section 5(a) immunity in Illinois

1977The supreme court ruled the immunity to be inapplicable and stated that section 5(a) immunity was limited to actions by the employers’ “immediate employees.” ( 65 Ill. 2d 437, 447 , 359 N.E.2d 125, 130 .) The court noted that the injured employees could clearly have sued the owners and contractors but for the “fortuitous circumstances” ( 65 Ill. 2d 437, 446 , 359 N.E.2d 125, 129 ) of the failure of their immediate employers to insure and stated that to allow the owners and contractors to be subrogated to section 5(a) immunity would encourage the hiring of uninsured subcontractors.

1977The supreme court ruled the immunity to be inapplicable and stated that section 5(a) immunity was limited to actions by the employers’ “immediate employees.” ( 65 Ill. 2d 437, 447 , 359 N.E.2d 125, 130 .) The court noted that the injured employees could clearly have sued the owners and contractors but for the “fortuitous circumstances” ( 65 Ill. 2d 437, 446 , 359 N.E.2d 125, 129 ) of the failure of their immediate employers to insure and stated that to allow the owners and contractors to be subrogated to section 5(a) immunity would encourage the hiring of uninsured subcontractors.

1982Plaintiff contends here that the dual-capacity doctrine is applicable because, in addition to its role as employer, Allin was also the owner of the truck driven by decedent and, in this capacity, plaintiff maintains — relying on Smith v. Metropolitan Sanitary District (1979), 77 Ill. 2d 313 , 396 N.E.2d 524 — that Allin does not have section 5(a) immunity.

1982Plaintiff contends here that the dual-capacity doctrine is applicable because, in addition to its role as employer, Allin was also the owner of the truck driven by decedent and, in this capacity, plaintiff maintains — relying on Smith v. Metropolitan Sanitary District (1979), 77 Ill. 2d 313 , 396 N.E.2d 524 — that Allin does not have section 5(a) immunity.

2007Schmidt, 296 Ill.App.3d at 269-270 , 230 Ill.Dec. 655 , 694 N.E.2d at 629-30 .

2007Schmidt, 296 Ill.

2007Moran, 268 Ill.App.3d at 1006 , 206 Ill.Dec. 484 , 645 N.E.2d at 494 .

2007Moran, 268 Ill.

2003In support of our decision, we note that after the United States Supreme Court decision in Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 , 148 L. Ed. 2d 866 , 121 S. Ct. 955 (2001), holding that section 5 of the fourteenth amendment does not constitute a valid basis for Congress’s abrogation of states’ sovereign immunity under Title I of the ADA ( 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111 through 12117 (1994)), almost every federal circuit court of appeals to consider the question has held that Title II of the ADA did not constitute a valid abrogation of state sovereign immunity under secti

2003In support of our decision, we note that after the United States Supreme Court decision in Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 , 148 L. Ed. 2d 866 , 121 S. Ct. 955 (2001), holding that section 5 of the fourteenth amendment does not constitute a valid basis for Congress’s abrogation of states’ sovereign immunity under Title I of the ADA ( 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111 through 12117 (1994)), almost every federal circuit court of appeals to consider the question has held that Title II of the ADA did not constitute a valid abrogation of state sovereign immunity under secti

1998Fris v. Personal Products Co. , 255 Ill.

1998Fris v. Personal Products Co., 255 Ill.

2025As our supreme court has stated, “[i]f a parent company and its subsidiary are operated as separate entities, only the entity that was the immediate employer of the injured worker is entitled to section 5(a) immunity.” Munoz v. Bulley & Andrews, 2022 IL 127067, ¶ 29 .

2022Id. at 200-01 .

2015Defendant further argued that the evidence established that defendant and ENS were “a ‘joint venture’ as described in the Ioerger case and have an ‘agency’ relationship as described in the Villa case.” Defendant reasoned that “[a]s in -4- 2015 IL App (2d) 141090 both [Ioerger and Villa] the Defendant and [ENS] are so closely related that both are entitled to the grant of immunity afforded by [section 5(a) of the Act] and that grant is completely consistent with the intent of the Act.” ¶8 On appeal, plaintiffs argue that defendant was not Rick’s employer and that, to enjoy immunity under sectio

2012We find that this is a distinction upon which it is rational to make classifications.” Id. ¶ 41 Harris argues that it, like S.I.S. in Mier, qualifies as a service organization entitled to immunity under section 5(a) of the Compensation Act because of the services it was retained to provide.

