section 200 alleged violation in New York

2011The defendant made a prima facie showing that the accident was caused by the manner in which the injured plaintiff performed his work, and that it did not have the authority to supervise or control the performance of his work (see Erickson v Cross Ready Mix, Inc., 75 AD3d 519, 522-523 [2010]; McFadden v Lee, 62 AD3d 966, 967 [2009]; Ortega v Puccia, 57 AD3d 54, 61 [2008]).

2010Finally, the homeowners were entitled to summary judgment dismissing the cause of action which alleged a violation of Labor Law § 200 insofar as asserted "against them (see Ortega v Puccia, 57 AD3d at 62-63; Arama v Fruchter, 39 AD3d at 679 ; Ferrero v Best Modular Homes, Inc., 33 AD3d at 850-851 ).

2013As for the defendants Recine Material Corp. (hereinafter Recine) and PMC Rebar, Inc. (hereinafter PMC), both of which were subcontractors on the project, “ ‘Labor Law §§ 200, 240, and 241 liability cannot be assessed against a subcontractor who did not control the work that caused the plaintiffs injury’ ” (Kelarakos v Massapequa Water Dist., 38 AD3d 717, 718 [2007], quoting Zervos v City of New York, 8 AD3d 477, 481 [2004]; see Russin v Louis N. Picciano & Son, 54 NY2d 311 [1981]).

2013As for the defendants Recine Material Corp. (hereinafter Recine) and PMC Rebar, Inc. (hereinafter PMC), both of which were subcontractors on the project, “ ‘Labor Law §§ 200, 240, and 241 liability cannot be assessed against a subcontractor who did not control the work that caused the plaintiffs injury’ ” (Kelarakos v Massapequa Water Dist., 38 AD3d 717, 718 [2007], quoting Zervos v City of New York, 8 AD3d 477, 481 [2004]; see Russin v Louis N. Picciano & Son, 54 NY2d 311 [1981]).

2023Further, plaintiff has premised her Labor Law § 215 claim on defendant's alleged violation of Labor Law § 200, "which codifies the common-law duty of an owner or employer to provide employees with a safe place to work" ( Jock v Fien , 80 NY2d 965, 967 [1992]).

2023Further, plaintiff has premised her Labor Law § 215 claim on defendant's alleged violation of Labor Law § 200, "which codifies the common-law duty of an owner or employer to provide employees with a safe place to work" ( Jock v Fien , 80 NY2d 965, 967 [1992]).

2013As for the defendants Recine Material Corp. (hereinafter Recine) and PMC Rebar, Inc. (hereinafter PMC), both of which were subcontractors on the project, “ ‘Labor Law §§ 200, 240, and 241 liability cannot be assessed against a subcontractor who did not control the work that caused the plaintiffs injury’ ” (Kelarakos v Massapequa Water Dist., 38 AD3d 717, 718 [2007], quoting Zervos v City of New York, 8 AD3d 477, 481 [2004]; see Russin v Louis N. Picciano & Son, 54 NY2d 311 [1981]).

2013As for the defendants Recine Material Corp. (hereinafter Recine) and PMC Rebar, Inc. (hereinafter PMC), both of which were subcontractors on the project, “ ‘Labor Law §§ 200, 240, and 241 liability cannot be assessed against a subcontractor who did not control the work that caused the plaintiffs injury’ ” (Kelarakos v Massapequa Water Dist., 38 AD3d 717, 718 [2007], quoting Zervos v City of New York, 8 AD3d 477, 481 [2004]; see Russin v Louis N. Picciano & Son, 54 NY2d 311 [1981]).

2013Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of Donadic’s cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as alleged a violation of Labor Law § 200 insofar as asserted against it (see Acosta v Hadjigavriel, 18 AD3d 406, 407 [2005]).

2013Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of Donadic’s cross motion which was for summary judgment dismissing so much of the complaint as alleged a violation of Labor Law § 200 insofar as asserted against it (see Acosta v Hadjigavriel, 18 AD3d 406, 407 [2005]).

2013As for the defendants Recine Material Corp. (hereinafter Recine) and PMC Rebar, Inc. (hereinafter PMC), both of which were subcontractors on the project, “ ‘Labor Law §§ 200, 240, and 241 liability cannot be assessed against a subcontractor who did not control the work that caused the plaintiffs injury’ ” (Kelarakos v Massapequa Water Dist., 38 AD3d 717, 718 [2007], quoting Zervos v City of New York, 8 AD3d 477, 481 [2004]; see Russin v Louis N. Picciano & Son, 54 NY2d 311 [1981]).

2013As for the defendants Recine Material Corp. (hereinafter Recine) and PMC Rebar, Inc. (hereinafter PMC), both of which were subcontractors on the project, “ ‘Labor Law §§ 200, 240, and 241 liability cannot be assessed against a subcontractor who did not control the work that caused the plaintiffs injury’ ” (Kelarakos v Massapequa Water Dist., 38 AD3d 717, 718 [2007], quoting Zervos v City of New York, 8 AD3d 477, 481 [2004]; see Russin v Louis N. Picciano & Son, 54 NY2d 311 [1981]).

