section 10 right to counsel in Montana

2009Schwartz contended, as he contends on appeal, that the warrantless electronic transmission of his conversations with the Cl violated his privacy rights under Article II, Section 10 of the Montana Constitution and that the warrantless surveillance taints all evidence. ¶7 The District Court denied the motion to suppress based primarily upon the decision in State v. Brown, 232 Mont. 1 , 755 P.2d 1364 (1988), which held that one participant to a conversation can consent to having it electronically monitored without the necessity of a search warrant.

2009Schwartz contended, as he contends on appeal, that the warrantless electronic transmission of his conversations with the Cl violated his privacy rights under Article II, Section 10 of the Montana Constitution and that the warrantless surveillance taints all evidence. ¶7 The District Court denied the motion to suppress based primarily upon the decision in State v. Brown, 232 Mont. 1 , 755 P.2d 1364 (1988), which held that one participant to a conversation can consent to having it electronically monitored without the necessity of a search warrant.

2021Goetz, ¶¶ 13-14 (citing State v. Hardaway, 2001 MT 252 , ¶¶ 32 and 35, 307 Mont. 139 , 36 P.3d 900 ; State v. Solis, 214 Mont. 310, 316 , 693 P.2d 518, 521 (1984) (finding greater Montana right to privacy based on express recognition of a specific right to privacy in Article II, Section 10).

2021Goetz, ¶¶ 13-14 (citing State v. Hardaway, 2001 MT 252 , ¶¶ 32 and 35, 307 Mont. 139 , 36 P.3d 900 ; State v. Solis, 214 Mont. 310, 316 , 693 P.2d 518, 521 (1984) (finding greater Montana right to privacy based on express recognition of a specific right to privacy in Article II, Section 10).

2018State v. Goetz , 2008 MT 296 , ¶¶ 25-31, 345 Mont. 421 , 191 P.3d 489 ; Great Falls Tribune v. Cascade Co. Sheriff , 238 Mont. 103 , 105-07, 775 P.2d 1267 , 1268-70 (1989). ¶ 12 Our caselaw recognizes that a complainant, third-party witnesses, and the subject of a complaint or allegation of misconduct often have objectively reasonable, subjective expectations of privacy in non-disclosure of their respective involvements prior to formal adjudication of the matter.

2018State v. Goetz , 2008 MT 296 , ¶¶ 25-31, 345 Mont. 421 , 191 P.3d 489 ; Great Falls Tribune v. Cascade Co. Sheriff , 238 Mont. 103 , 105-07, 775 P.2d 1267 , 1268-70 (1989). ¶ 12 Our caselaw recognizes that a complainant, third-party witnesses, and the subject of a complaint or allegation of misconduct often have objectively reasonable, subjective expectations of privacy in non-disclosure of their respective involvements prior to formal adjudication of the matter.

2018State v. Goetz , 2008 MT 296 , ¶¶ 25-31, 345 Mont. 421 , 191 P.3d 489 ; Great Falls Tribune v. Cascade Co. Sheriff , 238 Mont. 103 , 105-07, 775 P.2d 1267 , 1268-70 (1989). ¶ 12 Our caselaw recognizes that a complainant, third-party witnesses, and the subject of a complaint or allegation of misconduct often have objectively reasonable, subjective expectations of privacy in non-disclosure of their respective involvements prior to formal adjudication of the matter.

2009At the time of the District Court’s decision, State v. Goetz, 2008 MT 296 , 345 Mont. 421 , 191 P.3d 489 had not been decided.

1998The Court then “excise[d] the results of the thermal imaging scan from the search warrant application and review[ed] the remaining information to determine if sufficient probable cause existed for the issuance of the warrant.” Siegal, 281 Mont. at 279 , 934 P.2d at 193 .

1998The Court then “excise[d] the results of the thermal imaging scan from the search warrant application and review[ed] the remaining information to determine if sufficient probable cause existed for the issuance of the warrant.” Siegal, 281 Mont. at 279 , 934 P.2d at 193 .

2024However, the holding is clearly contrary to the plain language of Article II, Section 15, which states that “persons under 18 years of age” are entitled to the fundamental rights set forth in Article II “unless specifically precluded by laws which enhance the protections of such persons.” Thus, without engaging in a full analysis of the point, I concur with the Court’s statement in Footnote 3 that In re S.L.M.’s holding in this regard “was incorrect” and is “repudiate[d],” such that it should not be cited or relied upon in the future. ¶60 Turning to the equal protection issue, I would not, as

2024However, the holding is clearly contrary to the plain language of Article II, Section 15, which states that “persons under 18 years of age” are entitled to the fundamental rights set forth in Article II “unless specifically precluded by laws which enhance the protections of such persons.” Thus, without engaging in a full analysis of the point, I concur with the Court’s statement in Footnote 3 that In re S.L.M.’s holding in this regard “was incorrect” and is “repudiate[d],” such that it should not be cited or relied upon in the future. ¶60 Turning to the equal protection issue, I would not, as

2023Stand Up I, ¶ 16. ¶7 Appellants’ individual dignity claim was premised on Walker v. State, 2003 MT 134 , 316 Mont. 103 , 68 P.3d 872 .

