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33 New Mexico opinions name it 2 courts 1992–2026 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Mexico courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Garciagreen2 sentences2023See State v. Garcia, 2009-NMSC-046, ¶ 35 , 147 N.M. 134 , 217 P.3d 1032 (rejecting, as a matter of state constitutional law, the submission to authority analysis set forth in Hodari D. “and instead maintain[ing] Mendenhall’s free-to-leave test as the proper measure of a seizure under Article II, Section 10” of the New Mexico Constitution). been violated. 2023See State v. Garcia, 2009-NMSC-046, ¶ 35 , 147 N.M. 134 , 217 P.3d 1032 (rejecting, as a matter of state constitutional law, the submission to authority analysis set forth in Hodari D. “and instead maintain[ing] Mendenhall’s free-to-leave test as the proper measure of a seizure under Article II, Section 10” of the New Mexico Constitution). been violated. | 6 | 7 |
State v. Leyvagreen2 sentences2022See State v. Duran, 2005-NMSC-034, ¶ 23 , 138 N.M. 414 , 120 P.3d 836 , overruled on other grounds by State v. Leyva, 2011- NMSC-009, ¶ 17 149 N.M. 435 , 250 P.3d 861 (upholding Duran as the appropriate test for reviewing searches and seizures under Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution). 2022See State v. Duran, 2005-NMSC-034, ¶ 23 , 138 N.M. 414 , 120 P.3d 836 , overruled on other grounds by State v. Leyva, 2011- NMSC-009, ¶ 17 149 N.M. 435 , 250 P.3d 861 (upholding Duran as the appropriate test for reviewing searches and seizures under Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution). | 4 | 5 |
State v. Gomezgreen2 sentences2014For the reasons that follow, we consider certain distinct state characteristics to be adequate grounds upon which to depart from federal jurisprudence and elaborate on our state search and seizure jurisprudence with respect to garbage searches. {16} The foremost distinct state characteristic upon which this Court has elaborated New Mexico’s search and seizure jurisprudence under Article II, Section 10 is “a strong preference for warrants.” Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 36 (citing Campos v. State, 1994-NMSC-012 , 117 N.M. 155 , 870 P.2d 117 (Campos II); State v. Gutierrez, 1993- NMSC-062, 116 N.M. 43 2014For the reasons that follow, we consider certain distinct state characteristics to be adequate grounds upon which to depart from federal jurisprudence and elaborate on our state search and seizure jurisprudence with respect to garbage searches. {16} The foremost distinct state characteristic upon which this Court has elaborated New Mexico’s search and seizure jurisprudence under Article II, Section 10 is “a strong preference forwarrants.” Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 36 (citing Campos v. State, 1994-NMSC-012 , 117 N.M. 155 , 870 P.2d 117 (Campos II); State v. Gutierrez, 1993-NMSC-062 , 116 N.M. 431 | 3 | 4 |
Terry v. Ohiogreen2 sentences2022The Duran Court adopted the test set out in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968), which considers “[(1)] whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception, and [(2)] whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” Duran, 2005-NMSC-034, ¶ 23 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20 ). {14} Defendant concedes that the initial traffic stop meets the first part of Duran. 2022The Duran Court adopted the test set out in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968), which considers “[(1)] whether the officer’s action was justified at its inception, and [(2)] whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” Duran, 2005-NMSC-034, ¶ 23 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20 ). {14} Defendant concedes that the initial traffic stop meets the first part of Duran. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Lopezgreen2 sentences2016Unpersuaded, we affirm. 4 {2} The State raised a single issue in its docketing statement, contending that the 5 district court erred in granting Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence based on the 6 officers’ failure to comply with the knock and announce requirement. [CN 2] Based 7 on the totality of the circumstances in this case, we proposed to affirm the district 8 court’s suppression order. [CN 2] See State v. Attaway, 1994-NMSC-011 , ¶ 22, 117 9 N.M. 141 , 870 P.2d 103 (holding that the reasonableness of a search and seizure under 10 Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution 2016Unpersuaded, we affirm. 