section 43-247(3) adjudication in Nebraska

2019We determined that the order affected a substantial right of the State and was a final, appealable *392 order, because the "order dismissed the supplemental petition in its entirety with no leave to amend, thus foreclosing the State from pursuing adjudication and disposition on grounds of sexual abuse, and preventing the State from seeking to protect the children from such abuse." In re Interest of Noah B. et al., 295 Neb. at 775 , 891 N.W.2d at 119 -20 .

2019We determined that the order affected a substantial right of the State and was a final, appealable *392 order, because the "order dismissed the supplemental petition in its entirety with no leave to amend, thus foreclosing the State from pursuing adjudication and disposition on grounds of sexual abuse, and preventing the State from seeking to protect the children from such abuse." In re Interest of Noah B. et al., 295 Neb. at 775 , 891 N.W.2d at 119 -20 .

1999In re Interest of V.T. and L.T., 220 Neb. 256 , 369 N.W.2d 94 (1985); In re Interest of Aufenkamp, 214 Neb. 297 , 333 N.W.2d 681 (1983).

1999In re Interest of V.T. and L.T., 220 Neb. 256 , 369 N.W.2d 94 (1985); In re Interest of Aufenkamp, 214 Neb. 297 , 333 N.W.2d 681 (1983).

2019Furthermore, “[t]he record of proceedings before a juvenile court shall contain the evidence presented at the dispositional hearing held for the purpose of the parental rehabilitative plan.” In re Interest of J.H., 242 Neb. at 911 , 497 N.W.2d at 352 .

2019Furthermore, “[t]he record of proceedings before a juvenile court shall contain the evidence presented at the dispositional hearing held for the purpose of the parental rehabilitative plan.” In re Interest of J.H., 242 Neb. at 911 , 497 N.W.2d at 352 .

2005In re Interest of J.T.B. and H.J.T., 245 Neb. 624 , 514 N.W.2d 635 (1994).

2005In re Interest of J.T.B. and H.J.T., 245 Neb. 624 , 514 N.W.2d 635 (1994).

2003Teresa cites In re Interest of Kelly D., 3 Neb.App. 251 , 526 N.W.2d 439 (1994), in which this court decided sua sponte that there were no grounds for the adjudication and that the juvenile court therefore lacked jurisdiction for its adjudication under § 43-247(3)(a).

2003App. 251 , 526 N.W.2d 439 (1994), in which this court decided sua sponte that there were no grounds for the adjudication and that the juvenile court therefore lacked jurisdiction for its adjudication under § 43-247(3)(a).

2022Further, the orders were made without any evidence that this provision was reasonably related to the condition on which the allegations in the petition were based. [16] The Supreme Court has announced a procedural rule requiring a juvenile court to hold a hearing before entering an order containing a rehabilitative plan for a parent: [A]fter an adjudication under § 43-247(3)(a) of the Nebraska Juvenile Code and before entering an order - 882 - Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets 30 Nebraska Appellate Reports IN RE INTEREST OF MARQUEE N. Cite as 30 Neb. App. 862 containing a rehabilitative

2020In re Interest of Jeremy U. et al., supra. See, also, In re Interest of Devin W. et al., 270 Neb. 640 , 707 N.W.2d 758 (2005) (with regard to juvenile court adjudication proceedings under § 43-247, subject matter jurisdiction is vested in juvenile court by adjudication that child is juvenile described in § 43-247).

2020In re Interest of Jeremy U. et al., supra. See, also, In re Interest of Devin W. et al., 270 Neb. 640 , 707 N.W.2d 758 (2005) (with regard to juvenile court adjudication proceedings under § 43-247, subject matter jurisdiction is vested in juvenile court by adjudication that child is juvenile described in § 43-247).

2020Cite as 307 Neb. 817 child. 22 This case specifically raises questions concerning what level of State intrusion into the rights of a noncustodial parent, against whom no allegations have been made, is justified by a pending adjudication of the child under § 43-247(3)(a) due to allegations against the custodial parent and after a determination that the child would be at significant risk of harm if maintained in the custodial parent’s home.

