section 413 first paragraph in Pennsylvania

1935Co., 108 Pa. Superior Ct. 165 , 164 A. 731 , the supplemental agreement of March 6, 1931, was not subject to review under the first paragraph of section 413, and could not be modified under the second paragraph of said section, because there was no evidence that the disability had increased or recurred since the execution of said supplemental agreement.

1935Co., 108 Pa. Superior Ct. 165 , 164 A. 731 , the supplemental agreement of March 6, 1931, was not subject to review under the first paragraph of section 413, and could not be modified under the second paragraph of said section, because there was no evidence that the disability had increased or recurred since the execution of said supplemental agreement.

1942This limitation apparently would operate to bar any relief in this case, since the petition of claimant was filed more than one year after the expiration of the original award of Referee Casey: DeJoseph v. Standard Steel Car Co. et al., 99 Pa. Superior Ct. 497 ; Vetrulli v. Wallin Concrete Corp. et al., supra. However, in view of what has already been said, there is no need to consider this phase of the case.

1933Co., 103 Pa. Superior Ct. 598, 601 , 159 A. 79 , "The legislature, for the reasonable protection of the employer, has fixed a period beyond which agreements can not be reviewed except for the matters reserved in the first paragraph of Section 413, and they relate to a fact or condition existing at the time the agreement sought to be reopened was made, and not to subsequent changes, developments or increase of disability arising out of that condition.” The within case is ruled by DeJoseph v. Standard Steel Car Co., 99 Pa. Superior Ct. 497 , and Zavatskie v. P. & R.

1936The legislature, for the reasonable protection of the employer, has fixed a period beyond which agreements cannot be reviewed except for the matters reserved in the first paragraph of section 413, and they relate to a fact or condition existing at the time the agreement sought to be reopened was made, and not to subsequent changes, developments or increase of disability arising out of that condition.” Mis *397 takes of law or of fact as respects awards must be corrected by appeal (Ernst v. Sassaman, 117 Pa. Superior Ct. 353 , 178 A. 317 ), or by petition for rebearing (Sec. 426 as amended by A

1936The legislature, for the reasonable protection of the employer, has fixed a period beyond which agreements cannot be reviewed except for the matters reserved in the first paragraph of section 413, and they relate to a fact or condition existing at the time the agreement sought to be reopened was made, and not to subsequent changes, developments or increase of disability arising out of that condition.” Mis *397 takes of law or of fact as respects awards must be corrected by appeal (Ernst v. Sassaman, 117 Pa. Superior Ct. 353 , 178 A. 317 ), or by petition for rebearing (Sec. 426 as amended by A

2022The Court observed that “[t]he doctrine of unjust enrichment is an equitable one,” and the Board “does not have its roots in equity.” Fahringer, 529 A.2d at 59 .

2007NOTES [1] The Court's review in workers' compensation matters is limited to determining whether constitutional rights were violated, whether an error of law was committed, whether the practices and procedures of a Commonwealth agency were followed and whether the findings of fact made by the WCJ and necessary to support its decision were supported by substantial evidence. 2 Pa.C.S. § 704; Gunter v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (City of Philadelphia), 573 Pa. 386 , 825 A.2d 1236 (2003). [2] The first paragraph of Section 413(a) of the Act provides: A workers' compensation judge may, at an

2007NOTES [1] The Court's review in workers' compensation matters is limited to determining whether constitutional rights were violated, whether an error of law was committed, whether the practices and procedures of a Commonwealth agency were followed and whether the findings of fact made by the WCJ and necessary to support its decision were supported by substantial evidence. 2 Pa.C.S. § 704; Gunter v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (City of Philadelphia), 573 Pa. 386 , 825 A.2d 1236 (2003). [2] The first paragraph of Section 413(a) of the Act provides: A workers' compensation judge may, at an

2007Jeanes Hospital v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Hass), 582 Pa. 405 , 872 A.2d 159 (2005).

2007Jeanes Hospital v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Hass), 582 Pa. 405 , 872 A.2d 159 (2005).

2006Anderson v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Pennsylvania Hospital), 830 A.2d 636 (Pa.Cmwlth.2003).

