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34 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1990–2026 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Dunagan v. Stategreen2 sentences2016Guyse v. State, 286 Ga. 574, 577 (2) ( 690 SE2d 406 ) (2010) (noting that this method of assault is “a specific intent crime requiring proof that the defendant intended to violently injure someone”); Dunagan v. State, 269 Ga. 590, 592 (2) (a) ( 502 SE2d 726 ) (1998) (aggravated assault under OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (1) proscribes conduct *656 which is the result of the actor’s criminal intent); Montford v. State, 254 Ga. App. 524, 526 (1) ( 564 SE2d 216 ) (2002) (“the attempted or completed injury to the victim must be the intended consequence of the defendant’s act”); see Klicka v. State, 315 Ga. 2016Guyse v. State, 286 Ga. 574, 577 (2) ( 690 SE2d 406 ) (2010) (noting that this method of assault is “a specific intent crime requiring proof that the defendant intended to violently injure someone”); Dunagan v. State, 269 Ga. 590, 592 (2) (a) ( 502 SE2d 726 ) (1998) (aggravated assault under OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (1) proscribes conduct *656 which is the result of the actor’s criminal intent); Montford v. State, 254 Ga. App. 524, 526 (1) ( 564 SE2d 216 ) (2002) (“the attempted or completed injury to the victim must be the intended consequence of the defendant’s act”); see Klicka v. State, 315 Ga. | 5 | 6 |
Guyse v. Stategreen2 sentences2016Guyse v. State, 286 Ga. 574, 577 (2) ( 690 SE2d 406 ) (2010) (noting that this method of assault is “a specific intent crime requiring proof that the defendant intended to violently injure someone”); Dunagan v. State, 269 Ga. 590, 592 (2) (a) ( 502 SE2d 726 ) (1998) (aggravated assault under OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (1) proscribes conduct *656 which is the result of the actor’s criminal intent); Montford v. State, 254 Ga. App. 524, 526 (1) ( 564 SE2d 216 ) (2002) (“the attempted or completed injury to the victim must be the intended consequence of the defendant’s act”); see Klicka v. State, 315 Ga. 2016Guyse v. State, 286 Ga. 574, 577 (2) ( 690 SE2d 406 ) (2010) (noting that this method of assault is “a specific intent crime requiring proof that the defendant intended to violently injure someone”); Dunagan v. State, 269 Ga. 590, 592 (2) (a) ( 502 SE2d 726 ) (1998) (aggravated assault under OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (1) proscribes conduct *656 which is the result of the actor’s criminal intent); Montford v. State, 254 Ga. App. 524, 526 (1) ( 564 SE2d 216 ) (2002) (“the attempted or completed injury to the victim must be the intended consequence of the defendant’s act”); see Klicka v. State, 315 Ga. | 3 | 3 |
Flores v. Stategreen2 sentences2015Second, Patterson argues that he was entitled to a charge on simple assault because the evidence could have shown that Patterson drove recklessly but never intended to cause any injury and that the law allows conviction of reasonable-apprehension-of-injury assault based on reckless conduct, citing one statement in Flores v. State, 277 Ga. 780, 784 (3) ( 596 SE2d 114 ) (2004) (“an assault conviction under OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (2) does not exclude a finding of guilt for reckless conduct”). 2015Second, Patterson argues that he was entitled to a charge on simple assault because the evidence could have shown that Patterson drove recklessly but never intended to cause any injury and that the law allows conviction of reasonable-apprehension-of-injury assault based on reckless conduct, citing one statement in Flores v. State, 277 Ga. 780, 784 (3) ( 596 SE2d 114 ) (2004) (“an assault conviction under OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (2) does not exclude a finding of guilt for reckless conduct”). | 3 | 3 |
