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35 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1980–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Bundrage v. Stategreen2 sentences2011See Bundrage v. State, 814 So.2d 1133, 1134 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (holding that “in order to apply the enhancement provision of section 775.087(2)(a)(1), the State must prove actual possession”). 2010Bundrage v. State, 814 So.2d 1133 , 1135 n. 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (“An information does not have to refer to section 775.087 for the enhancement to apply, see Bryant v. State, 386 So.2d 237 (Fla.1980), as long as it alleges the use of a firearm, see Staton v. State, 636 So.2d 844 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994).”). | 5 | 6 |
Lareau v. Stategreen2 sentences2024Thus, “the crime of aggravated battery causing great bodily harm is subject to enhancement under section 775.087(1) while the crime of aggravated battery with a deadly weapon is not.” Harrell v. State, 150 So. 3d 858, 862 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (citing Lareau v. State, 573 So. 2d 813, 815 (Fla. 1991)). 2019In Lareau v. State, 573 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1991), the Florida Supreme Court held that the offense of aggravated battery causing great bodily harm is subject to enhancement under section 775.087(1), while the offense of aggravated battery with a deadly weapon is not. | 2 | 3 |
Harrell v. Stategreen2 sentences2024During the course of the crime committed, did the Defendant, LATEEF GARNES, actually discharge a firearm, and in doing so cause great bodily harm? _X_ Yes or __ No In Hurry v. State, 978 So. 2d 854, 854 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008), the court found that aggravated battery was “independently established by the great bodily harm, and the use of a deadly weapon [was] thus not an essential element of the aggravated battery.” See also Harrell, 150 So. 3d at 862 (“In order to support the enhancement under section 775.087(1), the jury must be given the option of finding the defendant guilty of aggravated batt 2024Thus, “the crime of aggravated battery causing great bodily harm is subject to enhancement under section 775.087(1) while the crime of aggravated battery with a deadly weapon is not.” Harrell v. State, 150 So. 3d 858, 862 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (citing Lareau v. State, 573 So. 2d 813, 815 (Fla. 1991)). | 2 | 2 |
Hurry v. Stategreen2 sentences2024During the course of the crime committed, did the Defendant, LATEEF GARNES, actually discharge a firearm, and in doing so cause great bodily harm? _X_ Yes or __ No In Hurry v. State, 978 So. 2d 854, 854 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008), the court found that aggravated battery was “independently established by the great bodily harm, and the use of a deadly weapon [was] thus not an essential element of the aggravated battery.” See also Harrell, 150 So. 3d at 862 (“In order to support the enhancement under section 775.087(1), the jury must be given the option of finding the defendant guilty of aggravated batt 2019See Hurry v. State, 978 So. 2d 854 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (affirming the reclassification of an aggravated battery conviction where it was clear from the verdict that the offense of aggravated battery was independently established by proof of great bodily harm and therefore the use of a weapon was not an essential element of the offense); Harrell v. State, 150 So. 3d 858, 862 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (“In order to support the enhancement under section 775.087(1), the jury must be given the option of finding the defendant guilty of aggravated battery with great bodily harm without also finding the defen | 2 | 2 |
Postell v. Stategreen2 sentences2015“This court has previously ruled that “the enhancement provisions of section 775.087(1), Florida Statutes (1977), . . . requires that the defendant personally possess the weapon during the commission of the crime involved.” Id. at 1190 (citing to Postell v. State, 383 So. 2d 1159, 1162 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)) (emphasis supplied). 85 enhancement provision of subsection 775.087(1), Florida Statutes (1983), extend to persons who do not actually possess the weapon but who commit an overt act in furtherance of its use by a coperpetrator?” Id. at 1271 . 2015This court has previously ruled that “the enhancement provisions of section 775.087(1), Florida Statutes (1977), ... requires that the defendant personally possess the weapon during the commission of the crime involved.” Id. at 1190 (citing to Postell v. State, 383 So.2d 1159, 1162 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)) (emphasis supplied). . | 2 | 2 |
