section 9-11-12(b) state a claim in Georgia

2020When reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, “the pleading being challenged . . . is construed in favor of the party who filed it.” Northway, 291 Ga. at 229 .

2016“On appeal, a trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim for which relief may be granted is reviewed de novo and the pleading challenged, i. e., the [complaint], is construed in favor of the party who filed it.” Northway v. Allen, 291 Ga. 227, 229 ( 728 SE2d 624 ) (2012) (citation omitted).

2022“A motion to dismiss based upon the lack of an expert affidavit is a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (6).” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Brown v. Tift Health Care, Inc., 279 Ga. App. 164, 164 ( 630 SE2d 788 ) (2006).

2022“A motion to dismiss based upon the lack of an expert affidavit is a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (6).” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Brown v. Tift Health Care, Inc., 279 Ga. App. 164, 164 ( 630 SE2d 788 ) (2006).

2026See Bonner v. Peterson, 301 Ga. App. 443, 443 ( 687 SE2d 676 ) (2009) (contrasting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under OCGA § 9-11-12(b)(6) with a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under OCGA § 9-11-12(b)(1)).

2026See Bonner v. Peterson, 301 Ga. App. 443, 443 ( 687 SE2d 676 ) (2009) (contrasting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under OCGA § 9-11-12(b)(6) with a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under OCGA § 9-11-12(b)(1)).

2024And a motion to dismiss based upon the lack of an expert affidavit “is one for failure to state a claim under OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (6).” Zephaniah v. Ga. Clinic, P.C., 350 Ga. App. 408, 410 ( 829 SE2d 448 ) (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted); Holloway v. Northside Hosp., 230 Ga. App. 371, 371-372 ( 496 SE2d 510 ) (1998) (dismissing claim where the plaintiffs alleged the nurses “should have known that she was subject to falling” because the claim amounted to professional negligence and the plaintiffs’ failure to attach a professional affidavit mandated dismissal).

2024And a motion to dismiss based upon the lack of an expert affidavit “is one for failure to state a claim under OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (6).” Zephaniah v. Ga. Clinic, P.C., 350 Ga. App. 408, 410 ( 829 SE2d 448 ) (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted); Holloway v. Northside Hosp., 230 Ga. App. 371, 371-372 ( 496 SE2d 510 ) (1998) (dismissing claim where the plaintiffs alleged the nurses “should have known that she was subject to falling” because the claim amounted to professional negligence and the plaintiffs’ failure to attach a professional affidavit mandated dismissal).

2023We disagree. 5 OCGA § 9-11-9.1 imposes “an initial pleading requirement on the plaintiff in a malpractice action.”3 And a motion to dismiss based upon the lack of expert affidavit is “a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (6).”4 Needless to say, this Court conducts a de novo review of “a trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss.”5 And in doing so, we are charged with construing “the pleadings in the light most favorable to the [plaintiff] with all doubts resolved in [the plaintiff’s] favor.”6 Indeed, unless the allegations of the complaint disclose with c

2023We disagree. 5 OCGA § 9-11-9.1 imposes “an initial pleading requirement on the plaintiff in a malpractice action.”3 And a motion to dismiss based upon the lack of expert affidavit is “a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (6).”4 Needless to say, this Court conducts a de novo review of “a trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss.”5 And in doing so, we are charged with construing “the pleadings in the light most favorable to the [plaintiff] with all doubts resolved in [the plaintiff’s] favor.”6 Indeed, unless the allegations of the complaint disclose with c

2023Joseph’s/Candler Health Sys., Inc., 341 Ga. App. 371, 371 ( 800 SE2d 395 ) (2017); Brown v. Tift Health Care, Inc., 279 Ga. App. 164, 165 ( 630 SE2d 788 ) (2006). 5 Dove v. Ty Cobb Healthcare Sys., 316 Ga. App. 7, 9 ( 729 SE2d 58 ) (2012) (punctuation omitted). 6 Procter, 312 Ga. App. at 487 (1) (punctuation omitted). 7 See id. 6 In any action for damages alleging professional malpractice against [a] professional licensed by the State of Georgia and listed in subsection (g) of this Code section . . . the plaintiff shall be required to file with the complaint an affidavit of an expert competent

