section 13 sentence reconsideration in Alabama

2015“To be eligible for sentence reconsideration under Ala.Code § 13-5-9.1 (1975), “ ‘(1) the inmate was sentenced before May 25, 2000, the date the 2000 amendment to the HFOA became effective; (2) the inmate was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole pursuant to § 13A-5-9(c)(3) and had no prior Class A felony convictions or was sentenced to life imprisonment pursuant to § 13A-5-9(c)(2), see Prestwood [v. State, 915 So.2d 580 (Ala.Crim.App.2005)]; and (3) the inmate is a “nonviolent convicted offender.” An inmate must satisfy all three requirements before he or she is eli

2012I stated in Ashford : “I agree with the majority that a circuit court may properly deny a motion for sentence reconsideration under § 13A-5-9.1, Ala.Code 1975, on the basis that such motion is successive, so long as at least one of the previous motions was properly considered in compliance with this Court’s opinion in Holt v. State, 960 So.2d 726 (Ala.Crim.App. 2006).

2007In her dissent, Justice Stuart noted: " In my dissent in Holt v. State , 960 So.2d 740 , 748 (Ala. 2006), I stated: `[I]f an inmate has been convicted of a violent offense, he is a violent offender and is not eligible for sentence reconsideration under § 13A-5-9.1 , Ala. Code 1975.' Thus, in my opinion, a court does not have jurisdiction to entertain a motion for sentence reconsideration filed by an inmate who has been convicted of an offense that is statutorily defined as a violent offense. " 972 So.2d at 827 (emphasis added).

2007In her dissent, Justice Stuart noted: "In my dissent in Holt v. State , 960 So.2d 740 , 748 (Ala. 2006), I stated: `[I]f an inmate has been convicted of a violent offense, he is a violent offender and is not eligible for sentence reconsideration under § 13A-5-9.1 , Ala. Code 1975.' Thus, in my opinion, a court does not have jurisdiction to entertain a motion for sentence reconsideration filed by an inmate who has been convicted of an offense that is statutorily defined as a violent offense. " 972 So.2d at 827 (emphasis added).

2016Joe Louis Spencer filed a motion for sentence reconsideration under § 13A-5-9.1, Ala. Code 1975, and Kirby v. State, 899 So.2d 968 (Ala. 2004).

2015On March 6, 2014, Bennett filed a motion for sentence reconsideration pursuant to § 13A-5-9.1, Ala.Code 1975 (repealed effective Mdrch 13, 2014, see Act No. 2014-165, Ala. Acts 2014) (a motion for sentence reconsideration is often referred to as a “Kirby motion” in light of this Court’s decision in Kirby v. State, 899 So.2d 968 (Ala.2004)).

2007I recognize the principle of stare decisis, and in light of this Court's decision in Ex parte Butler , 972 So.2d 821 (Ala. 2007), that a circuit court has jurisdiction to entertain a Kirby 7 motion for sentence reconsideration under § 13A-5-9.1 , Ala. Code 1975, filed by an inmate who has been convicted of an offense that is statutorily defined as a violent offense, I concur specially in the majority's decision to consider the merits of this petition.

2007In her dissent, Justice Stuart noted: " In my dissent in Holt v. State , 960 So.2d 740 , 748 (Ala. 2006), I stated: `[I]f an inmate has been convicted of a violent offense, he is a violent offender and is not eligible for sentence reconsideration under § 13A-5-9.1 , Ala. Code 1975.' Thus, in my opinion, a court does not have jurisdiction to entertain a motion for sentence reconsideration filed by an inmate who has been convicted of an offense that is statutorily defined as a violent offense. " 972 So.2d at 827 (emphasis added).

2007See also Vinson v. State , 950 So.2d 1233 (Ala.Crim.App. 2006), and Ferrell v. State , 944 So.2d 162 (Ala.Crim.App. 2006).

2006See Ferrell v. State , 944 So.2d 162 (Ala.Crim.App. 2006).

2007Because in my opinion the court never acquired jurisdiction to consider Butler's motion for sentence reconsideration under § 13A-5-9.1, Ala.Code 1975, the court did not have jurisdiction to enter its July 13 order, and that order is void." 972 So.2d at 828.

2007Because in my opinion the court never acquired jurisdiction to consider Butler's motion for sentence reconsideration under § 13A-5-9.1, Ala.Code 1975, the court did not have jurisdiction to enter its July 13 order, and that order is void." 972 So.2d at 828.

2012However, in this case, the Court erroneously relied on this Court’s opinion in Wells v. State, 941 So.2d 1008 (Ala.Crim.App.2005), in denying Ash-ford’s motion.

2011However, in this case, the Court erroneously relied on this Court’s opinion in Wells v. State, 941 So.2d 1008 (Ala.Crim.App.2005), in denying Ash-ford’s motion.

2011Nevertheless, the majority affirmed the denial of the motion, because, in Coats’s prior motion to reconsider this sentence, see Coats v. State, 986 So.2d 1241 (Ala.Crim.App.2007) (Welch, J., dissenting), the circuit court could have found Coats to be a violent offender and, thus, ineligible for sentence reconsideration under § 13A-5-9.1. 1 See A.G. v. State, 989 So.2d 1167, 1180 (Ala.Crim.App.2007) (“[A]n appellate court may affirm a circuit court’s judgment if that judgment is correct for any reason.”).