State v. Rodriguezgreen2 sentences2015See State v. Rodriguez, 602 So.2d 1270, 1272 (Fla.1992). 1995NOTES [1] § 812.13(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1993). [2] See Poiteer v. State, 627 So.2d 526 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); Freeny v. State, 621 So.2d 505 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993). [3] See also State v. Rodriguez, 602 So.2d 1270 (Fla. 1992) (defendant's sentence could not be enhanced under section 775.087(1) where a passenger in the car picked up a gun and shot at police and the defendant did not have actual possession of the weapon); Willingham v. State, 541 So.2d 1240 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. denied, 548 So.2d 663 (Fla. 1989) (where sale of cocaine was completed before the defendant seized a gun and began shooting, he d | 1 | 2 |
Freeny v. Stategreen2 sentences2015See Freeny v. State, 621 So.2d 505, 506 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993) (confirming that to warrant imposition of enhancement under section 775.087 “the state must prove that the defendant had actual physical possession of the weapon”). 1995NOTES [1] § 812.13(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1993). [2] See Poiteer v. State, 627 So.2d 526 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); Freeny v. State, 621 So.2d 505 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993). [3] See also State v. Rodriguez, 602 So.2d 1270 (Fla. 1992) (defendant's sentence could not be enhanced under section 775.087(1) where a passenger in the car picked up a gun and shot at police and the defendant did not have actual possession of the weapon); Willingham v. State, 541 So.2d 1240 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. denied, 548 So.2d 663 (Fla. 1989) (where sale of cocaine was completed before the defendant seized a gun and began shooting, he d | 1 | 2 |
Tucker v. Stategreen2 sentences2011Because not all permanent disabilities and permanent disfigurements fall within the definition of “great bodily harm,” we cannot conclude that the jury found that Johnson’s discharge of a firearm caused great bodily harm. 2 Tucker v. State, 726 So.2d 768 (Fla.1999) (enhancement of sentence under section 775.087(1) must be supported by jury finding). 2003See Tucker v. State, 726 So.2d 768 (Fla.1999); State v. Hargrove, 694 So.2d 729 (Fla.1997); State v. Tripp, 642 So.2d 728 (Fla.1994); State v. Overfelt, 457 So.2d 1385 (Fla.1984). | 1 | 2 |
Willingham v. Stategreen2 sentences1995NOTES [1] § 812.13(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (1993). [2] See Poiteer v. State, 627 So.2d 526 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); Freeny v. State, 621 So.2d 505 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993). [3] See also State v. Rodriguez, 602 So.2d 1270 (Fla. 1992) (defendant's sentence could not be enhanced under section 775.087(1) where a passenger in the car picked up a gun and shot at police and the defendant did not have actual possession of the weapon); Willingham v. State, 541 So.2d 1240 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. denied, 548 So.2d 663 (Fla. 1989) (where sale of cocaine was completed before the defendant seized a gun and began shooting, he d 1992See also Willingham v. State, 541 So.2d 1240 (Fla. 2d DCA), review denied, 548 So.2d 663 (Fla. 1989); Ngai v. State, 556 So.2d 1130 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). | 1 | 2 |
State v. McKinnongreen2 sentences1992Nonetheless, we must conclude that, under State v. McKinnon, 540 So.2d 111 (Fla. 1989), a post- Carawan, pre-July 1, 1988, case, a defendant can be convicted of both aggravated battery and robbery. 1990In State v. McKinnon, 540 So.2d 111, 112-113 (Fla. 1989), the Florida Supreme Court ruled that enhancement under Section 775.087(1)(b) (use of a firearm) was error, holding: Webster McKinnon was charged with second-degree murder (count I) and display or use of a firearm during the commission of a felony (count II) for the shooting death of a patron at a bar that is owned and operated by McKinnon. | 1 | 2 |
Freudenberger v. Stategreen1 sentence2026See Freudenberger v. State, 940 So. 2d 551, 555 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006). | 1 | 1 |
Stoute v. Stategreen2 sentences2024“In order to support the enhancement under section 775.087(1), the jury must be given the option of finding the defendant guilty of aggravated battery with great bodily harm without also finding the defendant guilty of aggravated battery with a deadly weapon.” Id.; see also Stoute, 915 So. 2d at 1248 . 2024“In order to support the enhancement under section 775.087(1), the jury must be given the option of finding the defendant guilty of aggravated battery with great bodily harm without also finding the defendant guilty of aggravated battery with a deadly weapon.” Id.; see also Stoute, 915 So. 2d at 1248 . | 1 | 1 |
Cabral v. Stategreen1 sentence2019In Cabral v. State, 944 So. 2d 1026, 1027 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006), this Court held that when “it is unclear whether appellant was found guilty of aggravated battery based on great bodily harm or the use of a deadly weapon, enhancement of his sentence for the use of a deadly weapon pursuant to section 775.087(1), Florida Statutes, was not permissible.” See Frasier v. State, 132 So. 3d 365 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (holding that because the jury returned a verdict finding the defendant guilty of aggravated battery causing permanent disability, permanent disfigurement, or great bodily harm and with a deadl | 1 | 1 |
