section 8 right to privacy in Oregon

2010The plurality applied the methodology for analyzing free expression challenges under Article I, section 8, set out in State v. Robertson, 293 Or 402 , 649 P2d 569 (1982).

2010The plurality applied the methodology for analyzing free expression challenges under Article I, section 8, set out in State v. Robertson, 293 Or 402 , 649 P2d 569 (1982).

2026State v. Rangel, 328 Or 294, 302 , 977 P2d 379 (1999) (quoting State v. Robertson, 293 Or 402, 416-17 , 649 P2d 569 (1982)); see also State v. C.

2026State v. Rangel, 328 Or 294, 302 , 977 P2d 379 (1999) (quoting State v. Robertson, 293 Or 402, 416-17 , 649 P2d 569 (1982)); see also State v. C.

2000In Lloyd Corporation v. Whiffen, 89 Or App 629, 634 , 750 P2d 1157 (1988) (hereafter “the Court of Appeals’ decision in Whiffen F), the Court of Appeals held that a broadly, worded injunction that prevented petitioning activity inside Lloyd Center, a large shopping center in Portland, implicated the petitioners’ rights of free expression under Article I, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution. 3 The court further held that, although the owner of Lloyd Center could not ban such activity outright, it could adopt reasonable time, place, and manner regulations relating to that activity.

2000In Lloyd Corporation v. Whiffen, 89 Or App 629, 634 , 750 P2d 1157 (1988) (hereafter “the Court of Appeals’ decision in Whiffen F), the Court of Appeals held that a broadly, worded injunction that prevented petitioning activity inside Lloyd Center, a large shopping center in Portland, implicated the petitioners’ rights of free expression under Article I, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution. 3 The court further held that, although the owner of Lloyd Center could not ban such activity outright, it could adopt reasonable time, place, and manner regulations relating to that activity.

1991That language was deleted. 5 Defendant claims that, as a matter of law, punitive damages should not be allowed, because to do so would violate the right of free expression under Article I, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution, which prohibits any law “restraining the free expression of opinion * * *.” It relies on Wheeler v. Green, 286 Or 99 , 593 P2d 777 (1979), in which the court held that punitive damages are not recoverable in defamation cases.

1991That language was deleted. 5 Defendant claims that, as a matter of law, punitive damages should not be allowed, because to do so would violate the right of free expression under Article I, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution, which prohibits any law “restraining the free expression of opinion * * *.” It relies on Wheeler v. Green, 286 Or 99 , 593 P2d 777 (1979), in which the court held that punitive damages are not recoverable in defamation cases.

2024Id. at 496 .

2007Id. at 499-503 .

1996In Fadeley , the court held that the speech rights of Article I, section 8, had been modified by Article VII (amended), section 8, which allows discipline of judges for violating rules of judicial conduct. 310 Or. at 560 , 802 P.2d 31 .

1996(Emphasis supplied.) In Fadeley , the court held that the speech rights of Article I, section 8, had been modified by Article VII (amended), section 8, which allows discipline of judges for violating rules of judicial conduct. 310 Or at 560 .

1991Stores, 292 Or 131 , 637 P2d 126 (1984), and Wheeler v. Green, 286 Or 99 , 593 P2d 777 (1979), which both held that punitive damages may not be awarded for injuries that arise solely as a result of the abuse of the right to free expression under Article I, section 8.

1991Stores, 292 Or 131 , 637 P2d 126 (1984), and Wheeler v. Green, 286 Or 99 , 593 P2d 777 (1979), which both held that punitive damages may not be awarded for injuries that arise solely as a result of the abuse of the right to free expression under Article I, section 8.

1990We do not know what result the court would have reached in Lenrich if it had decided the case after Pruneyard. 12 In Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 US 551 , 92 S Ct 2219 , 33 L Ed 2d 131 (1972), the Court held that anti-war activists who wished to distribute anti-war literature within a shopping center had no federal constitutional right to do so on private property. 13 Although Fred Meyer officials testified that the company does not permit petitioning, there was also testimony that petitioning was nonetheless sometimes allowed. 14 We need not decide whether defendants’ actions were protected und

1990We do not know what result the court would have reached in Lenrich if it had decided the case after Pruneyard. 12 In Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 US 551 , 92 S Ct 2219 , 33 L Ed 2d 131 (1972), the Court held that anti-war activists who wished to distribute anti-war literature within a shopping center had no federal constitutional right to do so on private property. 13 Although Fred Meyer officials testified that the company does not permit petitioning, there was also testimony that petitioning was nonetheless sometimes allowed. 14 We need not decide whether defendants’ actions were protected und

2025Plaintiffs now seek an award of attorney fees in the amount of $71,540.20 for work in the trial court and on appeal, relying on the court’s inherent equitable authority to award fees when a plaintiff has vindicated an important constitutional right, as recognized in Deras v. Myers, 272 Or 47 , 535 P2d 541 (1975) and its progeny.

2025Plaintiffs now seek an award of attorney fees in the amount of $71,540.20 for work in the trial court and on appeal, relying on the court’s inherent equitable authority to award fees when a plaintiff has vindicated an important constitutional right, as recognized in Deras v. Myers, 272 Or 47 , 535 P2d 541 (1975) and its progeny.