2008In those instances, however, either the circuit court also examined the facts of the underlying offense or there was nothing in the record to suggest that the circuit court had refused to consider all the information presented to it in determining that the inmate was a violent offender.” Coats v. State 986 So.2d 1241, 1242 (Ala.Crim.App.2007) (Welch, J., dissenting) In this case, although the circuit court did not affirmatively state that it could not consider other information before it, the court did conclude that Young’s petition was precluded from sentence reconsideration under § 13A-5-9.1

2008In an opinion being released today, this Court affirms the order of the circuit court in a similar case, stating that "the fact that a motion for sentence reconsideration under § 13A-5-&1 is successive is a valid basis, in and of itself, for denying that motion, so long as at least one of the previous motions was properly considered in compliance with this Court's opinion in Holt v. State, 960 So.2d 726 (Ala.Crim.App.2006) Ashford v. State, 12 So.3d 160, 162 (Ala. Crim.App.2008).

2008In an opinion being released today, this Court affirms the order of the circuit court in a similar case, stating that “the fact that a motion for sentence reconsideration under § 13A-5-9.1 is successive is a valid basis, in and of itself, for denying that motion, so long as at least one of the previous motions was properly considered in compliance with this Court’s opinion in Holt v. State, 960 So.2d 726 (Ala.Crim.App.2006) .... ” Ashford v. State, 12 So.3d 160, 162 (Ala.Crim.App.2008).

2010In Ex parte Jenkins, 992 So.2d 1248 (Ala.2007), Jenkins filed two motions for sentence reconsideration pursuant to § 13A-5-9.1, Ala. Code 1975, see Kirby v. State, 899 So.2d 968 (Ala.2004) (“Kirby motion”), and he appealed from the denial of the second motion.

2010When the process necessary to initiate proceedings is defective, the resulting judgment is void; Seymour does not hold otherwise, and the Courts of this State have acknowledged this rule in post- Seymour cases. *399 In Ex parte Jenkins, 992 So.2d 1248 (Ala.2007), Jenkins filed two motions for sentence reconsideration pursuant to § 13A-5-9.1, Ala.Code 1975, see Kirby v. State, 899 So.2d 968 (Ala.2004) (" Kirby motion"), and he appealed from the denial of the second motion.

2015See also Ex parte Gunn, 993 So.2d 433, 434 (Ala.2007) (noting the holding in Holt that “a trial court could not reject an application for sentence reconsideration under § 13A-5-9.1 solely on the basis that the underlying conviction was for a violent offense”).

2011Nevertheless, the majority affirmed the denial of the motion, because, in Coats’s prior motion to reconsider this sentence, see Coats v. State, 986 So.2d 1241 (Ala.Crim.App.2007) (Welch, J., dissenting), the circuit court could have found Coats to be a violent offender and, thus, ineligible for sentence reconsideration under § 13A-5-9.1. 1 See A.G. v. State, 989 So.2d 1167, 1180 (Ala.Crim.App.2007) (“[A]n appellate court may affirm a circuit court’s judgment if that judgment is correct for any reason.”).

2007I fully concur with this Court's decision to overrule the holding in Wells v. State , 941 So.2d 1008 , 1009 (Ala.Crim.App. 2005), that "the circuit court will *Page 438 not have jurisdiction to consider any second or successive motions for reconsideration filed by that defendant in that particular case." See my special writings in Ex parte Coleman , 974 So.2d 307 , 308 (Ala. 2007), and Ex parte Jenkins 992 So.2d 1248 , 1251 (Ala. 2007).

2007I fully concur with this Court's decision to overrule the holding in Wells v. State, 941 So.2d 1008, 1009 (Ala. Crim.App.2005), that "the circuit court will *438 not have jurisdiction to consider any second or successive motions for reconsideration filed by that defendant in that particular case." See my special writings in Ex parte Coleman, 974 So.2d 307, 308 (Ala. 2007), and Ex parte Jenkins 992 So.2d 1248, 1251 (Ala.2007).

2007See also Vinson v. State , 950 So.2d 1233 (Ala.Crim.App. 2006), and Ferrell v. State , 944 So.2d 162 (Ala.Crim.App. 2006).

2006Cf. Ex parte Sandifer, 925 So.2d 290, 294 (Ala.Crim.App.2005) (holding that a presiding circuit court judge’s order appointing another circuit court judge as the presiding judge over all petitions for reconsideration of sentence pursuant to § 13A-5-9.1, Ala.Code 1975, conflicted with the language in § 13A-5-9.1, Ala.Code 1975, because “[t]he legislature chose to use the term ‘presiding judge’ instead of ‘judge presiding over the case’ or ‘sentencing judge’s successor in office’; we assume that the legislature had its reasons for doing so”). 1 In this case, the appellant was convicted and sente

2006See Sanders , supra. In this case, the circuit court had jurisdiction to consider Holt's motion because the motion was filed in the court in which Holt was convicted and the judge who ruled on the motion was the presiding judge of the Jackson Circuit Court; the record indicates that this was Holt's first motion for reconsideration under § 13A-5-9.1 ; and Holt satisfied the first two eligibility requirements — he was sentenced before the 2000 amendment to the HFOA became effective and he was sentenced pursuant to § 13A-5-9 (c)(3) based on five prior felony convictions, none of which were Class

2006See Sanders, supra. In this case, the circuit court had jurisdiction to consider Holt's motion because the motion was filed in the court in which Holt was convicted and the judge who ruled on the motion was the presiding judge of the Jackson Circuit Court; the record indicates that this was Holt's first motion for reconsideration under § 13A-5-9.1; and Holt satisfied the first two eligibility requirements—he was sentenced before the 2000 amendment to the HFOA became effective and he was sentenced pursuant to § 13A-5-9(c)(3) based on five prior felony convictions, none of which were Class A fel