section 9-11-68 award of attorney fees in Georgia

2025See Bloomfield, 313 Ga. App. at 183 (2) (affirming trial court’s decision not to award attorney fees under OCGA § 9-11-68).

2025Compare Bloomfield, 313 Ga. App. at 182 (2) (affirming trial court’s denial of attorney fees under OCGA § 9-11-68 on the ground that defendant’s initial $25,000 offer of judgment in wrongful death case was not made in good faith based in part on the fact that the defendant later made a second offer of judgment for $1 million). 5 In its brief, Tech M relies on Cohen, supra, for the assertion that Georgia courts have found offers far below the claimed damages to be in good faith.

2025In addition, the party seeking fees must also introduce evidence of hours, rates, or some other indication of the value of the professional services actually rendered.” (Citation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Ga. Dept. of Corrections v. Couch, 295 Ga. 469, 483 (3) ( 759 SE2d 804 ) (2014), quoting Brock Built, LLC v. Blake, 316 Ga. App. 710, 714-715 ( 730 SE2d 180 ) (2012). 5 The above language shows that Graham’s second expert was incorrect to assert that a percentage specified in a contingency fee agreement has “nothing to do” with proving a proper and reasonable fee under OCGA § 9-11-68: on t

2025In addition, the party seeking fees must also introduce evidence of hours, rates, or some other indication of the value of the professional services actually rendered.” (Citation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Ga. Dept. of Corrections v. Couch, 295 Ga. 469, 483 (3) ( 759 SE2d 804 ) (2014), quoting Brock Built, LLC v. Blake, 316 Ga. App. 710, 714-715 ( 730 SE2d 180 ) (2012). 5 The above language shows that Graham’s second expert was incorrect to assert that a percentage specified in a contingency fee agreement has “nothing to do” with proving a proper and reasonable fee under OCGA § 9-11-68: on t

2023See, e.g., Eichenblatt v. Piedmont/Maple, LLC, 358 Ga. App. 234 , 235 ( 854 SE2d 572 ) (2021) (direct appeal from an award of attorney fees under OCGA § 9-11-68 exceeding $10,000).

2023See, e.g., Eichenblatt v. Piedmont/Maple, LLC, 358 Ga. App. 234 , 235 ( 854 SE2d 572 ) (2021) (direct appeal from an award of attorney fees under OCGA § 9-11-68 exceeding $10,000).

2025In addition, the party seeking fees must also introduce evidence of hours, rates, or some other indication of the value of the professional services actually rendered.” (Citation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Ga. Dept. of Corrections v. Couch, 295 Ga. 469, 483 (3) ( 759 SE2d 804 ) (2014), quoting Brock Built, LLC v. Blake, 316 Ga. App. 710, 714-715 ( 730 SE2d 180 ) (2012). 5 The above language shows that Graham’s second expert was incorrect to assert that a percentage specified in a contingency fee agreement has “nothing to do” with proving a proper and reasonable fee under OCGA § 9-11-68: on t

2025In addition, the party seeking fees must also introduce evidence of hours, rates, or some other indication of the value of the professional services actually rendered.” (Citation omitted; emphasis supplied.) Ga. Dept. of Corrections v. Couch, 295 Ga. 469, 483 (3) ( 759 SE2d 804 ) (2014), quoting Brock Built, LLC v. Blake, 316 Ga. App. 710, 714-715 ( 730 SE2d 180 ) (2012). 5 The above language shows that Graham’s second expert was incorrect to assert that a percentage specified in a contingency fee agreement has “nothing to do” with proving a proper and reasonable fee under OCGA § 9-11-68: on t

2023See Strategic Law LLC v. Pain Managment & Wellness Centers of GA, LLC et al., 343 Ga. App. 444 , ( 806 SE2d 880 ) (2017) (reversing and remanding to the trial court for it to reconsider plaintiff’s claim for attorney fees under OCGA § 9-11-68 when the case ended in a consent judgment, but originated with a lawsuit).