1998The first paragraph of Section 413 of the Act gives the WCJ the authority to review and set aside agreements of the parties "if it be proved that such ... agreement was in any material respect incorrect.” Spears v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Newman and Company, Inc.), 85 Pa.Cmwlth. 346 , 481 A.2d 1244 (1984). 6 .Section 407 of the Act provides in pertinent part: the employer ... and employe ... may agree upon the compensation payable to the employe ... under this act; but any agreement ... permitting a commutation of payments contrary to the provisions of this act, or varying the amo

1998The first paragraph of Section 413 of the Act gives the WCJ the authority to review and set aside agreements of the parties "if it be proved that such ... agreement was in any material respect incorrect.” Spears v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Newman and Company, Inc.), 85 Pa.Cmwlth. 346 , 481 A.2d 1244 (1984). 6 .Section 407 of the Act provides in pertinent part: the employer ... and employe ... may agree upon the compensation payable to the employe ... under this act; but any agreement ... permitting a commutation of payments contrary to the provisions of this act, or varying the amo

1994The majority also cites Beissel v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (John Wanamaker, Inc.), 502 Pa. 178 , 465 A.2d 969 (1983) and County of Schuylkill v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Lawlor), 151 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 97, 617 A.2d 46 (1992), in support of its position that we should not set aside the Notice of Compensation Payable here because it is an admission of liability.

1994In Rollins Outdoor Advertising v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 506 Pa. 592 , 487 A.2d 794 (1985), our Supreme Court, pursuant to the first paragraph' of section 413(a) of the Act, set side a supplemental agreement because its provisions were illegal under section 407 of the Act. 5 Accordingly, the Court declared that the agreement was wholly null and void, treated the agreement as if it never existed and returned the parties to their respective positions prior to the agreement. 6 Like the supplemental agreement in Rollins, the Notice of Compensation Payable in this case is illegal unde

1994In Rollins Outdoor Advertising v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 506 Pa. 592 , 487 A.2d 794 (1985), our Supreme Court, pursuant to the first paragraph' of section 413(a) of the Act, set side a supplemental agreement because its provisions were illegal under section 407 of the Act. 5 Accordingly, the Court declared that the agreement was wholly null and void, treated the agreement as if it never existed and returned the parties to their respective positions prior to the agreement. 6 Like the supplemental agreement in Rollins, the Notice of Compensation Payable in this case is illegal unde

1994In Rollins Outdoor Advertising v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 506 Pa. 592 , 487 A.2d 794 (1985), our Supreme Court, pursuant to the first paragraph' of section 413(a) of the Act, set side a supplemental agreement because its provisions were illegal under section 407 of the Act. 5 Accordingly, the Court declared that the agreement was wholly null and void, treated the agreement as if it never existed and returned the parties to their respective positions prior to the agreement. 6 Like the supplemental agreement in Rollins, the Notice of Compensation Payable in this case is illegal unde

1994In Rollins Outdoor Advertising v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 506 Pa. 592 , 487 A.2d 794 (1985), our Supreme Court, pursuant to the first paragraph' of section 413(a) of the Act, set side a supplemental agreement because its provisions were illegal under section 407 of the Act. 5 Accordingly, the Court declared that the agreement was wholly null and void, treated the agreement as if it never existed and returned the parties to their respective positions prior to the agreement. 6 Like the supplemental agreement in Rollins, the Notice of Compensation Payable in this case is illegal unde

1994The majority also cites Beissel v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (John Wanamaker, Inc.), 502 Pa. 178 , 465 A.2d 969 (1983) and County of Schuylkill v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Lawlor), 151 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 97, 617 A.2d 46 (1992), in support of its position that we should not set aside the Notice of Compensation Payable here because it is an admission of liability.

1994The majority also cites Beissel v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (John Wanamaker, Inc.), 502 Pa. 178 , 465 A.2d 969 (1983) and County of Schuylkill v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Lawlor), 151 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 97, 617 A.2d 46 (1992), in support of its position that we should not set aside the Notice of Compensation Payable here because it is an admission of liability.

