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34 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1984–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Long v. Stategreen2 sentences2022We have explained that “because there is no element of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon that is not contained in armed robbery, that form of aggravated assault will merge into armed robbery if the crimes are part of the same act or transaction.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Chambers v. Hall, 305 Ga. 363, 365 (3) (825 SE2d 162) (2019); see also Long v. State, 287 Ga. 886, 889 (2) (700 SE2d 399) (2010) (holding that the “deadly weapon” requirement of aggravated assault under OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2) is the equivalent of the “offensive weapon” requirement of armed robbery under OCGA § 2022We have explained that “because there is no element of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon that is not contained in armed robbery, that form of aggravated assault will merge into armed robbery if the crimes are part of the same act or transaction.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Chambers v. Hall, 305 Ga. 363, 365 (3) (825 SE2d 162) (2019); see also Long v. State, 287 Ga. 886, 889 (2) (700 SE2d 399) (2010) (holding that the “deadly weapon” requirement of aggravated assault under OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2) is the equivalent of the “offensive weapon” requirement of armed robbery under OCGA § | 3 | 3 |
Jackson v. Virginiared2 sentences2012Jones was charged with six counts of aggravated assault under OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2), which provides that “[a] person commits the offense of aggravated assault when he or she assaults [w]ith a 6 See English v. State, 301 Ga. App. 842, 842 ( 689 SE2d 130 ) (2010). 7 Joiner v. State, 299 Ga. App. 300, 300 ( 682 SE2d 381 ) (2009); see also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (III) (B) ( 99 SCt 2781 , 61 LE2d 560) (1979). 8 Miller v. State, 273 Ga. 831, 832 ( 546 SE2d 524 ) (2001) (punctuation omitted). 6 deadly weapon or with any object, device, or instrument which, when used offensively again 2012Jones was charged with six counts of aggravated assault under OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2), which provides that “[a] person commits the offense of aggravated assault when he or she assaults [w]ith a 6 See English v. State, 301 Ga. App. 842, 842 ( 689 SE2d 130 ) (2010). 7 Joiner v. State, 299 Ga. App. 300, 300 ( 682 SE2d 381 ) (2009); see also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (III) (B) ( 99 SCt 2781 , 61 LE2d 560) (1979). 8 Miller v. State, 273 Ga. 831, 832 ( 546 SE2d 524 ) (2001) (punctuation omitted). 6 deadly weapon or with any object, device, or instrument which, when used offensively again | 2 | 3 |
Maynor v. Stategreen2 sentences2011“The offense of aggravated assault under OCGA § 16-5-21 has two essential elements: (1) that a simple assault under OCGA § 16-5-20 was committed on the victim and (2) that it was aggravated by” one of three factors, including the “use of a deadly weapon as provided in OCGA § 16-5-21.” Maynor v. State, 257 Ga. App. 151, 153 ( 570 SE2d 428 ) (2002). 2011“The offense of aggravated assault under OCGA § 16-5-21 has two essential elements: (1) that a simple assault under OCGA § 16-5-20 was committed on the victim and (2) that it was aggravated by” one of three factors, including the “use of a deadly weapon as provided in OCGA § 16-5-21.” Maynor v. State, 257 Ga. App. 151, 153 ( 570 SE2d 428 ) (2002). | 2 | 2 |
