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32 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1989–2026 8 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Radosevich v. Industrial Commissiongreen2 sentences2018App. 3d at 778 , 305 Ill.Dec. 469 , 856 N.E.2d 1 . ¶ 16 Similarly, in Sunrise Assisted Living , the court, relying on Radosevich , affirmed a circuit court's refusal to deny a claimant a judgment under section 19(g) of the Act ( 820 ILCS 305/19(g) (West 2012) ) and an award of an interest under section 2-1303 of the Code ( 735 ILCS 5/2-1303 (West 2012) ) in circumstances identical to the case at bar, explaining: "In this case, Sunrise appealed the Commission's decision, and section 19(n) interest accrued while that appeal was pending. 2018App. 3d at 778 , 305 Ill.Dec. 469 , 856 N.E.2d 1 . ¶ 16 Similarly, in Sunrise Assisted Living , the court, relying on Radosevich , affirmed a circuit court's refusal to deny a claimant a judgment under section 19(g) of the Act ( 820 ILCS 305/19(g) (West 2012) ) and an award of an interest under section 2-1303 of the Code ( 735 ILCS 5/2-1303 (West 2012) ) in circumstances identical to the case at bar, explaining: "In this case, Sunrise appealed the Commission's decision, and section 19(n) interest accrued while that appeal was pending. | 2 | 5 |
Illinois State Toll Highway Authority v. Heritage Standard Bankgreen2 sentences2014See Illinois State Toll Highway Authority v. Heritage Standard Bank & Trust Co., 157 Ill. 2d 282, 295-301 (1993) (discussing prejudgment and postjudgment interest under section 2-1303 of the Code). 11 foreclosure proceeding, interest accrues at the contract rate until the judgment of foreclosure and at the statutory legal rate under section 2-1303 of the Code after that point). ¶ 21 In reaching the conclusion that plaintiff was legally entitled to collect the postjudgment interest in question, we must comment upon the case of Standard Bank & Trust Co. v. Callaghan, 215 Ill. 2014See Illinois State Toll Highway Authority v. Heritage Standard Bank & Trust Co., 157 Ill. 2d 282, 295-301 (1993) (discussing prejudgment and postjudgment interest under section 2-1303 of the Code). -7- that interest should have been calculated on the principal at the contract rate until the date of the foreclosure decree and at the statutory legal rate for judgments after that date); In re Daniels, 102 B.R. 680, 683 (Bankr. | 2 | 3 |
General Motors Corp. v. Pappasgreen2 sentences2024See General Motors v. Pappas, 242 Ill. 2d 163, 174-75 (2011) (finding postjudgment interest collateral to the judgment). 2023See General Motors Corp. v. Pappas, 242 Ill. 2d 163, 175 (2011) (discussing postjudgment interest under section 2-1303). | 2 | 2 |
Standard Bank and Trust Co. v. Callaghangreen2 sentences2014See Standard Bank, 215 Ill. 2014See Illinois State Toll Highway Authority v. Heritage Standard Bank & Trust Co., 157 Ill. 2d 282, 295-301 (1993) (discussing prejudgment and postjudgment interest under section 2-1303 of the Code). 11 foreclosure proceeding, interest accrues at the contract rate until the judgment of foreclosure and at the statutory legal rate under section 2-1303 of the Code after that point). ¶ 21 In reaching the conclusion that plaintiff was legally entitled to collect the postjudgment interest in question, we must comment upon the case of Standard Bank & Trust Co. v. Callaghan, 215 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
