section 9545(b) satisfy the requirements in Pennsylvania

2026Appellant claims his “mental[] impairment and his [previously] being unrepresented by counsel for many years impacted any ability on his part to bring his claims to the attention of the [PCRA c]ourt.” Id. - 14 - Finally, Appellant observes that our Supreme Court, in Commonwealth v. Cruz, 852 A.2d 287 (Pa. 2004) (discussed infra), held that “mental incompetence at the relevant times, if proven, may satisfy the requirements of Section 9545(b)(1)(ii)[.]” Id. at 288 (emphasis in original); see also Appellant’s Brief at 14, 29 (discussing Cruz).

2026Appellant claims his “mental[] impairment and his [previously] being unrepresented by counsel for many years impacted any ability on his part to bring his claims to the attention of the [PCRA c]ourt.” Id. - 14 - Finally, Appellant observes that our Supreme Court, in Commonwealth v. Cruz, 852 A.2d 287 (Pa. 2004) (discussed infra), held that “mental incompetence at the relevant times, if proven, may satisfy the requirements of Section 9545(b)(1)(ii)[.]” Id. at 288 (emphasis in original); see also Appellant’s Brief at 14, 29 (discussing Cruz).

2020Lee, 206 A.3d at 9-11 ; Commonwealth v. Montgomery, 181 A.3d 359, 366-67 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc); Furgess, 149 A.3d at 94 ; Commonwealth v. Lawson, 90 A.3d 1, 6-8 (Pa. Super. 2014). -7- Here, the United States Supreme Court recognized a new constitutional right in Miller, that mandatory life imprisonment without parole is unconstitutional for crimes committed when the defendant was under the age of 18, and held that right retroactive in Montgomery v. Louisiana.

2020Lee, 206 A.3d at 9-11 ; Commonwealth v. Montgomery, 181 A.3d 359, 366-67 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc); Furgess, 149 A.3d at 94 ; Commonwealth v. Lawson, 90 A.3d 1, 6-8 (Pa. Super. 2014). -7- Here, the United States Supreme Court recognized a new constitutional right in Miller, that mandatory life imprisonment without parole is unconstitutional for crimes committed when the defendant was under the age of 18, and held that right retroactive in Montgomery v. Louisiana.

2015See Commonwealth v. Cintora, 69 A.3d 759, 764 (Pa. ____________________________________________ 6 On March 23, 2015, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Montgomery v. Louisiana, 135 S. Ct. 1546 (2015), which again presents the Miller v. Alabama retroactively question.

2014See Commonwealth v. Brandon, 51 A.3d 231, 235 (Pa. Super. 2012) (quotations and citation omitted) (stating “the sixty-day period [for 42 Pa.C.S. 9545(b)(2)] begins to run upon the date of the underlying judicial decision.”). -4- J-S55039-14 In any event, regardless of waiver, no relief would be warranted as we agree with the PCRA court that Hadley cannot satisfy the requirements of Section 9545(b)(1)(iii), since: (1) Miller does not apply to Hadley or excuse the late filing of her most recent petition because she was 22 years old when she committed the underlying murder;8 (2) this Court, in Co

2014See Commonwealth v. Brandon, 51 A.3d 231, 235 (Pa. Super. 2012) (quotations and citation omitted) (stating “the sixty-day period [for 42 Pa.C.S. 9545(b)(2)] begins to run upon the date of the underlying judicial decision.”). -4- J-S55039-14 In any event, regardless of waiver, no relief would be warranted as we agree with the PCRA court that Hadley cannot satisfy the requirements of Section 9545(b)(1)(iii), since: (1) Miller does not apply to Hadley or excuse the late filing of her most recent petition because she was 22 years old when she committed the underlying murder;8 (2) this Court, in Co

2014See also Commonwealth v. Cintora, 69 A.3d 759 (Pa. Super. 2013), appeal denied, 81 A.3d 75 (Pa. 2013) (holding a contention that Miller applies to persons over 18 whose brains were immature at the time of the crime does not bring the matter within the newly recognized constitutional right exception).

