section 205 recovery in New York

2019Commn. , 85 NY2d 423, 441 ).

1997Commn. ( 85 NY2d 423, 441 ), to defeat a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the complaint "a plaintiff seeking recovery under General Municipal Law § 205-a must identify the statute or ordinance with which the defendant failed to comply, describe the manner in which the firefighter was injured, and set forth those facts from which it may be inferred that the defendant’s negligence directly or indirectly caused the harm to the firefighter (Brophy v Generoso, 137 AD2d 478, 479 ).” It is clear that whether the alleged omission or negligence of a party in control of the premises cons

1998The City appealed and plaintiffs General Municipal Law § 205-a cause of action was dismissed by the Court of Appeals determination that recovery pursuant to section 205-a is predicated only upon a violation of premises-related provisions. ( 70 NY2d 558 .) In October of 1996 General Municipal Law § 205-a (1) was amended so that the statute would apply to predicate violations “at any time or place”.

1995The Court, in addressing the viability of the plaintiff’s claims under General Municipal Law § 205-a (the legislative counterpart to General Municipal Law § 205-e) stated: "To fall within the protective scope of the statute and defeat a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff seeking recovery under General Municipal Law § 205-a must identify the statute or ordinance with which the defendant failed to comply, describe the manner in which the firefighter was injured, and set forth those facts from which it may be inferred that the defendant’s negligence directly or indirectly caused the harm to the firef

1997Commn. ( 85 NY2d 423, 441 ), to defeat a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the complaint "a plaintiff seeking recovery under General Municipal Law § 205-a must identify the statute or ordinance with which the defendant failed to comply, describe the manner in which the firefighter was injured, and set forth those facts from which it may be inferred that the defendant’s negligence directly or indirectly caused the harm to the firefighter (Brophy v Generoso, 137 AD2d 478, 479 ).” It is clear that whether the alleged omission or negligence of a party in control of the premises cons

1995The Court, in addressing the viability of the plaintiff’s claims under General Municipal Law § 205-a (the legislative counterpart to General Municipal Law § 205-e) stated: "To fall within the protective scope of the statute and defeat a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff seeking recovery under General Municipal Law § 205-a must identify the statute or ordinance with which the defendant failed to comply, describe the manner in which the firefighter was injured, and set forth those facts from which it may be inferred that the defendant’s negligence directly or indirectly caused the harm to the firef

1997Commn., 85 NY2d 423 ; DiFlorio v Van Slyke, 234 AD2d 961 ; Jantzen v Edelman of N. Y., 221 AD2d 594 ; Malsky v Towner, 196 AD2d 532 ).

1994However, the Supreme Court erred in dismissing that part of the plaintiff’s complaint which sought recovery pursuant to General Municipal Law § 205-e. The plaintiffs opposing papers raised an issue of fact as to whether the defendant failed to comply with the rules of the New York City Department of Transportation (see, 34 RCNY 2-13 [d] [2]; 2-33 [d]), concerning the proper securing of plating over excavation sites (see, e.g., Malsky v Towner, 196 AD2d 532 ).

1995In creating a right of recovery under General Municipal Law § 205-a for an injury to or the death of a firefighter connected with violations of fire safety or prevention statutes, codes or rules, the Legislature determined that firefighters should not be expected to assume the risks of additional hazards arising out of such violations (see, McGee v Adams Paper & Twine Co., 26 AD2d, at 195 , supra; see also, Zanghi v Niagara Frontier Transp.

1987Relying on McGee v Adams Paper & Twine Co. ( 26 AD2d 186 , affd 20 NY2d 921 ), the Appellate Division rejected this argument, holding that those "legal requirements are not fire preventive in nature” and that recovery under General Municipal Law § 205-a is limited to instances where a "fire preventive” provision was violated (120 AD2d, at 33).

2004Auth., 31 AD2d 759 [1969]).

2003The Court stated that “[e]ven assuming that [defendant] failed to maintain a properly-functioning fire protection system and that such failure permitted the fire to ignite or spread, the uncontroverted evidence in the record established that the plaintiffs injuries resulted from the depletion of his air supply, which caused him to be overcome by smoke” ( 288 AD2d at 434 ).