4 {2} The State raised a single issue in its docketing statement, contending that the 5 district court erred in granting Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence based on the 6 officers’ failure to comply with the knock and announce requirement. [CN 2] Based 7 on the totality of the circumstances in this case, we proposed to affirm the district 8 court’s suppression order. [CN 2] See State v. Attaway, 1994-NMSC-011 , ¶ 22, 117 9 N.M. 141 , 870 P.2d 103 (holding that the reasonableness of a search and seizure under 10 Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution | 1 | 2 |
State v. Affsprunggreen2 sentences2009DEFENDANT WAS SEIZED UNDER ARTICLE II, SECTION 10 OF THE NEW MEXICO CONSTITUTION {36} Having clarified that a seizure occurs under Article II, Section 10 with reference only to Mendenhall’s reasonable person standard, we now apply that standard to the case at bar to determine whether and at what point Defendant was placed in such a position. {37} “[A] person has been ‘seized’ ... only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.” Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554 , 100 S.Ct. 1870 (footnote omitted); accord St 2009DEFENDANT WAS SEIZED UNDER ARTICLE II, SECTION 10 OF THE NEW MEXICO CONSTITUTION {36} Having clarified that a seizure occurs under Article II, Section 10 with reference only to Mendenhall’s reasonable person standard, we now apply that standard to the case at bar to determine whether and at what point Defendant was placed in such a position. {37} “[A] person has been ‘seized’ ... only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.” Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554 , 100 S.Ct. 1870 (footnote omitted); accord St | 1 | 2 |
United States v. Mendenhallgreen2 sentences2015Olson, 2012-NMSC-035, ¶ 10 . 9 {8} A seizure occurs under Article II, Section 10 “ ‘only if, in view of all of the 10 circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that 11 he was not free to leave.’ ” State v. Garcia, 2009-NMSC-046, ¶¶ 36-37 , 147 N.M. 12 134, 217 P.3d 1032 (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)). 13 Possible indicators of a seizure include “the threatening presence of several officers, 14 the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the 15 citizen, or the use of language or tone of voi 2009DEFENDANT WAS SEIZED UNDER ARTICLE II, SECTION 10 OF THE NEW MEXICO CONSTITUTION {36} Having clarified that a seizure occurs under Article II, Section 10 with reference only to Mendenhall’s reasonable person standard, we now apply that standard to the case at bar to determine whether and at what point Defendant was placed in such a position. {37} “[A] person has been ‘seized’ ... only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.” Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 554 , 100 S.Ct. 1870 (footnote omitted); accord St | 1 | 2 |
State v. Gutierrezgreen2 sentences2014For the reasons that follow, we consider certain distinct state characteristics to be adequate grounds upon which to depart from federal jurisprudence and elaborate on our state search and seizure jurisprudence with respect to garbage searches. {16} The foremost distinct state characteristic upon which this Court has elaborated New Mexico’s search and seizure jurisprudence under Article II, Section 10 is “a strong preference forwarrants.” Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 36 (citing Campos v. State, 1994-NMSC-012 , 117 N.M. 155 , 870 P.2d 117 (Campos II); State v. Gutierrez, 1993-NMSC-062 , 116 N.M. 431 2014For the reasons that follow, we consider certain distinct state characteristics to be adequate grounds upon which to depart from federal jurisprudence and elaborate on our state search and seizure jurisprudence with respect to garbage searches. {16} The foremost distinct state characteristic upon which this Court has elaborated New Mexico’s search and seizure jurisprudence under Article II, Section 10 is “a strong preference forwarrants.” Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 36 (citing Campos v. State, 1994-NMSC-012 , 117 N.M. 155 , 870 P.2d 117 (Campos II); State v. Gutierrez, 1993-NMSC-062 , 116 N.M. 431 | 1 | 2 |
