section 452.330 division of marital property in Missouri

1983See Stark v. Stark, 539 S.W.2d 779 (Mo.App.1976).

1980Stark v. Stark, 539 S.W.2d 779, 783 (Mo.App.1976).

2007A circuit court has “great flexibility and discretion in its division of property pursuant to Section 452.330.” Nelson v. Nelson, 25 S.W.3d 511, 517 (Mo.App.2000).

2001Nelson v. Nelson, 25 S.W.3d 511, 517 (Mo.App.2000).

2002Myers v. Myers, 47 S.W.3d 403, 407 (Mo.App.2001).

2002Myers v. Myers, 47 S.W.3d 403, 407 (Mo.App.2001).

2000Klockow v. Klockow, 979 S.W.2d 482, 487 (Mo.App.1998).

1999Klockow v. Klockow, 979 S.W.2d 482, 487 (Mo.App.1998).

1998In doing so, we noted that the general rule mandating division of marital property under § 452.330 “seeks to effectively minimize the necessity for recourse to further litigation [such as partition actions] to completely sever all relations between the parties.” Id. (quoting Corder v. Corder, 546 S.W.2d 798, 804 (Mo.App.

1977The division of marital property within the meaning of Section 452.330, supra, cannot be accomplished by way of a mathematical formula, Claunch v. Claunch, 525 S.W.2d 788, 792-793 (Mo.App.1975); nor can the power to apportion be circumscribed by rigid methods or mechanics, Corder v. Corder, 546 S.W.2d 798, 805-806 [12, 13] (Mo.App.1977).

1981Hopkins v. Hopkins, 597 S.W.2d 702, 709 [6] (Mo.App.1980); Ravenscroft v. Ravenscroft, 585 S.W.2d 270, 274 [6] (Mo.App.1979).

1980Ravenscroft v. Ravenscroft, 585 S.W.2d 270, 274 [6] (Mo.App.1979); Hopkins v. Hopkins, 597 S.W.2d 702 (Mo.App.1980).

1977Claunch v. Claunch, 525 S.W.2d 788, 791 [2, 3] (Mo.App.1975).

1977The division of marital property within the meaning of Section 452.330, supra, cannot be accomplished by way of a mathematical formula, Claunch v. Claunch, 525 S.W.2d 788, 792-793 (Mo.App.1975); nor can the power to apportion be circumscribed by rigid methods or mechanics, Corder v. Corder, 546 S.W.2d 798, 805-806 [12, 13] (Mo.App.1977).

1997See Hanson, 738 S.W.2d at 438-39 (not error for trial court to find bank accounts and certificates of deposit held jointly between parents and children as marital property); Hubbs v. Hubbs, 870 S.W.2d 901, 906-907 (Mo.App.1994)(funds from bank account held jointly by wife and son from different marriage were marital property).

1987To synopsize, limit and possibly clarify our opinion, we consider that in Hanson v. Hanson and Graham v. Graham, 738 S.W. 2d 429 , our Supreme Court held that the goodwill of a commercial or professional corporation is an intangible asset susceptible of division under the provisions of § 452.330, if it may properly be classified as marital property within the intent of § 452.330.2; that Hanson also held the goodwill of a professional corporation is peculiar to organizations of that order, and *590 its value should be determined by ascertaining the price the professional practice would bring we

1981Hopkins v. Hopkins, 597 S.W.2d 702, 709 [6] (Mo.App.1980); Ravenscroft v. Ravenscroft, 585 S.W.2d 270, 274 [6] (Mo.App.1979).

1980Ravenscroft v. Ravenscroft, 585 S.W.2d 270, 274 [6] (Mo.App.1979); Hopkins v. Hopkins, 597 S.W.2d 702 (Mo.App.1980).

2022See Alberswerth v. Alberswerth, 184 S.W.3d 81, 96 (Mo. App. W.D. 2006) (citation omitted). 11 This reference to “separate” property clearly references what is referred to as “nonmarital” property in section 452.330. 12 Though multifarious, we elect to address Husband’s claims in this Point IV. 14 Both parties acknowledged at trial that household goods and personal property would be characterized as marital property.