Kishon Larhame Birch v. State of Floridagreen1 sentence2019However, “[t]he sentence enhancement created in section 775.087(1) is not itself a substantive offense or an element of any underlying offense.” Birch v. State, 248 So. 3d 1213, 1219 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018). | 1 | 1 |
Miller v. Stategreen1 sentence2017Miller v. State, 838 So.2d 644, 644 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003); Johnson v. State, 855 So.2d 218, 222 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003); Bundrage v. State, 814 So.2d 1133, 1135 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. Stategreen1 sentence2017Miller v. State, 838 So.2d 644, 644 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003); Johnson v. State, 855 So.2d 218, 222 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003); Bundrage v. State, 814 So.2d 1133, 1135 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). | 1 | 1 |
Young v. Stategreen2 sentences2015See generally Young v. State, 86 So.3d 541, 543 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012) (recognizing Section 775.087(2) to be an enhancement statute by noting that "in order for a court to enhance a defendant’s sentence based on section 775.087(2), the grounds for the enhancement must be clearly charged in the information”). . 2015However, this court denied Yegge's additionally requested relief regarding the minimum mandatory enhancement to Yegge's sentence, observing that "[a] youthful offender who commits a substantive violation of probation can be sentenced to the maximum sentence allowable for the original offense" and that "the six-year limitation applicable to youthful offender sentences no longer applies." Id. at 1059 (emphasis omitted) (citing § 958.14, Fla. Stat. (2007), which provides that "no youthful offender shall be committed to the custody of the department 1 See generally Young v. State, 86 So. 3d 541, 5 | 1 | 1 |
Yegge v. Stategreen2 sentences2015Accordingly, this court concluded that because the maximum sentence for armed burglary under section 810.02(2)(b), Florida Statutes (2002), is life and the six-year cap for the originally imposed youthful offender sentence under section 958.04 no longer applied, Yegge's ten-year sentence, including the minimum mandatory designation, was within the allowable sentencing range and was legal. 88 So. 3d at 1059 . 2015However, this court denied Yegge's additionally requested relief regarding the minimum mandatory enhancement to Yegge's sentence, observing that "[a] youthful offender who commits a substantive violation of probation can be sentenced to the maximum sentence allowable for the original offense" and that "the six-year limitation applicable to youthful offender sentences no longer applies." Id. at 1059 (emphasis omitted) (citing § 958.14, Fla. Stat. (2007), which provides that "no youthful offender shall be committed to the custody of the department 1 See generally Young v. State, 86 So. 3d 541, 5 | 1 | 1 |
Lee v. Stategreen1 sentence2014See Lee v. State, 130 So.3d 707, 710 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) (addressing an enhancement under section 775.087(2)(a)(3), Florida Statutes (1999), which requires a sentence of twenty-five years to life where the defendant “discharged” a firearm or destructive device and as a result, the victim suffered “death or great bodily harm”). | 1 | 1 |
Jackson v. Stategreen2 sentences2009See id. (citing Jackson, 852 So.2d 941 ; Gibbs, 623 So.2d 551 ). 2009See id. | 1 | 1 |
Bradley v. Stategreen1 sentence2009See Bradley, 971 So.2d at 961 . | 1 | 1 |
Gibbs v. Stategreen2 sentences2009See id. (citing Jackson, 852 So.2d 941 ; Gibbs, 623 So.2d 551 ). 2009See id. (citing Jackson, 852 So.2d 941 ; Gibbs, 623 So.2d 551 ). | 1 | 1 |
| Strickland v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Matthews v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gonzalez v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Stafford v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Watson v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| Menendez v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Overfelt
green
2 sentences2004And, pursuant to the supreme court's decision in State v. Overfelt, 457 So.2d 1385 (Fla.1984), the determination would require a jury finding. 2003See Tucker v. State, 726 So.2d 768 (Fla.1999); State v. Hargrove, 694 So.2d 729 (Fla.1997); State v. Tripp, 642 So.2d 728 (Fla.1994); State v. Overfelt, 457 So.2d 1385 (Fla.1984). | 5 | 1985–2004 |
State v. Rodriguez
green
