section 16-13-30(d) mandatory life sentence in Georgia

1993This phrase originated in State v. Hendrixson, 251 Ga. 853, 854 ( 310 SE2d 526 ) which held that a prior drug conviction need not be set out in the indictment to authorize the maximum life sentence under § 16-13-30 (d).

1993This phrase originated in State v. Hendrixson, 251 Ga. 853, 854 ( 310 SE2d 526 ) which held that a prior drug conviction need not be set out in the indictment to authorize the maximum life sentence under § 16-13-30 (d).

1993I agree with the majority's holding in Division 3 that the life sentence recidivist provision of OCGA § 16-13-30 (d) does not require that a defendant be convicted of a first offense prior to the commission of the "second or subsequent offense." This is in accordance with our decision in State v. Hendrixson, 251 Ga. 853, 854-855 ( 310 SE2d 526 ) (1984) and with the more recent decision of the Court of Appeals in State v. Sears, 202 Ga. App. 352, 354-355 (8) ( 414 SE2d 494 ) (1991).

1993I agree with the majority's holding in Division 3 that the life sentence recidivist provision of OCGA § 16-13-30 (d) does not require that a defendant be convicted of a first offense prior to the commission of the "second or subsequent offense." This is in accordance with our decision in State v. Hendrixson, 251 Ga. 853, 854-855 ( 310 SE2d 526 ) (1984) and with the more recent decision of the Court of Appeals in State v. Sears, 202 Ga. App. 352, 354-355 (8) ( 414 SE2d 494 ) (1991).

1993As we pointed out in Grant v. State, 258 Ga. 299, 300 ( 368 SE2d 737 ) (1988), citing Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S. 263, 284-285 (100 SC 1133, 63 LE2d 382) (1980), the purpose of a recidivist statute is to deter repeat offenders, and, at some point, to segregate those offenders from the rest of society for an extended period of time.

1993As we pointed out in Grant v. State, 258 Ga. 299, 300 ( 368 SE2d 737 ) (1988), citing Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S. 263, 284-285 (100 SC 1133, 63 LE2d 382) (1980), the purpose of a recidivist statute is to deter repeat offenders, and, at some point, to segregate those offenders from the rest of society for an extended period of time.

2022As noted above, the trial court judge retains discretion to sentence a defendant to either ten to forty years in confinement or a life sentence for a subsequent violation of OCGA § 16-13-30 (b), even if the State pursues a recidivist sentence under OCGA § 17-10-7 (c).22 Consequently, “[t]he 22 See Scott, 248 Ga. App. at 545-546 (2); see also Mann v. State, 273 Ga. 366, 369 (1) ( 541 SE2d 645 ) (2001) (holding that the trial court retains discretion to 12 judge’s failure to exercise discretion when sentencing [Waller] to not less than ten years nor more than [forty] years or life imprisonment u

2022As noted above, the trial court judge retains discretion to sentence a defendant to either ten to forty years in confinement or a life sentence for a subsequent violation of OCGA § 16-13-30 (b), even if the State pursues a recidivist sentence under OCGA § 17-10-7 (c).22 Consequently, “[t]he 22 See Scott, 248 Ga. App. at 545-546 (2); see also Mann v. State, 273 Ga. 366, 369 (1) ( 541 SE2d 645 ) (2001) (holding that the trial court retains discretion to 12 judge’s failure to exercise discretion when sentencing [Waller] to not less than ten years nor more than [forty] years or life imprisonment u

1998See Gilbert v. State, 208 Ga. App. 258, 259-262 ( 430 SE2d 391 ) (1993).” Cody v. State, 222 Ga. App. 468, 471 (4) ( 474 SE2d 669 ).

1998See Gilbert v. State, 208 Ga. App. 258, 259-262 ( 430 SE2d 391 ) (1993).” Cody v. State, 222 Ga. App. 468, 471 (4) ( 474 SE2d 669 ).

1993In Edwards v. State, 260 Ga. 121, 122 (1) ( 390 SE2d 580 ) (1990), the Court interpreted its decision in State v. Hendrixson, 251 Ga. 853 ( 310 SE2d 526 ) (1984) as follows: “This Court has indicated that before the state can seek a life sentence under § 16-13-30 (d), the state must give notice before trial under § 17-10-2 (a) of the conviction the state plans to use in aggravation.” Accord Moss v. State, 206 Ga. App. 310 (5) ( 425 SE2d 386 ) (1992).

1993In Edwards v. State, 260 Ga. 121, 122 (1) ( 390 SE2d 580 ) (1990), the Court interpreted its decision in State v. Hendrixson, 251 Ga. 853 ( 310 SE2d 526 ) (1984) as follows: “This Court has indicated that before the state can seek a life sentence under § 16-13-30 (d), the state must give notice before trial under § 17-10-2 (a) of the conviction the state plans to use in aggravation.” Accord Moss v. State, 206 Ga. App. 310 (5) ( 425 SE2d 386 ) (1992).

