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33 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1987–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hernon v. EW Corrigan Const. Co.green2 sentences1995The court was well aware of section 13 — 202 and noted that personal injuries at construction sites "could fall neatly under either statute of limitations.” (Hernon, 149 Ill. 2d at 194, 595 N.E.2d at 562 .) But, the court concluded: "based upon our general rules of statutory construction, our appellate court’s interpretation of the repose portion of section 13 — 214, and the legislative history of section 13 — 214, we agree with the plaintiff that section 13 — 214(a) governs his cause.” (Hernon, 149 Ill. 2d at 194, 595 N.E.2d at 562 .) The court held that although the claim could fit into eith 1995The court was well aware of section 13 — 202 and noted that personal injuries at construction sites "could fall neatly under either statute of limitations.” (Hernon, 149 Ill. 2d at 194, 595 N.E.2d at 562 .) But, the court concluded: "based upon our general rules of statutory construction, our appellate court’s interpretation of the repose portion of section 13 — 214, and the legislative history of section 13 — 214, we agree with the plaintiff that section 13 — 214(a) governs his cause.” (Hernon, 149 Ill. 2d at 194, 595 N.E.2d at 562 .) The court held that although the claim could fit into eith | 2 | 3 |
Tregenza v. Lehman Brothers, Inc.green2 sentences2002See, e.g., Tregenza v. Lehman Brothers, Inc., 287 Ill. 2002See, e.g. , Tregenza v. Lehman Bros. , 287 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
Antunes v. Sookhakitchgreen2 sentences2001See Antunes v. Sookhakitch, 146 Ill. 2d 477, 486 (1992) (referring to the repose period of section 13 — 212(b)). 2001See Antunes v. Sookhakitch , 146 Ill. 2d 477, 486 (1992) (referring to the repose period of section 13–212(b)). | 2 | 2 |
Ferguson v. McKenziegreen2 sentences2004Ferguson , 202 Ill. 2d at 313 . 2004Ferguson, 202 Ill. 2d at 313 . | 1 | 3 |
Limer v. Lymangreen2 sentences2001See also Limer v. Lyman , 220 Ill. App. 3d 1036, 1043 (1991) (concluding that medical malpractice statute of repose found in section 13--212(a) of the Code operated to bar the plaintiff's wrongful death action); Wolfe v. Westlake Community Hospital , 173 Ill. App. 3d 608, 612 (1988) (finding that the plaintiff had two years from the date of her husband's death to file her wrongful death claim provided that two-year limitations period did not exceed four-year medical malpractice statute of repose). 2001See also Limer v. Lyman, 220 Ill. App. 3d 1036, 1043 (1991) (concluding that medical malpractice statute of repose found in section 13 — 212(a) of the Code operated to bar the plaintiffs wrongful death action); Wolfe v. Westlake Community Hospital, 173 Ill. App. 3d 608, 612 (1988) (finding that the plaintiff had two years from the date of her husband’s death to file her wrongful death claim provided that two-year limitations period did not exceed four-year medical malpractice statute of repose). | 1 | 2 |
Will v. Northwestern Universitygreen1 sentence2009See Will v. Northwestern University, 378 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
Wolfe v. Westlake Community Hospitalgreen2 sentences2001See also Limer v. Lyman , 220 Ill. App. 3d 1036, 1043 (1991) (concluding that medical malpractice statute of repose found in section 13--212(a) of the Code operated to bar the plaintiff's wrongful death action); Wolfe v. Westlake Community Hospital , 173 Ill. App. 3d 608, 612 (1988) (finding that the plaintiff had two years from the date of her husband's death to file her wrongful death claim provided that two-year limitations period did not exceed four-year medical malpractice statute of repose). 2001See also Limer v. Lyman, 220 Ill. App. 3d 1036, 1043 (1991) (concluding that medical malpractice statute of repose found in section 13 — 212(a) of the Code operated to bar the plaintiffs wrongful death action); Wolfe v. Westlake Community Hospital, 173 Ill. App. 3d 608, 612 (1988) (finding that the plaintiff had two years from the date of her husband’s death to file her wrongful death claim provided that two-year limitations period did not exceed four-year medical malpractice statute of repose). | 1 | 1 |
Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Industrial Commissiongreen1 sentence1993(A, C & S, 131 Ill. 2d at 477, 546 N.E.2d at 603.) Although the supreme court did not distinguish the limitations and repose provisions of section 13 — 213 of the Code in finding the school districts exempt from the operation of the time bar, the court likely considered the repose provision because sales of the asbestos products used in the construction of the schools occurred as early as 1946, which would have triggered that portion of the statute. | 1 | 1 |