2023Joseph’s/Candler Health Sys., Inc., 341 Ga. App. 371, 371 ( 800 SE2d 395 ) (2017); Brown v. Tift Health Care, Inc., 279 Ga. App. 164, 165 ( 630 SE2d 788 ) (2006). 5 Dove v. Ty Cobb Healthcare Sys., 316 Ga. App. 7, 9 ( 729 SE2d 58 ) (2012) (punctuation omitted). 6 Procter, 312 Ga. App. at 487 (1) (punctuation omitted). 7 See id. 6 In any action for damages alleging professional malpractice against [a] professional licensed by the State of Georgia and listed in subsection (g) of this Code section . . . the plaintiff shall be required to file with the complaint an affidavit of an expert competent

2018At that time, the trial court noted that the claim failed because plaintiffs were not strangers to the contracts or business relationships between the Medical Center and CGAS; rather, plaintiffs were "all parties to an interwoven set of contracts." See Galardi v. Steele-Inman , 266 Ga. App. 515 , 521 (3), 597 S.E.2d 571 (2004) ("all parties to a comprehensive interwoven set of contracts are not liable for tortious interference with any of the contracts or business relationships") (footnote omitted).

2018At that time, the trial court noted that the claim failed because plaintiffs were not strangers to the contracts or business relationships between the Medical Center and CGAS; rather, plaintiffs were "all parties to an interwoven set of contracts." See Galardi v. Steele-Inman , 266 Ga. App. 515 , 521 (3), 597 S.E.2d 571 (2004) ("all parties to a comprehensive interwoven set of contracts are not liable for tortious interference with any of the contracts or business relationships") (footnote omitted).

2023See generally OCGA § 9-11-56; Austin, 294 Ga. at 774-775 ; Griffith, 366 Ga. App. at 871 (3) (“When a defendant moves for summary judgment on the basis of official immunity, he bears the burden of establishing that he was entitled to the protection of said immunity.”) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2019Such a motion is properly granted when the plaintiff “would not be entitled to relief under any state of provable facts asserted in support” of the allegations in the complaint and “could not possibly introduce evidence within the framework of the complaint sufficient to warrant a grant of the relief sought.” Austin 12 v. Clark, 294 Ga. 773, 774-775 ( 755 SE2d 796 ) (2014) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2025(Citation, punctuation, and emphasis omitted.) McLeod, 369 Ga. App. at 717-718.

2024And a motion to dismiss based upon the lack of an expert affidavit “is one for failure to state a claim under OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (6).” Zephaniah v. Ga. Clinic, P.C., 350 Ga. App. 408, 410 ( 829 SE2d 448 ) (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted); Holloway v. Northside Hosp., 230 Ga. App. 371, 371-372 ( 496 SE2d 510 ) (1998) (dismissing claim where the plaintiffs alleged the nurses “should have known that she was subject to falling” because the claim amounted to professional negligence and the plaintiffs’ failure to attach a professional affidavit mandated dismissal).

2024And a motion to dismiss based upon the lack of an expert affidavit “is one for failure to state a claim under OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (6).” Zephaniah v. Ga. Clinic, P.C., 350 Ga. App. 408, 410 ( 829 SE2d 448 ) (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted); Holloway v. Northside Hosp., 230 Ga. App. 371, 371-372 ( 496 SE2d 510 ) (1998) (dismissing claim where the plaintiffs alleged the nurses “should have known that she was subject to falling” because the claim amounted to professional negligence and the plaintiffs’ failure to attach a professional affidavit mandated dismissal).

2023(Citation, punctuation, and footnote omitted; emphasis supplied.) Lyle v. Fulcrum Loan Holdings, 354 Ga. App. 742 ( 841 SE2d 182 ) (2020); see also Depository Trust & Clearing Corp. v. Jones, 348 Ga. App. 474, 475 ( 823 SE2d 558 ) (2019); Osprey 2 Cove Real Estate v. Towerview Constr., 343 Ga. App. 436, 437 (1) ( 808 SE2d 425 ) (2017).