Longo v. Globe Auto Recycling, Inc.green2 sentences2011App. 3d 1028 (2001): “Courts have held that the legislature did not vest the trial court with discretion in assessing interest under section 2-1303 of the Code. [Citation.] Rather, imposition of statutory interest at the rate of 9% from the date the final judgment was entered is mandatory.” Longo, 318 Ill. 2007As this court stated in Longo v. Globe Auto Recycling, Inc., 318 Ill.App.3d 1028 , 252 Ill.Dec. 799 , 743 N.E.2d 667 (2001): "Courts have held that the legislature did not vest the trial court with discretion in assessing interest under section 2-1303 of the Code. [Citations.] Rather, imposition of statutory interest at the rate of 9% from the date the final judgment was entered is mandatory." Longo, 318 Ill.App.3d at 1039 , 252 Ill.Dec. 799 , 743 N.E.2d 667 . | 1 | 5 |
Browning, Ektelon Division v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2020Browning, Ektelon Division v. Williams, 348 Ill. 2008Browning, Ektelon Division v. Williams, 348 Ill.App.3d 830, 833 , 283 Ill.Dec. 143 , 807 N.E.2d 984 (2004). | 1 | 2 |
Sunrise Assisted Living v. Banachgreen2 sentences2018Without a judgment, [the claimant] was not entitled to additional interest under section 2-1303 of the Code." Sunrise Assisted Living , 2015 IL App (2d) 140037 , ¶ 35, 393 Ill.Dec. 797 , 35 N.E.3d 189 . *73 ¶ 17 We find the reasoning in Radosevich and Sunrise Assisted Living to be sound and to clearly dispose of the issue raised in these appeals. 2018Without a judgment, [the claimant] was not entitled to additional interest under section 2-1303 of the Code." Sunrise Assisted Living , 2015 IL App (2d) 140037 , ¶ 35, 393 Ill.Dec. 797 , 35 N.E.3d 189 . *73 ¶ 17 We find the reasoning in Radosevich and Sunrise Assisted Living to be sound and to clearly dispose of the issue raised in these appeals. | 1 | 2 |
4220 Kildare, LLC v. Regent Insurance Co.green1 sentence2026See, e.g., In re Marriage of Hyman, 2024 IL App (2d) 230352 , ¶ 27; 4220 Kildare, LLC v. Regent Insurance Co., 2022 IL App (1st) 210803, ¶¶ 19, 21 . | 1 | 1 |
Stanphill v. Ortberggreen1 sentence2024See, e.g., Stanphill v. Ortberg, 2020 IL App (2d) 190769, ¶ 9 (application of interest under section 2-1303 is mandatory; trial court has no discretion to refrain from imposing interest on money judgment). ¶ 79 Three-Readings Rule ¶ 80 Advocate argues that the General Assembly violated the Illinois Constitution’s three- readings requirement. | 1 | 1 |
Inman v. Howe Freightways, Inc.green2 sentences2023Although this court has held that postjudgment interest under section 2-1303 is mandatory (see Inman, 2022 IL App (1st) 210274, ¶ 77 ), article XIII of the Insurance Code nonetheless provides that “[t]he pleadings and proceedings insofar as not otherwise regulated by [Article XIII], shall be as in other civil proceedings.” 215 ILCS 5/190(4) (West 2020). 2023See Inman v. Howe Freightways, Inc., 2022 IL App (1st) 210274, ¶ 77 (“The circuit court has no discretion in awarding interest; rather, the court is required to award interest on a judgment.”); Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London v. Abbott Laboratories, 2014 IL App (1st) 132020 , ¶ 62 (“The trial court has no discretion to deny postjudgment interest, as the imposition of statutory interest from the date the final judgment was entered is mandatory.”). | 1 | 1 |
Secura Insurance v. Illinois Farmers Insurancegreen1 sentence2023Accordingly, we briefly address our jurisdiction to consider the instant appeal in light of the 8 subsequent motion filed by plaintiff.5 See Secura Insurance Co. v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co., 232 Ill. 2d 209, 213 (2009) (“A reviewing court must ascertain its jurisdiction before proceeding in a cause of action, regardless of whether either party has raised the issue.”); A.M. | 1 | 1 |
