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32 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1989–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Gillis v. Goodgamegreen2 sentences1996Ballew III, for appellee. 1 See Gillis v. Goodgame, 262 Ga. 117 ( 414 SE2d 197 ) (1992), reversing Gillis v. Goodgame, 199 Ga. App. 413 ( 404 SE2d 815 ) (1991) (concluding that a radiological physicist is not one of the professions covered by the affidavit requirement of OCGA § 9-11-9.1). 1996Ballew III, for appellee. 1 See Gillis v. Goodgame, 262 Ga. 117 ( 414 SE2d 197 ) (1992), reversing Gillis v. Goodgame, 199 Ga. App. 413 ( 404 SE2d 815 ) (1991) (concluding that a radiological physicist is not one of the professions covered by the affidavit requirement of OCGA § 9-11-9.1). | 4 | 10 |
Hodge v. Jennings Mill, Ltd.green2 sentences2017These allegations do not implicate Grady Hospital or Osipow. 17 Hobbs, supra at 248 . 18 Nash v. Studdard, 294 Ga. App. 845, 853 (5) ( 670 SE2d 508 ) (2008) (citation and punctuation omitted). 19 Hobbs, supra at 248 (citation omitted). 20 Nash, supra; Hodge v. Jennings Mill, 215 Ga. App. 507, 508 ( 451 SE2d 66 ) (1994) (“[T]he affidavit requirements of OCGA § 9-11-9.1 are limited to those claims for professional malpractice by negligent act or omission, sounding in tort or by breach of contract for failure to *209 perform professional services [in] accordance with the professional obligation o 2017These allegations do not implicate Grady Hospital or Osipow. 17 Hobbs, supra at 248 . 18 Nash v. Studdard, 294 Ga. App. 845, 853 (5) ( 670 SE2d 508 ) (2008) (citation and punctuation omitted). 19 Hobbs, supra at 248 (citation omitted). 20 Nash, supra; Hodge v. Jennings Mill, 215 Ga. App. 507, 508 ( 451 SE2d 66 ) (1994) (“[T]he affidavit requirements of OCGA § 9-11-9.1 are limited to those claims for professional malpractice by negligent act or omission, sounding in tort or by breach of contract for failure to *209 perform professional services [in] accordance with the professional obligation o | 3 | 3 |
Gadd v. WILSON & COMPANY, ENGINEERS & ARCHITECTSgreen2 sentences2009See generally Gadd v. Wilson & Co., 262 Ga. 234, 235 ( 416 SE2d 285 ) (1992) (the purpose of the affidavit requirement of OCGA § 9-11-9.1 is “to reduce the number of frivolous malpractice suits being filed”) (punctuation omitted), citing 0-1 Doctors Mem. 2009See generally Gadd v. Wilson & Co., 262 Ga. 234, 235 ( 416 SE2d 285 ) (1992) (the purpose of the affidavit requirement of OCGA § 9-11-9.1 is “to reduce the number of frivolous malpractice suits being filed”) (punctuation omitted), citing 0-1 Doctors Mem. | 3 | 3 |
Lamb v. Candler General Hospital, Inc.green2 sentences1993(Additionally, no claim based on simple negligence, which per se would not require a supporting affidavit, has been averred in the complaint against any of the appellants.) In Gillis v. Goodgame, 262 Ga. 117, 118 ( 414 SE2d 197 ), it was concluded that “the legislature intended for the term ‘professional’ as used in OCGA § 9-11-9.1 to be defined by OCGA §§ 14-7-2 (2); 14-10-2 (2), and 43-1-24. . . . [Tjherefore . . . the affidavit requirements of § 9-11-9.1 apply only to those professions recognized under Georgia law in OCGA §§ 14-7-2 (2); 14-10-2 (2); and 43-1-24.” This holding was further cl 1992In Gillis v. Goodgame, 262 Ga. 117, 118 ( 414 SE2d 197 ), it was concluded that “the legislature intended for the term ‘professional’ as used in OCGA § 9-11-9.1 to be defined by OCGA §§ 14-7-2 (2); 14-10-2 (2), and 43-1-24. . . . [Therefore . . . the affidavit requirements of § 9-11-9.1 apply only to those professions recognized under Georgia law in OCGA §§ 14-7-2 (2); 14-10-2 (2), and 43-1-24.” This holding was further clarified in Lamb, supra at 72 (2), which recognized that Gillis, supra, held that the affidavit requirements of § 9-11-9.1 apply only to those professions recognized under Geo | 2 | 4 |