1992The Pennsylvania supreme court’s decisions in Turner v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 479 Pa. 618 , 389 A.2d 42 (1978) and Reed v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 499 Pa. 177 , 452 A.2d 997 (1982) authorize a referee to modify an agreement when the agreement contains a material mistake that is objectively determinable.

1992The Pennsylvania supreme court’s decisions in Turner v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 479 Pa. 618 , 389 A.2d 42 (1978) and Reed v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 499 Pa. 177 , 452 A.2d 997 (1982) authorize a referee to modify an agreement when the agreement contains a material mistake that is objectively determinable.

1992The Pennsylvania supreme court’s decisions in Turner v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 479 Pa. 618 , 389 A.2d 42 (1978) and Reed v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 499 Pa. 177 , 452 A.2d 997 (1982) authorize a referee to modify an agreement when the agreement contains a material mistake that is objectively determinable.

1992The Pennsylvania supreme court’s decisions in Turner v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 479 Pa. 618 , 389 A.2d 42 (1978) and Reed v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 499 Pa. 177 , 452 A.2d 997 (1982) authorize a referee to modify an agreement when the agreement contains a material mistake that is objectively determinable.

1984In Guzik v. Laurel Ridge Construction Co., 196 Pa. Superior Ct. 586 , 176 A.2d 183 (1961), where as here there was a referee’s unappealed termination order based upon a stipulation at a hearing on July 31, 1957, that all disability as a result of the accident had ceased as of March 5, 1957, as here there was a subsequent petition to reinstate in support of which claimant’s testimony was that, “notwithstanding the stipulation of Counsel, he had not recovered at the time of the hearing on July 31, 1957.” In ruling that the petition to reinstate should be treated as filed under the first paragrap

1984In Guzik v. Laurel Ridge Construction Co., 196 Pa. Superior Ct. 586 , 176 A.2d 183 (1961), where as here there was a referee’s unappealed termination order based upon a stipulation at a hearing on July 31, 1957, that all disability as a result of the accident had ceased as of March 5, 1957, as here there was a subsequent petition to reinstate in support of which claimant’s testimony was that, “notwithstanding the stipulation of Counsel, he had not recovered at the time of the hearing on July 31, 1957.” In ruling that the petition to reinstate should be treated as filed under the first paragrap

1961The particular section of the statute under which a petition is filed is not material, provided that a proper ground for action under an appropriate section is proved: Eberst v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 133 Pa. Superior Ct. 427 , 3 A. 2d 25 ; Selinsky v. New Shawmut Mining Co., 178 Pa. Superior Ct. 240 , 115 A. 2d 916 .

1961The particular section of the statute under which a petition is filed is not material, provided that a proper ground for action under an appropriate section is proved: Eberst v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 133 Pa. Superior Ct. 427 , 3 A. 2d 25 ; Selinsky v. New Shawmut Mining Co., 178 Pa. Superior Ct. 240 , 115 A. 2d 916 .

1961The particular section of the statute under which a petition is filed is not material, provided that a proper ground for action under an appropriate section is proved: Eberst v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 133 Pa. Superior Ct. 427 , 3 A. 2d 25 ; Selinsky v. New Shawmut Mining Co., 178 Pa. Superior Ct. 240 , 115 A. 2d 916 .

1961The particular section of the statute under which a petition is filed is not material, provided that a proper ground for action under an appropriate section is proved: Eberst v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 133 Pa. Superior Ct. 427 , 3 A. 2d 25 ; Selinsky v. New Shawmut Mining Co., 178 Pa. Superior Ct. 240 , 115 A. 2d 916 .

1955Leeper v. Logan I. & Steel Co. et al., 131 Pa. Superior Ct. 172 , 198 A. 489 .

1955Leeper v. Logan I. & Steel Co. et al., 131 Pa. Superior Ct. 172 , 198 A. 489 .

