resto ration of leave credits improperly used” (Matter of DePoalo v County of Schenectady, 85 NY2d 527, 532 ).

1997Petitioner’s denial of an employee’s application for disability benefits pursuant to General Municipal Law § 207-c falls within the discretionary authority vested exclusively within municipalities by the statute (see, Matter of De Poalo v County of Schenectady, 200 AD2d 277, 280 , affd 85 NY2d 527 ; Matter of Schenectady County Sheriff’s Benevolent Assn. v McEvoy, 124 AD2d 911, 912 ).

2000Accordingly, while the Supreme Court properly granted the City’s motion to dismiss the complaint, it should have done so on the ground that the plaintiff’s receipt of General Municipal Law § 207-c benefits provided his exclusive remedy and barred any cause of action based on common-law negligence (see, O’Hare v City of New Rochelle, 249 AD2d 375 ; Damiani v City of Buffalo, 198 AD2d 814 ; O’Dette v Barton, 190 AD2d 1074 ; see also, Petendree v City of Yonkers, 270 AD2d 403 ).

1998The court properly concluded that the plaintiffs’ claims against the City of New Rochelle should be dismissed because the receipt of benefits under General Municipal Law § 207-c was the injured plaintiffs exclusive remedy (see, Damiani v City of Buffalo, 198 AD2d 814, 815 ; O’Dette v Parton, 190 AD2d 1074, 1075 ).

2000Accordingly, while the Supreme Court properly granted the City’s motion to dismiss the complaint, it should have done so on the ground that the plaintiff’s receipt of General Municipal Law § 207-c benefits provided his exclusive remedy and barred any cause of action based on common-law negligence (see, O’Hare v City of New Rochelle, 249 AD2d 375 ; Damiani v City of Buffalo, 198 AD2d 814 ; O’Dette v Barton, 190 AD2d 1074 ; see also, Petendree v City of Yonkers, 270 AD2d 403 ).

1998The court properly concluded that the plaintiffs’ claims against the City of New Rochelle should be dismissed because the receipt of benefits under General Municipal Law § 207-c was the injured plaintiffs exclusive remedy (see, Damiani v City of Buffalo, 198 AD2d 814, 815 ; O’Dette v Parton, 190 AD2d 1074, 1075 ).

1998Those petitioners were awarded benefits by the Workers’ Compensation Board (Board), and respondents, who did not appeal those determinations, are bound by them (see, Matter of De John v Town of Frankfort, 209 AD2d 938 ; Matter of Maresco v Rozzi, 162 AD2d 534, 535 ; Matter of Crawford v Sheriff's Dept., 152 AD2d 382, 385-386 , lv denied 76 NY2d 704 ).

1994Under the circumstances, respondent is bound by those compensation determinations that have not been appealed and is obligated to pay disability benefits pursuant to General Municipal Law § 207-c retroactive to the date of the accident (see, Matter of Maresco v Rozzi, 162 AD2d 534, 535 ; Matter of Crawford v Sheriff’s Dept., 152 AD2d 382, 385-386 , lv denied 76 NY2d 704 ; Rosinsky v City of Binghamton, 72 Misc 2d 187, 188-189 ).

1995Determination unanimously annulled on the law with costs, petition granted and matter remitted to respondents for further proceedings in accordance with the following Memorandum: Because the Comptroller granted petitioner’s application for performance of duty disability retirement, respondents improperly denied petitioner’s application for disability benefits pursuant to General Municipal Law § 207-a (2) on the ground that petitioner is not disabled as a result of his performance of duties as a firefighter (see, Matter of Putnam v City of Watertown, 213 AD2d 974 ; Matter of Dembowski v La Poll

1995An earlier CPLR article 78 proceeding brought by petitioner to compel the City to pay him differential disability benefits pursuant to section 207-a (2) was dismissed as premature because the City had no opportunity to investigate petitioner’s application for benefits and conduct a hearing in that regard (see, Putnam v City of Watertown, supra).

2018The related facts are described in detail in our decisions in two previous appeals in this CPLR article 78 proceeding (137 AD3d 1462 [2016]; 113 AD3d 989 [2014], lv dismissed 23 NY3d 1015 [2014]) and in our decision in another appeal in a separate CPLR article 78 proceeding arising from the same dispute ( Matter of McKay v Village of Endicott , 139 AD3d 1327 [2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 912 [2017]).

2018The related facts are described in more detail in our prior decision in this proceeding ( 139 AD3d 1327 [2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 912 [2017]) and in our decisions in two previous appeals in a separate but closely related CPLR article 78 proceeding ( Matter of McKay v Village of Endicott , 137 AD3d 1462 [2016]; Matter of McKay v Village of Endicott , 113 AD3d 989 [2014], lv dismissed 23 NY3d 1015 [2014]).