0-1 Doctors Memorial Holding Co. v. Mooregreen2 sentences1991Unlike OCGA § 9-11-56, “[n]othing in the affidavit requirements in OCGA § 9-11-9.1 demands that the standard of care be set forth, that a plaintiff’s expert state he is familiar with the appropriate standard of care, or that the affiant detail the manner in which the defendant deviated from that standard.” 0-1 Doctors Memorial Holding Co. v. Moore, 190 Ga. App. 286, 287 (1) ( 378 SE2d 708 ) (1989). 1991Unlike OCGA § 9-11-56, “[n]othing in the affidavit requirements in OCGA § 9-11-9.1 demands that the standard of care be set forth, that a plaintiff’s expert state he is familiar with the appropriate standard of care, or that the affiant detail the manner in which the defendant deviated from that standard.” 0-1 Doctors Memorial Holding Co. v. Moore, 190 Ga. App. 286, 287 (1) ( 378 SE2d 708 ) (1989). | 2 | 3 |
Okelley v. Atlanta Heart Associates, P.C.green2 sentences2012See OKelley v. Atlanta Heart Assoc., 316 Ga. App. 218, 219 ( 728 SE2d 313 ) (2012). 2012See OKelley v. Atlanta Heart Assoc., 316 Ga. App. 218, 219 ( 728 SE2d 313 ) (2012). | 2 | 2 |
Fales v. Jacobsgreen2 sentences2012Citing Fales v. Jacobs, 263 Ga. App. 461, 462 ( 588 SE2d 294 ) (2003), Dr. Jensen nevertheless claims that the contemporaneous affidavit filing requirement of OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (a) would be negated if a plaintiff was allowed to bring an ordinary negligence claim without an affidavit, and then later add claims for professional negligence after the expiration of the statute of limitation. 2012Citing Fales v. Jacobs, 263 Ga. App. 461, 462 ( 588 SE2d 294 ) (2003), Dr. Jensen nevertheless claims that the contemporaneous affidavit filing requirement of OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (a) would be negated if a plaintiff was allowed to bring an ordinary negligence claim without an affidavit, and then later add claims for professional negligence after the expiration of the statute of limitation. | 2 | 2 |
Barr v. Johnsongreen2 sentences1998"The affidavit requirements of OCGA § 9-11-9.1 `are limited to those claims "for professional malpractice by negligent act or omission, sounding in tort or by breach of contract for failure to perform professional services in accordance *340 with the professional obligation of care." Barr v. Johnson, [ 189 Ga.App. 136, 137 , 375 S.E.2d 51 , supra]. 1998"The affidavit requirements of OCGA § 9-11-9.1 `are limited to those claims "for professional malpractice by negligent act or omission, sounding in tort or by breach of contract for failure to perform professional services in accordance *340 with the professional obligation of care." Barr v. Johnson, [ 189 Ga.App. 136, 137 , 375 S.E.2d 51 , supra]. | 1 | 2 |
Williams v. Alvista Healthcare Center, Inc.green2 sentences2026See Oduok, 340 Ga. App. at 207 (1) (key factor in determining whether an allegation falls within the realm of medical malpractice “is the existence or absence of allegations that the defendant-professional has rendered negligent professional services” (quotation marks omitted)); Williams v. Alvista Healthcare Ctr., 283 Ga. App. 613, 616 (1)(b) ( 642 SE2d 232 ) (2007) (negligence per se claim based on nursing home’s alleged violation of non-professional, administrative regulation not subject to affidavit requirement in OCGA § 9-11-9.1). 2026See Oduok, 340 Ga. App. at 207 (1) (key factor in determining whether an allegation falls within the realm of medical malpractice “is the existence or absence of allegations that the defendant-professional has rendered negligent professional services” (quotation marks omitted)); Williams v. Alvista Healthcare Ctr., 283 Ga. App. 613, 616 (1)(b) ( 642 SE2d 232 ) (2007) (negligence per se claim based on nursing home’s alleged violation of non-professional, administrative regulation not subject to affidavit requirement in OCGA § 9-11-9.1). | 1 | 1 |
