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31 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1997–2026 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Thomasgreen2 sentences2001See People v. Thomas , 171 Ill. 2d 207, 222 , 664 N.E.2d 76, 84 (1996) (Class X sentencing under section 5-5-3(c)(8) of the Unified Code is mandatory). 2001See People v. Thomas , 171 Ill. 2d 207, 222 , 664 N.E.2d 76, 84 (1996) (Class X sentencing under section 5-5-3(c)(8) of the Unified Code is mandatory). | 2 | 4 |
People v. Williamsgreen2 sentences2005Further, defendant acknowledges that the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Williams , 149 Ill. 2d 467, 492 , 599 N.E.2d 913, 924 (1992), held that a higher standard of proof, beyond a reasonable doubt, should not be imposed on sentencing factors when a trial court finds a defendant eligible for Class X sentencing under section 5-5-3(c)(8) (Ill. 2005Further, defendant acknowledges that the Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Williams , 149 Ill. 2d 467, 492 , 599 N.E.2d 913, 924 (1992), held that a higher standard of proof, beyond a reasonable doubt, should not be imposed on sentencing factors when a trial court finds a defendant eligible for Class X sentencing under section 5-5-3(c)(8) (Ill. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Lathongreen2 sentences2003People v. Lathon, 317 Ill.App.3d 573 , 251 Ill.Dec. 296 , 740 N.E.2d 377 (1st Dist., 1st Div. 2000) (section 5-5-3(c)(8) is constitutional under Apprendi); People v. Lundy, 334 Ill.App.3d 819, 834 , 268 Ill.Dec. 790 , 779 N.E.2d 404 (1st Dist., 1st Div.2002) (section 5-5-3(c)(8) is constitutional under Apprendi ); People v. Young, 334 Ill.App.3d 785, 794 , 268 Ill.Dec. 679 , 779 N.E.2d 293 (1st Dist., 1st Div.2002) (the Lathon reasoning is sound; Apprendi does not render the enhanced sentencing provision in section 5-5-3(c)(8) unconstitutional); People v. Wallace, 331 Ill.App.3d 822, 838 , 265 2003People v. Lathon, 317 Ill.App.3d 573 , 251 Ill.Dec. 296 , 740 N.E.2d 377 (1st Dist., 1st Div. 2000) (section 5-5-3(c)(8) is constitutional under Apprendi); People v. Lundy, 334 Ill.App.3d 819, 834 , 268 Ill.Dec. 790 , 779 N.E.2d 404 (1st Dist., 1st Div.2002) (section 5-5-3(c)(8) is constitutional under Apprendi ); People v. Young, 334 Ill.App.3d 785, 794 , 268 Ill.Dec. 679 , 779 N.E.2d 293 (1st Dist., 1st Div.2002) (the Lathon reasoning is sound; Apprendi does not render the enhanced sentencing provision in section 5-5-3(c)(8) unconstitutional); People v. Wallace, 331 Ill.App.3d 822, 838 , 265 | 1 | 4 |
People v. Jamesongreen2 sentences2008See Morrow v. Dixon, 108 Ill. 2d 223, 226-27 (1985); People v. Levin, 157 Ill. 2d 138, 156 (1993); People v. Jameson, 162 Ill. 2d 282, 287 (1994); Thomas, 171 Ill. 2d at 222 . 2000MANDATORY CLASS X SENTENCING PROVISION OF SECTION 5-5-3(c)(8) IS CONSTITUTIONAL UNDER APPRENDI The defendant argues that the mandatory Class X sentencing provision of section 5-5-3(c)(8) violates defendant’s right to due process and trial by jury because section 5-5-3(c)(8) did not require the State to give notice of its intent to sentence defendant as a Class X offender and it did not require the State to prove to a jury defendant's prior convictions beyond a reasonable doubt. 730 ILCS 5-5- 3(c)(8) (West 1998); People v. Jameson , 162 Ill. 2d 282 (1994). | 1 | 2 |
