section 2 voluntary dismissal in Illinois

2008According to the court, “[wjhere a plaintiff (1) fails to exercise due diligence, particularly where his failure continues long after the expiration of the statute of limitations; (2) takes a voluntary dismissal pursuant to section 2 — 1009 when his diligence is challenged by a Rule 103(b) motion; and (3) refiles his action under section 13 — 217, even though promptly effecting service on his refiled complaint, justice is truly and unnecessarily delayed.” O’Connell, 112 Ill. 2d at 282 .

2008According to the court, "[w]here a plaintiff (1) fails to exercise due diligence, particularly where his failure continues long after the expiration of the statute of limitations; (2) takes a voluntary dismissal pursuant to section 2--1009 when his diligence is challenged by a Rule 103(b) motion; and (3) refiles his action under section 13--217, even though promptly effecting service on his refiled complaint, justice is truly and unnecessarily delayed." O'Connell, 112 Ill. 2d at 282 .

2007Muskat reaffirms Aranda’s conclusion in its holding that a “voluntary dismissal under section 2–1009 and *** refiling under section 13–217 does not insulate the plaintiff from the lack of diligence displayed prior to the dismissal.” Muskat, 122 Ill. 2d at 49 .

2007Muskat reaffirms Aranda’s conclusion in its holding that a “voluntary dismissal under section 2 — 1009 and *** refiling under section 13 — 217 does not insulate the plaintiff from the lack of diligence displayed prior to the dismissal.” Muskat, 122 Ill. 2d at 49 .

2002The order granting the voluntary dismissal also provided that “the plaintiff is ordered to pay all costs associated with this case including the costs incurred by the defendants in the taking of depositions and those other costs as provided for in Galowich v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 93 Ill.

1999The order granting the voluntary dismissal also provided that “the plaintiff is ordered to pay all costs associated with this case including the costs incurred by the defendants in the taking of depositions and those other costs as provided for in Galowich v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 93 Ill.

1993To allow a plaintiff to allege a mistaken interpretation of law or miscalculated tactical decision as a basis upon which to vacate a voluntary dismissal under section 2 — 1401 would amount to an invitation to circumvent the mandate of section 13 — 217 which permits only a single refiling after a voluntary dismissal (Flesner, 145 Ill. 2d at 254 (statute permits only single refiling even though underlying statute of limitations has not yet expired); Gendek v. Jehangir (1988), 119 Ill. 2d 338, 343-44 (statute permits only single refiling within one-year saving period), and the rule which prohibit

1988A voluntary dismissal pursuant to section 2 — 1009 of the Code of Civil Procedure is a final and appealable order (Swisher v. Duffy (1987), 117 Ill. 2d 376, 379 , 512 N.E.2d 1207 ; Kahle v. John Deere Co. (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 302, 307 , 472 N.E.2d 787 ), and this court has jurisdiction to consider the merits of these appeals.

1991A voluntary dismissal pursuant to section 2 — 1009 of the Code of Civil Procedure is a final and appealable order (Swisher v. Duffy (1987), 117 Ill. 2d 376, 379 ), and this court has jurisdiction to consider the merits of these appeals.

1988A voluntary dismissal pursuant to section 2 — 1009 of the Code of Civil Procedure is a final and appealable order (Swisher v. Duffy (1987), 117 Ill. 2d 376, 379 , 512 N.E.2d 1207 ; Kahle v. John Deere Co. (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 302, 307 , 472 N.E.2d 787 ), and this court has jurisdiction to consider the merits of these appeals.

2009The rule made clear in Rein and Hudson flows directly from the policy considerations behind the res judicata doctrine. “ ‘Res judicata promotes judicial economy by preventing repetitive litigation and [additionally] protects parties from being forced to bear the unjust burden of relitigating essentially the same case.’ ” Piagentini v. Ford Motor Co., 387 Ill.