2023(Citation, punctuation, and footnote omitted; emphasis supplied.) Lyle v. Fulcrum Loan Holdings, 354 Ga. App. 742 ( 841 SE2d 182 ) (2020); see also Depository Trust & Clearing Corp. v. Jones, 348 Ga. App. 474, 475 ( 823 SE2d 558 ) (2019); Osprey 2 Cove Real Estate v. Towerview Constr., 343 Ga. App. 436, 437 (1) ( 808 SE2d 425 ) (2017).

2023Abramson v. Williams, 281 Ga. App. 617, 618 ( 636 SE2d 765 ) (2006).

2023Abramson v. Williams, 281 Ga. App. 617, 618 ( 636 SE2d 765 ) (2006).

2023(Citation, punctuation, and footnote omitted; emphasis supplied.) Lyle v. Fulcrum Loan Holdings, 354 Ga. App. 742 ( 841 SE2d 182 ) (2020); see also Depository Trust & Clearing Corp. v. Jones, 348 Ga. App. 474, 475 ( 823 SE2d 558 ) (2019); Osprey 2 Cove Real Estate v. Towerview Constr., 343 Ga. App. 436, 437 (1) ( 808 SE2d 425 ) (2017).

2023(Citation, punctuation, and footnote omitted; emphasis supplied.) Lyle v. Fulcrum Loan Holdings, 354 Ga. App. 742 ( 841 SE2d 182 ) (2020); see also Depository Trust & Clearing Corp. v. Jones, 348 Ga. App. 474, 475 ( 823 SE2d 558 ) (2019); Osprey 2 Cove Real Estate v. Towerview Constr., 343 Ga. App. 436, 437 (1) ( 808 SE2d 425 ) (2017).

2023Joseph’s/Candler Health Sys., Inc., 341 Ga. App. 371, 371 ( 800 SE2d 395 ) (2017); Brown v. Tift Health Care, Inc., 279 Ga. App. 164, 165 ( 630 SE2d 788 ) (2006). 5 Dove v. Ty Cobb Healthcare Sys., 316 Ga. App. 7, 9 ( 729 SE2d 58 ) (2012) (punctuation omitted). 6 Procter, 312 Ga. App. at 487 (1) (punctuation omitted). 7 See id. 6 In any action for damages alleging professional malpractice against [a] professional licensed by the State of Georgia and listed in subsection (g) of this Code section . . . the plaintiff shall be required to file with the complaint an affidavit of an expert competent

2023Joseph’s/Candler Health Sys., Inc., 341 Ga. App. 371, 371 ( 800 SE2d 395 ) (2017); Brown v. Tift Health Care, Inc., 279 Ga. App. 164, 165 ( 630 SE2d 788 ) (2006). 5 Dove v. Ty Cobb Healthcare Sys., 316 Ga. App. 7, 9 ( 729 SE2d 58 ) (2012) (punctuation omitted). 6 Procter, 312 Ga. App. at 487 (1) (punctuation omitted). 7 See id. 6 In any action for damages alleging professional malpractice against [a] professional licensed by the State of Georgia and listed in subsection (g) of this Code section . . . the plaintiff shall be required to file with the complaint an affidavit of an expert competent

2022“On appeal, this Court reviews the denial of a motion to dismiss de novo, construing the pleadings in the light most favorable to the plaintiff with any doubts resolved in [his] favor.” Siska v. McNeil, 346 Ga. App. 429, 431 ( 816 SE2d 423 ) (2018).

2022“On appeal, this Court reviews the denial of a motion to dismiss de novo, construing the pleadings in the light most favorable to the plaintiff with any doubts resolved in [his] favor.” Siska v. McNeil, 346 Ga. App. 429, 431 ( 816 SE2d 423 ) (2018).

2022See Champion Windows of Chattanooga v. Edwards, 326 Ga. App. 232, 242 (2), n. 9 ( 756 SE2d 314 ) (2014) (“Issues and objections not raised in the trial court and ruled on by the trial court are deemed waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal”) (citation and punctuation omitted).Second, Ramos’s argument overlooks the fact that Owens moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (1), not for failure to state a claim pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (6).