2020It also raises issues of how the noncustodial parent’s disability is treated in relation to determining temporary custodial rights. [8-10] The relationship between parent and child is constitutionally protected and cannot be affected without procedural due process. 23 Due process of law is the “basic and essential term in the social compact which defines the rights of the individual and delimits the powers which the state may exercise.” 24 But due process, “‘unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.’” 25 The concept

2020It also raises issues of how the noncustodial parent’s disability is treated in relation to determining temporary custodial rights. [8-10] The relationship between parent and child is constitutionally protected and cannot be affected without procedural due process. 23 Due process of law is the “basic and essential term in the social compact which defines the rights of the individual and delimits the powers which the state may exercise.” 24 But due process, “‘unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.’” 25 The concept

2019In re Interest of Jeffrey K., 273 Neb. 239 , 728 N.W.2d 606 (2007).

2019In re Interest of Jeffrey K., 273 Neb. 239 , 728 N.W.2d 606 (2007).

2019We noted the relative specificity of the relevant statutes as well as the need to avoid the possibility of conflicting orders from different courts.16 12 § 43-246(6). 13 See In re Interest of Ethan M., 18 Neb. App. 63 , 774 N.W.2d 766 (2009). 14 Compare Ponseigo v. Mary W., 267 Neb. 72 , 672 N.W.2d 36 (2003), with Schleuter v. McCuiston, 203 Neb. 101 , 277 N.W.2d 667 (1979). 15 Ponseigo v. Mary W., supra note 14 . 16 See id. - 235 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 302 Nebraska R eports IN RE INTEREST OF KAMILLE C. & KAMIYA C.

2019We noted the relative specificity of the relevant statutes as well as the need to avoid the possibility of conflicting orders from different courts.16 12 § 43-246(6). 13 See In re Interest of Ethan M., 18 Neb. App. 63 , 774 N.W.2d 766 (2009). 14 Compare Ponseigo v. Mary W., 267 Neb. 72 , 672 N.W.2d 36 (2003), with Schleuter v. McCuiston, 203 Neb. 101 , 277 N.W.2d 667 (1979). 15 Ponseigo v. Mary W., supra note 14 . 16 See id. - 235 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 302 Nebraska R eports IN RE INTEREST OF KAMILLE C. & KAMIYA C.

2019We noted the relative specificity of the relevant statutes as well as the need to avoid the possibility of conflicting orders from different courts.16 12 § 43-246(6). 13 See In re Interest of Ethan M., 18 Neb. App. 63 , 774 N.W.2d 766 (2009). 14 Compare Ponseigo v. Mary W., 267 Neb. 72 , 672 N.W.2d 36 (2003), with Schleuter v. McCuiston, 203 Neb. 101 , 277 N.W.2d 667 (1979). 15 Ponseigo v. Mary W., supra note 14 . 16 See id. - 235 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 302 Nebraska R eports IN RE INTEREST OF KAMILLE C. & KAMIYA C.

2019We noted the relative specificity of the relevant statutes as well as the need to avoid the possibility of conflicting orders from different courts.16 12 § 43-246(6). 13 See In re Interest of Ethan M., 18 Neb. App. 63 , 774 N.W.2d 766 (2009). 14 Compare Ponseigo v. Mary W., 267 Neb. 72 , 672 N.W.2d 36 (2003), with Schleuter v. McCuiston, 203 Neb. 101 , 277 N.W.2d 667 (1979). 15 Ponseigo v. Mary W., supra note 14 . 16 See id. - 235 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 302 Nebraska R eports IN RE INTEREST OF KAMILLE C. & KAMIYA C.

2019We noted the relative specificity of the relevant statutes as well as the need to avoid the possibility of conflicting orders from different courts.16 12 § 43-246(6). 13 See In re Interest of Ethan M., 18 Neb. App. 63 , 774 N.W.2d 766 (2009). 14 Compare Ponseigo v. Mary W., 267 Neb. 72 , 672 N.W.2d 36 (2003), with Schleuter v. McCuiston, 203 Neb. 101 , 277 N.W.2d 667 (1979). 15 Ponseigo v. Mary W., supra note 14 . 16 See id. - 235 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 302 Nebraska R eports IN RE INTEREST OF KAMILLE C. & KAMIYA C.

2019We noted the relative specificity of the relevant statutes as well as the need to avoid the possibility of conflicting orders from different courts.16 12 § 43-246(6). 13 See In re Interest of Ethan M., 18 Neb. App. 63 , 774 N.W.2d 766 (2009). 14 Compare Ponseigo v. Mary W., 267 Neb. 72 , 672 N.W.2d 36 (2003), with Schleuter v. McCuiston, 203 Neb. 101 , 277 N.W.2d 667 (1979). 15 Ponseigo v. Mary W., supra note 14 . 16 See id. - 235 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 302 Nebraska R eports IN RE INTEREST OF KAMILLE C. & KAMIYA C.

