Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
28 Iowa opinions name it 2 courts 1981–2025 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Iowa courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Fountaingreen2 sentences2021Iowa case law is clear that assault under section 708.1 is a specific intent crime “[b]ecause the elements . . . include an act that is done to achieve the additional consequence of causing the victim pain, injury or offensive physical contact.” State v. Fountain, 786 N.W.2d 260, 265 (Iowa 2010). 2020See State v. Fountain, 786 N.W.2d 260, 265 (Iowa 2010) (“The elements of assault under Iowa Code section 708.1 have not changed since our decision in [State v. Heard, 636 N.W.2d 227, 231 (Iowa 2001)]. | 5 | 5 |
State v. Heardgreen2 sentences2021See, e.g., State v. Heard, 636 N.W.2d 227 , 231–32 (Iowa 2001); State v. Bedard, 668 N.W.2d 598, 601 (Iowa 2003) (maintaining that assault under section 708.1(1) and (2) would still require specific intent after the legislature specifically added a Code section dictating it a general intent crime). 2020See State v. Fountain, 786 N.W.2d 260, 265 (Iowa 2010) (“The elements of assault under Iowa Code section 708.1 have not changed since our decision in [State v. Heard, 636 N.W.2d 227, 231 (Iowa 2001)]. | 3 | 7 |
State v. Keetongreen2 sentences2016Instead, he focuses on the second element—the commission of an assault to carry out his intent to complete a theft of the cigarettes. 6 “We look to the definition of assault in section 708.1 to consider whether a robbery occurred under section 711.1(1).” Keeton, 710 N.W.2d at 533 . 2010See, e.g., Keeton, 710 N.W.2d at 534 . 8 The elements of assault under Iowa Code section 708.1 have not changed since our decision in Heard. | 2 | 3 |
State of Iowa v. Travis Howard Richard Beckgreen2 sentences2025See id. at 66 (holding a 2002 legislative amendment, now codified at Iowa Code section 708.1(1), which expressly states assault is “general intent crime,” had “continued effect” because it applied to third alternative means of commission)2; see also State v. Allen, No. 19-1509, 2021 WL 211133 , at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 21, 2021), aff’d on other grounds, 965 N.W.2d 909 , 912 (Iowa 2021); State v. Phipps, No. 17-1653, 2018 WL 4638351 , at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 26, 2018); State v. Meek, No. 16-0797, 2017 WL 706334, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 22, 2017). 2017See State v. Beck, 854 N.W.2d 56, 66 (Iowa Ct. App. 2014) (holding 2002 1 The jury received the following instruction regarding specific intent: “‘Specific intent’ means not only being aware of doing an act and doing it voluntarily, but in addition, doing it with a specific purpose in mind.” 2 Regarding general intent, the court instructed: To commit a crime a person must intend to do an act which is against the law. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Bedardgreen2 sentences2021See, e.g., State v. Heard, 636 N.W.2d 227 , 231–32 (Iowa 2001); State v. Bedard, 668 N.W.2d 598, 601 (Iowa 2003) (maintaining that assault under section 708.1(1) and (2) would still require specific intent after the legislature specifically added a Code section dictating it a general intent crime). 2014See State v. Fountain, 786 N.W.2d 260, 266 (Iowa 2010); State v. Bedard, 668 N.W.2d 598, 601 (Iowa 2003). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Oganred2 sentences2016The court stated, “Although in the past we have defined the assault alternative in section 708.1(2) as a general intent crime, see State v. Ogan, 497 N.W.2d 902, 903 (Iowa 1993), we now hold this alternative is a specific-intent crime. 2001Although in the past we have defined the assault alternative in section 708.1(2) as a general intent crime, see State v. Ogan, 497 N.W.2d 902, 903 (Iowa 1993), we now hold this alternative is a specific-intent crime. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Spearsgreen2 sentences2006See State v. Spears, 312 N.W.2d 79, 80 (Iowa 1981). 2006See State v. Spears, 312 N.W.2d 79, 80 (Iowa 1981). | 2 | 2 |
State v. McVeygreen2 sentences2020Under this section, a defendant must commit an act that he intends to cause pain 3 Wadsworth asserts the debate about jury instructions “highlights the absurdity” of the distinction between specific-intent and general-intent crimes and the availability of a diminished capacity defense, citing the dissent in McVey, 376 N.W.2d at 589–90 (Carter, J. dissenting). 2014The continuing requirement that the State prove specific intent under the first two modes of assault in section 708.1 necessarily controls our resolution of the question presented herein The supreme court has held — without limitation or equivocation — the defense of diminished responsibility “is available to any crime in which specific intent is an element.” State v. McVey, 376 N.W.2d 585, 587 (Iowa 1985) (emphasis added); see State v. Jacobs, 607 N.W.2d 679, 684 (Iowa 2000) (stating defense is available “in those instances in which the State must prove defendant’s specific intent as an eleme | 1 | 2 |