ODUOK v. FULTON DeKALB HOSPITAL AUTHORITY Et Al.green1 sentence2026See Oduok, 340 Ga. App. at 207 (1) (key factor in determining whether an allegation falls within the realm of medical malpractice “is the existence or absence of allegations that the defendant-professional has rendered negligent professional services” (quotation marks omitted)); Williams v. Alvista Healthcare Ctr., 283 Ga. App. 613, 616 (1)(b) ( 642 SE2d 232 ) (2007) (negligence per se claim based on nursing home’s alleged violation of non-professional, administrative regulation not subject to affidavit requirement in OCGA § 9-11-9.1). | 1 | 1 |
Bonner v. Petersongreen2 sentences2017These allegations do not implicate Grady Hospital or Osipow. 17 Hobbs, supra at 248 . 18 Nash v. Studdard, 294 Ga. App. 845, 853 (5) ( 670 SE2d 508 ) (2008) (citation and punctuation omitted). 19 Hobbs, supra at 248 (citation omitted). 20 Nash, supra; Hodge v. Jennings Mill, 215 Ga. App. 507, 508 ( 451 SE2d 66 ) (1994) (“[T]he affidavit requirements of OCGA § 9-11-9.1 are limited to those claims for professional malpractice by negligent act or omission, sounding in tort or by breach of contract for failure to *209 perform professional services [in] accordance with the professional obligation o 2017These allegations do not implicate Grady Hospital or Osipow. 17 Hobbs, supra at 248 . 18 Nash v. Studdard, 294 Ga. App. 845, 853 (5) ( 670 SE2d 508 ) (2008) (citation and punctuation omitted). 19 Hobbs, supra at 248 (citation omitted). 20 Nash, supra; Hodge v. Jennings Mill, 215 Ga. App. 507, 508 ( 451 SE2d 66 ) (1994) (“[T]he affidavit requirements of OCGA § 9-11-9.1 are limited to those claims for professional malpractice by negligent act or omission, sounding in tort or by breach of contract for failure to *209 perform professional services [in] accordance with the professional obligation o | 1 | 1 |
Minster v. Pohlgreen2 sentences2017These allegations do not implicate Grady Hospital or Osipow. 17 Hobbs, supra at 248 . 18 Nash v. Studdard, 294 Ga. App. 845, 853 (5) ( 670 SE2d 508 ) (2008) (citation and punctuation omitted). 19 Hobbs, supra at 248 (citation omitted). 20 Nash, supra; Hodge v. Jennings Mill, 215 Ga. App. 507, 508 ( 451 SE2d 66 ) (1994) (“[T]he affidavit requirements of OCGA § 9-11-9.1 are limited to those claims for professional malpractice by negligent act or omission, sounding in tort or by breach of contract for failure to *209 perform professional services [in] accordance with the professional obligation o 2017These allegations do not implicate Grady Hospital or Osipow. 17 Hobbs, supra at 248 . 18 Nash v. Studdard, 294 Ga. App. 845, 853 (5) ( 670 SE2d 508 ) (2008) (citation and punctuation omitted). 19 Hobbs, supra at 248 (citation omitted). 20 Nash, supra; Hodge v. Jennings Mill, 215 Ga. App. 507, 508 ( 451 SE2d 66 ) (1994) (“[T]he affidavit requirements of OCGA § 9-11-9.1 are limited to those claims for professional malpractice by negligent act or omission, sounding in tort or by breach of contract for failure to *209 perform professional services [in] accordance with the professional obligation o | 1 | 1 |