2023See Strategic Law LLC v. Pain Managment & Wellness Centers of GA, LLC et al., 343 Ga. App. 444 , ( 806 SE2d 880 ) (2017) (reversing and remanding to the trial court for it to reconsider plaintiff’s claim for attorney fees under OCGA § 9-11-68 when the case ended in a consent judgment, but originated with a lawsuit).

2025Compare Bloomfield, 313 Ga. App. at 182 (2) (affirming trial court’s denial of attorney fees under OCGA § 9-11-68 on the ground that defendant’s initial $25,000 offer of judgment in wrongful death case was not made in good faith based in part on the fact that the defendant later made a second offer of judgment for $1 million). 5 In its brief, Tech M relies on Cohen, supra, for the assertion that Georgia courts have found offers far below the claimed damages to be in good faith.

2013Great West Casualty Co. v. Bloomfield, 313 Ga. App. 180, 183 ( 721 SE2d 173 ) (2011); Cohen, 310 Ga. App. at 763 .

2018On appeal, the OCGA § 9-11-68 attorney fee award was reversed because the offeror did not generally identify which of the offeree's claims were to be resolved.). 34 Richardson , 339 Ga. App. at 462 , 793 S.E.2d 640 . 35 Id. (punctuation omitted). 36 The record shows that the Appellees had separate counsel for their counterclaims, including separate billing records. 37 See generally, Ga. Dept. of Corrections v. Couch , 295 Ga. 469 , 483-484 (3) (a), 759 S.E.2d 804 (2014) (The Appellant contested the reasonableness of the attorney fees awarded under OCGA § 9-11-68 (b).). 1 See Fla. Stat. § 768.7

2018On appeal, the OCGA § 9-11-68 attorney fee award was reversed because the offeror did not generally identify which of the offeree's claims were to be resolved.). 34 Richardson , 339 Ga. App. at 462 , 793 S.E.2d 640 . 35 Id. (punctuation omitted). 36 The record shows that the Appellees had separate counsel for their counterclaims, including separate billing records. 37 See generally, Ga. Dept. of Corrections v. Couch , 295 Ga. 469 , 483-484 (3) (a), 759 S.E.2d 804 (2014) (The Appellant contested the reasonableness of the attorney fees awarded under OCGA § 9-11-68 (b).). 1 See Fla. Stat. § 768.7

2025See, e.g., Anglin v. Smith, 358 Ga. App. 38 ( 853 SE2d 142 ) (2020).

2025See, e.g., Anglin v. Smith, 358 Ga. App. 38 ( 853 SE2d 142 ) (2020).

2025See Cajun Contractors, 360 Ga. App. at 408 (2) (c) (affirming trial court’s award of fees under OCGA § 9-11-68 when the amount was reduced from that owed under the contingency fee agreement but still “within the range of the evidence”); Khalia, Inc. v. Rosebud, 353 Ga. App. 350 , 356 (3) ( 836 SE2d 840 ) (2019) (physical precedent only) 8 (affirming a trial court’s award of fees under OCGA § 9-11-68 when there was “some evidence” before the court to support that award, even though it was substantially less than the amount provided in the plaintiff’s contingency fee agreement).

2025Sub, LLC, 360 Ga. App. 390 , 402 (2) ( 861 SE2d 222 ) (2021), but “[a]n abuse of discretion occurs where a ruling . . . misapplies the relevant law.” Bellomo v. Tech Mahindra (Ams.), Inc., 374 Ga. App. 199 , 201 (1) ( 912 SE2d 82 ) (2025) (punctuation omitted). 5 OCGA § 9-11-68(b)(2) provides: If a plaintiff makes an offer of settlement which is rejected by the defendant and the plaintiff recovers a final judgment in an amount greater than 125 percent of such offer of settlement, the plaintiff shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation incurred by the pl

2025GBJ argues that the trial court erred by awarding Keel $1,820,000 in attorney fees pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-68 (b) (2).5 Section 9-11-68 (b) (2) “provides a sanction in the form of attorney fees and litigation expenses incurred after the failure to accept what the statute defines as a reasonable settlement offer.”Junior v. Graham, 313 Ga. 420 , 420 ( 870 SE2d 378 ) (2022).

