section 2 meet the requirements in Illinois

2013“Allegations that are conclusory in nature and merely recite statutory language are insufficient to meet the requirements of section 2- 408.” Id. ¶ 19 Finally, Nicholas and Michael contend that they have a right to bring their own claim based on section 506 of the Marriage Act, which allows the trial court to appoint an attorney, guardian ad litem, or child representative to advocate for the rights of minor children in a -5- dissolution proceeding. 750 ILCS 5/506(a) (West 2010).

2007“Allegations that are conclusory in nature and merely recite statutory language are insufficient to meet the requirements of section 2 — 408.” Rosewell, 241 Ill.

2008The trial court denied the State’s motion to dismiss, finding that defendant had a viable claim under People v. Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d 177 , 840 N.E.2d 658 (2005).

2008The trial court denied the State’s motion to dismiss, finding that defendant had a viable claim under People v. Whitfield, 217 Ill. 2d 177 , 840 N.E.2d 658 (2005).

2005Singletary, 266 F.3d at 195 .

2003App. 3d 736 , 525 N.E.2d 177 (1988), the court determined that the affidavit of a registered nurse is insufficient to meet the requirements of section 2 — 622.

2003Storcz, 256 Ill.

1998Winters v. Podzamsky, 252 Ill.

1998App. 3d at 363-64 , 693 N.E.2d at 497 ), stating, “Section 2 — 622 should not be so strictly construed that fine technicalities can be used as a means of stripping plaintiffs of their substantive rights and their day in court.” Brems, 295 Ill.

1998The reviewing court found the fourth amended report sufficient to meet the requirements of section 2 — 622(a) of the Code and reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the action (Brems, 295 Ill.

1997Cuthbertson v. Axelrod, 282 Ill.

1997Sheinkop, M.D., Ltd., 121 Ill. 2d 188, 193-94 , 520 N.E.2d 293 (1987)), but it is within the discretion of the circuit court to decide whether to dismiss the complaint with prejudice based on a failure to meet the requirements of section 2—622.

1997Sheinkop, M.D., Ltd., 121 Ill. 2d 188, 193-94 , 520 N.E.2d 293 (1987)), but it is within the discretion of the circuit court to decide whether to dismiss the complaint with prejudice based on a failure to meet the requirements of section 2—622.

1996The court held that ”[t]he trial court was not required to exercise its discretion in favor of plaintiff given the numerous opportunities plaintiff had to comply with section 2 — 622.” Wasielewski, 189 Ill.

1992In addition, we find that the plaintiff’s failure to file separate reports as to each defendant was merely a technical deficiency which “should not be utilized to deprive the plaintiff of [her] substantive rights” (Requena, 212 Ill.

1991(Kaput v. Hoey (1988), 124 Ill. 2d 370 , 530 N.E.2d 230 ; Gruss, 201 Ill.

1991App. 3d 474 , 378 N.E.2d 1130 .) Therefore, even had the trial court correctly ruled that it was not divested of jurisdiction over the matter by the filing of the notice of appeal and treated the petition as one under section 2 — 1401, it would have had to deny defendant’s petition for failure to meet the requirements of section 2 — 1401(c).

1991(Kaput v. Hoey (1988), 124 Ill. 2d 370 , 530 N.E.2d 230 ; Gruss, 201 Ill.

1991(Kaput v. Hoey (1988), 124 Ill. 2d 370 , 530 N.E.2d 230 ; Gruss, 201 Ill.

1991App. 3d at 1078-79 , 530 N.E.2d at 1001 .) We hold that the third prerequisite of section 2 — 801 is established.

1991(Ketcham, 146 Ill.

1991App. 3d 208, 214 , 534 N.E.2d 449, 452-53 .) As discussed above, neither the second nor the third requirement of section 2 — 616(d) has been met.

1989(Foster v. Leong (1985), 139 Ill.

1988App. 516, 521 , 56 N.E.2d 135, 137 .) As a result of this principle, our courts have held that to meet the requirements of section 2 of the Consumer Fraud Act, the Attorney General need allege only that: (1) a defendant is engaged in a trade or commerce, and (2) the defendant is engaged in unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of that trade or commerce.

1987(See, e.g., National Industries Inc. v. Howard (1977), 54 Ill.

1985App. 3d 91, 96 , 385 N.E.2d 804 .) To meet the requirements of section 2 of the Consumer Fraud Act (Ill.

1984In In re Burns (1978), 67 Ill.

1983App. 3d 735 , 382 N.E.2d 711 , where we held that a parental relationship failed to meet the requirements of section 2— 616(d)(3).

1980(McNally v. Nicholson Manufacturing Co. (Me. 1973), 313 A.2d 913 .) The theory underlying this principle is that the employee stands in such relationship to his employer, the last purchaser, that he is the functional equivalent of a guest or family member.

1955(Heineman v. Hermann, 385 Ill. 191 ; Pyle v. Pyle, 158 Ill. 289 .) Under this rule, the fact that Bernard Schnur might have an inchoate right of dower, if the title to property in question was found to be in his wife, would not give him such an interest in the results of the suit as to render him incompetent as a party in interest under the third subparagraph of section 2 of the Evidence Act.