section 413 three year statute of limitations in Pennsylvania

2015Penn Beverage, 901 A.2d at 1102 (concluding that the claimant's specific loss petition for facial disfigurement arose from a previously established automobile accident work injury and therefore should be analyzed pursuant to Section 413(a)); see also Westinghouse Electric Corp./CBS v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Korach), 584 Pa. 411 , 883 A.2d 579, 587-92 (2005) (holding that a petition seeking to add a psychiatric condition to a previously accepted back injury from over ten years prior was governed by the limitations period of Section 413(a) because the later injury “arose as a direct

2015Penn Beverage, 901 A.2d at 1102 (concluding that the claimant's specific loss petition for facial disfigurement arose from a previously established automobile accident work injury and therefore should be analyzed pursuant to Section 413(a)); see also Westinghouse Electric Corp./CBS v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Korach), 584 Pa. 411 , 883 A.2d 579, 587-92 (2005) (holding that a petition seeking to add a psychiatric condition to a previously accepted back injury from over ten years prior was governed by the limitations period of Section 413(a) because the later injury “arose as a direct

2001Nevertheless, although the following statements of our Supreme Court in Smith v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 543 Pa. 295 , 670 A.2d 1146 (1996), were made with regard to the question of whether the statute of limitations under Section 413(a) is a waivable defense, we find these statements instructive as to the question now posed to us.

2001Nevertheless, although the following statements of our Supreme Court in Smith v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 543 Pa. 295 , 670 A.2d 1146 (1996), were made with regard to the question of whether the statute of limitations under Section 413(a) is a waivable defense, we find these statements instructive as to the question now posed to us.

2013In USX Corporation , the Commonwealth Court stated that “the three-year limitation bar of Section 413 ... is totally inapplicable where there has been a suspension, which is addressed in the last proviso of Section 413.” Id. at 1114.

2013The Township relies on Joseph v. Bossert, 185 Pa.Super. 36 , 138 A.2d 256 (1958), a case where the court affirmed a refusal to dismiss a claimant’s petition filed more than a year after the most recent compensation payment, because it was filed within the then applicable 300-week period; and USX Corp., 571 A.2d at 1114 , a case where a claimant sought reinstatement of benefits during the 500-week period, and the employer sought to have the claimant’s filing window limited to three years, with the Commonwealth Court holding that Section 413(a)’s three-year limitation “is totally inapplicable wh

2012Vincent Health Center), 157 Pa.Cmwlth. 584 , 630 A.2d 555 (Pa.Cmwlth.1993) ], we expressly distinguished the three-year statute of limitations in Section 413 from the five-hundred week statute of repose....

2012Vincent Health Center), 157 Pa.Cmwlth. 584 , 630 A.2d 555 (Pa.Cmwlth.1993) ], we expressly distinguished the three-year statute of limitations in Section 413 from the five-hundred week statute of repose....

2025Dillinger v. Workers’ Comp[.] Appeal B[d.] (Port Auth[.] of Allegheny C[nty.], 40 A.3d 748, 752-53 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012); Fitzgibbons . . . ; Kelley v. Workers’ Comp[.] Appeal B[d.] (Standard Steel), 919 A.2d 321, 325-27 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007). [W]hen a party is seeking either to obtain relief through the correction of an NCP under paragraph one of Section 413 of the Act, or is seeking to add additional[,] consequential injuries to a claimant’s compensable, work-related injuries under paragraph two of Section 413 of the Act, the party must file the petition within three years of the date of the most

2017Dillinger v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Port Authority of Allegheny County), 40 A.3d 748, 752-53 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012); Fitzgibbons v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (City of Philadelphia), 999 A.2d 659 , 663- 64 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) (en banc); Kelley v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Standard Steel), 919 A.2d 321, 325-27 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007). [W]hen a party is seeking either to obtain relief through the correction of an NCP under paragraph one of Section 413 of the Act, or is seeking to add additional consequential injuries to a claimant’s compensable, work-related injuries under p

2025Dillinger v. Workers’ Comp[.] Appeal B[d.] (Port Auth[.] of Allegheny C[nty.], 40 A.3d 748, 752-53 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012); Fitzgibbons . . . ; Kelley v. Workers’ Comp[.] Appeal B[d.] (Standard Steel), 919 A.2d 321, 325-27 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007). [W]hen a party is seeking either to obtain relief through the correction of an NCP under paragraph one of Section 413 of the Act, or is seeking to add additional[,] consequential injuries to a claimant’s compensable, work-related injuries under paragraph two of Section 413 of the Act, the party must file the petition within three years of the date of the most

2017Dillinger v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Port Authority of Allegheny County), 40 A.3d 748, 752-53 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2012); Fitzgibbons v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (City of Philadelphia), 999 A.2d 659 , 663- 64 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) (en banc); Kelley v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Standard Steel), 919 A.2d 321, 325-27 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007). [W]hen a party is seeking either to obtain relief through the correction of an NCP under paragraph one of Section 413 of the Act, or is seeking to add additional consequential injuries to a claimant’s compensable, work-related injuries under p

2007Appeal Bd. (Taylor Wharton Co.), 692 A.2d 629, 631 (Pa.Cmwlth.1997).