2023Stand Up I, ¶ 16. ¶7 Appellants’ individual dignity claim was premised on Walker v. State, 2003 MT 134 , 316 Mont. 103 , 68 P.3d 872 .

2022We have recognized “only a few ‘specifically established and well-delineated’” exceptions to the Article II, Section 11 search warrant requirement, Nichols v. DOJ, 2011 MT 33, ¶ 20 , 359 Mont. 251 , 248 P.3d 813 (quoting State v. Loh, 275 Mont. 460, 468 , 914 P.2d 592, 597 (1996)), including, as pertinent here, the “consent” and “probation search” exceptions.

2022We have recognized “only a few ‘specifically established and well-delineated’” exceptions to the Article II, Section 11 search warrant requirement, Nichols v. DOJ, 2011 MT 33, ¶ 20 , 359 Mont. 251 , 248 P.3d 813 (quoting State v. Loh, 275 Mont. 460, 468 , 914 P.2d 592, 597 (1996)), including, as pertinent here, the “consent” and “probation search” exceptions.

2021The District Court did not err in ruling in favor of Officer Miller as a matter of law on the Estate’s constitutional tort claims and in refusing to instruct the jury on a constitutional tort theory of liability. ¶27 The District Court’s decision also comports with our decisions in Dorwart, Sunburst, and Bassett v. Lamantia, 2018 MT 119 , 391 Mont. 309 , 417 P.3d 299 .

2021The District Court did not err in ruling in favor of Officer Miller as a matter of law on the Estate’s constitutional tort claims and in refusing to instruct the jury on a constitutional tort theory of liability. ¶27 The District Court’s decision also comports with our decisions in Dorwart, Sunburst, and Bassett v. Lamantia, 2018 MT 119 , 391 Mont. 309 , 417 P.3d 299 .

2018State v. Goetz , 2008 MT 296 , ¶¶ 25-31, 345 Mont. 421 , 191 P.3d 489 ; Great Falls Tribune v. Cascade Co. Sheriff , 238 Mont. 103 , 105-07, 775 P.2d 1267 , 1268-70 (1989). ¶ 12 Our caselaw recognizes that a complainant, third-party witnesses, and the subject of a complaint or allegation of misconduct often have objectively reasonable, subjective expectations of privacy in non-disclosure of their respective involvements prior to formal adjudication of the matter.

2018State v. Goetz , 2008 MT 296 , ¶¶ 25-31, 345 Mont. 421 , 191 P.3d 489 ; Great Falls Tribune v. Cascade Co. Sheriff , 238 Mont. 103 , 105-07, 775 P.2d 1267 , 1268-70 (1989). ¶ 12 Our caselaw recognizes that a complainant, third-party witnesses, and the subject of a complaint or allegation of misconduct often have objectively reasonable, subjective expectations of privacy in non-disclosure of their respective involvements prior to formal adjudication of the matter.

2016The Montana Constitution establishes the right to privacy in Article II, Section 10: *303 “The right of individual privacy is essential to the well-being of a free society and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest.” The competing interests of the right to privacy and the right to know “must be balanced in the context of the facts of each case, to determine whether the demands of individual privacy exceed the merits of public disclosure.” Billings Gazette v. City of Billings, 2013 MT 334, ¶ 14 , 372 Mont. 409 , 313 P.3d 129 (citation and internal quotation ma

2016The Montana Constitution establishes the right to privacy in Article II, Section 10: *303 “The right of individual privacy is essential to the well-being of a free society and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest.” The competing interests of the right to privacy and the right to know “must be balanced in the context of the facts of each case, to determine whether the demands of individual privacy exceed the merits of public disclosure.” Billings Gazette v. City of Billings, 2013 MT 334, ¶ 14 , 372 Mont. 409 , 313 P.3d 129 (citation and internal quotation ma

2014News stories about violence in our country are heart-wrenching, but they are not a blanket excuse for 18 abridging the right to privacy under Section 10’s plain meaning, or its original intent, or our precedent. ¶36 As a final matter, the Court cites to recently decided federal law for the proposition that an arrestee has a privacy interest in her belongings, but that those interests are “diminished.” Opinion, ¶ 12 (citing Maryland v. King, ___ U.S. at ___, 133 S. Ct. at 1978 ).