2021This timeliness exception applies only where the convicted defendant shows both that he did not know the facts upon which he bases his PCRA petition and that he could not have learned of those facts earlier by the exercise of due diligence. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii); Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 204 A.3d 524, 526 (Pa. Super. 2019); Commonwealth v. Taylor, 933 A.2d 1035, 1040-41 (Pa. Super. 2007).

2020See Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 994 A.2d 1091, 1094 (Pa. 2010) (appellant did not satisfy 11 requirement for time -bar exception where he did not state when he first learned of the facts underlying his PCRA claims); Commonwealth v. Breakiron, 781 A.2d 94, 98 (Pa. 2001) (petition untimely where appellant failed to offer reasonable explanation why, with due diligence, new information could not have been obtained earlier); Commonwealth v. Taylor, 933 A.2d 1035, 1041 (Pa. Super. 2007) (to satisfy requirements of §9545(b)(1)(ii), "[a] petitioner must... explain why his asserted facts could not have b

2020Lee, 206 A.3d at 9-11 ; Commonwealth v. Montgomery, 181 A.3d 359, 366-67 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc); Furgess, 149 A.3d at 94 ; Commonwealth v. Lawson, 90 A.3d 1, 6-8 (Pa. Super. 2014). -7- Here, the United States Supreme Court recognized a new constitutional right in Miller, that mandatory life imprisonment without parole is unconstitutional for crimes committed when the defendant was under the age of 18, and held that right retroactive in Montgomery v. Louisiana.

2020Lee, 206 A.3d at 9-11 ; Commonwealth v. Montgomery, 181 A.3d 359, 366-67 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc); Furgess, 149 A.3d at 94 ; Commonwealth v. Lawson, 90 A.3d 1, 6-8 (Pa. Super. 2014). -7- Here, the United States Supreme Court recognized a new constitutional right in Miller, that mandatory life imprisonment without parole is unconstitutional for crimes committed when the defendant was under the age of 18, and held that right retroactive in Montgomery v. Louisiana.

2014See Commonwealth v. Brandon, 51 A.3d 231, 235 (Pa. Super. 2012) (quotations and citation omitted) (stating “the sixty-day period [for 42 Pa.C.S. 9545(b)(2)] begins to run upon the date of the underlying judicial decision.”). -4- J-S55039-14 In any event, regardless of waiver, no relief would be warranted as we agree with the PCRA court that Hadley cannot satisfy the requirements of Section 9545(b)(1)(iii), since: (1) Miller does not apply to Hadley or excuse the late filing of her most recent petition because she was 22 years old when she committed the underlying murder;8 (2) this Court, in Co

2014As mentioned above, the -8- J-S60006-14 underlying judicial decision. cannot satisfy the requirements of Section 9545(b)(1)(iii) since: (1) Miller does not apply to Chambers because he was not under 18 years of age when he committed the underlying murder;9 and (2) even if Chambers had been under 18 years old when he committed the murder, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 81 A.3d 1, 11 (Pa. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2724 (2014), held that Miller is not retroactive and does not apply to those already serving sentences of life imprisonment.

2021However, “[o]nly under a very limited circumstance has the Supreme Court ever allowed a form of mental illness or incompetence to excuse an otherwise untimely PCRA petition.” Monaco, supra at 1080-81 . “[T]he general rule remains that mental illness or psychological condition, absent more, will not serve as an exception to the PCRA’s jurisdictional time requirements.” Id. at 1081 .

2021However, “[o]nly under a very limited circumstance has the Supreme Court ever allowed a form of mental illness or incompetence to excuse an otherwise untimely PCRA petition.” Monaco, supra at 1080-81 . “[T]he general rule remains that mental illness or psychological condition, absent more, will not serve as an exception to the PCRA’s jurisdictional time requirements.” Id. at 1081 .

2021This timeliness exception applies only where the convicted defendant shows both that he did not know the facts upon which he bases his PCRA petition and that he could not have learned of those facts earlier by the exercise of due diligence. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii); Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 204 A.3d 524, 526 (Pa. Super. 2019); Commonwealth v. Taylor, 933 A.2d 1035, 1040-41 (Pa. Super. 2007).