People v. Givensgreen2 sentences2005App. 3d 910, 914 , 747 N.E.2d 436, 439 (2001) (regarding extended-term sentencing under section 5-5-3(c)(8) of the Unified Code (730 ILCS 5/5-5-3(c)(8) (West 2000)). 2003People v. Lathon, 317 Ill.App.3d 573 , 251 Ill.Dec. 296 , 740 N.E.2d 377 (1st Dist., 1st Div. 2000) (section 5-5-3(c)(8) is constitutional under Apprendi); People v. Lundy, 334 Ill.App.3d 819, 834 , 268 Ill.Dec. 790 , 779 N.E.2d 404 (1st Dist., 1st Div.2002) (section 5-5-3(c)(8) is constitutional under Apprendi ); People v. Young, 334 Ill.App.3d 785, 794 , 268 Ill.Dec. 679 , 779 N.E.2d 293 (1st Dist., 1st Div.2002) (the Lathon reasoning is sound; Apprendi does not render the enhanced sentencing provision in section 5-5-3(c)(8) unconstitutional); People v. Wallace, 331 Ill.App.3d 822, 838 , 265 | 1 | 2 |
People v. Mitchellgreen1 sentence2026The trial court shall then impose a sentence upon the defendant.” 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3(d) (West 2024); see also People v. Mitchell, 2014 IL App (1st) 120080 , ¶¶ 10- 12 (when appellate court vacated sentence with instructions to resentence defendant, trial court erred by resentencing defendant without holding new sentencing hearing under section 5-5-3(d)); People v. Stephens, 2012 IL App (1st) 110296, ¶ 123 . | 1 | 1 |
People v. Gonzalezgreen1 sentence2020See People v. Gonzalez, 151 Ill. 2d 79, 84-85 (1992) (“There is a general prohibition against the use of a single factor both as an element of a defendant’s crime and as an aggravating factor justifying the imposition of a harsher sentence than might otherwise have been imposed.” (Emphasis in original.)). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Guevaragreen1 sentence2014People v. Guevara, 216 Ill. 2d 533, 545 (2005). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Fieldsgreen2 sentences2010Fields, 383 Ill.App.3d at 922-23 , 322 Ill.Dec. 699 , 891 N.E.2d at 993 . 2010Fields, 383 Ill.App.3d at 922-23 , 322 Ill.Dec. 699 , 891 N.E.2d at 993 . | 1 | 1 |
People v. Smartgreen2 sentences2010People v. Smart, 311 Ill.App.3d 415, 417-18 , 243 Ill.Dec. 645 , 723 N.E.2d 1246, 1248 (2000). 2010People v. Smart, 311 Ill.App.3d 415, 417-18 , 243 Ill.Dec. 645 , 723 N.E.2d 1246, 1248 (2000). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Levingreen1 sentence2008See Morrow v. Dixon, 108 Ill. 2d 223, 226-27 (1985); People v. Levin, 157 Ill. 2d 138, 156 (1993); People v. Jameson, 162 Ill. 2d 282, 287 (1994); Thomas, 171 Ill. 2d at 222 . | 1 | 1 |
Morrow v. Dixongreen1 sentence2008See Morrow v. Dixon, 108 Ill. 2d 223, 226-27 (1985); People v. Levin, 157 Ill. 2d 138, 156 (1993); People v. Jameson, 162 Ill. 2d 282, 287 (1994); Thomas, 171 Ill. 2d at 222 . | 1 | 1 |
Shepard v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2005Specifically, defendant argues that under the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Shepard v. United States , 544 U.S. , , 161 L. | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Wootersgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Apprendi v. New Jersey
green
2 sentences2003Lastly, defendant argues that the mandatory Class X sentencing provision of section 5-5-3(c)(8) of the Code, under which he was sentenced, is unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466 , 147 L. 2003Lastly, defendant argues that the mandatory Class X sentencing provision of section 5-5-3(c)(8) of the Code, under which he was sentenced, is unconstitutional under Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466 , 147 L. | 9 | 2000–2003 |
Almendarez-Torres v. United States
red