1942See Busi v. A. & S. Wilson Co. et al., 110 Pa. Superior Ct. 95, 98, 99 , 167 A. 655 ; Zupicick v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 108 Pa. Superior Ct. 165, 168 , 164 A. 731 ; Savidge v. Dime Trust & Safe Deposit Co. et al., 108 Pa. Superior Ct. 333, 339 , 164 A. 734 ; Corniak v. Cohen et al., 150 Pa. Superior Ct. 140 , 27 A. 2d 560 .

1942See Busi v. A. & S. Wilson Co. et al., 110 Pa. Superior Ct. 95, 98, 99 , 167 A. 655 ; Zupicick v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 108 Pa. Superior Ct. 165, 168 , 164 A. 731 ; Savidge v. Dime Trust & Safe Deposit Co. et al., 108 Pa. Superior Ct. 333, 339 , 164 A. 734 ; Corniak v. Cohen et al., 150 Pa. Superior Ct. 140 , 27 A. 2d 560 .

1942But the petition in that case was filed neither within the period the award had to run nor within a year after the last payment of compensation, 6 Hill v. Booth & Flinn Co. et al., 146 Pa. Superior Ct. 575, 580 , 23 A. (2d) 85. 7 See Koreen v. Union Collieries Company, 141 Pa. Superior Ct. 70, 72 , 14 A. (2d) 845; Petrovan v. Bockhill Coal and Iron Co., 130 Pa. Superior Ct. 58, 64 , 196 A. 516 . 8 It is not contended the petition can be treated as having been filed under the first paragraph of Section 413.

1942But the petition in that case was filed neither within the period the award had to run nor within a year after the last payment of compensation, 6 Hill v. Booth & Flinn Co. et al., 146 Pa. Superior Ct. 575, 580 , 23 A. (2d) 85. 7 See Koreen v. Union Collieries Company, 141 Pa. Superior Ct. 70, 72 , 14 A. (2d) 845; Petrovan v. Bockhill Coal and Iron Co., 130 Pa. Superior Ct. 58, 64 , 196 A. 516 . 8 It is not contended the petition can be treated as having been filed under the first paragraph of Section 413.

1942But the petition in that case was filed neither within the period the award had to run nor within a year after the last payment of compensation, 6 Hill v. Booth & Flinn Co. et al., 146 Pa. Superior Ct. 575, 580 , 23 A. (2d) 85. 7 See Koreen v. Union Collieries Company, 141 Pa. Superior Ct. 70, 72 , 14 A. (2d) 845; Petrovan v. Bockhill Coal and Iron Co., 130 Pa. Superior Ct. 58, 64 , 196 A. 516 . 8 It is not contended the petition can be treated as having been filed under the first paragraph of Section 413.

1942See Busi v. A. & S. Wilson Co. et al., 110 Pa. Superior Ct. 95, 98, 99 , 167 A. 655 ; Zupicick v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 108 Pa. Superior Ct. 165, 168 , 164 A. 731 ; Savidge v. Dime Trust & Safe Deposit Co. et al., 108 Pa. Superior Ct. 333, 339 , 164 A. 734 ; Corniak v. Cohen et al., 150 Pa. Superior Ct. 140 , 27 A. 2d 560 .

1942See Busi v. A. & S. Wilson Co. et al., 110 Pa. Superior Ct. 95, 98, 99 , 167 A. 655 ; Zupicick v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 108 Pa. Superior Ct. 165, 168 , 164 A. 731 ; Savidge v. Dime Trust & Safe Deposit Co. et al., 108 Pa. Superior Ct. 333, 339 , 164 A. 734 ; Corniak v. Cohen et al., 150 Pa. Superior Ct. 140 , 27 A. 2d 560 .

1942But the petition in that case was filed neither within the period the award had to run nor within a year after the last payment of compensation, 6 Hill v. Booth & Flinn Co. et al., 146 Pa. Superior Ct. 575, 580 , 23 A. (2d) 85. 7 See Koreen v. Union Collieries Company, 141 Pa. Superior Ct. 70, 72 , 14 A. (2d) 845; Petrovan v. Bockhill Coal and Iron Co., 130 Pa. Superior Ct. 58, 64 , 196 A. 516 . 8 It is not contended the petition can be treated as having been filed under the first paragraph of Section 413.