2025GBJ argues that the trial court erred by awarding Keel $1,820,000 in attorney fees pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-68 (b) (2).5 Section 9-11-68 (b) (2) “provides a sanction in the form of attorney fees and litigation expenses incurred after the failure to accept what the statute defines as a reasonable settlement offer.”Junior v. Graham, 313 Ga. 420 , 420 ( 870 SE2d 378 ) (2022).

2026Any remedy for this hardship must be addressed by the legislature.” Cancel, 356 Ga. App. at 532(1)(b).

2026Cancel, 356 Ga. App. at 531(1).6 5 For example, OCGA § 9-15-14, which provides a different sanction for litigation conduct, states that a party seeking attorney fees must file a motion for such fees no later than 45 days after the final disposition of the action.

2025On appeal from an OCGA § 9-11-68 fee award, we review de novo whether the trial court properly interpreted and applied the statute.3 When interpreting a statute, “we must presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it 3 Tiller v. RJJB Assoc., 331 Ga. App. 622, 623 ( 770 SE2d 883 ) (2015); see Hill v. First Atlantic Bank, 323 Ga. App. 731, 732 ( 747 SE2d 892 ) (2013) (statutory construction is a legal issue that we address de novo). 4 meant.”4 Thus, absent clear evidence that the legislature intended a contrary meaning (as reflected in the relevant statutory text), “we as

2025On appeal from an OCGA § 9-11-68 fee award, we review de novo whether the trial court properly interpreted and applied the statute.3 When interpreting a statute, “we must presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it 3 Tiller v. RJJB Assoc., 331 Ga. App. 622, 623 ( 770 SE2d 883 ) (2015); see Hill v. First Atlantic Bank, 323 Ga. App. 731, 732 ( 747 SE2d 892 ) (2013) (statutory construction is a legal issue that we address de novo). 4 meant.”4 Thus, absent clear evidence that the legislature intended a contrary meaning (as reflected in the relevant statutory text), “we as

2025See also Coastal Bank, 363 Ga. App. at 630-631.

2025On appeal from an OCGA § 9-11-68 fee award, we review de novo whether the trial court properly interpreted and applied the statute.3 When interpreting a statute, “we must presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it 3 Tiller v. RJJB Assoc., 331 Ga. App. 622, 623 ( 770 SE2d 883 ) (2015); see Hill v. First Atlantic Bank, 323 Ga. App. 731, 732 ( 747 SE2d 892 ) (2013) (statutory construction is a legal issue that we address de novo). 4 meant.”4 Thus, absent clear evidence that the legislature intended a contrary meaning (as reflected in the relevant statutory text), “we as

2025On appeal from an OCGA § 9-11-68 fee award, we review de novo whether the trial court properly interpreted and applied the statute.3 When interpreting a statute, “we must presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it 3 Tiller v. RJJB Assoc., 331 Ga. App. 622, 623 ( 770 SE2d 883 ) (2015); see Hill v. First Atlantic Bank, 323 Ga. App. 731, 732 ( 747 SE2d 892 ) (2013) (statutory construction is a legal issue that we address de novo). 4 meant.”4 Thus, absent clear evidence that the legislature intended a contrary meaning (as reflected in the relevant statutory text), “we as

2025As set forth above, “a party’s reasonable and correct determination that its exposure is minimal, and its offer to settle the matter for a nominal value, does not require a finding that its offer was made in bad faith.” Hillman, 347 Ga. App. at 656-657 (2) (a) (affirming award of attorney fees under OCGA § 9-11-68, and rejecting plaintiffs’ claim that the offer of settlement was too low and made after only rudimentary paper discovery).