Brinson v. Stategreen2 sentences2016See also Brinson v. State, 272 Ga. 345, 347 (1) ( 529 SE2d 129 ) (2000) (“[Central to the offense of aggravated assault is that an assault as defined in OCGA § 16-5-20 be committed on the victim.”) As such, Count 4 of the indictment charged Patterson with a simple assault under OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (2), that was aggravated by the use of an object — Patterson’s vehicle — that when used offensively against Silvers, was likely to, and actually did, result in serious bodily injury Patterson contends that as to Count 4, he was entitled to jury instructions on the lesser included crimes of reckless co 2016See also Brinson v. State, 272 Ga. 345, 347 (1) ( 529 SE2d 129 ) (2000) (“[Central to the offense of aggravated assault is that an assault as defined in OCGA § 16-5-20 be committed on the victim.”) As such, Count 4 of the indictment charged Patterson with a simple assault under OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (2), that was aggravated by the use of an object — Patterson’s vehicle — that when used offensively against Silvers, was likely to, and actually did, result in serious bodily injury Patterson contends that as to Count 4, he was entitled to jury instructions on the lesser included crimes of reckless co | 2 | 3 |
Patterson v. Stategreen2 sentences2022See Evans, supra, 360 Ga. App. at 616 (18) (the crime of conspiracy to commit a RICO violation under OCGA § 16-14-4 is not a specific intent crime because “the statute does not contain plain language providing that specific intent to violate the law is an element of a RICO conspiracy”); Patterson v. State, 299 Ga. 491, 493-496 ( 789 SE2d 175 ) (2016) (concluding that the crime of 6 simple assault under OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (2) was not a specific intent crime because the statute did not contain any requirement that the defendant act with the specific intent to place the victim in reasonable appre 2022See Evans, supra, 360 Ga. App. at 616 (18) (the crime of conspiracy to commit a RICO violation under OCGA § 16-14-4 is not a specific intent crime because “the statute does not contain plain language providing that specific intent to violate the law is an element of a RICO conspiracy”); Patterson v. State, 299 Ga. 491, 493-496 ( 789 SE2d 175 ) (2016) (concluding that the crime of 6 simple assault under OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (2) was not a specific intent crime because the statute did not contain any requirement that the defendant act with the specific intent to place the victim in reasonable appre | 2 | 2 |
Scott v. Stategreen2 sentences2017We cannot say that the omission of a full charge on simple assault was erroneous where, as here, the jury was properly instructed on general intent and the evidence is undisputed that an injury was intentionally inflicted, Cantera v. State, 289 Ga. 583, 584-586 (2) ( 713 SE2d 826 ) (2011), and, moreover, the jury charge did track the applicable definition of simple assault in OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (1), Scott v. State, 290 Ga. 883, 886-887 (4) ( 725 SE2d 305 ) (2012). 2017We cannot say that the omission of a full charge on simple assault was erroneous where, as here, the jury was properly instructed on general intent and the evidence is undisputed that an injury was intentionally inflicted, Cantera v. State, 289 Ga. 583, 584-586 (2) ( 713 SE2d 826 ) (2011), and, moreover, the jury charge did track the applicable definition of simple assault in OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (1), Scott v. State, 290 Ga. 883, 886-887 (4) ( 725 SE2d 305 ) (2012). | 2 | 2 |
Cantera v. Stategreen2 sentences2017We cannot say that the omission of a full charge on simple assault was erroneous where, as here, the jury was properly instructed on general intent and the evidence is undisputed that an injury was intentionally inflicted, Cantera v. State, 289 Ga. 583, 584-586 (2) ( 713 SE2d 826 ) (2011), and, moreover, the jury charge did track the applicable definition of simple assault in OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (1), Scott v. State, 290 Ga. 883, 886-887 (4) ( 725 SE2d 305 ) (2012). 