State v. Duranyellow2 sentences2022See State v. Duran, 2005-NMSC-034, ¶ 23 , 138 N.M. 414 , 120 P.3d 836 , overruled on other grounds by State v. Leyva, 2011- NMSC-009, ¶ 17 149 N.M. 435 , 250 P.3d 861 (upholding Duran as the appropriate test for reviewing searches and seizures under Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution). 2022See State v. Duran, 2005-NMSC-034, ¶ 23 , 138 N.M. 414 , 120 P.3d 836 , overruled on other grounds by State v. Leyva, 2011- NMSC-009, ¶ 17 149 N.M. 435 , 250 P.3d 861 (upholding Duran as the appropriate test for reviewing searches and seizures under Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Jean-Paulgreen1 sentence2016Unpersuaded, we affirm. 4 {2} The State raised a single issue in its docketing statement, contending that the 5 district court erred in granting Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence based on the 6 officers’ failure to comply with the knock and announce requirement. [CN 2] Based 7 on the totality of the circumstances in this case, we proposed to affirm the district 8 court’s suppression order. [CN 2] See State v. Attaway, 1994-NMSC-011 , ¶ 22, 117 9 N.M. 141 , 870 P.2d 103 (holding that the reasonableness of a search and seizure under 10 Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution | 1 | 1 |
State v. Cranegreen2 sentences2015“Accordingly, New Mexico courts have long held that Article II, Section 10 provides greater protection of individual privacy 23 than the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Crane, 2014-NMSC-026, ¶ 16 , 329 P.3d 689 ; State v. Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009, ¶ 51 , 149 N.M. 435 , 250 P.3d 861 (“It is well-established that Article II, Section 10 provides more protection against unreasonable searches and seizures than the Fourth Amendment.”). {88} In light of the New Mexico Constitution’s strong belief in the protection of individual privacy, “[t]he foremost distinct state characteristic upon which this Court has 2015“Accordingly, New Mexico courts have long held that Article II, Section 10 provides greater protection of individual privacy 23 than the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Crane, 2014-NMSC-026, ¶ 16 , 329 P.3d 689 ; State v. Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009, ¶ 51 , 149 N.M. 435 , 250 P.3d 861 (“It is well-established that Article II, Section 10 provides more protection against unreasonable searches and seizures than the Fourth Amendment.”). {88} In light of the New Mexico Constitution’s strong belief in the protection of individual privacy, “[t]he foremost distinct state characteristic upon which this Court has | 1 | 1 |
State v. Johnsongreen1 sentence2013Even after Banks, our Supreme Court has stated that “[a]bsent exigent circumstances, officers must knock and announce their purpose and identity, then wait a reasonable period of time to determine if consent to enter will be given before forcefully entering.” Johnson, 2006-NMSC-049, ¶ 12 (emphasis added); cf. Lopez, 2005-NMSC-018, ¶ 23 (applying the Banks Fourth Amendment rule that reasonableness is assessed by reference to the time it would take for someone to attempt to engage in the conduct that the exigent circumstances exceptions seek to prevent to a case where the exigent circumstances e | 1 | 1 |
State v. Ketelsongreen2 sentences2012See State v. Ketelson, 2011-NMSC-023 , ¶ 3 10, 150 N.M. 137 , 257 P.3d 957 (stating that “as an initial matter, we must determine 4 whether our analysis is confined to the Fourth Amendment or whether [the d]efendant 5 properly preserved his argument under Article II, Section 10”). 2012See State v. Ketelson, 2011-NMSC-023 , ¶ 3 10, 150 N.M. 137 , 257 P.3d 957 (stating that “as an initial matter, we must determine 4 whether our analysis is confined to the Fourth Amendment or whether [the d]efendant 5 properly preserved his argument under Article II, Section 10”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Riveragreen2 sentences2011See, e.g., Rivera, 2010-NMSC-046, ¶ 23 , 148 N.M. 659 , 241 P.3d 1099 (declining to adopt the Fourth Amendment private search doctrine under Article II, Section 10 due to our constitution’s “strong preference for a warrant”); Garcia, 2009-NMSC-046, ¶ 37 , 147 N.M. 134 , 217 P.3d 1032 (retaining the totality of the circumstances free-to-leave test for seizures under Article II, Section 10); Rowell, 2008-NMSC-041, ¶ 20 , 144 N.M. 371 , 188 P.3d 