Bellevue Sch. Dist. v. BRAZIER CONSTR.red2 sentences1993(See Bellevue School District No. 405 v. Brazier Construction Co. (1984), 103 Wash. 2d 111, 118-20 , 691 P.2d 178, 182-83 (a statute of repose creates no statutory rights as does a non-claim statute and differs from a statute of limitations only by the point at which the limitations period begins to run); Rowan County Board of Education v. United States Gypsum Co. (1992), 332 N.C. 1 , 14- 16, 418 S.E.2d 648, 657-58 (despite the fact that statutes of repose differ in some respects from those of limitation, they are still time limitations and therefore still subject to the doctrine that time doe 1993(See Bellevue School District No. 405 v. Brazier Construction Co. (1984), 103 Wash. 2d 111, 118-20 , 691 P.2d 178, 182-83 (a statute of repose creates no statutory rights as does a non-claim statute and differs from a statute of limitations only by the point at which the limitations period begins to run); Rowan County Board of Education v. United States Gypsum Co. (1992), 332 N.C. 1 , 14- 16, 418 S.E.2d 648, 657-58 (despite the fact that statutes of repose differ in some respects from those of limitation, they are still time limitations and therefore still subject to the doctrine that time doe | 1 | 1 |
Rowan County Board of Education v. United States Gypsum Co.green2 sentences1993(See Bellevue School District No. 405 v. Brazier Construction Co. (1984), 103 Wash. 2d 111, 118-20 , 691 P.2d 178, 182-83 (a statute of repose creates no statutory rights as does a non-claim statute and differs from a statute of limitations only by the point at which the limitations period begins to run); Rowan County Board of Education v. United States Gypsum Co. (1992), 332 N.C. 1 , 14- 16, 418 S.E.2d 648, 657-58 (despite the fact that statutes of repose differ in some respects from those of limitation, they are still time limitations and therefore still subject to the doctrine that time doe 1993(See Bellevue School District No. 405 v. Brazier Construction Co. (1984), 103 Wash. 2d 111, 118-20 , 691 P.2d 178, 182-83 (a statute of repose creates no statutory rights as does a non-claim statute and differs from a statute of limitations only by the point at which the limitations period begins to run); Rowan County Board of Education v. United States Gypsum Co. (1992), 332 N.C. 1 , 14- 16, 418 S.E.2d 648, 657-58 (despite the fact that statutes of repose differ in some respects from those of limitation, they are still time limitations and therefore still subject to the doctrine that time doe | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp.green2 sentences1993(See Bellevue School District No. 405 v. Brazier Construction Co. (1984), 103 Wash. 2d 111, 118-20 , 691 P.2d 178, 182-83 (a statute of repose creates no statutory rights as does a non-claim statute and differs from a statute of limitations only by the point at which the limitations period begins to run); Rowan County Board of Education v. United States Gypsum Co. (1992), 332 N.C. 1 , 14- 16, 418 S.E.2d 648, 657-58 (despite the fact that statutes of repose differ in some respects from those of limitation, they are still time limitations and therefore still subject to the doctrine that time doe 1993(See Bellevue School District No. 405 v. Brazier Construction Co. (1984), 103 Wash. 2d 111, 118-20 , 691 P.2d 178, 182-83 (a statute of repose creates no statutory rights as does a non-claim statute and differs from a statute of limitations only by the point at which the limitations period begins to run); Rowan County Board of Education v. United States Gypsum Co. (1992), 332 N.C. 1 , 14- 16, 418 S.E.2d 648, 657-58 (despite the fact that statutes of repose differ in some respects from those of limitation, they are still time limitations and therefore still subject to the doctrine that time doe | 1 | 1 |
Board of Library Directors v. Skidmoregreen1 sentence1992App. 3d at 472 , 532 N.E.2d at 319 ; see also Board of Library Directors v. Skidmore, Owings & Merrill (1991), 215 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Orlak v. Loyola University Health System
green
2 sentences2011We also reiterated that the purpose of the statute of repose in section 13 — 212 is to curtail “potentially open-ended liability for health-care providers” and “reduce the cost of medical malpractice insurance and to assure its continued availability to medical practitioners.” Id. at 17 . 2011We also reiterated that the purpose of the statute of repose in section 13–212 is to curtail “potentially open-ended liability for health-care providers” and “reduce the cost of medical malpractice insurance and to assure its continued availability to medical practitioners.” Id. at 17 . | 4 | 2009–2011 |
Cammon v. West Suburban Hospital Medical Center
green
2 sentences2007Cammon, 301 Ill. 2007Cammon, 301 Ill. | 2 | 2007–2007 |
Best v. Taylor MacHine Works
green
2 sentences2004Best, 179 Ill. 2d at 467 . 2004Best , 179 Ill. 2d at 467 . | 2 | 2004–2004 |
Wackrow v. Niemi
green
1 sentence2015Charles thus argues that the statute of repose under section 13- 214.3(c) would not have expired until December 21, 2012, six years after Mary's death, such that his June 2012 complaint was also timely under that provision. ¶ 33 Molitor, on the other hand, argues that this case is governed by section 13-214.3(d), as construed by our supreme court in Wackrow v. Niemi, 231 Ill. 2d 418 (2008). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Brucker v. Mercola