Epps v. Gwinnett Countygreen2 sentences2017These allegations do not implicate Grady Hospital or Osipow. 17 Hobbs, supra at 248 . 18 Nash v. Studdard, 294 Ga. App. 845, 853 (5) ( 670 SE2d 508 ) (2008) (citation and punctuation omitted). 19 Hobbs, supra at 248 (citation omitted). 20 Nash, supra; Hodge v. Jennings Mill, 215 Ga. App. 507, 508 ( 451 SE2d 66 ) (1994) (“[T]he affidavit requirements of OCGA § 9-11-9.1 are limited to those claims for professional malpractice by negligent act or omission, sounding in tort or by breach of contract for failure to *209 perform professional services [in] accordance with the professional obligation o 2017These allegations do not implicate Grady Hospital or Osipow. 17 Hobbs, supra at 248 . 18 Nash v. Studdard, 294 Ga. App. 845, 853 (5) ( 670 SE2d 508 ) (2008) (citation and punctuation omitted). 19 Hobbs, supra at 248 (citation omitted). 20 Nash, supra; Hodge v. Jennings Mill, 215 Ga. App. 507, 508 ( 451 SE2d 66 ) (1994) (“[T]he affidavit requirements of OCGA § 9-11-9.1 are limited to those claims for professional malpractice by negligent act or omission, sounding in tort or by breach of contract for failure to *209 perform professional services [in] accordance with the professional obligation o | 1 | 1 |
Upson County Hospital, Inc. v. Headgreen2 sentences2017These allegations do not implicate Grady Hospital or Osipow. 17 Hobbs, supra at 248 . 18 Nash v. Studdard, 294 Ga. App. 845, 853 (5) ( 670 SE2d 508 ) (2008) (citation and punctuation omitted). 19 Hobbs, supra at 248 (citation omitted). 20 Nash, supra; Hodge v. Jennings Mill, 215 Ga. App. 507, 508 ( 451 SE2d 66 ) (1994) (“[T]he affidavit requirements of OCGA § 9-11-9.1 are limited to those claims for professional malpractice by negligent act or omission, sounding in tort or by breach of contract for failure to *209 perform professional services [in] accordance with the professional obligation o 2017These allegations do not implicate Grady Hospital or Osipow. 17 Hobbs, supra at 248 . 18 Nash v. Studdard, 294 Ga. App. 845, 853 (5) ( 670 SE2d 508 ) (2008) (citation and punctuation omitted). 19 Hobbs, supra at 248 (citation omitted). 20 Nash, supra; Hodge v. Jennings Mill, 215 Ga. App. 507, 508 ( 451 SE2d 66 ) (1994) (“[T]he affidavit requirements of OCGA § 9-11-9.1 are limited to those claims for professional malpractice by negligent act or omission, sounding in tort or by breach of contract for failure to *209 perform professional services [in] accordance with the professional obligation o | 1 | 1 |
Nash v. Studdardgreen2 sentences2017These allegations do not implicate Grady Hospital or Osipow. 17 Hobbs, supra at 248 . 18 Nash v. Studdard, 294 Ga. App. 845, 853 (5) ( 670 SE2d 508 ) (2008) (citation and punctuation omitted). 19 Hobbs, supra at 248 (citation omitted). 20 Nash, supra; Hodge v. Jennings Mill, 215 Ga. App. 507, 508 ( 451 SE2d 66 ) (1994) (“[T]he affidavit requirements of OCGA § 9-11-9.1 are limited to those claims for professional malpractice by negligent act or omission, sounding in tort or by breach of contract for failure to *209 perform professional services [in] accordance with the professional obligation o 2017These allegations do not implicate Grady Hospital or Osipow. 17 Hobbs, supra at 248 . 18 Nash v. Studdard, 294 Ga. App. 845, 853 (5) ( 670 SE2d 508 ) (2008) (citation and punctuation omitted). 19 Hobbs, supra at 248 (citation omitted). 20 Nash, supra; Hodge v. Jennings Mill, 215 Ga. App. 507, 508 ( 451 SE2d 66 ) (1994) (“[T]he affidavit requirements of OCGA § 9-11-9.1 are limited to those claims for professional malpractice by negligent act or omission, sounding in tort or by breach of contract for failure to *209 perform professional services [in] accordance with the professional obligation o | 1 | 1 |