2017We cannot say that the omission of a full charge on simple assault was erroneous where, as here, the jury was properly instructed on general intent and the evidence is undisputed that an injury was intentionally inflicted, Cantera v. State, 289 Ga. 583, 584-586 (2) ( 713 SE2d 826 ) (2011), and, moreover, the jury charge did track the applicable definition of simple assault in OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (1), Scott v. State, 290 Ga. 883, 886-887 (4) ( 725 SE2d 305 ) (2012). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Walkergreen2 sentences2016See State v. Walker, 295 Ga. 888, 893 ( 764 SE2d 804 ) (2014) (“We have repeatedly cautioned that our decisions stand only for the points raised by the parties and decided by the court. 2016See State v. Walker, 295 Ga. 888, 893 ( 764 SE2d 804 ) (2014) (“We have repeatedly cautioned that our decisions stand only for the points raised by the parties and decided by the court. | 2 | 2 |
Zaldivar v. Prickettgreen2 sentences2016This case concerns the meaning of OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (2), and so, our analysis ought to begin with the familiar and settled principles that inform our consideration of statutory meaning. “[A] statute draws its meaning from its text,” Zaldivar v. Prickett, 297 Ga. 589, 591 (1) ( 774 SE2d 688 ) (2015) (citation and punctuation omitted), and when we look to the statutory text, “we must presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant.” Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172 (1) (a) ( 751 SE2d 337 ) (2013) (citation and punctuation omitted). 2016This case concerns the meaning of OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (2), and so, our analysis ought to begin with the familiar and settled principles that inform our consideration of statutory meaning. “[A] statute draws its meaning from its text,” Zaldivar v. Prickett, 297 Ga. 589, 591 (1) ( 774 SE2d 688 ) (2015) (citation and punctuation omitted), and when we look to the statutory text, “we must presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant.” Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172 (1) (a) ( 751 SE2d 337 ) (2013) (citation and punctuation omitted). | 2 | 2 |
Turner v. Stategreen2 sentences2016Guyse v. State, 286 Ga. 574, 576 (2) ( 690 SE2d 406 ) (2010); Turner v. State, 281 Ga. 487, 489 (1) (b) ( 640 SE2d 25 ) (2007). 3 Patterson with a simple assault under OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (2), that was aggravated by the use of an object – Patterson’s vehicle – that when used offensively against Silvers, was likely to, and actually did, result in serious bodily injury. 2016Guyse v. State, 286 Ga. 574, 576 (2) ( 690 SE2d 406 ) (2010); Turner v. State, 281 Ga. 487, 489 (1) (b) ( 640 SE2d 25 ) (2007). 3 Patterson with a simple assault under OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (2), that was aggravated by the use of an object – Patterson’s vehicle – that when used offensively against Silvers, was likely to, and actually did, result in serious bodily injury. | 2 | 2 |
Crumbley v. Stategreen2 sentences2016See Crumbley, 61 Ga. at 584 . 2016See Crumbley, 61 Ga. at 584 . | 2 | 2 |
Deal v. Colemangreen2 sentences2016This case concerns the meaning of OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (2), and so, our analysis ought to begin with the familiar and settled principles that inform our consideration of statutory meaning. “[A] statute draws its meaning from its text,” Zaldivar v. Prickett, 297 Ga. 589, 591 (1) ( 774 SE2d 688 ) (2015) (citation and punctuation omitted), and when we look to the statutory text, “we must presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant.” Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172 (1) (a) ( 751 SE2d 337 ) (2013) (citation and punctuation omitted). 2016This case concerns the meaning of OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (2), and so, our analysis ought to begin with the familiar and settled principles that inform our consideration of statutory meaning. “[A] statute draws its meaning from its text,” Zaldivar v. Prickett, 297 Ga. 589, 591 (1) ( 774 SE2d 688 ) (2015) (citation and punctuation omitted), and when we look to the statutory text, “we must presume that the General Assembly meant what it said and said what it meant.” Deal v. Coleman, 294 Ga. 170, 172 (1) (a) ( 751 SE2d 337 ) (2013) (citation and punctuation omitted). | 2 | 2 |