Bishop v. Stategreen2 sentences2009Compare OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (1) (“A person commits the offense of aggravated assault when he or she assaults . . . [w]ith intent to murder, to rape, or to rob.”) (emphasis supplied). 6 Adams v. State, 293 Ga. App. 377, 381 (3) ( 667 SE2d 186 ) (2008) (when aggravated assault charge only requires proof of general criminal intent, an indictment is not void for failing to expressly allege such intent); Bishop, supra at 132 (2) (“Because the indictment charged Bishop with aggravated assault under OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2), which requires only a showing of a general intent to injure, it was not void fo 2005Sallie v. State, 276 Ga. 506, 515 (17) ( 578 SE2d 444 ) (2003); Bishop v. State, 266 Ga. App. 129, 131-132 (2) ( 596 SE2d 674 ) (2004). | 2 | 2 |
Chase v. Stategreen2 sentences2009We conclude that sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that Mackey acted in reckless disregard for human life and affirm his conviction for aggravated assault under OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (1) and (c) as charged in the indictment. 2 We find no merit in Mackey’s argument that the Supreme Court’s opinion in Chase v. State, 277 Ga. 636 ( 592 SE2d 656 ) (2004) requires a different result. 2009We conclude that sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s conclusion that Mackey acted in reckless disregard for human life and affirm his conviction for aggravated assault under OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (1) and (c) as charged in the indictment. 2 We find no merit in Mackey’s argument that the Supreme Court’s opinion in Chase v. State, 277 Ga. 636 ( 592 SE2d 656 ) (2004) requires a different result. | 1 | 2 |
Rodriguez v. Stategreen1 sentence2026Thus, the phrase “place or places” in OCGA § 16-5-91(a) cannot be accurately described apart from its definition in OCGA § 16-5-90(a)(1), and that definition must be read into the phrase “place or places.” See, e.g., Schmitt v. State, 318 Ga. 835, 847 (2024) (recognizing that aggravated assault under OCGA § 16-5-21(a) (which provides that aggravated assault is committed when a person “assaults” and one of several statutory aggravators is present) “has two elements: (1) the commission of a simple assault,” which is defined in the preceding section, OCGA § 16-5- 20(a), “and (2) the presence of a | 1 | 1 |
Schmitt v. Stategreen1 sentence2026Thus, the phrase “place or places” in OCGA § 16-5-91(a) cannot be accurately described apart from its definition in OCGA § 16-5-90(a)(1), and that definition must be read into the phrase “place or places.” See, e.g., Schmitt v. State, 318 Ga. 835, 847 (2024) (recognizing that aggravated assault under OCGA § 16-5-21(a) (which provides that aggravated assault is committed when a person “assaults” and one of several statutory aggravators is present) “has two elements: (1) the commission of a simple assault,” which is defined in the preceding section, OCGA § 16-5- 20(a), “and (2) the presence of a | 1 | 1 |
Chambers v. Hallgreen2 sentences2022We have explained that “because there is no element of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon that is not contained in armed robbery, that form of aggravated assault will merge into armed robbery if the crimes are part of the same act or transaction.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Chambers v. Hall, 305 Ga. 363, 365 (3) (825 SE2d 162) (2019); see also Long v. State, 287 Ga. 886, 889 (2) (700 SE2d 399) (2010) (holding that the “deadly weapon” requirement of aggravated assault under OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2) is the equivalent of the “offensive weapon” requirement of armed robbery under OCGA § 2022We have explained that “because there is no element of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon that is not contained in armed robbery, that form of aggravated assault will merge into armed robbery if the crimes are part of the same act or transaction.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Chambers v. Hall, 305 Ga. 363, 365 (3) (825 SE2d 162) (2019); see also Long v. State, 287 Ga. 886, 889 (2) (700 SE2d 399) (2010) (holding that the “deadly weapon” requirement of aggravated assault under OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2) is the equivalent of the “offensive weapon” requirement of armed robbery under OCGA § | 1 | 1 |