2025On appeal from an OCGA § 9-11-68 fee award, we review de novo whether the trial court properly interpreted and applied the statute.3 When interpreting a statute, “we must presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it 3 Tiller v. RJJB Assoc., 331 Ga. App. 622, 623 ( 770 SE2d 883 ) (2015); see Hill v. First Atlantic Bank, 323 Ga. App. 731, 732 ( 747 SE2d 892 ) (2013) (statutory construction is a legal issue that we address de novo). 4 meant.”4 Thus, absent clear evidence that the legislature intended a contrary meaning (as reflected in the relevant statutory text), “we as

2025On appeal from an OCGA § 9-11-68 fee award, we review de novo whether the trial court properly interpreted and applied the statute.3 When interpreting a statute, “we must presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it 3 Tiller v. RJJB Assoc., 331 Ga. App. 622, 623 ( 770 SE2d 883 ) (2015); see Hill v. First Atlantic Bank, 323 Ga. App. 731, 732 ( 747 SE2d 892 ) (2013) (statutory construction is a legal issue that we address de novo). 4 meant.”4 Thus, absent clear evidence that the legislature intended a contrary meaning (as reflected in the relevant statutory text), “we as

2025See generally Vourvoulias v. Cash, 372 Ga. App. 148 , 150 ( 904 SE2d 6 ) (2024).

2025See generally Vourvoulias v. Cash, 372 Ga. App. 148 , 150 ( 904 SE2d 6 ) (2024).

2025It is well-settled that “[w]hen the trial court sits as the trier of facts, it is presumed that the court separated admissible evidence and selected only the legal evidence in forming its judgment.” See HWA Props., Inc. v. Community & Southern Bank, 320 Ga. App. 334, 335 ( 739 SE2d 770 ) (2013).

2025It is well-settled that “[w]hen the trial court sits as the trier of facts, it is presumed that the court separated admissible evidence and selected only the legal evidence in forming its judgment.” See HWA Props., Inc. v. Community & Southern Bank, 320 Ga. App. 334, 335 ( 739 SE2d 770 ) (2013).

2025On appeal from an OCGA § 9-11-68 fee award, we review de novo whether the trial court properly interpreted and applied the statute.3 When interpreting a statute, “we must presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it 3 Tiller v. RJJB Assoc., 331 Ga. App. 622, 623 ( 770 SE2d 883 ) (2015); see Hill v. First Atlantic Bank, 323 Ga. App. 731, 732 ( 747 SE2d 892 ) (2013) (statutory construction is a legal issue that we address de novo). 4 meant.”4 Thus, absent clear evidence that the legislature intended a contrary meaning (as reflected in the relevant statutory text), “we as

2025On appeal from an OCGA § 9-11-68 fee award, we review de novo whether the trial court properly interpreted and applied the statute.3 When interpreting a statute, “we must presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it 3 Tiller v. RJJB Assoc., 331 Ga. App. 622, 623 ( 770 SE2d 883 ) (2015); see Hill v. First Atlantic Bank, 323 Ga. App. 731, 732 ( 747 SE2d 892 ) (2013) (statutory construction is a legal issue that we address de novo). 4 meant.”4 Thus, absent clear evidence that the legislature intended a contrary meaning (as reflected in the relevant statutory text), “we as

2025This means that the offer must sufficiently identify the claim or group or category of claims that the proposal covers.”11 8 OCGA § 9-11-68 (d) (1); Anglin v. Smith, 358 Ga. App. 38 , 39 ( 853 SE2d 142 ) (2020). 9 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Eichenblatt v. Piedmont/Maple, LLC, 358 Ga. App. 234 , 237 (1) ( 854 SE2d 572 ) (2021). 10 OCGA § 9-11-68 (a) (2)-(3). 11 (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Eichenblatt, 358 Ga. App. at 239 (1) (holding that an offer was ambiguous because it was “internally inconsistent as to the scope of the claims it sought to resolve”); accord CaseMetrix v. Sh