2014Demontiney requests that we overturn State v. Pastos, 269 Mont. 43 , 887 P.2d 199 (1994), and adopt the standard set forth in State v. Sierra, 214 Mont. 472 , 692 P.2d 1273 3 (1985), overruled in part, Pastos, 269 Mont. at 57 , 887 P.2d at 208 , and Reeves v. State, 599 P.2d 727 (Alaska 1979). ¶8 The State counters that the search was permissible under Pastos because inventory searches are an established exception to the warrant requirement, safety is a compelling state interest, and the search satisfied the requirements for an inventory search.

2014Demontiney requests that we overturn State v. Pastos, 269 Mont. 43 , 887 P.2d 199 (1994), and adopt the standard set forth in State v. Sierra, 214 Mont. 472 , 692 P.2d 1273 (1985), overruled in part, Pastos, 269 Mont. at 57 , 887 P.2d at 208 , and Reeves v. State, 599 P.2d 727 (Alaska 1979). ¶8 The State counters that the search was permissible under Pastos because inventory searches are an established exception to the warrant requirement, safety is a compelling state interest, and the search satisfied the requirements for an inventory search.

2012In reaching its decision, the District Court relied exclusively on Armstrong v. State, 1999 MT 261 , 296 Mont. 361 , 989 P.2d 364 .

2012In reaching its decision, the District Court relied exclusively on Armstrong v. State, 1999 MT 261 , 296 Mont. 361 , 989 P.2d 364 .

2007State v. Hill, 2004 MT 184, ¶ 19 , 322 Mont. 165, ¶ 19 , 94 P.3d 752, ¶ 19 .

2007State v. Hill, 2004 MT 184, ¶ 19 , 322 Mont. 165, ¶ 19 , 94 P.3d 752, ¶ 19 .

2005State v. Romain, 1999 MT 161, ¶ 14 , 295 Mont. 152, ¶ 14 , 983 P.2d 322, ¶ 14 . 3 DISCUSSION ¶6 Did the District Court err in concluding the warrantless search of Pelvit’s trash bags did not violate his right to privacy under Article II, Sections 10 and 11 of the Montana Constitution, and on that basis denying Pelvit’s motion to suppress? ¶7 Pelvit maintains he exhibited both an objective and subjective expectation of privacy in the contents of his trash, which society is willing to recognize as reasonable.

2005State v. Romain, 1999 MT 161, ¶ 14 , 295 Mont. 152, ¶ 14 , 983 P.2d 322, ¶ 14 . 3 DISCUSSION ¶6 Did the District Court err in concluding the warrantless search of Pelvit’s trash bags did not violate his right to privacy under Article II, Sections 10 and 11 of the Montana Constitution, and on that basis denying Pelvit’s motion to suppress? ¶7 Pelvit maintains he exhibited both an objective and subjective expectation of privacy in the contents of his trash, which society is willing to recognize as reasonable.

2005He points to State v. Martinez, 2003 MT 65, ¶ 52 , 314 Mont. 434, ¶ 52 , 67 P.3d 207, ¶ 52 , where we held that a traffic stop based on an unreliable tip constituted an unconstitutional infringement on Martinez’s right to privacy. ¶18 Pierce seemingly again forgets, however, that Officer Hoffman smelled the burnt marijuana, not based on a tip, but because he requested that Officer Hoffman retrieve his phone book from the truck.

2005He points to State v. Martinez, 2003 MT 65, ¶ 52 , 314 Mont. 434, ¶ 52 , 67 P.3d 207, ¶ 52 , where we held that a traffic stop based on an unreliable tip constituted an unconstitutional infringement on Martinez’s right to privacy. ¶18 Pierce seemingly again forgets, however, that Officer Hoffman smelled the burnt marijuana, not based on a tip, but because he requested that Officer Hoffman retrieve his phone book from the truck.

2002Individual privacy is simply too precious and fragile a constitutional right to be sacrificed on the altar of cases such as the one at issue here. ¶102 In reaching this conclusion, however, I reiterate the view expressed in my concurrence in Associated Press Inc. v. Montana Dept. of Revenue, 2000 MT 160 , 300 Mont. 233 , 4 P.3d 5 , that the right of privacy protected under Article II, Section 10 is guaranteed to individuals-i.e. human beings-only and is not a right enjoyed by nonhuman entities.

2002Individual privacy is simply too precious and fragile a constitutional right to be sacrificed on the altar of cases such as the one at issue here. ¶102 In reaching this conclusion, however, I reiterate the view expressed in my concurrence in Associated Press Inc. v. Montana Dept. of Revenue, 2000 MT 160 , 300 Mont. 233 , 4 P.3d 5 , that the right of privacy protected under Article II, Section 10 is guaranteed to individuals-i.e. human beings-only and is not a right enjoyed by nonhuman entities.