Chatman v. Browngreen1 sentence2019See Chatman, 291 Ga. at 791 n.1. 5 889 ( 700 SE2d 399 ) (2010) (holding that the “deadly weapon” requirement of aggravated assault under OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2) is the equivalent of the “offensive weapon” requirement of armed robbery under OCGA § 16-8-41 (a)). | 1 | 1 |
Sallee v. the Stategreen2 sentences2016Specifically, the State argues that although, under OCGA § 16-5- 20 (a) (1), simple assault—which is an essential element of an aggravated assault under OCGA § 16-5-21 (b)—is an attempted battery, simple assault under OCGA § 4 OCGA § 17-7-54 (a); see also Corhen, 306 Ga. App. at 497 . 5 Corhen, 306 Ga. App. at 497 ; see also Lowe v. State, 276 Ga. 538, 539 (2) ( 579 SE2d 728 ) (2003); Dunbar, 209 Ga. App. at 98 (2). 6 Sallee v. State, 329 Ga. App. 612, 616 (2) ( 765 SE2d 758 ) (2014); see also Corhen, 306 Ga. App. at 497 . 4 16-5-20 (a) (2) is not an inchoate offense and, therefore, a defendan 2016Specifically, the State argues that although, under OCGA § 16-5- 20 (a) (1), simple assault—which is an essential element of an aggravated assault under OCGA § 16-5-21 (b)—is an attempted battery, simple assault under OCGA § 4 OCGA § 17-7-54 (a); see also Corhen, 306 Ga. App. at 497 . 5 Corhen, 306 Ga. App. at 497 ; see also Lowe v. State, 276 Ga. 538, 539 (2) ( 579 SE2d 728 ) (2003); Dunbar, 209 Ga. App. at 98 (2). 6 Sallee v. State, 329 Ga. App. 612, 616 (2) ( 765 SE2d 758 ) (2014); see also Corhen, 306 Ga. App. at 497 . 4 16-5-20 (a) (2) is not an inchoate offense and, therefore, a defendan | 1 | 1 |
Lowe v. Stategreen2 sentences2016Specifically, the State argues that although, under OCGA § 16-5- 20 (a) (1), simple assault—which is an essential element of an aggravated assault under OCGA § 16-5-21 (b)—is an attempted battery, simple assault under OCGA § 4 OCGA § 17-7-54 (a); see also Corhen, 306 Ga. App. at 497 . 5 Corhen, 306 Ga. App. at 497 ; see also Lowe v. State, 276 Ga. 538, 539 (2) ( 579 SE2d 728 ) (2003); Dunbar, 209 Ga. App. at 98 (2). 6 Sallee v. State, 329 Ga. App. 612, 616 (2) ( 765 SE2d 758 ) (2014); see also Corhen, 306 Ga. App. at 497 . 4 16-5-20 (a) (2) is not an inchoate offense and, therefore, a defendan 2016Specifically, the State argues that although, under OCGA § 16-5- 20 (a) (1), simple assault—which is an essential element of an aggravated assault under OCGA § 16-5-21 (b)—is an attempted battery, simple assault under OCGA § 4 OCGA § 17-7-54 (a); see also Corhen, 306 Ga. App. at 497 . 5 Corhen, 306 Ga. App. at 497 ; see also Lowe v. State, 276 Ga. 538, 539 (2) ( 579 SE2d 728 ) (2003); Dunbar, 209 Ga. App. at 98 (2). 6 Sallee v. State, 329 Ga. App. 612, 616 (2) ( 765 SE2d 758 ) (2014); see also Corhen, 306 Ga. App. at 497 . 4 16-5-20 (a) (2) is not an inchoate offense and, therefore, a defendan | 1 | 1 |
State v. Corhengreen2 sentences2016Specifically, the State argues that although, under OCGA § 16-5- 20 (a) (1), simple assault—which is an essential element of an aggravated assault under OCGA § 16-5-21 (b)—is an attempted battery, simple assault under OCGA § 4 OCGA § 17-7-54 (a); see also Corhen, 306 Ga. App. at 497 . 5 Corhen, 306 Ga. App. at 497 ; see also Lowe v. State, 276 Ga. 538, 539 (2) ( 579 SE2d 728 ) (2003); Dunbar, 209 Ga. App. at 98 (2). 6 Sallee v. State, 329 Ga. App. 612, 616 (2) ( 765 SE2d 758 ) (2014); see also Corhen, 306 Ga. App. at 497 . 4 16-5-20 (a) (2) is not an inchoate offense and, therefore, a defendan 2016Specifically, the State argues that although, under OCGA § 16-5- 20 (a) (1), simple assault—which is an essential element of an aggravated assault under OCGA § 16-5-21 (b)—is an attempted battery, simple assault under OCGA § 4 OCGA § 17-7-54 (a); see also Corhen, 306 Ga. App. at 497 . 5 Corhen, 306 Ga. App. at 497 ; see also Lowe v. State, 276 Ga. 538, 539 (2) ( 579 SE2d 728 ) (2003); Dunbar, 209 Ga. App. at 98 (2). 6 Sallee v. State, 329 Ga. App. 612, 616 (2) ( 765 SE2d 758 ) (2014); see also Corhen, 306 Ga. App. at 497 . 4 16-5-20 (a) (2) is not an inchoate offense and, therefore, a defendan | 1 | 1 |