2 sentences2005Ed. 2d 350 , 118 S. Ct. 1219 (1998), was correctly decided, this court should conclude that the reasoning of Apprendi applies to sentencing enhancement factors even where based on prior convictions, such as those present in the Class X sentencing provision of section 5-5-3(c)(8). 2003Defendant argues that because Apprendi questions whether Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 , 118 S.Ct. 1219 , 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998), was correctly decided, we should find that Apprendi requires prior convictions to be charged, submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt and hold that Class X sentencing under section 5-5-3(c)(8) violates defendant's right to trial by jury and due process. | 6 | 2001–2005 |
People v. Baaree
green
2 sentences2017Baaree, 315 Ill. 2014App. 3d at 1050 , 735 N.E.2d at 722 . ¶ 25 The defendant in Baaree argued he should not have been subject to Class X sentencing under section 5-5-3(c)(8). | 3 | 2014–2017 |
People v. Stokes
green
2 sentences2017Id. at 344 . ¶ 22 While defendant’s appeal in the instant case was pending, the appellate court in People v. Douglas, 2014 IL App (4th) 120617 , disagreed with the preceding cases and held that a defendant’s eligibility for Class X sentencing pursuant to section 5-5-3(c)(8) depended upon his age at the time he is charged, rather than his age at the time of conviction. 2016Id. at 344 . ¶ 22 While defendant’s appeal in the instant case was pending, the appellate court in People v. Douglas, 2014 IL App (4th) 120617 , disagreed with the preceding cases and held that a defendant’s eligibility for Class X sentencing pursuant to section 5-5-3(c)(8) depended upon his age at the time he is charged, rather than his age at the time of conviction. | 2 | 2016–2017 |
People v. Douglas
green
2 sentences2017Id. at 344 . ¶ 22 While defendant’s appeal in the instant case was pending, the appellate court in People v. Douglas, 2014 IL App (4th) 120617 , disagreed with the preceding cases and held that a defendant’s eligibility for Class X sentencing pursuant to section 5-5-3(c)(8) depended upon his age at the time he is charged, rather than his age at the time of conviction. 2016Id. at 344 . ¶ 22 While defendant’s appeal in the instant case was pending, the appellate court in People v. Douglas, 2014 IL App (4th) 120617 , disagreed with the preceding cases and held that a defendant’s eligibility for Class X sentencing pursuant to section 5-5-3(c)(8) depended upon his age at the time he is charged, rather than his age at the time of conviction. | 2 | 2016–2017 |
People v. Bertalot
green
2 sentences2002App. 3d 89 , 518 N.E.2d 467 (1987) (use of civil or criminal contempt proceedings not available after expiration of term of probation), held that, to survive the period of probation as an independent disposition, the punishment must exist as a sentencing alternative under section 5-5-3(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Unified Code) (730 ILCS 5/5-5-3(b) (West 1996)). 1997Bertalot , 164 Ill. | 2 | 1997–2002 |
People v. Stephens
green
1 sentence2026The trial court shall then impose a sentence upon the defendant.” 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3(d) (West 2024); see also People v. Mitchell, 2014 IL App (1st) 120080 , ¶¶ 10- 12 (when appellate court vacated sentence with instructions to resentence defendant, trial court erred by resentencing defendant without holding new sentencing hearing under section 5-5-3(d)); People v. Stephens, 2012 IL App (1st) 110296, ¶ 123 . | 1 | 2026–2026 |
People v. Hare
green
1 sentence2008Hare, 315 Ill. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