Glover v. Stategreen2 sentences2016See O’Neal v. State, 288 Ga. 219, 220-221 ( 702 SE2d 288 ) (2010); Glover v. State, 272 Ga. 639, 640 ( 533 SE2d 374 ) (2000). 2016See O’Neal v. State, 288 Ga. 219, 220-221 ( 702 SE2d 288 ) (2010); Glover v. State, 272 Ga. 639, 640 ( 533 SE2d 374 ) (2000). | 2 | 2 |
Montford v. Stategreen2 sentences2016Guyse v. State, 286 Ga. 574, 577 (2) ( 690 SE2d 406 ) (2010) (noting that this method of assault is “a specific intent crime requiring proof that the defendant intended to violently injure someone”); Dunagan v. State, 269 Ga. 590, 592 (2) (a) ( 502 SE2d 726 ) (1998) (aggravated assault under OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (1) proscribes conduct *656 which is the result of the actor’s criminal intent); Montford v. State, 254 Ga. App. 524, 526 (1) ( 564 SE2d 216 ) (2002) (“the attempted or completed injury to the victim must be the intended consequence of the defendant’s act”); see Klicka v. State, 315 Ga. 2016Guyse v. State, 286 Ga. 574, 577 (2) ( 690 SE2d 406 ) (2010) (noting that this method of assault is “a specific intent crime requiring proof that the defendant intended to violently injure someone”); Dunagan v. State, 269 Ga. 590, 592 (2) (a) ( 502 SE2d 726 ) (1998) (aggravated assault under OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (1) proscribes conduct *656 which is the result of the actor’s criminal intent); Montford v. State, 254 Ga. App. 524, 526 (1) ( 564 SE2d 216 ) (2002) (“the attempted or completed injury to the victim must be the intended consequence of the defendant’s act”); see Klicka v. State, 315 Ga. | 2 | 2 |
O'NEAL v. Stategreen2 sentences2016See O’Neal v. State, 288 Ga. 219, 220-221 ( 702 SE2d 288 ) (2010); Glover v. State, 272 Ga. 639, 640 ( 533 SE2d 374 ) (2000). 2016See O’Neal v. State, 288 Ga. 219, 220-221 ( 702 SE2d 288 ) (2010); Glover v. State, 272 Ga. 639, 640 ( 533 SE2d 374 ) (2000). | 2 | 2 |
Watkins v. Stategreen2 sentences2014See Goforth v. State, 271 Ga. 700, 701-702 (3) ( 523 SE2d 868 ) (1999); Tiller v. State, 267 Ga. 888 (4) ( 485 SE2d 720 ) (1997) (overruled on other grounds, Dunagan v. State, 269 Ga. 590, 593 ( 502 SE2d 726 ) (1998)); Watkins v. State, 306 Ga. App. 769, 770 (1) ( 702 SE2d 904 ) (2010); Jordan v. State, 322 Ga. App. 252, 254 (3) ( 744 SE2d 447 ) (2013) (where indictment charged defendant with aggravated assault for having shot the victim with a gun, a deadly weapon, the state was not required to show that the victim was in reasonable apprehension of a violent injury, as required for an assault 2014See Goforth v. State, 271 Ga. 700, 701-702 (3) ( 523 SE2d 868 ) (1999); Tiller v. State, 267 Ga. 888 (4) ( 485 SE2d 720 ) (1997) (overruled on other grounds, Dunagan v. State, 269 Ga. 590, 593 ( 502 SE2d 726 ) (1998)); Watkins v. State, 306 Ga. App. 769, 770 (1) ( 702 SE2d 904 ) (2010); Jordan v. State, 322 Ga. App. 252, 254 (3) ( 744 SE2d 447 ) (2013) (where indictment charged defendant with aggravated assault for having shot the victim with a gun, a deadly weapon, the state was not required to show that the victim was in reasonable apprehension of a violent injury, as required for an assault | 2 | 2 |
Jordan v. Stategreen2 sentences2014See Goforth v. State, 271 Ga. 700, 701-702 (3) ( 523 SE2d 868 ) (1999); Tiller v. State, 267 Ga. 888 (4) ( 485 SE2d 720 ) (1997) (overruled on other grounds, Dunagan v. State, 269 Ga. 590, 593 ( 502 SE2d 726 ) (1998)); Watkins v. State, 306 Ga. App. 769, 770 (1) ( 702 SE2d 904 ) (2010); Jordan v. State, 322 Ga. App. 252, 254 (3) ( 744 SE2d 447 ) (2013) (where indictment charged defendant with aggravated assault for having shot the victim with a gun, a deadly weapon, the state was not required to show that the victim was in reasonable apprehension of a violent injury, as required for an assault 2014See Goforth v. State, 271 Ga. 700, 701-702 (3) ( 523 SE2d 868 ) (1999); Tiller v. State, 267 Ga. 888 (4) ( 485 SE2d 720 ) (1997) (overruled on other grounds, Dunagan v. State, 269 Ga. 590, 593 ( 502 SE2d 726 ) (1998)); Watkins v. State, 306 Ga. App. 769, 770 (1) ( 702 SE2d 904 ) (2010); Jordan v. State, 322 Ga. App. 252, 254 (3) ( 744 SE2d 447 ) (2013) (where indictment charged defendant with aggravated assault for having shot the victim with a gun, a deadly weapon, the state was not required to show that the victim was in reasonable apprehension of a violent injury, as required for an assault | 2 | 2 |