Silvers v. Stategreen2 sentences2016See Silvers v. State, 278 Ga. 45, 47 (2) (a) ( 597 SE2d 373 ) (2004) (indictment charging aggravated assault with a firearm, by shooting, clearly denotes the use of a deadly weapon); The indictment did not fail to adequately allege an essential element of aggravated assault. 6 3. 2016See Silvers v. State, 278 Ga. 45, 47 (2) (a) ( 597 SE2d 373 ) (2004) (indictment charging aggravated assault with a firearm, by shooting, clearly denotes the use of a deadly weapon); The indictment did not fail to adequately allege an essential element of aggravated assault. 6 3. | 1 | 1 |
Dunbar v. Stategreen1 sentence2016Specifically, the State argues that although, under OCGA § 16-5- 20 (a) (1), simple assault—which is an essential element of an aggravated assault under OCGA § 16-5-21 (b)—is an attempted battery, simple assault under OCGA § 4 OCGA § 17-7-54 (a); see also Corhen, 306 Ga. App. at 497 . 5 Corhen, 306 Ga. App. at 497 ; see also Lowe v. State, 276 Ga. 538, 539 (2) ( 579 SE2d 728 ) (2003); Dunbar, 209 Ga. App. at 98 (2). 6 Sallee v. State, 329 Ga. App. 612, 616 (2) ( 765 SE2d 758 ) (2014); see also Corhen, 306 Ga. App. at 497 . 4 16-5-20 (a) (2) is not an inchoate offense and, therefore, a defendan | 1 | 1 |
Jeffrey v. Stategreen2 sentences2015Compare Jeffrey v. State, 296 Ga. 713 ( 770 SE2d 585 ) (2015) (multiple convictions for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon merged for purposes of sentencing). 8 8. 2015Compare Jeffrey v. State, 296 Ga. 713 ( 770 SE2d 585 ) (2015) (multiple convictions for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon merged for purposes of sentencing). 8 8. | 1 | 1 |
Kelley v. Stategreen2 sentences2015See Kelley v. State, 248 Ga. App. 721, 723 (1) ( 548 SE2d 357 ) (2001) (aggravated assault under OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2) (2011) and battery under OCGA § 16-5-23.1 (a) have different required elements). (b) We likewise conclude that under the required evidence test, Gipson’s two aggravated assault convictions did not merge. 7 As alleged in the indictment, aggravated assault with intent to murder required proof of a fact — the intent to kill — that aggravated assault with an offensive weapon did not, and aggravated assault with an offensive weapon required proof of a fact — use of the tree limb o 2015See Kelley v. State, 248 Ga. App. 721, 723 (1) ( 548 SE2d 357 ) (2001) (aggravated assault under OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2) (2011) and battery under OCGA § 16-5-23.1 (a) have different required elements). (b) We likewise conclude that under the required evidence test, Gipson’s two aggravated assault convictions did not merge. 7 As alleged in the indictment, aggravated assault with intent to murder required proof of a fact — the intent to kill — that aggravated assault with an offensive weapon did not, and aggravated assault with an offensive weapon required proof of a fact — use of the tree limb o | 1 | 1 |
Thomas v. Stategreen2 sentences2015See Thomas v. State, 292 Ga. 429, 434 (5) ( 738 SE2d 571 ) (2013) (aggravated assault convictions under OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (1) and (a) (2) (2011) did not merge under the required evidence test). 2015See Thomas v. State, 292 Ga. 429, 434 (5) ( 738 SE2d 571 ) (2013) (aggravated assault convictions under OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (1) and (a) (2) (2011) did not merge under the required evidence test). | 1 | 1 |
Simpson v. Stategreen2 sentences2014See Simpson v. State, 277 Ga. 356, 358 ( 589 SE2d 90 ) (2003) (“[A]n indictment for aggravated assault should . . . allege the aggravating aspect of the simple assault.”). 2014See Simpson v. State, 277 Ga. 356, 358 ( 589 SE2d 90 ) (2003) (“[A]n indictment for aggravated assault should . . . allege the aggravating aspect of the simple assault.”). | 1 | 1 |