95 (rejecting a bright-line rule for car searches incident to arrest in favor of a case-by-case approach); State v. Bombay, 2008-NMSC-029, ¶¶ 5, 8 , 144 2011See, e.g., Rivera, 2010-NMSC-046, ¶ 23 , 148 N.M. 659 , 241 P.3d 1099 (declining to adopt the Fourth Amendment private search doctrine under Article II, Section 10 due to our constitution’s “strong preference for a warrant”); Garcia, 2009-NMSC-046, ¶ 37 , 147 N.M. 134 , 217 P.3d 1032 (retaining the totality of the circumstances free-to-leave test for seizures under Article II, Section 10); Rowell, 2008-NMSC-041, ¶ 20 , 144 N.M. 371 , 188 P.3d 95 (rejecting a bright-line rule for car searches incident to arrest in favor of a case-by-case approach); State v. Bombay, 2008-NMSC-029, ¶¶ 5, 8 , 144 | 1 | 1 |
State v. Rowellgreen2 sentences2011See, e.g., Rivera, 2010-NMSC-046, ¶ 23 , 148 N.M. 659 , 241 P.3d 1099 (declining to adopt the Fourth Amendment private search doctrine under Article II, Section 10 due to our constitution’s “strong preference for a warrant”); Garcia, 2009-NMSC-046, ¶ 37 , 147 N.M. 134 , 217 P.3d 1032 (retaining the totality of the circumstances free-to-leave test for seizures under Article II, Section 10); Rowell, 2008-NMSC-041, ¶ 20 , 144 N.M. 371 , 188 P.3d 95 (rejecting a bright-line rule for car searches incident to arrest in favor of a case-by-case approach); State v. Bombay, 2008-NMSC-029, ¶¶ 5, 8 , 144 2011See, e.g., Rivera, 2010-NMSC-046, ¶ 23 , 148 N.M. 659 , 241 P.3d 1099 (declining to adopt the Fourth Amendment private search doctrine under Article II, Section 10 due to our constitution’s “strong preference for a warrant”); Garcia, 2009-NMSC-046, ¶ 37 , 147 N.M. 134 , 217 P.3d 1032 (retaining the totality of the circumstances free-to-leave test for seizures under Article II, Section 10); Rowell, 2008-NMSC-041, ¶ 20 , 144 N.M. 371 , 188 P.3d 95 (rejecting a bright-line rule for car searches incident to arrest in favor of a case-by-case approach); State v. Bombay, 2008-NMSC-029, ¶¶ 5, 8 , 144 | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Nealgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Bomboygreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. PAUL T.green | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Lopezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Williamsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Mexico. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Bricker
green
2 sentences2019In Rodarte, this Court 9 adopted Justice O’Connor’s approach as being more consistent with New Mexico’s 10 jurisprudence under Article II, Section 10, which has stressed the importance of 11 case-by-case determinations of reasonableness and avoided bright-line rules. 2005- 12 NMCA-141, ¶¶ 13-16. 13 {12} The next year, in Bricker, 2006-NMCA-052 , we addressed the constitutional 14 reasonableness of a full custodial arrest of a defendant suspected of driving with a 15 suspended license, a misdemeanor punishable by a jail term of up to 364 days 16 under NMSA 1978, Section 66-5-39(A) (2013). 2019In Rodarte, this Court 9 adopted Justice O’Connor’s approach as being more consistent with New Mexico’s 10 jurisprudence under Article II, Section 10, which has stressed the importance of 11 case-by-case determinations of reasonableness and avoided bright-line rules. 2005- 12 NMCA-141, ¶¶ 13-16. 13 {12} The next year, in Bricker, 2006-NMCA-052 , we addressed the constitutional 14 reasonableness of a full custodial arrest of a defendant suspected of driving with a 15 suspended license, a misdemeanor punishable by a jail term of up to 364 days 16 under NMSA 1978, Section 66-5-39(A) (2013). | 3 | 2019–2019 |
Kyllo v. United States
green
2 sentences2014While acknowledging the difficulty of applying the Katz test to searches of “areas such as telephone booths, automobiles, or even the curtilage,” Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 , the law at a minimum recognizes that the expectation of privacy in the interior of the home is reasonable when the police “obtain}] by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected area, ... at least where ... the technology in question is not in general public use.” Id. (internal quotation m 2014While acknowledging the difficulty of applying the Katz test to searches of “areas such as telephone booths, automobiles, or even the curtilage,” Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 , the law at a minimum recognizes that the expectation of privacy in the interior of the home is reasonable when the police “obtain}] by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected area, ... at least where ... the technology in question is not in general public use.” Id. (internal quotation m | 3 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Granville