2021See Commonwealth v. -6- Fahy, 737 A.2d 214, 223 (Pa. 1999) (“Although legality of sentence is always subject to review within the PCRA, claims must still first satisfy the PCRA’s time limits or one of the exceptions thereto”) (citation omitted).

2020See Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 994 A.2d 1091, 1094 (Pa. 2010) (appellant did not satisfy 11 requirement for time -bar exception where he did not state when he first learned of the facts underlying his PCRA claims); Commonwealth v. Breakiron, 781 A.2d 94, 98 (Pa. 2001) (petition untimely where appellant failed to offer reasonable explanation why, with due diligence, new information could not have been obtained earlier); Commonwealth v. Taylor, 933 A.2d 1035, 1041 (Pa. Super. 2007) (to satisfy requirements of §9545(b)(1)(ii), "[a] petitioner must... explain why his asserted facts could not have b

2020See Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 994 A.2d 1091, 1094 (Pa. 2010) (appellant did not satisfy 11 requirement for time -bar exception where he did not state when he first learned of the facts underlying his PCRA claims); Commonwealth v. Breakiron, 781 A.2d 94, 98 (Pa. 2001) (petition untimely where appellant failed to offer reasonable explanation why, with due diligence, new information could not have been obtained earlier); Commonwealth v. Taylor, 933 A.2d 1035, 1041 (Pa. Super. 2007) (to satisfy requirements of §9545(b)(1)(ii), "[a] petitioner must... explain why his asserted facts could not have b

2020See Commonwealth v. Yarris, 731 A.2d 581 , (Pa. 1999) (holding that petitioner does not satisfy § 9545(b)(1)(ii) -7- where “he makes no attempt to explain why the information . . . could not, with the exercise of due diligence, have been obtained much earlier”); see also Commonwealth v. Vega, 754 A.2d 714, 718 (Pa.Super. 2000) (holding that petitioner does not satisfy § 9545(b)(1)(ii) when he fails to provide the date on which he learned of the newly discovered facts).

2020See Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 994 A.2d 1091, 1094 (Pa. 2010) (appellant did not satisfy 11 requirement for time -bar exception where he did not state when he first learned of the facts underlying his PCRA claims); Commonwealth v. Breakiron, 781 A.2d 94, 98 (Pa. 2001) (petition untimely where appellant failed to offer reasonable explanation why, with due diligence, new information could not have been obtained earlier); Commonwealth v. Taylor, 933 A.2d 1035, 1041 (Pa. Super. 2007) (to satisfy requirements of §9545(b)(1)(ii), "[a] petitioner must... explain why his asserted facts could not have b

2020See Commonwealth v. Yarris, 731 A.2d 581 , (Pa. 1999) (holding that petitioner does not satisfy § 9545(b)(1)(ii) -7- where “he makes no attempt to explain why the information . . . could not, with the exercise of due diligence, have been obtained much earlier”); see also Commonwealth v. Vega, 754 A.2d 714, 718 (Pa.Super. 2000) (holding that petitioner does not satisfy § 9545(b)(1)(ii) when he fails to provide the date on which he learned of the newly discovered facts).

2015See Reid, 99 A.3d at 438 .6 6 Even if James had satisfied the procedural requirements of his ineffectiveness claim relating to Ms. Perry, we would have concluded that he failed to satisfy the substantive requirements for his claim.

2015See Commonwealth v. Cintora, 69 A.3d 759, 764 (Pa. ____________________________________________ 6 On March 23, 2015, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Montgomery v. Louisiana, 135 S. Ct. 1546 (2015), which again presents the Miller v. Alabama retroactively question.

2014See Commonwealth v. Brandon, 51 A.3d 231, 235 (Pa. Super. 2012) (quotations and citation omitted) (stating “the sixty-day period [for 42 Pa.C.S. 9545(b)(2)] begins to run upon the date of the underlying judicial decision.”). -4- J-S55039-14 In any event, regardless of waiver, no relief would be warranted as we agree with the PCRA court that Hadley cannot satisfy the requirements of Section 9545(b)(1)(iii), since: (1) Miller does not apply to Hadley or excuse the late filing of her most recent petition because she was 22 years old when she committed the underlying murder;8 (2) this Court, in Co