Sidner v. Stategreen2 sentences2014We neither weigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses, but determine only whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of [each] crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 4 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Sidner v. State, 304 Ga. App. 373, 374 ( 696 SE2d 398 ) (2010). 2014We neither weigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses, but determine only whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of [each] crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 4 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Sidner v. State, 304 Ga. App. 373, 374 ( 696 SE2d 398 ) (2010). | 1 | 1 |
McGlasker v. Stategreen2 sentences2013We agree. ‘Whether offenses merge is a legal question, which we review de novo.” McGlasker v. State, 321 Ga. App. 614, 616 (2) ( 741 SE2d 303 ) (2013). 2013We agree. ‘Whether offenses merge is a legal question, which we review de novo.” McGlasker v. State, 321 Ga. App. 614, 616 (2) ( 741 SE2d 303 ) (2013). | 1 | 1 |
Blige v. Stategreen2 sentences2013Compare Blige v. State, 208 Ga. App. 851, 852 ( 432 SE2d 574 ) (1993) (reversing aggravated assault conviction where instruction emphasized that jury could convict defendant of aggravated assault if it found that he assaulted victim “with intent to rob,” rather than with an offensive weapon as alleged in the indictment), (aff’d on other grounds by 264 Ga. 166 ( 441 SE2d 752 ) (1994). 2013Compare Blige v. State, 208 Ga. App. 851, 852 ( 432 SE2d 574 ) (1993) (reversing aggravated assault conviction where instruction emphasized that jury could convict defendant of aggravated assault if it found that he assaulted victim “with intent to rob,” rather than with an offensive weapon as alleged in the indictment), (aff’d on other grounds by 264 Ga. 166 ( 441 SE2d 752 ) (1994). | 1 | 1 |
Blige v. Stategreen2 sentences2013Compare Blige v. State, 208 Ga. App. 851, 852 ( 432 SE2d 574 ) (1993) (reversing aggravated assault conviction where instruction emphasized that jury could convict defendant of aggravated assault if it found that he assaulted victim “with intent to rob,” rather than with an offensive weapon as alleged in the indictment), (aff’d on other grounds by 264 Ga. 166 ( 441 SE2d 752 ) (1994). 2013Compare Blige v. State, 208 Ga. App. 851, 852 ( 432 SE2d 574 ) (1993) (reversing aggravated assault conviction where instruction emphasized that jury could convict defendant of aggravated assault if it found that he assaulted victim “with intent to rob,” rather than with an offensive weapon as alleged in the indictment), (aff’d on other grounds by 264 Ga. 166 ( 441 SE2d 752 ) (1994). | 1 | 1 |
Morris v. Stategreen1 sentence2012Therefore, we conclude that this count was legally sufficient to withstand a general demurrer. 17 (ii) In Count 2, the indictment alleged that Wilson, “without lawful authority, did entice [S. J.], a child, from [N. J.], who has lawful custody of said child, contrary to the laws of said State [.]” Although the indictment did not allege that Wilson “knowingly or recklessly... entice[d]” the child, pursuant to OCGA § 16-5-45 (b) (1) (A), “[t]he failure to allege intent is not fatal where the indictment employs language that necessarily raises an inference that the requisite criminal intent exist | 1 | 1 |