2018The current appeal arises from this Court's 2016 determination that respondent is bound by a Hearing Officer's determination that petitioner is entitled to supplemental permanent disability benefits under General Municipal Law § 207-a (2) for a period beginning in December 2010 and continuing until he reaches mandatory service retirement age ( 139 AD3d at 1330-1331 ).

2018The related facts are described in more detail in our prior decision in this proceeding ( 139 AD3d 1327 [2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 912 [2017]) and in our decisions in two previous appeals in a separate but closely related CPLR article 78 proceeding ( Matter of McKay v Village of Endicott , 137 AD3d 1462 [2016]; Matter of McKay v Village of Endicott , 113 AD3d 989 [2014], lv dismissed 23 NY3d 1015 [2014]).

2016This Court confirmed the administrative determination denying Jackson’s application for disability benefits pursuant to General Municipal Law § 207-c (Matter of Jackson v Barber, 133 AD3d 958 [2015]).

2016This Court confirmed the administrative determination denying Jackson’s application for disability benefits pursuant to General Municipal Law § 207-c (Matter of Jackson v Barber, 133 AD3d 958 [2015]).

2007In view of the objective medical evidence demonstrating that petitioner’s dilated cardiomyopathy was not accompanied by underlying stress-related coronary artery disease or hypertension, and the conclusions of various doctors that petitioner’s disabling condition was of unknown origin, the statutory presumption set forth in General Municipal Law § 207-k was adequately rebutted, and the determination of respondent Board of Trustees that the condition was not job-related is not arbitrary and capricious (see Matter of McNamara v Kelly, 32 AD3d 747 [2006]; Matter of Seldon v Kelly, 21 AD3d 840 [20

2006Objective medical evidence supports the Medical Board’s finding that petitioner’s cardiomyopathy is due to a mildly reduced left ventricular ejection fraction unrelated to his nonobstructive coronary artery disease or recently diagnosed and well-controlled hypertension, and suffices to rebut the statutory presumption that the cardiomyopathy is job related (see Matter of Seldon v Kelly, 21 AD3d 840 [2005]).

2001However, the Supreme Court correctly determined that the plaintiffs receipt of benefits pursuant to General Municipal Law § 207-c is his exclusive remedy against his municipal employer (see, Braxton v City of Yonkers, supra; Nieves v City of Yonkers, 268 AD2d 412 ; O'Hare v City of New Rochelle, 249 AD2d 375 ).

2000Contrary to the plaintiffs’ contentions, the injured plaintiffs receipt of disability benefits pursuant to General Municipal Law § 207-a is an exclusive remedy and bars any common-law negligence claims or General Municipal Law § 205-a claims against the defendant (see, Petendree v City of Yonkers, 270 AD2d 403 ; Nieves v City of Yonkers, 268 AD2d 412 ; O’Hare v City of New Rochelle, 249 AD2d 375 ).

2000The rule is well settled insofar as General Municipal Law § 207-c disability claims by injured police officers are concerned (see, O’Hare v City of New Rochelle, 249 AD2d 375 ; Damiani v City of Buffalo, 198 AD2d 814 ; O’Dette v Parton, 190 AD2d 1074 ), and the same result is warranted under the parallel provisions of General Municipal Law § 207-a applicable to a firefighter (see, Matter of Schade v Town of Wallkill, 235 AD2d 542 ; Matter of Fedorczak v Dolce, 202 AD2d 668 ).

1995Furthermore, the ruling of the Workers’ Compensation Board in favor of petitioner precluded respondent from denying General Municipal Law § 207-a (1) benefits on the ground that petitioner was not injured as a result of his performance of duties as a firefighter (see, Matter of De John v Town of Frankfort, 209 AD2d 938 ; Matter of Fedorczak v Dolce, 202 AD2d 668 ; Matter of Maresco v Rozzi, 162 AD2d 534 ; Matter of Crawford v Sheriff’s Dept., 152 AD2d 382 , lv denied 76 NY2d 704 ).

1998Those petitioners were awarded benefits by the Workers’ Compensation Board (Board), and respondents, who did not appeal those determinations, are bound by them (see, Matter of De John v Town of Frankfort, 209 AD2d 938 ; Matter of Maresco v Rozzi, 162 AD2d 534, 535 ; Matter of Crawford v Sheriff's Dept., 152 AD2d 382, 385-386 , lv denied 76 NY2d 704 ).