People v. Rivera
green
1 sentence2007People v. Rivera, 362 Ill. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
People v. Ramos
green
2 sentences2003People v. Lathon, 317 Ill.App.3d 573 , 251 Ill.Dec. 296 , 740 N.E.2d 377 (1st Dist., 1st Div. 2000) (section 5-5-3(c)(8) is constitutional under Apprendi); People v. Lundy, 334 Ill.App.3d 819, 834 , 268 Ill.Dec. 790 , 779 N.E.2d 404 (1st Dist., 1st Div.2002) (section 5-5-3(c)(8) is constitutional under Apprendi ); People v. Young, 334 Ill.App.3d 785, 794 , 268 Ill.Dec. 679 , 779 N.E.2d 293 (1st Dist., 1st Div.2002) (the Lathon reasoning is sound; Apprendi does not render the enhanced sentencing provision in section 5-5-3(c)(8) unconstitutional); People v. Wallace, 331 Ill.App.3d 822, 838 , 265 2003People v. Lathon, 317 Ill.App.3d 573 , 251 Ill.Dec. 296 , 740 N.E.2d 377 (1st Dist., 1st Div. 2000) (section 5-5-3(c)(8) is constitutional under Apprendi); People v. Lundy, 334 Ill.App.3d 819, 834 , 268 Ill.Dec. 790 , 779 N.E.2d 404 (1st Dist., 1st Div.2002) (section 5-5-3(c)(8) is constitutional under Apprendi ); People v. Young, 334 Ill.App.3d 785, 794 , 268 Ill.Dec. 679 , 779 N.E.2d 293 (1st Dist., 1st Div.2002) (the Lathon reasoning is sound; Apprendi does not render the enhanced sentencing provision in section 5-5-3(c)(8) unconstitutional); People v. Wallace, 331 Ill.App.3d 822, 838 , 265 | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| People v. Dixon green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
People v. Echols
green
2 sentences2003People v. Lathon, 317 Ill.App.3d 573 , 251 Ill.Dec. 296 , 740 N.E.2d 377 (1st Dist., 1st Div. 2000) (section 5-5-3(c)(8) is constitutional under Apprendi); People v. Lundy, 334 Ill.App.3d 819, 834 , 268 Ill.Dec. 790 , 779 N.E.2d 404 (1st Dist., 1st Div.2002) (section 5-5-3(c)(8) is constitutional under Apprendi ); People v. Young, 334 Ill.App.3d 785, 794 , 268 Ill.Dec. 679 , 779 N.E.2d 293 (1st Dist., 1st Div.2002) (the Lathon reasoning is sound; Apprendi does not render the enhanced sentencing provision in section 5-5-3(c)(8) unconstitutional); People v. Wallace, 331 Ill.App.3d 822, 838 , 265 2003People v. Lathon, 317 Ill.App.3d 573 , 251 Ill.Dec. 296 , 740 N.E.2d 377 (1st Dist., 1st Div. 2000) (section 5-5-3(c)(8) is constitutional under Apprendi); People v. Lundy, 334 Ill.App.3d 819, 834 , 268 Ill.Dec. 790 , 779 N.E.2d 404 (1st Dist., 1st Div.2002) (section 5-5-3(c)(8) is constitutional under Apprendi ); People v. Young, 334 Ill.App.3d 785, 794 , 268 Ill.Dec. 679 , 779 N.E.2d 293 (1st Dist., 1st Div.2002) (the Lathon reasoning is sound; Apprendi does not render the enhanced sentencing provision in section 5-5-3(c)(8) unconstitutional); People v. Wallace, 331 Ill.App.3d 822, 838 , 265 | 1 | 2003–2003 |
People v. Wallace
green
2 sentences2003People v. Lathon, 317 Ill.App.3d 573 , 251 Ill.Dec. 296 , 740 N.E.2d 377 (1st Dist., 1st Div. 2000) (section 5-5-3(c)(8) is constitutional under Apprendi); People v. Lundy, 334 Ill.App.3d 819, 834 , 268 Ill.Dec. 790 , 779 N.E.2d 404 (1st Dist., 1st Div.2002) (section 5-5-3(c)(8) is constitutional under Apprendi ); People v. Young, 334 Ill.App.3d 785, 794 , 268 Ill.Dec. 679 , 779 N.E.2d 293 (1st Dist., 1st Div.2002) (the Lathon reasoning is sound; Apprendi does not render the enhanced sentencing provision in section 5-5-3(c)(8) unconstitutional); People v. Wallace, 331 Ill.App.3d 822, 838 , 265 2003People v. Lathon, 317 Ill.App.3d 573 , 251 Ill.Dec. 296 , 740 N.E.2d 377 (1st Dist., 1st Div. 2000) (section 5-5-3(c)(8) is constitutional under Apprendi); People v. Lundy, 334 Ill.App.3d 819, 834 , 268 Ill.Dec. 790 , 779 N.E.2d 404 (1st Dist., 1st Div.2002) (section 5-5-3(c)(8) is constitutional under Apprendi ); People v. Young, 334 Ill.App.3d 785, 794 , 268 Ill.Dec. 679 , 779 N.E.2d 293 (1st Dist., 1st Div.2002) (the Lathon reasoning is sound; Apprendi does not render the enhanced sentencing provision in section 5-5-3(c)(8) unconstitutional); People v. Wallace, 331 Ill.App.3d 822, 838 , 265 | 1 | 2003–2003 |