2025In this appeal, plaintiffs, a business that sells vaping products and its owner, succeeded in their challenge to ORS 431A.175(2)(f), which restricted the packaging of inhalant delivery systems (including vaping products), as an unconstitutional restriction on the free speech rights protected under Article I, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution.1 Bates v. Oregon Health Authority, 335 Or App 464 , 559 P3d 924 (2024), rev allowed, 373 Or 284 (2025).

2025In this appeal, plaintiffs, a business that sells vaping products and its owner, succeeded in their challenge to ORS 431A.175(2)(f), which restricted the packaging of inhalant delivery systems (including vaping products), as an unconstitutional restriction on the free speech rights protected under Article I, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution.1 Bates v. Oregon Health Authority, 335 Or App 464 , 559 P3d 924 (2024), rev allowed, 373 Or 284 (2025).

2021In conducting our review, “the court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to any issue of fact.” ORS 183.482(7).2 1 In his fifth assignment of error, petitioner contends that the board’s final order “improperly infringes on his [commercial speech] rights under Article I, § 8 of the Oregon Constitution,” because “[t]he only basis for the board to seek discipline is because [petitioner] refers in advertising and media to the fact that he is an Oregon licensed chiropractor.” 2 Although reviewing for substantial evidence includes reviewing for substantial reason, see, e.g.,

2021In conducting our review, “the court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to any issue of fact.” ORS 183.482(7).2 1 In his fifth assignment of error, petitioner contends that the board’s final order “improperly infringes on his [commercial speech] rights under Article I, § 8 of the Oregon Constitution,” because “[t]he only basis for the board to seek discipline is because [petitioner] refers in advertising and media to the fact that he is an Oregon licensed chiropractor.” 2 Although reviewing for substantial evidence includes reviewing for substantial reason, see, e.g.,

2010On de novo review, Osborne v. Fadden, 225 Or App 431, 433 , 201 P3d 278 , rev den, 346 Or 213 (2009), we affirm.

2010On de novo review, Osborne v. Fadden, 225 Or App 431, 433 , 201 P3d 278 , rev den, 346 Or 213 (2009), we affirm.

2010On de novo review, Osborne v. Fadden, 225 Or App 431, 433 , 201 P3d 278 , rev den, 346 Or 213 (2009), we affirm.

2009Thus, we concluded that, because the sole basis for the defendant’s demurrer was that ORS 162.015(1) criminalized unreported campaign contributions and the statute did not proscribe that conduct, the trial court had erred in concluding that it unconstitutionally burdened the defendant’s rights under Article I, section 8. 121 Or App at 213 . 2 This case presents different circumstances from those that existed in Gyenes .

2009Thus, we concluded that, because the sole basis for the defendant's demurrer was that ORS 162.015(1) criminalized unreported campaign contributions and the statute did not proscribe that conduct, the trial court had erred in concluding that it unconstitutionally burdened the defendant's rights under Article I, section 8. 121 Or.App. at 213 , 855 P.2d 642 . [2] This case presents different circumstances from those that existed in Gyenes .

2007Id. at 44 .

2006In this case, the Court of Appeals concluded that IP 8 proposes at least two changes to the Oregon Constitution, one aimed at the free expression provisions of Article I, section 8, [7] and one aimed at the legislative majority provisions of Article IV, section 25. [8] Meyer, 205 Or.App. at 307 , 134 P.3d 1005 .

2006In this case, the Court of Appeals concluded that IP 8 proposes at least two changes to the Oregon Constitution, one aimed at the free expression provisions of Article I, section 8, 7 and one aimed at the legislative majority provisions of Article IV, section 25. 8 Meyer, 205 Or App at 307 .

2006Rather, the challenger will prevail in his or her facial challenge if the court concludes that the statute in question prohibits constitutionally protected conduct of any kind.” State v. Hirsch/Friend, 338 Or 622, 628 , 114 P3d 1104 (2005) (citation omitted).

2006Rather, the challenger will prevail in his or her facial challenge if the court concludes that the statute in question prohibits constitutionally protected conduct of any kind.” State v. Hirsch/Friend, 338 Or 622, 628 , 114 P3d 1104 (2005) (citation omitted).

2000Barcik v. Kubiaczyk, 321 Or 174 , 895 P2d 765 (1995).

2000Barcik v. Kubiaczyk, 321 Or 174 , 895 P2d 765 (1995).

2000Id.

2000Rather, the court addressed the case on what it characterized as “subconstitutional” grounds, 307 Or at 680 , concluding that principles of equity required that the petitioners be allowed to solicit signatures inside Lloyd Center, so long as they did so reasonably, quietly, and peaceably, and without substantially interfering with the owner’s commercial enterprise.

1995See State v. Castrejon, 317 Or 202 , 856 P2d 616 (1993); Ailes v. Portland Meadows, Inc., 312 Or 376 , 823 P2d 956 (1991); State v. Brown, 310 Or 347 , 800 P2d 259 (1990); Simpson v. Simpson, 83 Or App 86 , 730 P2d 592 (1986), rev den 303 Or 454 (1987); Defendant also assigns error to the trial court’s denial of his post-trial motion in arrest of judgment on the ground that ORS 162.375 violated his constitutional right of free speech under Article I, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution.