Joiner v. Stategreen2 sentences2012Jones was charged with six counts of aggravated assault under OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2), which provides that “[a] person commits the offense of aggravated assault when he or she assaults [w]ith a 6 See English v. State, 301 Ga. App. 842, 842 ( 689 SE2d 130 ) (2010). 7 Joiner v. State, 299 Ga. App. 300, 300 ( 682 SE2d 381 ) (2009); see also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (III) (B) ( 99 SCt 2781 , 61 LE2d 560) (1979). 8 Miller v. State, 273 Ga. 831, 832 ( 546 SE2d 524 ) (2001) (punctuation omitted). 6 deadly weapon or with any object, device, or instrument which, when used offensively again 2012Jones was charged with six counts of aggravated assault under OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2), which provides that “[a] person commits the offense of aggravated assault when he or she assaults [w]ith a 6 See English v. State, 301 Ga. App. 842, 842 ( 689 SE2d 130 ) (2010). 7 Joiner v. State, 299 Ga. App. 300, 300 ( 682 SE2d 381 ) (2009); see also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (III) (B) ( 99 SCt 2781 , 61 LE2d 560) (1979). 8 Miller v. State, 273 Ga. 831, 832 ( 546 SE2d 524 ) (2001) (punctuation omitted). 6 deadly weapon or with any object, device, or instrument which, when used offensively again | 1 | 1 |
| Lambert v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
Louisyr v. Stategreen2 sentences2012We review the question of merger de novo, Louisyr v. State, 307 Ga. App. 724, 730 (2) ( 706 SE2d 114 ) (2011), bearing in mind, as our Supreme Court has explained, that aggravated assault and armed robbery do not merge as a matter of law, and they seldom merge as a matter of fact. 2012We review the question of merger de novo, Louisyr v. State, 307 Ga. App. 724, 730 (2) ( 706 SE2d 114 ) (2011), bearing in mind, as our Supreme Court has explained, that aggravated assault and armed robbery do not merge as a matter of law, and they seldom merge as a matter of fact. | 1 | 1 |
Miller v. Stategreen2 sentences2012Jones was charged with six counts of aggravated assault under OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2), which provides that “[a] person commits the offense of aggravated assault when he or she assaults [w]ith a 6 See English v. State, 301 Ga. App. 842, 842 ( 689 SE2d 130 ) (2010). 7 Joiner v. State, 299 Ga. App. 300, 300 ( 682 SE2d 381 ) (2009); see also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (III) (B) ( 99 SCt 2781 , 61 LE2d 560) (1979). 8 Miller v. State, 273 Ga. 831, 832 ( 546 SE2d 524 ) (2001) (punctuation omitted). 6 deadly weapon or with any object, device, or instrument which, when used offensively again 2012Jones was charged with six counts of aggravated assault under OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2), which provides that “[a] person commits the offense of aggravated assault when he or she assaults [w]ith a 6 See English v. State, 301 Ga. App. 842, 842 ( 689 SE2d 130 ) (2010). 7 Joiner v. State, 299 Ga. App. 300, 300 ( 682 SE2d 381 ) (2009); see also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (III) (B) ( 99 SCt 2781 , 61 LE2d 560) (1979). 8 Miller v. State, 273 Ga. 831, 832 ( 546 SE2d 524 ) (2001) (punctuation omitted). 6 deadly weapon or with any object, device, or instrument which, when used offensively again | 1 | 1 |
English v. Stategreen2 sentences2012Jones was charged with six counts of aggravated assault under OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2), which provides that “[a] person commits the offense of aggravated assault when he or she assaults [w]ith a 6 See English v. State, 301 Ga. App. 842, 842 ( 689 SE2d 130 ) (2010). 7 Joiner v. State, 299 Ga. App. 300, 300 ( 682 SE2d 381 ) (2009); see also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (III) (B) ( 99 SCt 2781 , 61 LE2d 560) (1979). 8 Miller v. State, 273 Ga. 831, 832 ( 546 SE2d 524 ) (2001) (punctuation omitted). 6 deadly weapon or with any object, device, or instrument which, when used offensively again 2012Jones was charged with six counts of aggravated assault under OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2), which provides that “[a] person commits the offense of aggravated assault when he or she assaults [w]ith a 6 See English v. State, 301 Ga. App. 842, 842 ( 689 SE2d 130 ) (2010). 7 Joiner v. State, 299 Ga. App. 300, 300 ( 682 SE2d 381 ) (2009); see also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (III) (B) ( 99 SCt 2781 , 61 LE2d 560) (1979). 8 Miller v. State, 273 Ga. 831, 832 ( 546 SE2d 524 ) (2001) (punctuation omitted). 6 deadly weapon or with any object, device, or instrument which, when used offensively again | 1 | 1 |