People v. Roberts
green
2 sentences2003People v. Lathon, 317 Ill.App.3d 573 , 251 Ill.Dec. 296 , 740 N.E.2d 377 (1st Dist., 1st Div. 2000) (section 5-5-3(c)(8) is constitutional under Apprendi); People v. Lundy, 334 Ill.App.3d 819, 834 , 268 Ill.Dec. 790 , 779 N.E.2d 404 (1st Dist., 1st Div.2002) (section 5-5-3(c)(8) is constitutional under Apprendi ); People v. Young, 334 Ill.App.3d 785, 794 , 268 Ill.Dec. 679 , 779 N.E.2d 293 (1st Dist., 1st Div.2002) (the Lathon reasoning is sound; Apprendi does not render the enhanced sentencing provision in section 5-5-3(c)(8) unconstitutional); People v. Wallace, 331 Ill.App.3d 822, 838 , 265 2003People v. Lathon, 317 Ill.App.3d 573 , 251 Ill.Dec. 296 , 740 N.E.2d 377 (1st Dist., 1st Div. 2000) (section 5-5-3(c)(8) is constitutional under Apprendi); People v. Lundy, 334 Ill.App.3d 819, 834 , 268 Ill.Dec. 790 , 779 N.E.2d 404 (1st Dist., 1st Div.2002) (section 5-5-3(c)(8) is constitutional under Apprendi ); People v. Young, 334 Ill.App.3d 785, 794 , 268 Ill.Dec. 679 , 779 N.E.2d 293 (1st Dist., 1st Div.2002) (the Lathon reasoning is sound; Apprendi does not render the enhanced sentencing provision in section 5-5-3(c)(8) unconstitutional); People v. Wallace, 331 Ill.App.3d 822, 838 , 265 | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| People v. Dunn green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
People v. Jones
green
2 sentences2003People v. Lathon, 317 Ill.App.3d 573 , 251 Ill.Dec. 296 , 740 N.E.2d 377 (1st Dist., 1st Div. 2000) (section 5-5-3(c)(8) is constitutional under Apprendi); People v. Lundy, 334 Ill.App.3d 819, 834 , 268 Ill.Dec. 790 , 779 N.E.2d 404 (1st Dist., 1st Div.2002) (section 5-5-3(c)(8) is constitutional under Apprendi ); People v. Young, 334 Ill.App.3d 785, 794 , 268 Ill.Dec. 679 , 779 N.E.2d 293 (1st Dist., 1st Div.2002) (the Lathon reasoning is sound; Apprendi does not render the enhanced sentencing provision in section 5-5-3(c)(8) unconstitutional); People v. Wallace, 331 Ill.App.3d 822, 838 , 265 2003People v. Lathon, 317 Ill.App.3d 573 , 251 Ill.Dec. 296 , 740 N.E.2d 377 (1st Dist., 1st Div. 2000) (section 5-5-3(c)(8) is constitutional under Apprendi); People v. Lundy, 334 Ill.App.3d 819, 834 , 268 Ill.Dec. 790 , 779 N.E.2d 404 (1st Dist., 1st Div.2002) (section 5-5-3(c)(8) is constitutional under Apprendi ); People v. Young, 334 Ill.App.3d 785, 794 , 268 Ill.Dec. 679 , 779 N.E.2d 293 (1st Dist., 1st Div.2002) (the Lathon reasoning is sound; Apprendi does not render the enhanced sentencing provision in section 5-5-3(c)(8) unconstitutional); People v. Wallace, 331 Ill.App.3d 822, 838 , 265 | 1 | 2003–2003 |
People v. Lundy
green