State v. Meekgreen1 sentence2025See id. at 66 (holding a 2002 legislative amendment, now codified at Iowa Code section 708.1(1), which expressly states assault is “general intent crime,” had “continued effect” because it applied to third alternative means of commission)2; see also State v. Allen, No. 19-1509, 2021 WL 211133 , at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 21, 2021), aff’d on other grounds, 965 N.W.2d 909 , 912 (Iowa 2021); State v. Phipps, No. 17-1653, 2018 WL 4638351 , at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 26, 2018); State v. Meek, No. 16-0797, 2017 WL 706334, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 22, 2017). | 1 | 1 |
State of Iowa v. Jameesha Renae Allengreen1 sentence2025See id. at 66 (holding a 2002 legislative amendment, now codified at Iowa Code section 708.1(1), which expressly states assault is “general intent crime,” had “continued effect” because it applied to third alternative means of commission)2; see also State v. Allen, No. 19-1509, 2021 WL 211133 , at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 21, 2021), aff’d on other grounds, 965 N.W.2d 909 , 912 (Iowa 2021); State v. Phipps, No. 17-1653, 2018 WL 4638351 , at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 26, 2018); State v. Meek, No. 16-0797, 2017 WL 706334, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. Feb. 22, 2017). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. William Maurice Smithgreen1 sentence2022See Smith, 171 F.3d 617, 620-21 ; see also State v. Hadaway, No. 11-1665, 2012 WL 5356153 , at *2-3 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 31, 2012). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Delaygreen1 sentence2021See State v. Delay, 320 N.W.2d 831, 833 (Iowa 1982). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Redmongreen1 sentence2021“Specific intent is present when from the circumstances the offender must have subjectively desired the prohibited result.” State v. Fountain, 786 N.W.2d 260, 264 (Iowa 2010) (quoting State v. Redmon, 244 N.W.2d 792, 797 (Iowa 1976)). 5 There is no question that the parties were married and residing together at the time of the assault, making the assault domestic abuse. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Maxwellgreen1 sentence2019Therefore, we find “there [is] no reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s failure to object to the instruction, the result of the proceedings would have been different.” State v. Maxwell, 743 N.W.2d 185, 197 (Iowa 2008) (finding the defendant failed to establish prejudice due to the “overwhelming evidence supporting [the defendant’s] guilt” and “the negligible effect the . . . jury instruction could have had on the verdict”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Truesdellgreen1 sentence2018In a published opinion, this court has acknowledged assault under section 708.1(2)(c) 2 We need not determine whether Phipps’s argument for judgment of acquittal was made with enough specificity to preserve this argument for appeal, see State v. Truesdell, 679 N.W.2d 611, 615 (Iowa 2004), because even if it was, his failure to object to the jury instruction advising the jury that assault while displaying a dangerous weapon is a general- intent crime now prevents him from challenging whether there was substantial evidence to find specific intent. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Canalgreen1 sentence2018See Canal, 773 N.W.2d at 530 (providing we review the sufficiency of the evidence in the light of the jury instructions given). 6 (providing a person commits assault when displaying in a threatening manner any dangerous weapon toward another) has not been found to be a specific intent crime. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Beetsgreen1 sentence2016State v. Beets, 528 N.W.2d 521, 523 (Iowa 1995). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Barneygreen1 sentence2014The continuing requirement that the State prove specific intent under the first two modes of assault in section 708.1 necessarily controls our resolution of the question presented herein The supreme court has held — without limitation or equivocation — the defense of diminished responsibility “is available to any crime in which specific intent is an element.” State v. McVey, 376 N.W.2d 585, 587 (Iowa 1985) (emphasis added); see State v. Jacobs, 607 N.W.2d 679, 684 (Iowa 2000) (stating defense is available “in those instances in which the State must prove defendant’s specific intent as an eleme | 1 | 1 |