2012Finally, the plaintiffs contend that the third parties intended to be covered by the legislature under section 5(a) are those “parties that conduct gratuitous safety inspections as incident to their workers’ compensation relationship with the employer.” (Emphasis in original.) In support of their contention that more than the mere provision of a safety inspection is required to invoke immunity under section 5(a), the plaintiffs point to cases where “Illinois courts have imposed liability on entities that contract to provide service inspection, and/or maintenance.” To support their position, th

2012Finally, the plaintiffs contend that the third parties intended to be covered by the legislature under section 5(a) are those “parties that conduct gratuitous safety inspections as incident to their workers’ compensation relationship with the employer.” (Emphasis in original.) In support of their contention that more than the mere provision of a safety inspection is required to invoke immunity under section 5(a), the plaintiffs point to cases where “Illinois courts have imposed liability on entities that contract to provide service inspection, and/or maintenance.” To support their position, th

2012Ill. 2004); Jardine v. Rubloff, 73 Ill. 2d 31 (1978); Leavitt v. Farwell Tower Ltd.

2012Finally, the plaintiffs contend that the third parties intended to be covered by the legislature under section 5(a) are those “parties that conduct gratuitous safety inspections as incident to their workers’ compensation relationship with the employer.” (Emphasis in original.) In support of their contention that more than the mere provision of a safety inspection is required to invoke immunity under section 5(a), the plaintiffs point to cases where “Illinois courts have imposed liability on entities that contract to provide service inspection, and/or maintenance.” To support their position, th

2012Finally, the plaintiffs contend that the third parties intended to be covered by the legislature under section 5(a) are those “parties that conduct gratuitous safety inspections as incident to their workers’ compensation relationship with the employer.” (Emphasis in original.) In support of their contention that more than the mere provision of a safety inspection is required to invoke immunity under section 5(a), the plaintiffs point to cases where “Illinois courts have imposed liability on entities that contract to provide service inspection, and/or maintenance.” To support their position, th

2007American National Bank, 192 Ill. 2d at 280-81 , 735 N.E.2d at 555 .

2007American National Bank, 192 Ill. 2d at 280-81 , 735 N.E.2d at 555 .

1997In addition, in rejecting the holding of Lake Motor Freight, Inc. v. Randy Trucking, Inc., 118 Ill.

1997First, the statement of the issue is repeated by the court just after its description of the procedural background of the case: "We address first the third-party defendant’s contention that its statutory immunity under sections 5(a) and 11 of the Workers’ Compensation Act from tort actions by its employees also immunizes it from this claim under the Contribution Act.” Doyle, 101 Ill. 2d at 6 , 461 N.E.2d at 384 .

1997First, the statement of the issue is repeated by the court just after its description of the procedural background of the case: "We address first the third-party defendant’s contention that its statutory immunity under sections 5(a) and 11 of the Workers’ Compensation Act from tort actions by its employees also immunizes it from this claim under the Contribution Act.” Doyle, 101 Ill. 2d at 6 , 461 N.E.2d at 384 .

1996In Jenkins v. Wu, 102 Ill. 2d 468, 480 , 468 N.E.2d 1162 (1984), the supreme court stated that the purpose of section 8 — 2101 "is to ensure the effectiveness of professional self-evaluation, by members of the medical profession, in the interest of improving the quality of health care,” and absent the privilege granted by this section, physicians would be reluctant to "engage in frank evaluations of their colleagues.” 102 Ill. 2d at 480 , 468 N.E.2d at 1168 .

1996In Jenkins v. Wu, 102 Ill. 2d 468, 480 , 468 N.E.2d 1162 (1984), the supreme court stated that the purpose of section 8 — 2101 "is to ensure the effectiveness of professional self-evaluation, by members of the medical profession, in the interest of improving the quality of health care,” and absent the privilege granted by this section, physicians would be reluctant to "engage in frank evaluations of their colleagues.” 102 Ill. 2d at 480 , 468 N.E.2d at 1168 .

1995A similar result was obtained in Cipriano v. FYM Associates (1986), 117 A.D.2d 770 , 499 N.Y.S.2d 101 , where the court found that the partnership and the partners were one entity.

1995A similar result was obtained in Cipriano v. FYM Associates (1986), 117 A.D.2d 770 , 499 N.Y.S.2d 101 , where the court found that the partnership and the partners were one entity.

1981App.3d 699, 708 , 300 N.E.2d 512, 518 . • 8 Marcus is cited by both Larson and the supreme court as an example of the dual capacity doctrine and, because of this precedent in a different factual context, the Fifth District recently held that section 5(a) afforded no immunity to the employer-defendant in McCormick v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. (1980), 82 Ill.

1981Marcus is cited by both Larson and the supreme court as an example of the dual capacity doctrine and, because of this precedent in a different factual context, the Fifth District recently held that section 5(a) afforded no immunity to the employer-defendant in McCormick v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. (1980), 82 Ill.