Goforth v. Stategreen2 sentences2014See Goforth v. State, 271 Ga. 700, 701-702 (3) ( 523 SE2d 868 ) (1999); Tiller v. State, 267 Ga. 888 (4) ( 485 SE2d 720 ) (1997) (overruled on other grounds, Dunagan v. State, 269 Ga. 590, 593 ( 502 SE2d 726 ) (1998)); Watkins v. State, 306 Ga. App. 769, 770 (1) ( 702 SE2d 904 ) (2010); Jordan v. State, 322 Ga. App. 252, 254 (3) ( 744 SE2d 447 ) (2013) (where indictment charged defendant with aggravated assault for having shot the victim with a gun, a deadly weapon, the state was not required to show that the victim was in reasonable apprehension of a violent injury, as required for an assault 2014See Goforth v. State, 271 Ga. 700, 701-702 (3) ( 523 SE2d 868 ) (1999); Tiller v. State, 267 Ga. 888 (4) ( 485 SE2d 720 ) (1997) (overruled on other grounds, Dunagan v. State, 269 Ga. 590, 593 ( 502 SE2d 726 ) (1998)); Watkins v. State, 306 Ga. App. 769, 770 (1) ( 702 SE2d 904 ) (2010); Jordan v. State, 322 Ga. App. 252, 254 (3) ( 744 SE2d 447 ) (2013) (where indictment charged defendant with aggravated assault for having shot the victim with a gun, a deadly weapon, the state was not required to show that the victim was in reasonable apprehension of a violent injury, as required for an assault | 2 | 2 |
Ferguson v. Stategreen2 sentences2012However, even if the jury’s verdict necessarily indicates that the jury found incredible Touchstone’s statements to police that the gun discharged accidentally, we do not believe that it follows, under the facts of this case, that “the jury was entitled to take his untruthfulness as substantive and affirmative evidence of his guilt [of aggravated assault under OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (1) as charged by the trial court].” Ferguson v. State, 307 Ga. App. 232, 235 (1) ( 704 SE2d 470 ) (2010) (jury could consider perjured testimony as affirmative evidence of guilt). 2012However, even if the jury’s verdict necessarily indicates that the jury found incredible Touchstone’s statements to police that the gun discharged accidentally, we do not believe that it follows, under the facts of this case, that “the jury was entitled to take his untruthfulness as substantive and affirmative evidence of his guilt [of aggravated assault under OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (1) as charged by the trial court].” Ferguson v. State, 307 Ga. App. 232, 235 (1) ( 704 SE2d 470 ) (2010) (jury could consider perjured testimony as affirmative evidence of guilt). | 2 | 2 |
Maynor v. Stategreen2 sentences2011“The offense of aggravated assault under OCGA § 16-5-21 has two essential elements: (1) that a simple assault under OCGA § 16-5-20 was committed on the victim and (2) that it was aggravated by” one of three factors, including the “use of a deadly weapon as provided in OCGA § 16-5-21.” Maynor v. State, 257 Ga. App. 151, 153 ( 570 SE2d 428 ) (2002). 2011“The offense of aggravated assault under OCGA § 16-5-21 has two essential elements: (1) that a simple assault under OCGA § 16-5-20 was committed on the victim and (2) that it was aggravated by” one of three factors, including the “use of a deadly weapon as provided in OCGA § 16-5-21.” Maynor v. State, 257 Ga. App. 151, 153 ( 570 SE2d 428 ) (2002). | 2 | 2 |
Lawson v. Stategreen2 sentences2011See Bearden, supra, 291 Ga. App. at 806-807 (“Th[e] offense [of simple assault] is complete if the assailant has made such a demonstration of violence, coupled with an apparent ability to inflict injury so as to cause the person against whom it is directed reasonably to fear the injury unless he retreats to secure his safety.”) (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Lawson v. State, 275 Ga. App. 334, 338 ( 620 SE2d 600 ) (2005). 2011See Bearden, supra, 291 Ga. App. at 806-807 (“Th[e] offense [of simple assault] is complete if the assailant has made such a demonstration of violence, coupled with an apparent ability to inflict injury so as to cause the person against whom it is directed reasonably to fear the injury unless he retreats to secure his safety.”) (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Lawson v. State, 275 Ga. App. 334, 338 ( 620 SE2d 600 ) (2005). | 2 | 2 |