Veverka v. Cashgreen1 sentence2014The continuing requirement that the State prove specific intent under the first two modes of assault in section 708.1 necessarily controls our resolution of the question presented herein The supreme court has held — without limitation or equivocation — the defense of diminished responsibility “is available to any crime in which specific intent is an element.” State v. McVey, 376 N.W.2d 585, 587 (Iowa 1985) (emphasis added); see State v. Jacobs, 607 N.W.2d 679, 684 (Iowa 2000) (stating defense is available “in those instances in which the State must prove defendant’s specific intent as an eleme | 1 | 1 |
State v. Jacobsgreen1 sentence2014The continuing requirement that the State prove specific intent under the first two modes of assault in section 708.1 necessarily controls our resolution of the question presented herein The supreme court has held — without limitation or equivocation — the defense of diminished responsibility “is available to any crime in which specific intent is an element.” State v. McVey, 376 N.W.2d 585, 587 (Iowa 1985) (emphasis added); see State v. Jacobs, 607 N.W.2d 679, 684 (Iowa 2000) (stating defense is available “in those instances in which the State must prove defendant’s specific intent as an eleme | 1 | 1 |
Wilker v. Wilkergreen1 sentence2004See Wilker v. Wilker, 630 N.W.2d 590, 596-97 (Iowa 2001) (concluding “unwelcome” physical contact was sufficient to support finding of assault under section 708.1(1)); cf. Chang, 587 N.W.2d at 462 (determining proof of intent required under section 708.1 was sufficient when natu *133 ral consequence of defendant’s act was to place victim in fear of painful or injurious contact). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Li-Yu Changgreen1 sentence2004See Wilker v. Wilker, 630 N.W.2d 590, 596-97 (Iowa 2001) (concluding “unwelcome” physical contact was sufficient to support finding of assault under section 708.1(1)); cf. Chang, 587 N.W.2d at 462 (determining proof of intent required under section 708.1 was sufficient when natu *133 ral consequence of defendant’s act was to place victim in fear of painful or injurious contact). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Ceasergreen2 sentences2001State v. Ceaser, 585 N.W.2d 192, 194 (Iowa 1998). 2001State v. Ceaser, 585 N.W.2d 192, 194 (Iowa 1998). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Weltongreen1 sentence1981State v. Welton, 300 N.W.2d 157, 160 (Iowa 1981). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Iowa. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Braggs
green
2 sentences2025In reaching that conclusion, the Braggs court stated that “it is impossible to commit attempted murder without also performing an act which meets the statutory definition of an assault.” Id. at 36– 37. 2025This court held that “assault under Iowa Code section 708.1(1) (2005) is a lesser-included offense of attempt to commit murder, and, therefore, Braggs’s counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the instruction on this offense.” Id. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Law
green
1 sentence2018Threats of violence or other offensive physical contact could constitute an assault under section 708.1, however "[a] mere threat, without more, is not necessarily an assault by placing another in fear." State v. Law , 306 N.W.2d 756 , 759 (Iowa 1981), overruled on other grounds by State v. Wales , 325 N.W.2d 87 , 89 (Iowa 1982). "[O]ur courts have held threats made over the telephone or by text message did not constitute an assault when the threat lacks immediacy and an ability to execute the act." In re Landhuis , No. 14-1447, 2015 WL 1331854 , at *3, (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 25, 2015). 4 In orde | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Wales
green
1 sentence2018Threats of violence or other offensive physical contact could constitute an assault under section 708.1, however "[a] mere threat, without more, is not necessarily an assault by placing another in fear." State v. Law , 306 N.W.2d 756 , 759 (Iowa 1981), overruled on other grounds by State v. Wales , 325 N.W.2d 87 , 89 (Iowa 1982). "[O]ur courts have held threats made over the telephone or by text message did not constitute an assault when the threat lacks immediacy and an ability to execute the act." In re Landhuis , No. 14-1447, 2015 WL 1331854 , at *3, (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 25, 2015). 4 In orde | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Sille v. Shaffer
green
1 sentence2016The above-quoted incident did not rise to the level of an “act which is intended to cause pain or injury to, or which is intended to result in physical contact which will be insulting or offensive to another, coupled with the apparent ability to execute the act.” See id. § 708.1(2)(a). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.