2 sentences2003People v. Lathon, 317 Ill.App.3d 573 , 251 Ill.Dec. 296 , 740 N.E.2d 377 (1st Dist., 1st Div. 2000) (section 5-5-3(c)(8) is constitutional under Apprendi); People v. Lundy, 334 Ill.App.3d 819, 834 , 268 Ill.Dec. 790 , 779 N.E.2d 404 (1st Dist., 1st Div.2002) (section 5-5-3(c)(8) is constitutional under Apprendi ); People v. Young, 334 Ill.App.3d 785, 794 , 268 Ill.Dec. 679 , 779 N.E.2d 293 (1st Dist., 1st Div.2002) (the Lathon reasoning is sound; Apprendi does not render the enhanced sentencing provision in section 5-5-3(c)(8) unconstitutional); People v. Wallace, 331 Ill.App.3d 822, 838 , 265 2003People v. Lathon, 317 Ill.App.3d 573 , 251 Ill.Dec. 296 , 740 N.E.2d 377 (1st Dist., 1st Div. 2000) (section 5-5-3(c)(8) is constitutional under Apprendi); People v. Lundy, 334 Ill.App.3d 819, 834 , 268 Ill.Dec. 790 , 779 N.E.2d 404 (1st Dist., 1st Div.2002) (section 5-5-3(c)(8) is constitutional under Apprendi ); People v. Young, 334 Ill.App.3d 785, 794 , 268 Ill.Dec. 679 , 779 N.E.2d 293 (1st Dist., 1st Div.2002) (the Lathon reasoning is sound; Apprendi does not render the enhanced sentencing provision in section 5-5-3(c)(8) unconstitutional); People v. Wallace, 331 Ill.App.3d 822, 838 , 265 | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| People v. Young green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
People v. Jones
green
2 sentences2003People v. Lathon, 317 Ill.App.3d 573 , 251 Ill.Dec. 296 , 740 N.E.2d 377 (1st Dist., 1st Div. 2000) (section 5-5-3(c)(8) is constitutional under Apprendi); People v. Lundy, 334 Ill.App.3d 819, 834 , 268 Ill.Dec. 790 , 779 N.E.2d 404 (1st Dist., 1st Div.2002) (section 5-5-3(c)(8) is constitutional under Apprendi ); People v. Young, 334 Ill.App.3d 785, 794 , 268 Ill.Dec. 679 , 779 N.E.2d 293 (1st Dist., 1st Div.2002) (the Lathon reasoning is sound; Apprendi does not render the enhanced sentencing provision in section 5-5-3(c)(8) unconstitutional); People v. Wallace, 331 Ill.App.3d 822, 838 , 265 2003People v. Lathon, 317 Ill.App.3d 573 , 251 Ill.Dec. 296 , 740 N.E.2d 377 (1st Dist., 1st Div. 2000) (section 5-5-3(c)(8) is constitutional under Apprendi); People v. Lundy, 334 Ill.App.3d 819, 834 , 268 Ill.Dec. 790 , 779 N.E.2d 404 (1st Dist., 1st Div.2002) (section 5-5-3(c)(8) is constitutional under Apprendi ); People v. Young, 334 Ill.App.3d 785, 794 , 268 Ill.Dec. 679 , 779 N.E.2d 293 (1st Dist., 1st Div.2002) (the Lathon reasoning is sound; Apprendi does not render the enhanced sentencing provision in section 5-5-3(c)(8) unconstitutional); People v. Wallace, 331 Ill.App.3d 822, 838 , 265 | 1 | 2003–2003 |
People v. Watson
green
2 sentences2003People v. Lathon, 317 Ill.App.3d 573 , 251 Ill.Dec. 296 , 740 N.E.2d 377 (1st Dist., 1st Div. 2000) (section 5-5-3(c)(8) is constitutional under Apprendi); People v. Lundy, 334 Ill.App.3d 819, 834 , 268 Ill.Dec. 790 , 779 N.E.2d 404 (1st Dist., 1st Div.2002) (section 5-5-3(c)(8) is constitutional under Apprendi ); People v. Young, 334 Ill.App.3d 785, 794 , 268 Ill.Dec. 679 , 779 N.E.2d 293 (1st Dist., 1st Div.2002) (the Lathon reasoning is sound; Apprendi does not render the enhanced sentencing provision in section 5-5-3(c)(8) unconstitutional); People v. Wallace, 331 Ill.App.3d 822, 838 , 265 2003People v. Lathon, 317 Ill.App.3d 573 , 251 Ill.Dec. 296 , 740 N.E.2d 377 (1st Dist., 1st Div. 2000) (section 5-5-3(c)(8) is constitutional under Apprendi); People v. Lundy, 334 Ill.App.3d 819, 834 , 268 Ill.Dec. 790 , 779 N.E.2d 404 (1st Dist., 1st Div.2002) (section 5-5-3(c)(8) is constitutional under Apprendi ); People v. Young, 334 Ill.App.3d 785, 794 , 268 Ill.Dec. 679 , 779 N.E.2d 293 (1st Dist., 1st Div.2002) (the Lathon reasoning is sound; Apprendi does not render the enhanced sentencing provision in section 5-5-3(c)(8) unconstitutional); People v. Wallace, 331 Ill.App.3d 822, 838 , 265 | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| People v. Olivo green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.