1995App. 3d 970 , 627 N.E.2d 76 (voluntary dismissal pursuant to section 2 — 1009 after trial has commenced).) Although Gibellina was decided in the context of the filing of a section 2 — 1009 motion during the pendency of a defense motion, which if favorably ruled upon would have been dispositive of the case, there is merit in the contention that it also should be applicable to the instant case.

1995(Marion Metal, 243 Ill.

1993App. 3d 5 , 581 N.E.2d 739 , the appellate court held that a voluntary dismissal pursuant to section 2 — 1009 is a final and appealable order and that the reviewing court had jurisdiction to consider the merits of the appeal.

1991Edwards, 121 Ill.

1991(Edwards, 121 Ill.

1990(Martinez v. Erickson (1989), 127 Ill. 2d 112 , 535 N.E.2d 853 .) On appeal from a Rule 103(b) dismissal, the reviewing court must consider whether the trial court abused its discretion.

1990(Martinez v. Erickson (1989), 127 Ill. 2d 112 , 535 N.E.2d 853 .) On appeal from a Rule 103(b) dismissal, the reviewing court must consider whether the trial court abused its discretion.

1988In O’Connell, the plaintiff did not obtain service until more than eight months after the expiration of the applicable limitations period. ( 112 Ill. 2d at 277 .) The defendants then filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 103(b). ( 112 Ill. 2d at 277 .) Before any hearing was held on that motion, the plaintiff was granted a voluntary dismissal under section 2 — 1009 of the Code. ( 112 Ill. 2d at 278 .) The plaintiff refiled the action eight months later pursuant to section 13 — 217 of the Code and promptly obtained service upon the defendants. ( 112 Ill. 2d at 278 .) The defendants again m

1988Defendants raise these issues: (1) whether the trial court lacked jurisdiction under Elg v. Whittington (1987), 119 Ill. 2d 344 , 518 N.E.2d 1232 , to consider plaintiffs’ motions to vacate the dismissal order and for voluntary dismissal of the complaint; (2) whether the court abused its discretion in vacating its order dismissing the complaint with prejudice; and (3) whether plaintiffs were entitled to voluntary dismissal pursuant to section 2 — 1009 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill.

1988Defendants raise these issues: (1) whether the trial court lacked jurisdiction under Elg v. Whittington (1987), 119 Ill. 2d 344 , 518 N.E.2d 1232 , to consider plaintiffs’ motions to vacate the dismissal order and for voluntary dismissal of the complaint; (2) whether the court abused its discretion in vacating its order dismissing the complaint with prejudice; and (3) whether plaintiffs were entitled to voluntary dismissal pursuant to section 2 — 1009 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill.

1987(Galowich v. Beech Aircraft Corp. (1982), 92 Ill. 2d 157, 161 .) There had been no prior holding of this court that a voluntary dismissal under section 2 — 1009 of the Code of Civil Procedure was not a final and appealable order.

1987While it has been recognized that abuse by counsel of the privilege granted to plaintiffs of voluntarily dismissing a complaint before trial and refiling under sections 2 — 1009 and 13 — 217 is possible (see Meyers v. Bridgeport Machines Division of Textron, Inc. (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 112, 123-25 , 497 N.E.2d 745 (Ryan, J., dissenting)), any change in the procedure should be addressed by the General Assembly or by supreme court rule.

1987While it has been recognized that abuse by counsel of the privilege granted to plaintiffs of voluntarily dismissing a complaint before trial and refiling under sections 2 — 1009 and 13 — 217 is possible (see Meyers v. Bridgeport Machines Division of Textron, Inc. (1986), 113 Ill. 2d 112, 123-25 , 497 N.E.2d 745 (Ryan, J., dissenting)), any change in the procedure should be addressed by the General Assembly or by supreme court rule.

1986The other authorities cited by plaintiff (In re Marriage of Wright (1981), 92 Ill.

1984Bernick v. Chicago Title & Trust Co. (1945), 325 Ill. App. 495, 501 .