2 sentences2015“This court has previously ruled that “the enhancement provisions of section 775.087(1), Florida Statutes (1977), . . . requires that the defendant personally possess the weapon during the commission of the crime involved.” Id. at 1190 (citing to Postell v. State, 383 So. 2d 1159, 1162 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)) (emphasis supplied). 85 enhancement provision of subsection 775.087(1), Florida Statutes (1983), extend to persons who do not actually possess the weapon but who commit an overt act in furtherance of its use by a coperpetrator?” Id. at 1271 . 2015This court has previously ruled that “the enhancement provisions of section 775.087(1), Florida Statutes (1977), ... requires that the defendant personally possess the weapon during the commission of the crime involved.” Id. at 1190 (citing to Postell v. State, 383 So.2d 1159, 1162 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980)) (emphasis supplied). . | 2 | 1992–2015 |
Bryant v. State
green
2 sentences2010Bundrage v. State, 814 So.2d 1133 , 1135 n. 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (“An information does not have to refer to section 775.087 for the enhancement to apply, see Bryant v. State, 386 So.2d 237 (Fla.1980), as long as it alleges the use of a firearm, see Staton v. State, 636 So.2d 844 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994).”). 2002NOTES [1] An information does not have to refer to section 775.087 for the enhancement to apply, see Bryant v. State, 386 So.2d 237 (Fla.1980), as long as it alleges the use of a firearm, see Staton v. State, 636 So.2d 844 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994). | 2 | 2002–2010 |
Staton v. State
green
2 sentences2010Bundrage v. State, 814 So.2d 1133 , 1135 n. 1 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) (“An information does not have to refer to section 775.087 for the enhancement to apply, see Bryant v. State, 386 So.2d 237 (Fla.1980), as long as it alleges the use of a firearm, see Staton v. State, 636 So.2d 844 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994).”). 2002NOTES [1] An information does not have to refer to section 775.087 for the enhancement to apply, see Bryant v. State, 386 So.2d 237 (Fla.1980), as long as it alleges the use of a firearm, see Staton v. State, 636 So.2d 844 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994). | 2 | 2002–2010 |
Timothy Donald Helton v. State of Florida
neutral
1 sentence2019In Cabral v. State, 944 So. 2d 1026, 1027 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006), this Court held that when “it is unclear whether appellant was found guilty of aggravated battery based on great bodily harm or the use of a deadly weapon, enhancement of his sentence for the use of a deadly weapon pursuant to section 775.087(1), Florida Statutes, was not permissible.” See Frasier v. State, 132 So. 3d 365 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (holding that because the jury returned a verdict finding the defendant guilty of aggravated battery causing permanent disability, permanent disfigurement, or great bodily harm and with a deadl | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Frasier v. State
neutral
1 sentence2019In Cabral v. State, 944 So. 2d 1026, 1027 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006), this Court held that when “it is unclear whether appellant was found guilty of aggravated battery based on great bodily harm or the use of a deadly weapon, enhancement of his sentence for the use of a deadly weapon pursuant to section 775.087(1), Florida Statutes, was not permissible.” See Frasier v. State, 132 So. 3d 365 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014) (holding that because the jury returned a verdict finding the defendant guilty of aggravated battery causing permanent disability, permanent disfigurement, or great bodily harm and with a deadl | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Wooten
green
2 sentences2015In Wooten, 782 So.2d 408 , the State challenged Wooten’s sentence on direct appeal, arguing that the trial court erred in not applying the 10/20/Life enhancement to the youthful offender sentence imposed. 2015In Wooten, 782 So. 2d 408 , the State challenged Wooten's sentence on direct appeal, arguing that the trial court erred in not applying the 10/20/Life enhancement to the youthful offender sentence imposed. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Webb v. State
green
1 sentence2014Id. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| State v. Hargrove green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| State v. Tripp green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Poiteer v. State green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Webb v. State green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Webster v. State green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Ngai v. State green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Carawan v. State red | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Smith v. State green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Hamilton v. State neutral | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Williams v. State green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Green v. Bruns green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Congregation Temple De Hirsch v. Aronson green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.