Bearden v. Stategreen2 sentences2011Under OCGA § 16-5-20, “[a] person commits the offense of simple assault when he or she either: (1) [ajttempts to commit a violent injury to the person of another; or (2) [c]ommits an act which places another in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury.” An assault under OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (2) is complete “if the assailant has made such a demonstration of violence, coupled with an apparent ability to inflict injury so as to cause the person against whom it is directed reasonably to fear the injury unless he retreats to secure his safety.” (Citations and punctuation omit 2011Under OCGA § 16-5-20, “[a] person commits the offense of simple assault when he or she either: (1) [ajttempts to commit a violent injury to the person of another; or (2) [c]ommits an act which places another in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury.” An assault under OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (2) is complete “if the assailant has made such a demonstration of violence, coupled with an apparent ability to inflict injury so as to cause the person against whom it is directed reasonably to fear the injury unless he retreats to secure his safety.” (Citations and punctuation omit | 2 | 2 |
Daniel Ray Metcalf v. Stategreen1 sentence2026The jury also found Neal guilty of aggravated assault, which has two elements: (1) the commission of a simple assault under OCGA § 16-5-20 and 17 Metcalf, 349 Ga. App. at 415(2)(a) (citation and punctuation omitted). 18 OCGA § 16-5-3(a). 8 (2) the presence of a statutory aggravator. | 1 | 1 |
Gude v. Stategreen2 sentences2025See Gude v. State, 320 Ga. 308, 311 (1) ( 908 SE2d 620 ) (2024) (challenge to jury instruction on aggravated assault that was not objected to at trial will be reviewed for plain error only). 2025See Gude v. State, 320 Ga. 308, 311 (1) ( 908 SE2d 620 ) (2024) (challenge to jury instruction on aggravated assault that was not objected to at trial will be reviewed for plain error only). | 1 | 1 |
Kipp v. Stategreen2 sentences2024See OCGA § 16-5-21 (a). “[T]he simple assault 28 encompassed within aggravated assault may be committed in two ways: when a person ‘[a]ttempts to commit a violent injury to the person of another,’ OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (1), or when a person ‘[c]ommits an act which places another in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury[,]’ [OCGA § 16-5-20] (a) (2).” Kipp v. State, 294 Ga. 55, 59 (2) (a) ( 751 SE2d 83 ) (2013). 2024See OCGA § 16-5-21 (a). “[T]he simple assault 28 encompassed within aggravated assault may be committed in two ways: when a person ‘[a]ttempts to commit a violent injury to the person of another,’ OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (1), or when a person ‘[c]ommits an act which places another in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury[,]’ [OCGA § 16-5-20] (a) (2).” Kipp v. State, 294 Ga. 55, 59 (2) (a) ( 751 SE2d 83 ) (2013). | 1 | 1 |
| Dana Evans v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
People v. Langworthyyellow2 sentences2022See also People v. Langworthy, 416 Mich. 630, 643-644 (B) & n.21 ( 331 NW2d 171 ) (1982) (noting “the overwhelming weight of authority which holds that rape is a general- intent crime”). 2022See also People v. Langworthy, 416 Mich. 630, 643-644 (B) & n.21 ( 331 NW2d 171 ) (1982) (noting “the overwhelming weight of authority which holds that rape is a general- intent crime”). | 1 | 1 |
| Myers v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Edwards v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Patterson v. the Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Regent v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| KLICKA v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Sawyergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Walker v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Holcomb v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Johnson v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Jones v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Howard v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Holmes v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Jones v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Dorsey v. State