2025This means that the offer must sufficiently identify the claim or group or category of claims that the proposal covers.”11 8 OCGA § 9-11-68 (d) (1); Anglin v. Smith, 358 Ga. App. 38 , 39 ( 853 SE2d 142 ) (2020). 9 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Eichenblatt v. Piedmont/Maple, LLC, 358 Ga. App. 234 , 237 (1) ( 854 SE2d 572 ) (2021). 10 OCGA § 9-11-68 (a) (2)-(3). 11 (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Eichenblatt, 358 Ga. App. at 239 (1) (holding that an offer was ambiguous because it was “internally inconsistent as to the scope of the claims it sought to resolve”); accord CaseMetrix v. Sh

2025See, e.g., Lyons v. Lyons, 244 Ga. 619 ( 261 SE2d 395 ) (1979) (reversing judgment awarding husband exclusive possession and title of property and 36 remanding to reconsider issue of attorney fees in favor of wife); Price, 372 Ga. App. at 431 (2), n.5 (noting that attorney fee award under OCGA § 13-6-11 is subject to apportionment under OCGA § 51-12-33); Gibson-Wright v. Smith, 370 Ga. App. 860 , 866 (2) (b) ( 896 SE2d 907 ) (2024) (vacating trial court’s denial of appellant’s claim for attorney fees under OCGA § 9-15-14, and remanding the issue for reconsideration in light of determination th

2025See, e.g., Lyons v. Lyons, 244 Ga. 619 ( 261 SE2d 395 ) (1979) (reversing judgment awarding husband exclusive possession and title of property and 36 remanding to reconsider issue of attorney fees in favor of wife); Price, 372 Ga. App. at 431 (2), n.5 (noting that attorney fee award under OCGA § 13-6-11 is subject to apportionment under OCGA § 51-12-33); Gibson-Wright v. Smith, 370 Ga. App. 860 , 866 (2) (b) ( 896 SE2d 907 ) (2024) (vacating trial court’s denial of appellant’s claim for attorney fees under OCGA § 9-15-14, and remanding the issue for reconsideration in light of determination th

2025See, e.g., Lyons v. Lyons, 244 Ga. 619 ( 261 SE2d 395 ) (1979) (reversing judgment awarding husband exclusive possession and title of property and 36 remanding to reconsider issue of attorney fees in favor of wife); Price, 372 Ga. App. at 431 (2), n.5 (noting that attorney fee award under OCGA § 13-6-11 is subject to apportionment under OCGA § 51-12-33); Gibson-Wright v. Smith, 370 Ga. App. 860 , 866 (2) (b) ( 896 SE2d 907 ) (2024) (vacating trial court’s denial of appellant’s claim for attorney fees under OCGA § 9-15-14, and remanding the issue for reconsideration in light of determination th

2025See e. g., Alston & Bird, LLP v. Hatcher, 312 Ga. 350, 350 ( 862 SE2d 295 ) (2021) (“when we interpret unambiguous statutory text that appears not to serve the purpose we imagine the statute to have, we must follow the path of the text, not the apparently different path of the ‘purpose’”), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized by Deaton Holdings, Inc. v. Reid, 367 Ga. App. 746 , 748 n.3 ( 888 SE2d 333 ) (2023). 2.

2025See e. g., Alston & Bird, LLP v. Hatcher, 312 Ga. 350, 350 ( 862 SE2d 295 ) (2021) (“when we interpret unambiguous statutory text that appears not to serve the purpose we imagine the statute to have, we must follow the path of the text, not the apparently different path of the ‘purpose’”), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized by Deaton Holdings, Inc. v. Reid, 367 Ga. App. 746 , 748 n.3 ( 888 SE2d 333 ) (2023). 2.