2003Contrary to the assertion in the dissent, Balsamo v City of New York ( 287 AD2d 22 [2001]), does not provide that Labor Law § 27-a is to be accorded an expansive interpretation in order to effectuate the goal of General Municipal Law § 205-e. Where, as here, there was no negligent failure to comply with a statute or ordinance, there can be no recovery under General Municipal Law § 205-e and, of course, in the absence of actionable negligence, there is no comparative fault analysis.

2003Auth ., 233 AD2d 217, 218 [1st Dept 1996] [citation omitted]; see also Florio v City of New York , 226 AD2d 148 [1996].) General Municipal Law § 205-e (1), in pertinent part, provides that an injured police officer has a right of action if his injury: "occurs directly or indirectly as a result of any neglect, omission, willful or culpable negligence of any person . . . in failing to comply with the requirements of any of the statutes, [or] ordinances . . . of . . . city governments . . . [T]he person . . . guilty of said neglect, omission, willful or culpable negligence at the time of such inj

2003The second cause of action seeks recovery pursuant to General Municipal Law § 205-e. Briefly stated, plaintiff contends that the defendant was negligent in two respects: the first is in allowing criminal activity to be transacted on its premises, and the second is in locking the outer vestibule door.{** 2 Misc 3d at 855 } On October 23, 2001, Ms. Catherine Macri testified at an examination before trial on behalf of the defendant.

2000Proof of a reasonable connection between the violation and the firefighter’s injury is sufficient for recovery under General Municipal Law § 205-a (Johnson v Riggio Realty Corp., 153 AD2d 485 , appeal dismissed 74 NY2d 945 ).

2000The Appellate Division reversed, holding “Supreme Court erred in concluding that an alleged violation of the New York City Police Department Patrol Guide procedures concerning the use of firearms could not serve as the basis for an action seeking recovery pursuant to General Municipal Law § 205-e” ( 219 AD2d 581 , 582).

2000The Appellate Division reversed, holding "Supreme Court erred in concluding that an alleged violation of the New York City Police Department Patrol *577 Guide procedures concerning the use of firearms could not serve as the basis for an action seeking recovery pursuant to General Municipal Law § 205-e" ( 219 AD2d 581 , 582).

1997The plaintiff commenced this action against Joseph Manitta and the owner of the vehicle, Geraldine Manitta, alleging, inter alia, a right of recovery pursuant to General Municipal Law § 205-e. In response to the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint pursuant to Santangelo v State of New York ( 71 NY2d 393 ), the plaintiff cross-moved for summary judgment on the issue of liability on his claim pursuant to General Municipal Law § 205-e. In support of his cross motion, the plaintiff proffered a prima facie case that his injuries were practically and reasonably the resul

1997Commn., 85 NY2d 423 ; DiFlorio v Van Slyke, 234 AD2d 961 ; Jantzen v Edelman of N. Y., 221 AD2d 594 ; Malsky v Towner, 196 AD2d 532 ).

1997Commn., 85 NY2d 423 ; DiFlorio v Van Slyke, 234 AD2d 961 ; Jantzen v Edelman of N. Y., 221 AD2d 594 ; Malsky v Towner, 196 AD2d 532 ).

1995The Supreme Court erred in concluding that an alleged violation of the New York City Police Department Patrol Guide procedures concerning the use of firearms could not serve as the basis for an action seeking recovery pursuant to General Municipal Law § 205-e (cf., Sledge v City of New York, 207 AD2d 338 ; Murphy v City of New York, 202 AD2d 407 ).

1995The Supreme Court erred in concluding that an alleged violation of the New York City Police Department Patrol Guide procedures concerning the use of firearms could not serve as the basis for an action seeking recovery pursuant to General Municipal Law § 205-e (cf., Sledge v City of New York, 207 AD2d 338 ; Murphy v City of New York, 202 AD2d 407 ).

1995Jacques v City of New York, 215 AD2d 75 ).