2017Cite as 298 Neb. 436 and (2) the evidence was insufficient to sustain an adjudication of jurisdiction under § 43-247(1).

2016ANALYSIS This case presents these issues: whether the order of the juvenile court changing the permanency objective for the 1 In re Interest of Octavio B. et al., 290 Neb. 589 , 861 N.W.2d 415 (2015). 2 Id. - 159 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 295 Nebraska R eports IN RE INTEREST OF LeVANTA S. Cite as 295 Neb. 151 brothers was a final, appealable order; whether the juvenile court exceeded its authority by changing the permanency objec- tive to guardianship when there has been no adjudication under § 43-247(3)(a) (Supp. 2015).

2016ANALYSIS This case presents these issues: whether the order of the juvenile court changing the permanency objective for the 1 In re Interest of Octavio B. et al., 290 Neb. 589 , 861 N.W.2d 415 (2015). 2 Id. - 159 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 295 Nebraska R eports IN RE INTEREST OF LeVANTA S. Cite as 295 Neb. 151 brothers was a final, appealable order; whether the juvenile court exceeded its authority by changing the permanency objec- tive to guardianship when there has been no adjudication under § 43-247(3)(a) (Supp. 2015).

2016The court sustained an ex parte motion requiring supervision of all visits between the parents and the boys, because the mother reportedly took the brothers on a visit together, in violation of a court order, and the father and LeRonn had gotten into an argument. - 156 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 295 Nebraska R eports IN RE INTEREST OF LeVANTA S. Cite as 295 Neb. 151 At a December 18, 2014, review hearing, the judge ques- tioned whether an adjudication under § 43-247(3)(c) was the right procedure in this case or whether subsection (3)(a) was more appropriate.

2014App. 867 , 774 N.W.2d 416 (2009), this court tacitly recognized that active efforts under ICWA are to be provided through- out a juvenile proceeding under § 43-247(3)(a).

2009In re Interest of Mainor T. & Estela T., 267 Neb. 232 , 674 N.W.2d 442 (2004).

2009In re Interest of Mainor T. & Estela T., 267 Neb. 232 , 674 N.W.2d 442 (2004).

2005In re Interest of Brian B. et al., 268 Neb. 870 , 689 N.W.2d 184 (2004); In re Interest of Kantril P. & Chenelle P., 257 Neb. 450 , 598 N.W.2d 729 (1999). [7] With regard to juvenile court adjudication proceedings under § 43-247, we have stated that subject matter jurisdiction is vested in the juvenile court by an adjudication that a child is a juvenile described in § 43-247.

2005In re Interest of Brian B. et al., 268 Neb. 870 , 689 N.W.2d 184 (2004); In re Interest of Kantril P. & Chenelle P., 257 Neb. 450 , 598 N.W.2d 729 (1999). [7] With regard to juvenile court adjudication proceedings under § 43-247, we have stated that subject matter jurisdiction is vested in the juvenile court by an adjudication that a child is a juvenile described in § 43-247.

2005In re Interest of Brian B. et al., 268 Neb. 870 , 689 N.W.2d 184 (2004); In re Interest of Kantril P. & Chenelle P., 257 Neb. 450 , 598 N.W.2d 729 (1999). [7] With regard to juvenile court adjudication proceedings under § 43-247, we have stated that subject matter jurisdiction is vested in the juvenile court by an adjudication that a child is a juvenile described in § 43-247.

2005In re Interest of Brian B. et al., 268 Neb. 870 , 689 N.W.2d 184 (2004); In re Interest of Kantril P. & Chenelle P., 257 Neb. 450 , 598 N.W.2d 729 (1999). [7] With regard to juvenile court adjudication proceedings under § 43-247, we have stated that subject matter jurisdiction is vested in the juvenile court by an adjudication that a child is a juvenile described in § 43-247.

2003“The allowance, amount, and allocation of a guardian ad litem fee are matters within the initial discretion of the trial court. . . and will be set aside on appeal only when there appears to be an abuse of discretion by the trial court.” Halouska v. Halouska, 7 Neb.