green
2 sentences2009Further, the court determined that the repose period of section 13 — 212(b) had not been tolled.” Brucker, 227 Ill. 2d at 511 , 886 N.E.2d at 311 . 2009Further, the court determined that the repose period of section 13 — 212(b) had not been tolled.” Brucker, 227 Ill. 2d at 511 , 886 N.E.2d at 311 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
prod.liab.rep. (Cch) P 13,357 Mae G. Stiffler v. Lutheran Hospital, D/B/A Hoopeston Community Memorial Hospital
green
1 sentence2009Stiffler, 965 F.2d at 139 . | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Elliott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.
green
1 sentence1998Elliott, 173 Ill. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
People v. Asbestospray Corp.
green
1 sentence1995However, in order to come within the repose provisions of the statute, "a manufacturer must perform some role related to the construction site beyond provision of standard products generally available to the public and not custom designed for the project.” (People v. Asbestospray Corp. (1993), 247 Ill. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
St. Louis v. Rockwell Graphic Systems, Inc.
green
2 sentences1995Louis v. Rockwell Graphic Systems, Inc. (1992), 153 Ill. 2d 1 , 605 N.E.2d 555 , the supreme court examined the question of whether a manufacturer of a printing press which was installed in a building undergoing expansion was protected by the repose provisions of section 13 — 214 of the Code. 1995Louis v. Rockwell Graphic Systems, Inc. (1992), 153 Ill. 2d 1 , 605 N.E.2d 555 , the supreme court examined the question of whether a manufacturer of a printing press which was installed in a building undergoing expansion was protected by the repose provisions of section 13 — 214 of the Code. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Signode Corp. v. Normandale Properties, Inc.
green
2 sentences1993Pursuant to motions filed by defendants and the State’s election to stand on its complaint, the circuit court dismissed the State’s complaint as untimely pursuant to sections 13 — 214(b) and 13 — 213(b) of the Code, finding (1) the repose provisions of section 13 — 213(b) of the Code constitute substantive law applicable equally to public bodies and to private individuals from which the State was not immune (citing In re Estate of Bird (1951), 410 Ill. 390, 397 , 102 N.E.2d 329, 333 ); (2) the repose provisions of the “construction” statute, section 13-214(b) of the Code, expressly applied to 1993Pursuant to motions filed by defendants and the State’s election to stand on its complaint, the circuit court dismissed the State’s complaint as untimely pursuant to sections 13 — 214(b) and 13 — 213(b) of the Code, finding (1) the repose provisions of section 13 — 213(b) of the Code constitute substantive law applicable equally to public bodies and to private individuals from which the State was not immune (citing In re Estate of Bird (1951), 410 Ill. 390, 397 , 102 N.E.2d 329, 333 ); (2) the repose provisions of the “construction” statute, section 13-214(b) of the Code, expressly applied to | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Illinois Public Aid Commission v. Sanderson
green
2 sentences1993Pursuant to motions filed by defendants and the State’s election to stand on its complaint, the circuit court dismissed the State’s complaint as untimely pursuant to sections 13 — 214(b) and 13 — 213(b) of the Code, finding (1) the repose provisions of section 13 — 213(b) of the Code constitute substantive law applicable equally to public bodies and to private individuals from which the State was not immune (citing In re Estate of Bird (1951), 410 Ill. 390, 397 , 102 N.E.2d 329, 333 ); (2) the repose provisions of the “construction” statute, section 13-214(b) of the Code, expressly applied to 1993Pursuant to motions filed by defendants and the State’s election to stand on its complaint, the circuit court dismissed the State’s complaint as untimely pursuant to sections 13 — 214(b) and 13 — 213(b) of the Code, finding (1) the repose provisions of section 13 — 213(b) of the Code constitute substantive law applicable equally to public bodies and to private individuals from which the State was not immune (citing In re Estate of Bird (1951), 410 Ill. 390, 397 , 102 N.E.2d 329, 333 ); (2) the repose provisions of the “construction” statute, section 13-214(b) of the Code, expressly applied to | 1 | 1993–1993 |
People Ex Rel. Hanrahan v. White
green
1 sentence1992Hanrahan v. White (1972), 52 Ill. 2d 70, 73 .) “In determining the legislative intent, courts should consider first the statutory language.” (Boykin, 94 Ill. 2d at 141 ; Harvey Firemen’s Association v. City of Harvey (1979), 75 Ill. 2d 358 .) Unambiguous terms, when not specifically defined, must be given their plain and ordinary meaning. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
La Salle National Bank v. Edward M. Cohon & Associates, Ltd.