Garrett v. Stategreen1 sentence2012See id. (finding that, because the aggravated assault conviction was “established by proof of the same or less than all the facts” that were required to establish the aggravated assault on a peace officer conviction, the crimes had to be merged for sentencing). 16 Consequently, pretermitting whether this count sufficiently charged Wilson with assaulting someone he knows is a peace officer, pursuant to OCGA § 16-5-21 (c), he still cannot admit to these allegations without being guilty of committing the lesser included offense of aggravated assault under OCGA § 16-5-21 (a) (2). | 1 | 1 |
| Henderson v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| May v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Wright v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bundren v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hammock v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Stevenson v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Adams v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Reddick v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Joiner v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Cooper v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Spear v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Smith v. Hardrick
green
2 sentences2008Notably, it remains “[un]necessary that an indictment charging a defendant with aggravated assault specify the manner in which the simple assault was committed, but it must set forth the aggravating aspect.” Chase v. State, 277 Ga. 636, 638 (1) ( 592 SE2d 656 ) (2004). 9 White v. State, 267 Ga. 523, 524 (5) ( 481 SE2d 804 ) (1997). 10 266 Ga. 54 ( 464 SE2d 198 ) (1995). 11 Id. at 55 (2); see also Maynor v. State, 257 Ga. App. 151, 153 ( 570 SE2d 428 ) (2002) (“offense of aggravated assault under OCGA § 16-5-21 has two essential elements: (1) that a *367 simple assault under OCGA § 16-5-20 was 2008Notably, it remains “[un]necessary that an indictment charging a defendant with aggravated assault specify the manner in which the simple assault was committed, but it must set forth the aggravating aspect.” Chase v. State, 277 Ga. 636, 638 (1) ( 592 SE2d 656 ) (2004). 9 White v. State, 267 Ga. 523, 524 (5) ( 481 SE2d 804 ) (1997). 10 266 Ga. 54 ( 464 SE2d 198 ) (1995). 11 Id. at 55 (2); see also Maynor v. State, 257 Ga. App. 151, 153 ( 570 SE2d 428 ) (2002) (“offense of aggravated assault under OCGA § 16-5-21 has two essential elements: (1) that a *367 simple assault under OCGA § 16-5-20 was | 2 | 1999–2008 |
Harris v. State
neutral
2 sentences2019OCGA § 16-5-20 states: (a) a person commits the offense of simple assault when he either: (1) Attempts to commit a violent injury to the person of another; or (2) Commits an act which places another in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury. 7 (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Harris v. State, 273 Ga. App. 90 ( 614 SE2d 189 ) (2005). 2019OCGA § 16-5-20 states: (a) a person commits the offense of simple assault when he either: (1) Attempts to commit a violent injury to the person of another; or (2) Commits an act which places another in reasonable apprehension of immediately receiving a violent injury. 7 (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Harris v. State, 273 Ga. App. 90 ( 614 SE2d 189 ) (2005). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Brinson v. State green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| McWilliams v. State neutral | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Doss v. State green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Hurt v. State green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.