Randall v. Randallgreen2 sentences2017See also Maupin v. Vincent, 245 Ga. App. 635, 635-636 (1) ( 538 SE2d 529 ) (2000) (trial court has authority to dismiss claim without prejudice for failure to appear at pre-trial hearing). 31 Edens v. O’Connor, 238 Ga. App. 252 (1) ( 519 SE2d 691 ) (1999); see also Randall v. Randall, 274 Ga. 107, 109 (2) ( 549 SE2d 384 ) (2001) (“Compliance with the notice requirement is mandatory, not discretionary.”) (citation omitted). 32 See Hammonds v. Sherman, 277 Ga. App. 498, 498-499 ( 627 SE2d 110 ) (2006). 2017See also Maupin v. Vincent, 245 Ga. App. 635, 635-636 (1) ( 538 SE2d 529 ) (2000) (trial court has authority to dismiss claim without prejudice for failure to appear at pre-trial hearing). 31 Edens v. O’Connor, 238 Ga. App. 252 (1) ( 519 SE2d 691 ) (1999); see also Randall v. Randall, 274 Ga. 107, 109 (2) ( 549 SE2d 384 ) (2001) (“Compliance with the notice requirement is mandatory, not discretionary.”) (citation omitted). 32 See Hammonds v. Sherman, 277 Ga. App. 498, 498-499 ( 627 SE2d 110 ) (2006). | 1 | 1 |
Sparks v. Kroger Co.green2 sentences2017These allegations do not implicate Grady Hospital or Osipow. 17 Hobbs, supra at 248 . 18 Nash v. Studdard, 294 Ga. App. 845, 853 (5) ( 670 SE2d 508 ) (2008) (citation and punctuation omitted). 19 Hobbs, supra at 248 (citation omitted). 20 Nash, supra; Hodge v. Jennings Mill, 215 Ga. App. 507, 508 ( 451 SE2d 66 ) (1994) (“[T]he affidavit requirements of OCGA § 9-11-9.1 are limited to those claims for professional malpractice by negligent act or omission, sounding in tort or by breach of contract for failure to *209 perform professional services [in] accordance with the professional obligation o 2017These allegations do not implicate Grady Hospital or Osipow. 17 Hobbs, supra at 248 . 18 Nash v. Studdard, 294 Ga. App. 845, 853 (5) ( 670 SE2d 508 ) (2008) (citation and punctuation omitted). 19 Hobbs, supra at 248 (citation omitted). 20 Nash, supra; Hodge v. Jennings Mill, 215 Ga. App. 507, 508 ( 451 SE2d 66 ) (1994) (“[T]he affidavit requirements of OCGA § 9-11-9.1 are limited to those claims for professional malpractice by negligent act or omission, sounding in tort or by breach of contract for failure to *209 perform professional services [in] accordance with the professional obligation o | 1 | 1 |
Maupin v. Vincentgreen2 sentences2017See also Maupin v. Vincent, 245 Ga. App. 635, 635-636 (1) ( 538 SE2d 529 ) (2000) (trial court has authority to dismiss claim without prejudice for failure to appear at pre-trial hearing). 31 Edens v. O’Connor, 238 Ga. App. 252 (1) ( 519 SE2d 691 ) (1999); see also Randall v. Randall, 274 Ga. 107, 109 (2) ( 549 SE2d 384 ) (2001) (“Compliance with the notice requirement is mandatory, not discretionary.”) (citation omitted). 32 See Hammonds v. Sherman, 277 Ga. App. 498, 498-499 ( 627 SE2d 110 ) (2006). 2017See also Maupin v. Vincent, 245 Ga. App. 635, 635-636 (1) ( 538 SE2d 529 ) (2000) (trial court has authority to dismiss claim without prejudice for failure to appear at pre-trial hearing). 31 Edens v. O’Connor, 238 Ga. App. 252 (1) ( 519 SE2d 691 ) (1999); see also Randall v. Randall, 274 Ga. 107, 109 (2) ( 549 SE2d 384 ) (2001) (“Compliance with the notice requirement is mandatory, not discretionary.”) (citation omitted). 32 See Hammonds v. Sherman, 277 Ga. App. 498, 498-499 ( 627 SE2d 110 ) (2006). | 1 | 1 |