green
2 sentences1992App. 3d 464 , 532 N.E.2d 314 , which rejected a similar argument, finding that “the statute of repose of section 13 — 214(b) must be read in conjunction with the statute of limitations of section 13 — 214(a). [Citation.] [The] distinction between the statute of limitations and statute of repose does not change the result of this case.” LaSalle, 177 Ill. 1992App. 3d 464 , 532 N.E.2d 314 , which rejected a similar argument, finding that “the statute of repose of section 13 — 214(b) must be read in conjunction with the statute of limitations of section 13 — 214(a). [Citation.] [The] distinction between the statute of limitations and statute of repose does not change the result of this case.” LaSalle, 177 Ill. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Harvey Firemen's Ass'n v. City of Harvey
green
1 sentence1992Hanrahan v. White (1972), 52 Ill. 2d 70, 73 .) “In determining the legislative intent, courts should consider first the statutory language.” (Boykin, 94 Ill. 2d at 141 ; Harvey Firemen’s Association v. City of Harvey (1979), 75 Ill. 2d 358 .) Unambiguous terms, when not specifically defined, must be given their plain and ordinary meaning. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
People v. Boykin
green
2 sentences1992Hanrahan v. White (1972), 52 Ill. 2d 70, 73 .) “In determining the legislative intent, courts should consider first the statutory language.” (Boykin, 94 Ill. 2d at 141 ; Harvey Firemen’s Association v. City of Harvey (1979), 75 Ill. 2d 358 .) Unambiguous terms, when not specifically defined, must be given their plain and ordinary meaning. 1992However, based upon our general rules of statutory construction, our appellate court’s interpretation of the repose portion of section 13 — 214, and the legislative history of section 13 — 214, we agree with the plaintiff that section 13 — 214(a) governs his cause. “ ‘The cardinal rule of statutory construction, to which all other canons and rules are subordinate, is to ascertain and give effect to the true intent and meaning of the legislature.’ ” (People v. Boykin (1983), 94 Ill. 2d 138, 141 , quoting People ex rel. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Antunes v. Sookhakitch
green
1 sentence1992Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 13—204) controlled the filing of the third-party complaints rather than the medical malpractice statute of repose of section 13—212(a). ( 181 Ill. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Neaterour v. Holt green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Wyness v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc.
green
1 sentence1991(Wyness v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc. (1989), 131 Ill. 2d 403 , 546 N.E.2d 58 .) By analogy to Hayes, the four-year repose provision of section 13—212(a) of the Code could bar an action for wrongful death before the party wronged died. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Hayes v. Mercy Hospital & Medical Center
green
2 sentences1991However, we consider the strong statement of the supreme court in Hayes v. Mercy Hospital & Medical Center (1990), 136 Ill. 2d 450 , 557 N.E.2d 873 , justifies the involuntary dismissal of that count. 1991However, we consider the strong statement of the supreme court in Hayes v. Mercy Hospital & Medical Center (1990), 136 Ill. 2d 450 , 557 N.E.2d 873 , justifies the involuntary dismissal of that count. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Dintelman v. Alliance Machine Co. green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Erdie v. Central Ill. Public Service Co. neutral | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Chestnut v. Adeli green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.