green
2 sentences2014“Our Supreme Court has emphasizedNew Mexico’s strong preference for warrants in order to preserve the values of privacy and sanctity of the home that are embodied by this provision.” State v. Granville, 2006-NMCA-098, ¶ 24 , 140 N.M. 345 , 142 P.3d 933 . {14} With this in mind, we discern two threads of analysis in Ciraolo and Riley that are inconsistent with our jurisprudence under Article II, Section 10. 2014“Our Supreme Court has emphasizedNew Mexico’s strong preference for warrants in order to preserve the values of privacy and sanctity of the home that are embodied by this provision.” State v. Granville, 2006-NMCA-098, ¶ 24 , 140 N.M. 345 , 142 P.3d 933 . {14} With this in mind, we discern two threads of analysis in Ciraolo and Riley that are inconsistent with our jurisprudence under Article II, Section 10. | 3 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Maez
green
2 sentences2023Maez was a decision made under Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, and did not discuss the standards relevant to determination of a seizure under Article II, Section 10. 2009-NMCA-108, ¶ 15 . 2023Maez was a decision made under Fourth 12 Amendment jurisprudence, and did not discuss the standards relevant to 13 determination of a seizure under Article II, Section 10. 2009-NMCA-108, ¶ 15 . 14 Defense counsel did not cite any contradictory authority on this point or otherwise 15 inform the district court of the divergence in state constitutional precedent. | 2 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Olson
green
2 sentences2018See 5 Leyva, 2011-NMSC-009, ¶ 3 (finding that “Article II, Section 10 provides greater 6 protections against unreasonable searches and seizures than does the Fourth 7 Amendment”); State v. Olson, 2012-NMSC-035, ¶ 10 , 285 P.3d 1066 (addressing only 8 broader protections of Article II, Section 10, where New Mexico Constitution 9 provides more expansive protections than the United States Constitution). 10 {11} A traffic stop and the attendant detention of its occupants is a “seizure” for 11 purposes of Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution. 2015Olson, 2012-NMSC-035, ¶ 10 . 9 {8} A seizure occurs under Article II, Section 10 “ ‘only if, in view of all of the 10 circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that 11 he was not free to leave.’ ” State v. Garcia, 2009-NMSC-046, ¶¶ 36-37 , 147 N.M. 12 134, 217 P.3d 1032 (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)). 13 Possible indicators of a seizure include “the threatening presence of several officers, 14 the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the person of the 15 citizen, or the use of language or tone of voi | 2 | 2015–2018 |
State v. Gutierrez
green
2 sentences1993In State v. Gutierrez, 112 N.M. 774 , 819 P.2d 1332 (Ct.App.), cert. granted, 114 N.M. 501 , 841 P.2d 549 (1991), this Court declined to approve a “good-faith” exception to the exclusionary rule, thereby precluding the use of evidence seized in violation of the protections accorded against unreasonable searches and seizures under Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution. 1993In State v. Gutierrez, 112 N.M. 774 , 819 P.2d 1332 (Ct.App.), cert. granted, 114 N.M. 501 , 841 P.2d 549 (1991), this Court declined to approve a “good-faith” exception to the exclusionary rule, thereby precluding the use of evidence seized in violation of the protections accorded against unreasonable searches and seizures under Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution. | 2 | 1992–1993 |
State v. Snyder
green
1 sentence2026The New Mexico exclusionary rule is grounded in effectuating the 16 constitutional rights of individuals and is therefore applicable where out- 17 of-state evidence is introduced in a New Mexico court 18 {16} In Snyder, the Court of Appeals wrestled with the application of a defendant’s 19 right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure under Article II, Section 10 20 where the defendant’s truck was subject to a warrantless search by federal agents at 21 a fixed border patrol checkpoint in New Mexico. 1998-NMCA-166, ¶ 1 . | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Martinez