Kramer v. Mount Carmel Shelter Care Facility, Inc.green1 sentence2020See id. at 393, 396 (where a portion of the judgment was later reduced, interest accrued on the remaining portion of the judgment from the date it was originally entered because the debtor could have halted the accrual of - 17 - interest by payment of the full amount or by simply subtracting the reversed amount with corresponding interest); see also Shackelford v. Allstate Fire & Casualty Insurance Co., 2017 IL App (1st) 162607, ¶ 16 (an arbitration award of $16,000 that was subject to “ ‘all applicable set-offs and liens to be resolved by the Parties and their Attorneys’ ” was not so indefini | 1 | 1 |
Shackelford v. Allstate Fire and Casualty Insurance Companygreen1 sentence2020See id. at 393, 396 (where a portion of the judgment was later reduced, interest accrued on the remaining portion of the judgment from the date it was originally entered because the debtor could have halted the accrual of - 17 - interest by payment of the full amount or by simply subtracting the reversed amount with corresponding interest); see also Shackelford v. Allstate Fire & Casualty Insurance Co., 2017 IL App (1st) 162607, ¶ 16 (an arbitration award of $16,000 that was subject to “ ‘all applicable set-offs and liens to be resolved by the Parties and their Attorneys’ ” was not so indefini | 1 | 1 |
In re Danielsgreen1 sentence2014See Illinois State Toll Highway Authority v. Heritage Standard Bank & Trust Co., 157 Ill. 2d 282, 295-301 (1993) (discussing prejudgment and postjudgment interest under section 2-1303 of the Code). -7- that interest should have been calculated on the principal at the contract rate until the date of the foreclosure decree and at the statutory legal rate for judgments after that date); In re Daniels, 102 B.R. 680, 683 (Bankr. | 1 | 1 |
Contract Development Corp. v. Beckgreen1 sentence2001Contract Development Corp. v. Beck , 255 Ill. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. McCluskey
green
2 sentences2015Accordingly, under these circumstances, we conclude that defendants' procedural due process rights were not violated and that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Michael's motion to vacate. ¶ 25 Defendants next contend that the circuit court erred by entering the confirmation of sale, arguing that BAC included taxes that it was not entitled to recover in the report of sale and that 8 No. 1-14-2053 BAC was only entitled to the note rate of interest, 6.5%, rather than the rate of interest pursuant to section 2-1303 of the Code, 9%, before the court confirmed the sale. ¶ 26 2015Accordingly, under these circumstances, we conclude that defendants’ procedural due process rights were not violated and that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Michael’s motion to vacate. ¶ 25 Defendants next contend that the circuit court erred by entering the confirmation of sale, arguing that BAC included taxes that it was not entitled to recover in the report of sale and that BAC was only entitled to the note rate of interest, 6.5%, rather than the rate of interest pursuant to section 2-1303 of the Code, 9%, before the court confirmed the sale. 1 See Bank of America | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Tri-G, Inc. v. Burke, Bosselman & Weaver
green
2 sentences2014Tri-G, 222 Ill. 2d at 258 . 2014Tri-G, 222 Ill. 2d at 258 . | 2 | 2014–2014 |
Caulkins v. Pritzker
green
1 sentence2024Caulkins v. Pritzker, 2023 IL 129453, ¶ 46 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
In re Marriage of Heinrich
green
1 sentence2024The purpose of a motion to reconsider “is to bring to the trial court’s attention newly discovered evidence not available at the time of the first hearing, changes in the law, or errors in the previous application of existing law to the facts at hand.” In re Marriage of Heinrich, 2014 IL App (2d) 121333, ¶ 55 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
In re Liquidation of Legion Indemnity Co.