2022See Champion Windows of Chattanooga v. Edwards, 326 Ga. App. 232, 242 (2), n. 9 ( 756 SE2d 314 ) (2014) (“Issues and objections not raised in the trial court and ruled on by the trial court are deemed waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal”) (citation and punctuation omitted).Second, Ramos’s argument overlooks the fact that Owens moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (1), not for failure to state a claim pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (6).

2021See generally Thompson, 354 Ga. App. at 205-206 (1) (noting that trial court serves as finder of fact in ruling on a motion to dismiss under OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (1)).

2020“In considering a motion for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity, a trial court is not confined to the allegations of the complaint, as the court would be if considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (6).” James, 337 Ga. App. at 867 (2).

2020See Balamo, 343 Ga. App. at 171 (1).

2019See City of Peachtree City v. Shaver, 276 Ga. 298, 301 ( 578 SE2d 409 ) (2003) (“A defendant is entitled to a charging instrument that is perfect in form as well as substance, and the proper method to challenge the form of such instrument is a special demurrer.” (citations omitted)); see also Kimbrough, 300 Ga. at 880-881 (“By filing a special demurrer, the accused claims not that the charge in an indictment is fatally defective and incapable of supporting a conviction (as 6 direct the parties to the helpful analogy to the Civil Practice Act expressed in Kimbrough: “A motion to dismiss for fai

2019See City of Peachtree City v. Shaver, 276 Ga. 298, 301 ( 578 SE2d 409 ) (2003) (“A defendant is entitled to a charging instrument that is perfect in form as well as substance, and the proper method to challenge the form of such instrument is a special demurrer.” (citations omitted)); see also Kimbrough, 300 Ga. at 880-881 (“By filing a special demurrer, the accused claims not that the charge in an indictment is fatally defective and incapable of supporting a conviction (as 6 direct the parties to the helpful analogy to the Civil Practice Act expressed in Kimbrough: “A motion to dismiss for fai

2019See City of Peachtree City v. Shaver, 276 Ga. 298, 301 ( 578 SE2d 409 ) (2003) (“A defendant is entitled to a charging instrument that is perfect in form as well as substance, and the proper method to challenge the form of such instrument is a special demurrer.” (citations omitted)); see also Kimbrough, 300 Ga. at 880-881 (“By filing a special demurrer, the accused claims not that the charge in an indictment is fatally defective and incapable of supporting a conviction (as 6 direct the parties to the helpful analogy to the Civil Practice Act expressed in Kimbrough: “A motion to dismiss for fai

2019See City of Peachtree City v. Shaver, 276 Ga. 298, 301 ( 578 SE2d 409 ) (2003) (“A defendant is entitled to a charging instrument that is perfect in form as well as substance, and the proper method to challenge the form of such instrument is a special demurrer.” (citations omitted)); see also Kimbrough, 300 Ga. at 880-881 (“By filing a special demurrer, the accused claims not that the charge in an indictment is fatally defective and incapable of supporting a conviction (as 6 direct the parties to the helpful analogy to the Civil Practice Act expressed in Kimbrough: “A motion to dismiss for fai

2019We therefore review the trial court’s order based on the understanding that the indictment was dismissed based on a general demurrer, and we conduct that review “de novo in order to determine whether the allegations in the indictment are legally sufficient.” State v. Cohen, 302 Ga. 616, 618 ( 807 SE2d 861 ) (2017) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2019We therefore review the trial court’s order based on the understanding that the indictment was dismissed based on a general demurrer, and we conduct that review “de novo in order to determine whether the allegations in the indictment are legally sufficient.” State v. Cohen, 302 Ga. 616, 618 ( 807 SE2d 861 ) (2017) (citation and punctuation omitted).

2017“We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss de novo, viewing all well-pled allegations in the complaint as true.” (Citation omitted.) Hobbs v. Great Expressions Dental Centers of Ga., 337 Ga.App. 248, 248 ( 786 SE2d 897 ) (2016).