1995See State v. Castrejon, 317 Or 202 , 856 P2d 616 (1993); Ailes v. Portland Meadows, Inc., 312 Or 376 , 823 P2d 956 (1991); State v. Brown, 310 Or 347 , 800 P2d 259 (1990); Simpson v. Simpson, 83 Or App 86 , 730 P2d 592 (1986), rev den 303 Or 454 (1987); Defendant also assigns error to the trial court’s denial of his post-trial motion in arrest of judgment on the ground that ORS 162.375 violated his constitutional right of free speech under Article I, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution.

1995See State v. Castrejon, 317 Or 202 , 856 P2d 616 (1993); Ailes v. Portland Meadows, Inc., 312 Or 376 , 823 P2d 956 (1991); State v. Brown, 310 Or 347 , 800 P2d 259 (1990); Simpson v. Simpson, 83 Or App 86 , 730 P2d 592 (1986), rev den 303 Or 454 (1987); Defendant also assigns error to the trial court’s denial of his post-trial motion in arrest of judgment on the ground that ORS 162.375 violated his constitutional right of free speech under Article I, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution.

1995See State v. Castrejon, 317 Or 202 , 856 P2d 616 (1993); Ailes v. Portland Meadows, Inc., 312 Or 376 , 823 P2d 956 (1991); State v. Brown, 310 Or 347 , 800 P2d 259 (1990); Simpson v. Simpson, 83 Or App 86 , 730 P2d 592 (1986), rev den 303 Or 454 (1987); Defendant also assigns error to the trial court’s denial of his post-trial motion in arrest of judgment on the ground that ORS 162.375 violated his constitutional right of free speech under Article I, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution.

1995"We therefore hold that persons whose rights under Article I, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution are violated by a municipality or its employees may not bring an action for damages against the municipality or its employees directly under the constitution, but will be limited to existing common-law, equitable, and statutory remedies." Id. at 302-04, 787 P.2d 881 (emphasis added).

1995Hunter answered in the negative the following certified question: “ ‘(1) May persons whose rights under Article I, section 8 of the Oregon Constitution were allegedly violated by a municipality and by municipal employees bring an action for damages against the municipality and its employees directly under the Oregon Constitution?’ ” Hunter, 309 Or at 302 .

1995See State v. Castrejon, 317 Or 202 , 856 P2d 616 (1993); Ailes v. Portland Meadows, Inc., 312 Or 376 , 823 P2d 956 (1991); State v. Brown, 310 Or 347 , 800 P2d 259 (1990); Simpson v. Simpson, 83 Or App 86 , 730 P2d 592 (1986), rev den 303 Or 454 (1987); Defendant also assigns error to the trial court’s denial of his post-trial motion in arrest of judgment on the ground that ORS 162.375 violated his constitutional right of free speech under Article I, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution.

1995See State v. Castrejon, 317 Or 202 , 856 P2d 616 (1993); Ailes v. Portland Meadows, Inc., 312 Or 376 , 823 P2d 956 (1991); State v. Brown, 310 Or 347 , 800 P2d 259 (1990); Simpson v. Simpson, 83 Or App 86 , 730 P2d 592 (1986), rev den 303 Or 454 (1987); Defendant also assigns error to the trial court’s denial of his post-trial motion in arrest of judgment on the ground that ORS 162.375 violated his constitutional right of free speech under Article I, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution.

1994We now hold in this case that the imposition of discipline under Canons 1, 2A and 3A(6) does not violate Article I, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution." 318 Or. at 431 , 870 P.2d at 203 .

1994We now hold in this case that the imposition of discipline under Canons 1, 2A and 3A(6) does not violate Article I, section 8, of the Oregon Constitution." 318 Or. at 431 , 870 P.2d at 203 .

1988It is [City of Portland v.] Aziz [ 47 Or App 937 , 615 P2d 1109 (1980)].

1988It is [City of Portland v.] Aziz [ 47 Or App 937 , 615 P2d 1109 (1980)].

1983Cf. Deras v. Myers, supra, 212 Or at 57 (laws restricting expenditures in support of or in opposition to a candidate for public office constitute an unconstitutional restriction on free expression under Article I, section 8); Schaumburg v. Citizens for Better Environ., 444 US 620, 100 S Ct 826 , 63 L Ed 2d 73 (1980) (ordinance prohibiting certain organizations, whose purpose was to gather and disseminate information on public issues, from soliciting contributions unconstitutionally restricts free speech under the First Amendment).

1983Cf. Deras v. Myers, supra, 212 Or at 57 (laws restricting expenditures in support of or in opposition to a candidate for public office constitute an unconstitutional restriction on free expression under Article I, section 8); Schaumburg v. Citizens for Better Environ., 444 US 620, 100 S Ct 826 , 63 L Ed 2d 73 (1980) (ordinance prohibiting certain organizations, whose purpose was to gather and disseminate information on public issues, from soliciting contributions unconstitutionally restricts free speech under the First Amendment).