neutral
1 sentence2023CONCLUSION ¶ 61 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County. ¶ 62 Affirmed. - 31 - In re Liquidation of Legion Indemnity Co., 2023 IL App (1st) 211370 Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 02-CH- 06695; the Hon. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Finley v. Finley
green
2 sentences2023According to section 2- 1303(a), “[t]he judgment debtor may by tender of payment of judgment, costs and interest accrued to the date of tender, stop the further accrual of interest on such judgment notwithstanding the prosecution of an appeal, or other steps to reverse, vacate or modify the judgment.” 735 ILCS 5/2- 1303(a) (West 2020). ¶ 52 In rejecting Catalina’s request for postjudgment interest, the circuit court acknowledged that postjudgment interest under section 2-1303 was mandatory, but found that, under Finley, 81 Ill. 2d 317 , it had discretion as a chancery court to disallow postjud 2023But it found that, pursuant to Finley v. Finley, 81 Ill. 2d 317 (1980), it had discretion as a chancery court to disallow postjudgment interest when it would not comport with justice and equity. | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Liquidation of Pine Top Insurance v. Shapo
green
1 sentence2023Id. at 697 . | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Bank of America, N.A. v. Kulesza
green
1 sentence2015Accordingly, under these circumstances, we conclude that defendants’ procedural due process rights were not violated and that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Michael’s motion to vacate. ¶ 25 Defendants next contend that the circuit court erred by entering the confirmation of sale, arguing that BAC included taxes that it was not entitled to recover in the report of sale and that BAC was only entitled to the note rate of interest, 6.5%, rather than the rate of interest pursuant to section 2-1303 of the Code, 9%, before the court confirmed the sale. 1 See Bank of America | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Sunrise Assisted Living v. Banach
neutral
2 sentences2015Sunrise also renews its argument that Banach is not entitled to interest under section 2-1303 of the Code, because (1) the Commission’s award, by itself, is not a judgment, and (2) Sunrise timely paid the amounts due under the arbitration award, including interest under section 19(n) of the Act. -4- 2015 IL App (2d) 140037 ¶ 13 A. Jurisdiction ¶ 14 Sunrise contends that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider Banach’s application for a judgment under section 19(g) of the Act, because her petition to modify the award under sections 19(h) and 8(a) was pending. 1 Resolving 2015Thereafter, Banach filed in the 2015 IL App (2d) 140037 circuit court an application for judgment pursuant to section 19(g) of the Act (820 ILCS 305/19(g) (West 2012)), arguing that she is entitled to interest under section 2-1303 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-1303 (West 2012)). | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Ponthieux v. Fernandes
green
2 sentences2006However, in that case, the defendant did not dispute that section 19(n) interest was not payable because the plaintiffs award was a wage-loss differential and there was a prearbitration credit, e.g., section 19(n) did not apply because there was no amount of the arbitrator's award remaining unpaid as of the date of the award to which interest could apply ( Ponthieux, 278 Ill.App.3d at 112 , 214 Ill.Dec. 815 , 662 N.E.2d at 174 ), and that cause of action had clearly been filed under section 19(g) and the claimant had obtained the judgment in circuit court to obtain section 2-1303 interest. 2006However, in that case, the defendant did not dispute that section 19(n) interest was not payable because the plaintiffs award was a wage-loss differential and there was a prearbitration credit, e.g., section 19(n) did not apply because there was no amount of the arbitrator's award remaining unpaid as of the date of the award to which interest could apply ( Ponthieux, 278 Ill.App.3d at 112 , 214 Ill.Dec. 815 , 662 N.E.2d at 174 ), and that cause of action had clearly been filed under section 19(g) and the claimant had obtained the judgment in circuit court to obtain section 2-1303 interest. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Yassin v. Certified Grocers of Illinois, Inc.
green
2 sentences2001It is well-settled that nothing less than a tender of the full amount of judgment due, plus interest accrued to that point, will stop the accrual of interest under section 2-1303. 735 ILCS 5/2-1303 (West 1998); Yassin v. Certified Grocers of Illinois, Inc. , 133 Ill. 2d 458, 462-64 , 551 N.E.2d 1319 (1990); Halloran v. Dickerson , 287 Ill. 2001It is well-settled that nothing less than a tender of the full amount of judgment due, plus interest accrued to that point, will stop the accrual of interest under section 2-1303. 735 ILCS 5/2-1303 (West 1998); Yassin v. Certified Grocers of Illinois, Inc. , 133 Ill. 2d 458, 462-64 , 551 N.E.2d 1319 (1990); Halloran v. Dickerson , 287 Ill. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Halloran v. Dickerson
green
2 sentences2001App. 3d 857, 862 , 679 N.E.2d 774 (1997). 2001It is well-settled that nothing less than a tender of the full amount of judgment due, plus interest accrued to that point, will stop the accrual of interest under section 2-1303. 735 ILCS 5/2-1303 (West 1998); Yassin v. Certified Grocers of Illinois, Inc. , 133 Ill. 2d 458, 462-64 , 551 N.E.2d 1319 (1990); Halloran v. Dickerson , 287 Ill. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Preston v. Thompson
green
1 sentence1989The court concluded that "the * * * statute's reference to `any other governmental entity' is a sufficiently clear reference to subject the state to liability for interest on judgments against it." Preston, 565 F. Supp. at 301 . | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.