2019See, e.g., Kennedy v. Milligan, 915 S.W.2d 784, 790 (Mo. App. W.D. 1996) (analogizing to the characterization of separate versus marital property in Section 452.330 in a case in which the parties remained married); see also In re Marriage of McIntosh, 126 S.W.3d 407, 411 (Mo. App. S.D. 2004) (internal citation omitted) (“[U]pon the death of a spouse before judgment . . . the issue of marital status becomes moot.”).

2019See, e.g., Kennedy v. Milligan, 915 S.W.2d 784, 790 (Mo. App. W.D. 1996) (analogizing to the characterization of separate versus marital property in Section 452.330 in a case in which the parties remained married); see also In re Marriage of McIntosh, 126 S.W.3d 407, 411 (Mo. App. S.D. 2004) (internal citation omitted) (“[U]pon the death of a spouse before judgment . . . the issue of marital status becomes moot.”).

2006Heslop v. Heslop, 967 S.W.2d 249, 254 (Mo.App.

2003Cohen v. Cohen, 73 S.W.3d 39, 53 (Mo.App.

2002In re Marriage of Gibson, 23 S.W.3d 686, 689-90 (Mo.App.2000).

1998We turn to the division of marital property under Section 452.330. 2 The division of marital property does not have to be equal, but it must be “fair and equitable.” Whitworth v. Whitworth, 806 S.W.2d 145, 150 (Mo.App.1991), citing D'Aquila v. D'Aquila, 715 S.W.2d 318, 320 (Mo.App.1986).

1998We turn to the division of marital property under Section 452.330. 2 The division of marital property does not have to be equal, but it must be “fair and equitable.” Whitworth v. Whitworth, 806 S.W.2d 145, 150 (Mo.App.1991), citing D'Aquila v. D'Aquila, 715 S.W.2d 318, 320 (Mo.App.1986).

1997See also Maudlin v. Lang, 867 S.W.2d 514, 516-17 (Mo. banc 1993); Rushing v. Southern Mo. Bank, 859 S.W.2d 211, 221 (Mo.App.1993). *239 As a result, Husband and Wife held an ownership interest in CD # 12049 which falls within the definition of marital property under § 452.330.

1997See also Maudlin v. Lang, 867 S.W.2d 514, 516-17 (Mo. banc 1993); Rushing v. Southern Mo. Bank, 859 S.W.2d 211, 221 (Mo.App.1993). *239 As a result, Husband and Wife held an ownership interest in CD # 12049 which falls within the definition of marital property under § 452.330.

1997See Hanson, 738 S.W.2d at 438-39 (not error for trial court to find bank accounts and certificates of deposit held jointly between parents and children as marital property); Hubbs v. Hubbs, 870 S.W.2d 901, 906-907 (Mo.App.1994)(funds from bank account held jointly by wife and son from different marriage were marital property).

1992“The definition of ‘marital’ funds is generally an issue of law, but the question whether an increase in the value of separate property was produced by marital funds or efforts is usually a question of fact.” In re Marriage of Schatz, 768 S.W.2d 607, 611 (Mo.App.1989).

1986N.J.W. v. W.E.W., 584 S.W.2d 148, 151 (Mo.App.1979).

1980The provision of § 452.325 for a property disposition by separation agreement of the spouses preempts a judicial division of the marital property under § 452.330, but only when the contract is by free assent 2 and treats with the full property 3 and then gains the respect of the court for enforcement in the decree of dissolution after consideration of the total economic circumstances of the contractor spouses. 4 It is only a written separation agreement for the disposition of the spousal property that a court may entertain for determination of nonunconscionability and enforcement as a judgment

1979Before an appellate court will disturb the trial court’s division under § 452.330, “it should appear from the record that the trial court erred or abused its discretion in decreeing the division [Citing cases] . . . .” Hilger v. Hilger, 570 S.W.2d 736, 740 (Mo.App.1978). 5 The parties do not challenge the trial court’s finding that the Tudor, Calvert and McKibbon properties are marital property.

1979Marital misconduct is a factor to be considered by the court in making a division of marital property under § 452.330, subsec. 1(4), Laws Mo.1973; In re Marriage of Galloway, 547 S.W.2d 193, 196 [4—7] (Mo.App.1977).