green
2 sentences2016I do not think that the reference to “attempt” in OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (1) can be naturally or reasonably understood to signal anything about the intent required for a simple assault under OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (2). 21 law of Georgia, it appears to have been understood to require an intent to inflict injury, see Dorsey, 108 Ga. at 479 , or at the least, an intent to arouse apprehension. 2016I do not think that the reference to “attempt” in OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (1) can be naturally or reasonably understood to signal anything about the intent required for a simple assault under OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (2). 21 law of Georgia, it appears to have been understood to require an intent to inflict injury, see Dorsey, 108 Ga. at 479 , or at the least, an intent to arouse apprehension. | 2 | 2016–2016 |
Jackson v. State
red
2 sentences2015Jackson, supra, 276 Ga. at 411 . 2004Jackson at 412(n.5), 577 S.E.2d 570 . | 2 | 2004–2015 |
Tiller v. State
green
2 sentences2014See Goforth v. State, 271 Ga. 700, 701-702 (3) ( 523 SE2d 868 ) (1999); Tiller v. State, 267 Ga. 888 (4) ( 485 SE2d 720 ) (1997) (overruled on other grounds, Dunagan v. State, 269 Ga. 590, 593 ( 502 SE2d 726 ) (1998)); Watkins v. State, 306 Ga. App. 769, 770 (1) ( 702 SE2d 904 ) (2010); Jordan v. State, 322 Ga. App. 252, 254 (3) ( 744 SE2d 447 ) (2013) (where indictment charged defendant with aggravated assault for having shot the victim with a gun, a deadly weapon, the state was not required to show that the victim was in reasonable apprehension of a violent injury, as required for an assault 2014See Goforth v. State, 271 Ga. 700, 701-702 (3) ( 523 SE2d 868 ) (1999); Tiller v. State, 267 Ga. 888 (4) ( 485 SE2d 720 ) (1997) (overruled on other grounds, Dunagan v. State, 269 Ga. 590, 593 ( 502 SE2d 726 ) (1998)); Watkins v. State, 306 Ga. App. 769, 770 (1) ( 702 SE2d 904 ) (2010); Jordan v. State, 322 Ga. App. 252, 254 (3) ( 744 SE2d 447 ) (2013) (where indictment charged defendant with aggravated assault for having shot the victim with a gun, a deadly weapon, the state was not required to show that the victim was in reasonable apprehension of a violent injury, as required for an assault | 2 | 2014–2014 |
Jackson v. Virginia
red
2 sentences2008Noting Brinson and White, however, the Court stated that it was “[p]retermitting whether it [was] necessary to charge on the elements of simple assault when the crime is aggravated assault.” Id. 22 See Suggested Pattern Jury Instructions, Vol. II: Criminal Cases (4th ed.), § 1.40.10. 23 Although Coney requested the jury charge on criminal negligence, it is apparent that he did so in connection with his request that the jury be charged on the lesser included offense of reckless conduct. 24 See Dunagan v. State, 269 Ga. 590, 591-594 (2) ( 502 SE2d 726 ) (1998) (explaining that aggravated assault 1990Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). 2. (a) Hawkins assigns error to the trial court’s refusal to give his requested charges on involuntary manslaughter under OCGA § 16-5-3 (a) (misdemeanor manslaughter); on pointing a firearm at another under OCGA § 16-11-102; and on simple assault under OCGA § 16-5-20. | 2 | 1990–2008 |
| Osborne v. State green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Gilbert v. State green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Smith v. Hardrick green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Cail v. State green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Matthews v. State green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| McWilliams v. State neutral | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.