1995Furthermore, the ruling of the Workers’ Compensation Board in favor of petitioner precluded respondent from denying General Municipal Law § 207-a (1) benefits on the ground that petitioner was not injured as a result of his performance of duties as a firefighter (see, Matter of De John v Town of Frankfort, 209 AD2d 938 ; Matter of Fedorczak v Dolce, 202 AD2d 668 ; Matter of Maresco v Rozzi, 162 AD2d 534 ; Matter of Crawford v Sheriff’s Dept., 152 AD2d 382 , lv denied 76 NY2d 704 ).

1995Determination unanimously annulled on the law with costs, petition granted and matter remitted to respondents for further proceedings in accordance with the following Memorandum: Because the Comptroller granted petitioner’s application for performance of duty disability retirement, respondents improperly denied petitioner’s application for disability benefits pursuant to General Municipal Law § 207-a (2) on the ground that petitioner is not disabled as a result of his performance of duties as a firefighter (see, Matter of Putnam v City of Watertown, 213 AD2d 974 ; Matter of Dembowski v La Poll

1995Because the Comptroller granted petitioner’s application for performance of duty disability retirement, it was improper for respondent to deny the application of petitioner for disability benefits pursuant to General Municipal Law § 207-a (2) on the ground that he was not permanently disabled as a result of his performance of duties as a firefighter (see, Matter of Cook v City of Utica, 216 AD2d 944 , lv granted 86 NY2d 710 ; Matter of Putnam v City of Watertown, 213 AD2d 974 ; Matter of Dembowski v La Polla, 213 AD2d 972 , lv dismissed 86 NY2d 855 ; Matter of Pidel v City of Yonkers, 208 AD2d

1995Determination unanimously annulled on the law with costs, petition granted and matter remitted to respondents for further proceedings in accordance with the following Memorandum: Because the Comptroller granted petitioner’s application for performance of duty disability retirement, respondents improperly denied petitioner’s application for disability benefits pursuant to General Municipal Law § 207-a (2) on the ground that petitioner is not disabled as a result of his performance of duties as a firefighter (see, Matter of Putnam v City of Watertown, 213 AD2d 974 ; Matter of Dembowski v La Poll

1995Because the Comptroller granted petitioner’s application for performance of duty disability retirement, it was improper for respondent to deny the application of petitioner for disability benefits pursuant to General Municipal Law § 207-a (2) on the ground that he was not permanently disabled as a result of his performance of duties as a firefighter (see, Matter of Cook v City of Utica, 216 AD2d 944 , lv granted 86 NY2d 710 ; Matter of Putnam v City of Watertown, 213 AD2d 974 ; Matter of Dembowski v La Polla, 213 AD2d 972 , lv dismissed 86 NY2d 855 ; Matter of Pidel v City of Yonkers, 208 AD2d

2018The related facts are described in detail in our decisions in two previous appeals in this CPLR article 78 proceeding (137 AD3d 1462 [2016]; 113 AD3d 989 [2014], lv dismissed 23 NY3d 1015 [2014]) and in our decision in another appeal in a separate CPLR article 78 proceeding arising from the same dispute ( Matter of McKay v Village of Endicott , 139 AD3d 1327 [2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 912 [2017]).

2018The related facts are described in more detail in our prior decision in this proceeding ( 139 AD3d 1327 [2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 912 [2017]) and in our decisions in two previous appeals in a separate but closely related CPLR article 78 proceeding ( Matter of McKay v Village of Endicott , 137 AD3d 1462 [2016]; Matter of McKay v Village of Endicott , 113 AD3d 989 [2014], lv dismissed 23 NY3d 1015 [2014]).

2018The related facts are described in more detail in our prior decision in this proceeding ( 139 AD3d 1327 [2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 912 [2017]) and in our decisions in two previous appeals in a separate but closely related CPLR article 78 proceeding ( Matter of McKay v Village of Endicott , 137 AD3d 1462 [2016]; Matter of McKay v Village of Endicott , 113 AD3d 989 [2014], lv dismissed 23 NY3d 1015 [2014]).

2018The related facts are described in detail in our decisions in two previous appeals in this CPLR article 78 proceeding (137 AD3d 1462 [2016]; 113 AD3d 989 [2014], lv dismissed 23 NY3d 1015 [2014]) and in our decision in another appeal in a separate CPLR article 78 proceeding arising from the same dispute ( Matter of McKay v Village of Endicott , 139 AD3d 1327 [2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 912 [2017]).

2018The related facts are described in detail in our decisions in two previous appeals in this CPLR article 78 proceeding (137 AD3d 1462 [2016]; 113 AD3d 989 [2014], lv dismissed 23 NY3d 1015 [2014]) and in our decision in another appeal in a separate CPLR article 78 proceeding arising from the same dispute ( Matter of McKay v Village of Endicott , 139 AD3d 1327 [2016], lv denied 28 NY3d 912 [2017]).