2017“We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss de novo, viewing all well-pled allegations in the complaint as true.” (Citation omitted.) Hobbs v. Great Expressions Dental Centers of Ga., 337 Ga.App. 248, 248 ( 786 SE2d 897 ) (2016).

2013The minimum pleading requirements are found in OCGA § 9-11-8 (a) (2) (A), which requires that the complaint contain “[a] short and plain statement of the claims showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” and we have held that the touchstone is fair notice — “this short and plain statement must include enough detail to afford the defendant fair notice of the nature of the claim and a fair opportunity to frame a responsive pleading.” (Citations omitted.) Benedict v. State Farm Bank, FSB, 309 Ga. App. 133, 134 (1) ( 709 SE2d 314 ) (2011).

2013The minimum pleading requirements are found in OCGA § 9-11-8 (a) (2) (A), which requires that the complaint contain “[a] short and plain statement of the claims showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” and we have held that the touchstone is fair notice — “this short and plain statement must include enough detail to afford the defendant fair notice of the nature of the claim and a fair opportunity to frame a responsive pleading.” (Citations omitted.) Benedict v. State Farm Bank, FSB, 309 Ga. App. 133, 134 (1) ( 709 SE2d 314 ) (2011).

2012See Bd. of Regents of the University Sys. of Ga. v. Canas, 295 Ga. App. 505, 507 (1) ( 672 SE2d 471 ) (2009). 5 LaSonde v. Chase Mortgage Co., 259 Ga. App. 772, 774 (1) ( 577 SE2d 822 ) (2003). 5 merits of the plaintiff’s claim.”6 Accordingly, Gold—the party seeking to benefit from the waiver of sovereign immunity—had the burden of proof to establish waiver.7 Our review of the trial court’s denial of the District’s motion to dismiss on sovereign- immunity grounds is de novo.8 The Board, the School District, the Board’s members, and the superintendent9 enjoy sovereign immunity.10 Indeed, it is

2012See Bd. of Regents of the University Sys. of Ga. v. Canas, 295 Ga. App. 505, 507 (1) ( 672 SE2d 471 ) (2009). 5 LaSonde v. Chase Mortgage Co., 259 Ga. App. 772, 774 (1) ( 577 SE2d 822 ) (2003). 5 merits of the plaintiff’s claim.”6 Accordingly, Gold—the party seeking to benefit from the waiver of sovereign immunity—had the burden of proof to establish waiver.7 Our review of the trial court’s denial of the District’s motion to dismiss on sovereign- immunity grounds is de novo.8 The Board, the School District, the Board’s members, and the superintendent9 enjoy sovereign immunity.10 Indeed, it is

2012See Bd. of Regents of the University Sys. of Ga. v. Canas, 295 Ga. App. 505, 507 (1) ( 672 SE2d 471 ) (2009). 5 LaSonde v. Chase Mortgage Co., 259 Ga. App. 772, 774 (1) ( 577 SE2d 822 ) (2003). 5 merits of the plaintiff’s claim.”6 Accordingly, Gold—the party seeking to benefit from the waiver of sovereign immunity—had the burden of proof to establish waiver.7 Our review of the trial court’s denial of the District’s motion to dismiss on sovereign- immunity grounds is de novo.8 The Board, the School District, the Board’s members, and the superintendent9 enjoy sovereign immunity.10 Indeed, it is

2012See Bd. of Regents of the University Sys. of Ga. v. Canas, 295 Ga. App. 505, 507 (1) ( 672 SE2d 471 ) (2009). 5 LaSonde v. Chase Mortgage Co., 259 Ga. App. 772, 774 (1) ( 577 SE2d 822 ) (2003). 5 merits of the plaintiff’s claim.”6 Accordingly, Gold—the party seeking to benefit from the waiver of sovereign immunity—had the burden of proof to establish waiver.7 Our review of the trial court’s denial of the District’s motion to dismiss on sovereign- immunity grounds is de novo.8 The Board, the School District, the Board’s members, and the superintendent9 enjoy sovereign immunity.10 Indeed, it is