Hammonds v. Shermangreen2 sentences2017See also Maupin v. Vincent, 245 Ga. App. 635, 635-636 (1) ( 538 SE2d 529 ) (2000) (trial court has authority to dismiss claim without prejudice for failure to appear at pre-trial hearing). 31 Edens v. O’Connor, 238 Ga. App. 252 (1) ( 519 SE2d 691 ) (1999); see also Randall v. Randall, 274 Ga. 107, 109 (2) ( 549 SE2d 384 ) (2001) (“Compliance with the notice requirement is mandatory, not discretionary.”) (citation omitted). 32 See Hammonds v. Sherman, 277 Ga. App. 498, 498-499 ( 627 SE2d 110 ) (2006). 2017See also Maupin v. Vincent, 245 Ga. App. 635, 635-636 (1) ( 538 SE2d 529 ) (2000) (trial court has authority to dismiss claim without prejudice for failure to appear at pre-trial hearing). 31 Edens v. O’Connor, 238 Ga. App. 252 (1) ( 519 SE2d 691 ) (1999); see also Randall v. Randall, 274 Ga. 107, 109 (2) ( 549 SE2d 384 ) (2001) (“Compliance with the notice requirement is mandatory, not discretionary.”) (citation omitted). 32 See Hammonds v. Sherman, 277 Ga. App. 498, 498-499 ( 627 SE2d 110 ) (2006). | 1 | 1 |
MCG Health, Inc. v. Bartongreen2 sentences2009Holding Co. v. Moore, 190 Ga. App. 286, 288 (1) ( 378 SE2d 708 ) (1989). 13 Spacht, supra. Our whole-court decision in Spacht referenced and relied upon our Supreme Court’s decision in Nathans, supra, in concluding that, because “the trial court is the gatekeeper of expert testimony!,] OCGA § 24-9-67.1 . . . gives the trial judge the discretion to determine whether the purported expert is competent to testify.” (Footnote omitted.) Id. at 901 (3), citing Nathans, supra. See also MCG Health v. Barton, 285 Ga. App. 577, 580 (1) ( 647 SE2d 81 ) (2007) (applying abuse-of-discretion standard in revi 2009Holding Co. v. Moore, 190 Ga. App. 286, 288 (1) ( 378 SE2d 708 ) (1989). 13 Spacht, supra. Our whole-court decision in Spacht referenced and relied upon our Supreme Court’s decision in Nathans, supra, in concluding that, because “the trial court is the gatekeeper of expert testimony!,] OCGA § 24-9-67.1 . . . gives the trial judge the discretion to determine whether the purported expert is competent to testify.” (Footnote omitted.) Id. at 901 (3), citing Nathans, supra. See also MCG Health v. Barton, 285 Ga. App. 577, 580 (1) ( 647 SE2d 81 ) (2007) (applying abuse-of-discretion standard in revi | 1 | 1 |
Mays v. Ellisgreen2 sentences2009Holding Co. v. Moore, 190 Ga. App. 286, 288 (1) ( 378 SE2d 708 ) (1989). 13 Spacht, supra. Our whole-court decision in Spacht referenced and relied upon our Supreme Court’s decision in Nathans, supra, in concluding that, because “the trial court is the gatekeeper of expert testimony!,] OCGA § 24-9-67.1 . . . gives the trial judge the discretion to determine whether the purported expert is competent to testify.” (Footnote omitted.) Id. at 901 (3), citing Nathans, supra. See also MCG Health v. Barton, 285 Ga. App. 577, 580 (1) ( 647 SE2d 81 ) (2007) (applying abuse-of-discretion standard in revi 2009Holding Co. v. Moore, 190 Ga. App. 286, 288 (1) ( 378 SE2d 708 ) (1989). 13 Spacht, supra. Our whole-court decision in Spacht referenced and relied upon our Supreme Court’s decision in Nathans, supra, in concluding that, because “the trial court is the gatekeeper of expert testimony!,] OCGA § 24-9-67.1 . . . gives the trial judge the discretion to determine whether the purported expert is competent to testify.” (Footnote omitted.) Id. at 901 (3), citing Nathans, supra. See also MCG Health v. Barton, 285 Ga. App. 577, 580 (1) ( 647 SE2d 81 ) (2007) (applying abuse-of-discretion standard in revi | 1 | 1 |