green
2 sentences2021Now having considered the brief in chief and the State’s answer, we affirm for the following reasons. {2} Defendant appeals from the denial of his motion to suppress evidence. [RP 90- 93] Defendant argues that his right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures under the United States Constitution and Article II Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution were violated when “he was seized by the Farmington police officers without reasonable suspicion that he was committing a crime.” [BIC 7, 8] Defendant specifically argues that a seizure occurred when the officers initially made contact 2021Now having considered the brief in chief and the State’s answer, we affirm for the following reasons. {2} Defendant appeals from the denial of his motion to suppress evidence. [RP 90- 93] Defendant argues that his right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures under the United States Constitution and Article II Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution were violated when “he was seized by the Farmington police officers without reasonable suspicion that he was committing a crime.” [BIC 7, 8] Defendant specifically argues that a seizure occurred when the officers initially made contact | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Walters
green
2 sentences2020Rather, “[t]he test is an objective one based upon a reasonable person standard, not the subjective perceptions of the particular individual.” State v. Walters, 1997-NMCA-013, ¶ 12 , 123 N.M. 88 , 934 P.2d 282 . 2020Rather, “[t]he test is an objective one based upon a reasonable person standard, not the subjective perceptions of the particular individual.” State v. Walters, 1997-NMCA-013, ¶ 12 , 123 N.M. 88 , 934 P.2d 282 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Halpern
green
2 sentences2016Specifically, we were not convinced that the State demonstrated a 16 justification for the noncompliance that would render the officers’ forcible entry into 17 Defendant’s home reasonable under Article II, Section 10. [CN 6] See State v. 18 Halpern, 2001-NMCA-049, ¶ 9 , 130 N.M. 694 , 30 P.3d 383 (“When the police have 19 not complied with the knock and announce requirement, the State bears the burden of 2 1 proving justification for noncompliance.”). 2 {3} In its memorandum in opposition, the State continues to argue that the officers 3 were justified in dispensing with the knock and announce 2016Specifically, we were not convinced that the State demonstrated a 16 justification for the noncompliance that would render the officers’ forcible entry into 17 Defendant’s home reasonable under Article II, Section 10. [CN 6] See State v. 18 Halpern, 2001-NMCA-049, ¶ 9 , 130 N.M. 694 , 30 P.3d 383 (“When the police have 19 not complied with the knock and announce requirement, the State bears the burden of 2 1 proving justification for noncompliance.”). 2 {3} In its memorandum in opposition, the State continues to argue that the officers 3 were justified in dispensing with the knock and announce | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Vargas
green
2 sentences2016Specifically, we were not convinced that the State demonstrated a 16 justification for the noncompliance that would render the officers’ forcible entry into 17 Defendant’s home reasonable under Article II, Section 10. [CN 6] See State v. 18 Halpern, 2001-NMCA-049, ¶ 9 , 130 N.M. 694 , 30 P.3d 383 (“When the police have 19 not complied with the knock and announce requirement, the State bears the burden of 2 1 proving justification for noncompliance.”). 2 {3} In its memorandum in opposition, the State continues to argue that the officers 3 were justified in dispensing with the knock and announce 2016Specifically, we were not convinced that the State demonstrated a 16 justification for the noncompliance that would render the officers’ forcible entry into 17 Defendant’s home reasonable under Article II, Section 10. [CN 6] See State v. 18 Halpern, 2001-NMCA-049, ¶ 9 , 130 N.M. 694 , 30 P.3d 383 (“When the police have 19 not complied with the knock and announce requirement, the State bears the burden of 2 1 proving justification for noncompliance.”). 2 {3} In its memorandum in opposition, the State continues to argue that the officers 3 were justified in dispensing with the knock and announce | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Attaway