1999See Lopresti, 692 A.2d at 631 (impliedly suggesting that Section 413 and 306(b) of the Act must be read in conjunction with one another).

2005See, e.g., WCAB (Reedy) v. SWIF, 22 Pa.Cmwlth. 498, 505 , 349 A.2d 920, 924 (1976) (stating that “the employer or its carrier may be estopped from raising [the Section 413(a) statute of limitations defense] if their actions, or the action of either of them, have intentionally or unintentionally caused the claimant to believe that his claim would be attended to”).

2005See, e.g., WCAB (Reedy) v. SWIF, 22 Pa.Cmwlth. 498, 505 , 349 A.2d 920, 924 (1976) (stating that “the employer or its carrier may be estopped from raising [the Section 413(a) statute of limitations defense] if their actions, or the action of either of them, have intentionally or unintentionally caused the claimant to believe that his claim would be attended to”).

2021In Fitzgibbons v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (City of Philadelphia), 999 A.2d 659, 663-64 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010), this Court pointed out that the first paragraph of Section 413 of the Act applies when a party is seeking to correct an NCP, and the second paragraph applies when a party is seeking to expand the description of the work injury to include consequential injuries, i.e., injuries that occurred as a result of the work injury after issuance of the NCP.

2017Fitzgibbons v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (City of Philadelphia), 999 A.2d 659 , 661 n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) (en banc). 3 Where a review or modification petition seeks to add a new injury that resulted from the claimant’s accepted work-related injuries, the three-year limitation of Section 413(a) applies and bars the new claim if no petition was filed within three years after the date that the claimant last received compensation benefits.

2017In Romanowski, the claimant’s petition sought reinstatement of benefits due to worsening of the injury and decreased earning capacity and the Court ruled that the petition, which was filed after both the three-year and 500-week periods expired, was barred by the time limitations in Section 413(a). 944 A.2d at 128, 130-31 .

2013The Township further argues that the limitations periods are not subject to “stacking.” For this proposition, the Township cites only to Romanowski v. WCAB (Precision Coil Processing), 944 A.2d 127 (Pa.Cmwlth.2008), a case concerning a post-500-week specific loss claim, where the court stated, without supporting analysis on the point, that: “There is no authority that would allow a claimant to stack the limitations periods in Section 413(a) of the Act.” Id. at 131 .

2015Penn Beverage, 901 A.2d at 1102 (concluding that the claimant's specific loss petition for facial disfigurement arose from a previously established automobile accident work injury and therefore should be analyzed pursuant to Section 413(a)); see also Westinghouse Electric Corp./CBS v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Korach), 584 Pa. 411 , 883 A.2d 579, 587-92 (2005) (holding that a petition seeking to add a psychiatric condition to a previously accepted back injury from over ten years prior was governed by the limitations period of Section 413(a) because the later injury “arose as a direct

2013The cited case, Guthrie v. WCAB (Keystone Coal Co.), 767 A.2d 634 (Pa.Cmwlth.2001), however, forwards no relevant discussion concerning the 500-week limitations period, let alone any comparative analysis concerning appropriate construction for the limitations provisions of Section 413(a). .

2001See O’Brien v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Montefiore Hospital), 690 A.2d 1262 (Pa.Cmwlth.1997) (holding that the term “compensation” does not include medical expenses for purposes of the running of the three-year statute of limitations in Section 413 of the Act, 77 P.S. § 772).

2001See O'Brien v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (Montefiore Hospital), 690 A.2d 1262 (Pa.Cmwlth.1997) (holding that the term "compensation" does not include medical expenses for purposes of the running of the three-year statute of limitations in Section 413 of the Act, 77 P.S. § 772).

1976Since the Board advanced the same argument in Falls-Over field Vocational School District v. Davis, 8 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 63 , 301 A.2d 118 (1973) which we there specifically rejected, and since Falls-Over field was decided on March 6, 1973 and the Board’s decision in this case is dated November 7, 1974, we are compelled to quote at length Judge Wilkinson’s opinion, which the Board has either misapprehended or overlooked: “Claimant-appellee’s position, and that advanced by the Board in support of its order, is that the filing was proper under the two-year limitation of Section 413.