Cotten v. Phillipsgreen2 sentences2009Holding Co. v. Moore, 190 Ga. App. 286, 288 (1) ( 378 SE2d 708 ) (1989). 13 Spacht, supra. Our whole-court decision in Spacht referenced and relied upon our Supreme Court’s decision in Nathans, supra, in concluding that, because “the trial court is the gatekeeper of expert testimony!,] OCGA § 24-9-67.1 . . . gives the trial judge the discretion to determine whether the purported expert is competent to testify.” (Footnote omitted.) Id. at 901 (3), citing Nathans, supra. See also MCG Health v. Barton, 285 Ga. App. 577, 580 (1) ( 647 SE2d 81 ) (2007) (applying abuse-of-discretion standard in revi 2009Holding Co. v. Moore, 190 Ga. App. 286, 288 (1) ( 378 SE2d 708 ) (1989). 13 Spacht, supra. Our whole-court decision in Spacht referenced and relied upon our Supreme Court’s decision in Nathans, supra, in concluding that, because “the trial court is the gatekeeper of expert testimony!,] OCGA § 24-9-67.1 . . . gives the trial judge the discretion to determine whether the purported expert is competent to testify.” (Footnote omitted.) Id. at 901 (3), citing Nathans, supra. See also MCG Health v. Barton, 285 Ga. App. 577, 580 (1) ( 647 SE2d 81 ) (2007) (applying abuse-of-discretion standard in revi | 1 | 1 |
Thompson v. Ezorgreen2 sentences2003That purpose is fulfilled when, before filing a com *493 plaint, a plaintiff investigates his or her claim sufficiently to secure an expert’s affidavit.” Thompson v. Ezor, 272 Ga. 849, 852 (2) ( 536 SE2d 749 ) (2000); see generally 0-1 Doctors Mem. 2003That purpose is fulfilled when, before filing a com *493 plaint, a plaintiff investigates his or her claim sufficiently to secure an expert’s affidavit.” Thompson v. Ezor, 272 Ga. 849, 852 (2) ( 536 SE2d 749 ) (2000); see generally 0-1 Doctors Mem. | 1 | 1 |
Moritz v. Orkin Exterminating Co.green2 sentences2002Moritz v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 215 Ga. App. 255, 256-257 ( 450 SE2d 233 ) (1994). 2002Moritz v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 215 Ga. App. 255, 256-257 ( 450 SE2d 233 ) (1994). | 1 | 1 |
| Druckman v. Ethridgegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Waldroup v. Greene County Hospital Authoritygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sisk v. Patelgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Harrell v. Luskgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Edens v. O'CONNOR
yellow
2 sentences2017See also Maupin v. Vincent, 245 Ga. App. 635, 635-636 (1) ( 538 SE2d 529 ) (2000) (trial court has authority to dismiss claim without prejudice for failure to appear at pre-trial hearing). 31 Edens v. O’Connor, 238 Ga. App. 252 (1) ( 519 SE2d 691 ) (1999); see also Randall v. Randall, 274 Ga. 107, 109 (2) ( 549 SE2d 384 ) (2001) (“Compliance with the notice requirement is mandatory, not discretionary.”) (citation omitted). 32 See Hammonds v. Sherman, 277 Ga. App. 498, 498-499 ( 627 SE2d 110 ) (2006). 2017See also Maupin v. Vincent, 245 Ga. App. 635, 635-636 (1) ( 538 SE2d 529 ) (2000) (trial court has authority to dismiss claim without prejudice for failure to appear at pre-trial hearing). 31 Edens v. O’Connor, 238 Ga. App. 252 (1) ( 519 SE2d 691 ) (1999); see also Randall v. Randall, 274 Ga. 107, 109 (2) ( 549 SE2d 384 ) (2001) (“Compliance with the notice requirement is mandatory, not discretionary.”) (citation omitted). 32 See Hammonds v. Sherman, 277 Ga. App. 498, 498-499 ( 627 SE2d 110 ) (2006). | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Dubois v. Brantley
green
2 sentences2015In Dubois v. Brantley, 297 Ga. 575 ( 775 SE2d 512 ) (2015), the Supreme Court reversed. 2015In Dubois v. Brantley, 297 Ga. 575 ( 775 SE2d 512 ) (2015), the Supreme Court reversed. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Brantley v. Dubois
green