green
1 sentence2016Unpersuaded, we affirm. 4 {2} The State raised a single issue in its docketing statement, contending that the 5 district court erred in granting Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence based on the 6 officers’ failure to comply with the knock and announce requirement. [CN 2] Based 7 on the totality of the circumstances in this case, we proposed to affirm the district 8 court’s suppression order. [CN 2] See State v. Attaway, 1994-NMSC-011 , ¶ 22, 117 9 N.M. 141 , 870 P.2d 103 (holding that the reasonableness of a search and seizure under 10 Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Clark v. Mitchell
neutral
1 sentence2016Unpersuaded, we affirm. 4 {2} The State raised a single issue in its docketing statement, contending that the 5 district court erred in granting Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence based on the 6 officers’ failure to comply with the knock and announce requirement. [CN 2] Based 7 on the totality of the circumstances in this case, we proposed to affirm the district 8 court’s suppression order. [CN 2] See State v. Attaway, 1994-NMSC-011 , ¶ 22, 117 9 N.M. 141 , 870 P.2d 103 (holding that the reasonableness of a search and seizure under 10 Article II, Section 10 of the New Mexico Constitution | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Cordova
green
2 sentences2014For the reasons that follow, we consider certain distinct state characteristics to be adequate grounds upon which to depart from federal jurisprudence and elaborate on our state search and seizure jurisprudence with respect to garbage searches. {16} The foremost distinct state characteristic upon which this Court has elaborated New Mexico’s search and seizure jurisprudence under Article II, Section 10 is “a strong preference forwarrants.” Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 36 (citing Campos v. State, 1994-NMSC-012 , 117 N.M. 155 , 870 P.2d 117 (Campos II); State v. Gutierrez, 1993-NMSC-062 , 116 N.M. 431 2014For the reasons that follow, we consider certain distinct state characteristics to be adequate grounds upon which to depart from federal jurisprudence and elaborate on our state search and seizure jurisprudence with respect to garbage searches. {16} The foremost distinct state characteristic upon which this Court has elaborated New Mexico’s search and seizure jurisprudence under Article II, Section 10 is “a strong preference forwarrants.” Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 36 (citing Campos v. State, 1994-NMSC-012 , 117 N.M. 155 , 870 P.2d 117 (Campos II); State v. Gutierrez, 1993-NMSC-062 , 116 N.M. 431 | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Campos v. State
green
2 sentences2014For the reasons that follow, we consider certain distinct state characteristics to be adequate grounds upon which to depart from federal jurisprudence and elaborate on our state search and seizure jurisprudence with respect to garbage searches. {16} The foremost distinct state characteristic upon which this Court has elaborated New Mexico’s search and seizure jurisprudence under Article II, Section 10 is “a strong preference forwarrants.” Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 36 (citing Campos v. State, 1994-NMSC-012 , 117 N.M. 155 , 870 P.2d 117 (Campos II); State v. Gutierrez, 1993-NMSC-062 , 116 N.M. 431 2014For the reasons that follow, we consider certain distinct state characteristics to be adequate grounds upon which to depart from federal jurisprudence and elaborate on our state search and seizure jurisprudence with respect to garbage searches. {16} The foremost distinct state characteristic upon which this Court has elaborated New Mexico’s search and seizure jurisprudence under Article II, Section 10 is “a strong preference forwarrants.” Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶ 36 (citing Campos v. State, 1994-NMSC-012 , 117 N.M. 155 , 870 P.2d 117 (Campos II); State v. Gutierrez, 1993-NMSC-062 , 116 N.M. 431 | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| State v. Jason L. green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| United States v. Leon green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.