1976Since the Board advanced the same argument in Falls-Over field Vocational School District v. Davis, 8 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 63 , 301 A.2d 118 (1973) which we there specifically rejected, and since Falls-Over field was decided on March 6, 1973 and the Board’s decision in this case is dated November 7, 1974, we are compelled to quote at length Judge Wilkinson’s opinion, which the Board has either misapprehended or overlooked: “Claimant-appellee’s position, and that advanced by the Board in support of its order, is that the filing was proper under the two-year limitation of Section 413.

2025Appeal Bd. (Caretti, Inc.), 202 A.3d 870, 880 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019). 6 “The payment of medical costs does not constitute ‘compensation’ for purposes of tolling the statute of limitations in Section 413(a) of the Act.” Seekford v. Workers’ Comp.

2021Rose, 238 A.3d at 556-57.

2016Appeal Bd. (Butcher), 892 A.2d 64, 67 (Pa. Cmwlth.) (holding that under Section 413(a) of Act, medical payments do not constitute “compensation” despite potentially harsh result, claimants electing to sign agreement foregoing indemnity benefits bear “the risk of being beyond the statute of limitations when their injury 8 The Supreme Court in Westinghouse explained: [A] critical distinction exists between the statute of repose present in Section 315 [of the Act], where the employer’s liability has not yet ripened, and the statute of limitations of Section 413(a) [of the Act], where employer’s l

2015Penn Beverage, 901 A.2d at 1102 (concluding that the claimant's specific loss petition for facial disfigurement arose from a previously established automobile accident work injury and therefore should be analyzed pursuant to Section 413(a)); see also Westinghouse Electric Corp./CBS v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Korach), 584 Pa. 411 , 883 A.2d 579, 587-92 (2005) (holding that a petition seeking to add a psychiatric condition to a previously accepted back injury from over ten years prior was governed by the limitations period of Section 413(a) because the later injury “arose as a direct

2012See, e.g., Edgewater Steel Co. v. WCAB (Beers), 719 A.2d 812, 814 (Pa.Cmwlth.1998); Deppenbrook v. WCAB (Republic Steel Corp.), 655 A.2d 1072, 1075-76 (Pa.Cmwlth.1995); Roussos v. WCAB (St.

2012See, e.g., Edgewater Steel Co. v. WCAB (Beers), 719 A.2d 812, 814 (Pa.Cmwlth.1998); Deppenbrook v. WCAB (Republic Steel Corp.), 655 A.2d 1072, 1075-76 (Pa.Cmwlth. 1995); Roussos v. WCAB (St.

2012We rejected the claimant’s assertion that he should have 500 weeks plus an additional three years to file his reinstatement petition, stating: We have unambiguously held that Section 413’s three year limitation “is totally inapplicable where there has been a suspension, which is addressed in the last proviso of Section 413.” Deppenbrook, 655 A.2d at 1074 (quoting USX Corporation v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Guthrie), 132 Pa.Cmwlth. 54 , 571 A.2d 1112, 1114 (1990)) (emphasis in original).

2012We rejected the claimant's assertion that he should have 500 weeks plus an additional three years to file his reinstatement petition, stating: We have unambiguously held that Section 413's three year limitation "is totally inapplicable where there has been a suspension, which is addressed in the last proviso of Section 413." Deppenbrook, 655 A.2d at 1074 (quoting USX Corporation v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Guthrie), 132 Pa. Cmwlth. 54, 571 A.2d 1112, 1114 (1990)) (emphasis in original).

2012In Bellows v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Shabloski), 663 A.2d 267, 270 (Pa.Cmwlth.1995), we held that a claimant was time-barred from seeking a reinstatement almost 12 years after he returned to work, noting that “[t]he Act grants a claimant a liberal period of over nine years” to seek reinstatement.

2012In Bellows v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board ( Shabloski ), 663 A.2d 267, 270 (Pa.Cmwlth. 1995), we held that a claimant was time-barred from seeking a reinstatement almost 12 years after he returned to work, *1250 noting that "[t]he Act grants a claimant a liberal period of over nine years" to seek reinstatement.

2006Compare Majority Opinion at ___-___, 901 A.2d at 485-86 (opining that Section 413(a) operates to bar both rights and remedies, and thus, sets forth a non-waivable defense), with Smith v. WCAB (Concept Planners & Designers), 543 Pa. 295, 300-01 , 670 A.2d 1146, 1147-48 (1996) (holding that Section 413(a) should be viewed as extinguishing a remedy rather than a right, and therefore, the defense is waivable).