2 sentences2015In Brantley v. Dubois, 327 Ga. App. 14 ( 755 SE2d 351 ) (2014), we reversed the judgment of the State Court of Glynn County denying the defendants’ renewed motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, motion for summary judgment based upon the plaintiffs’ alleged failure to comply with the affidavit requirement of OCGA §§ 9-11-9.1 and 24-7-702. 2015In Brantley v. Dubois, 327 Ga. App. 14 ( 755 SE2d 351 ) (2014), we reversed the judgment of the State Court of Glynn County denying the defendants’ renewed motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, motion for summary judgment based upon the plaintiffs’ alleged failure to comply with the affidavit requirement of OCGA §§ 9-11-9.1 and 24-7-702. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Hewett v. Kalish
green
2 sentences2009Holding Co. v. Moore, 190 Ga. App. 286, 288 (1) ( 378 SE2d 708 ) (1989). 13 Spacht, supra. Our whole-court decision in Spacht referenced and relied upon our Supreme Court’s decision in Nathans, supra, in concluding that, because “the trial court is the gatekeeper of expert testimony!,] OCGA § 24-9-67.1 . . . gives the trial judge the discretion to determine whether the purported expert is competent to testify.” (Footnote omitted.) Id. at 901 (3), citing Nathans, supra. See also MCG Health v. Barton, 285 Ga. App. 577, 580 (1) ( 647 SE2d 81 ) (2007) (applying abuse-of-discretion standard in revi 2009Holding Co. v. Moore, 190 Ga. App. 286, 288 (1) ( 378 SE2d 708 ) (1989). 13 Spacht, supra. Our whole-court decision in Spacht referenced and relied upon our Supreme Court’s decision in Nathans, supra, in concluding that, because “the trial court is the gatekeeper of expert testimony!,] OCGA § 24-9-67.1 . . . gives the trial judge the discretion to determine whether the purported expert is competent to testify.” (Footnote omitted.) Id. at 901 (3), citing Nathans, supra. See also MCG Health v. Barton, 285 Ga. App. 577, 580 (1) ( 647 SE2d 81 ) (2007) (applying abuse-of-discretion standard in revi | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Spacht v. Troyer
green
1 sentence2009Holding Co. v. Moore, 190 Ga. App. 286, 288 (1) ( 378 SE2d 708 ) (1989). 13 Spacht, supra. Our whole-court decision in Spacht referenced and relied upon our Supreme Court’s decision in Nathans, supra, in concluding that, because “the trial court is the gatekeeper of expert testimony!,] OCGA § 24-9-67.1 . . . gives the trial judge the discretion to determine whether the purported expert is competent to testify.” (Footnote omitted.) Id. at 901 (3), citing Nathans, supra. See also MCG Health v. Barton, 285 Ga. App. 577, 580 (1) ( 647 SE2d 81 ) (2007) (applying abuse-of-discretion standard in revi | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Legum v. Crouch
green
1 sentence2003OCGA § 9-3-71 (a), (c); see Gardner v. Hyster Co., supra. That the two-year statute of limitation in issue expired on September 27, 2002, Knutsen’s complaint, filed on September 17, 2002, was filed “within” ten days of the expiration of the statute of limitation, OCGA § 9-3-71 (a), (c); Legum v. Crouch, supra, satisfying the exception to the contemporaneous filing requirement under OCGA § 9-11-9.1 (b). 3 Decided October 24, 2003 Reconsideration denied November 13, 2003 Grant G. | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Gillis v. Goodgame green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Central Anesthesia Associates, P.C. v. Worthy green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Emory Clinic v. Wyatt green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Brake v. Mintz green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Chandler v. Koenig green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Kneip v. Southern Engineering Co. green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Jordan, Jones & Goulding v. Wilson green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| McKenzie v. SEABOARD SYSTEM R., INC. green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.