2011“When a premises condition is at issue, a property owner is liable under Labor Law § 200 when the owner created the dangerous condition causing an injury or when the owner failed to remedy a dangerous or defective condition of which he or she had actual or constructive notice” (Chowdhury v Rodriguez, 57 AD3d 121, 128 [2008]; see Ortega v Puccia, 57 AD3d 54, 61 [2008]).

2008If the defendant did not own the ladder, it could be held liable for common-law negligence and under Labor Law § 200 only if it was shown that the defendant had the authority to supervise or control the performance of the work (see Chowdhury v Rodriguez, 57 AD3d 121 [2008]; Ortega v Puccia, 57 AD3d 54 [2008]).

2011The defendant made a prima facie showing that the accident was caused by the manner in which the injured plaintiff performed his work, and that it did not have the authority to supervise or control the performance of his work (see Erickson v Cross Ready Mix, Inc., 75 AD3d 519, 522-523 [2010]; McFadden v Lee, 62 AD3d 966, 967 [2009]; Ortega v Puccia, 57 AD3d 54, 61 [2008]).

2011Francis Hosp., 78 AD3d at 1125; Erickson v Cross Ready Mix, Inc., 75 AD3d at 522-523 ; Delahaye v Saint Anns School, 40 AD3d 679, 684 [2007]).

2022The parties cross-appeal from the denial of their respective motions. [FN1] "Although both Labor Law § 240 (1) and § 241 impose nondelegable duties upon contractors, owners and their agents to comply with certain safety practices for the protection of workers engaged in various construction-related activities, the Legislature has carved out an exemption for the owners of one[-] and two-family dwellings who contract for but do not direct or control the work" ( Pelham v Moracco, LLC , 172 AD3d 1689 , 1690 [3d Dept 2019] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted]; see Vogler v Per

2017Where, as here, an accident allegedly involves defects in both the premises and the equipment used at the work site, a defendant moving for summary judgment with respect to an alleged violation of Labor Law § 200 is obligated to address the proof applicable to both liability standards (see DiMaggio v Cataletto, 117 AD3d 984, 986 [2014]; Reyes v Arco Wentworth Mgt.

2017Corp., 83 AD3d 47, 52 [2011]).

2014Labor Law §§ 240 (1) and 241 (6), specifically exempt “owners of one and two-family dwellings who contract for but do not direct or control the work.” A determination as to whether the exemption applies in a particular case turns on the nature of the site and the purpose of the work being performed, and must be based on the owner’s intentions at the time of the injury (see Lenda v Breeze Concrete Corp., 73 AD3d 987 [2010]; Allen v Fiori, 277 AD2d 674 [2000]; see also Khela v Neiger, 85 NY2d 333 [1995]).

2014Labor Law § 240 (1) imposes a nondelegable duty upon owners and general contractors and their agents to provide safety devices necessary to protect workers from risks inherent in elevated work sites (see McCarthy v Turner Constr., Inc., 17 NY3d 369, 374 [2011]).

2012Auth., 57 AD3d at 702).

2011The defendant made a prima facie showing that the accident was caused by the manner in which the injured plaintiff performed his work, and that it did not have the authority to supervise or control the performance of his work (see Erickson v Cross Ready Mix, Inc., 75 AD3d 519, 522-523 [2010]; McFadden v Lee, 62 AD3d 966, 967 [2009]; Ortega v Puccia, 57 AD3d 54, 61 [2008]).

2011Francis Hosp., 78 AD3d at 1125; Erickson v Cross Ready Mix, Inc., 75 AD3d at 522-523 ; Delahaye v Saint Anns School, 40 AD3d 679, 684 [2007]).

2011Since the State carried its prima facie burden of demonstrating that it lacked sufficient authority to supervise or control the work and the claimant did not raise a triable issue of fact, the Court of Claims erred in denying that branch of the State’s motion which was for summary judgment dismissing so much of the claim as alleged a violation of Labor Law § 200 (see Gurung v Arnav Retirement Trust, 79 AD3d 969, 970 [2010]; Austin v Consolidated Edison, Inc., 79 AD3d at 684; La Veglia v St.

2011Since the State carried its prima facie burden of demonstrating that it lacked sufficient authority to supervise or control the work and the claimant did not raise a triable issue of fact, the Court of Claims erred in denying that branch of the State’s motion which was for summary judgment dismissing so much of the claim as alleged a violation of Labor Law § 200 (see Gurung v Arnav Retirement Trust, 79 AD3d 969, 970 [2010]; Austin v Consolidated Edison, Inc., 79 AD3d at 684; La Veglia v St.

2011Francis Hosp., 78 AD3d at 1125; Erickson v Cross Ready Mix, Inc., 75 AD3d at 522-523 ; Delahaye v Saint Anns School, 40 AD3d 679, 684 [2007]).