1993In light of the facts of this case and the fact that a life sentence under OCGA § 16-13-30 (d) is mandatory, see Rucks v. State, 201 Ga. App. 142 ( 410 SE2d 206 ) (1991), we find no error in the procedure below. 3.

1993In light of the facts of this case and the fact that a life sentence under OCGA § 16-13-30 (d) is mandatory, see Rucks v. State, 201 Ga. App. 142 ( 410 SE2d 206 ) (1991), we find no error in the procedure below. 3.

2022As noted above, the trial court judge retains discretion to sentence a defendant to either ten to forty years in confinement or a life sentence for a subsequent violation of OCGA § 16-13-30 (b), even if the State pursues a recidivist sentence under OCGA § 17-10-7 (c).22 Consequently, “[t]he 22 See Scott, 248 Ga. App. at 545-546 (2); see also Mann v. State, 273 Ga. 366, 369 (1) ( 541 SE2d 645 ) (2001) (holding that the trial court retains discretion to 12 judge’s failure to exercise discretion when sentencing [Waller] to not less than ten years nor more than [forty] years or life imprisonment u

2006Specifically, Miller contends that because he was subject to a possible life sentence under OCGA § 16-13-30 (d) as a repeat drug offender (see Hailey v. State, 263 Ga. 210, 211 (2) ( 429 SE2d 917 ) (1993)), he was entitled to two hours for his closing argument under Uniform Superior Court Rule 13.1.

2006Specifically, Miller contends that because he was subject to a possible life sentence under OCGA § 16-13-30 (d) as a repeat drug offender (see Hailey v. State, 263 Ga. 210, 211 (2) ( 429 SE2d 917 ) (1993)), he was entitled to two hours for his closing argument under Uniform Superior Court Rule 13.1.

1998Howard's "`conviction for the more serious offense of trafficking in cocaine under OCGA § 16-13-31 was sufficient in conjunction with his previous conviction[s] for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute under OCGA § 16-13-30(b) to trigger the mandatory life sentence provisions of OCGA § 16-13-30(d). [Cits.]'" Brundage v. State, 231 Ga.App. 478, 480 (4), 499 S.E.2d 408 (1998).

1998Howard's "`conviction for the more serious offense of trafficking in cocaine under OCGA § 16-13-31 was sufficient in conjunction with his previous conviction[s] for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute under OCGA § 16-13-30(b) to trigger the mandatory life sentence provisions of OCGA § 16-13-30(d). [Cits.]'" Brundage v. State, 231 Ga.App. 478, 480 (4), 499 S.E.2d 408 (1998).

1998See Gilbert v. State, 208 Ga. App. 258, 259-262 ( 430 SE2d 391 ) (1993).” Cody v. State, 222 Ga. App. 468, 471 (4) ( 474 SE2d 669 ).

1998See Gilbert v. State, 208 Ga. App. 258, 259-262 ( 430 SE2d 391 ) (1993).” Cody v. State, 222 Ga. App. 468, 471 (4) ( 474 SE2d 669 ).

1995Scrutiny of the record in the case sub judice reveals no written pre-trial notice by the State that it intended to seek a life sentence as enhanced punishment on the ground that this would be defendant’s second or subsequent violation of OCGA § 16-13-30 (b). “[Statutes imposing recidivist or enhanced punishment must be read in conjunction with OCGA § 17-10-2.” Mays v. State, 262 Ga. 90, 91 (1) (b) ( 414 SE2d 481 ).

1995Scrutiny of the record in the case sub judice reveals no written pre-trial notice by the State that it intended to seek a life sentence as enhanced punishment on the ground that this would be defendant’s second or subsequent violation of OCGA § 16-13-30 (b). “[Statutes imposing recidivist or enhanced punishment must be read in conjunction with OCGA § 17-10-2.” Mays v. State, 262 Ga. 90, 91 (1) (b) ( 414 SE2d 481 ).

1995See Cain v. State, 262 Ga. 598 ( 422 SE2d 535 ) (1992).

1995See Cain v. State, 262 Ga. 598 ( 422 SE2d 535 ) (1992).

1993The appeal was docketed in this Court on October 30, 1992, and the Court heard oral arguments on January 19, 1993. [2] See also State v. Terry, 257 Ga. 473 ( 360 SE2d 588 ) (1987), in which we held that a defendant's prior conviction of a capital felony need not precede commission of a subsequent offense of murder in order for the state to seek the death penalty under OCGA § 17-10-30 (b) (1), which provides that the death penalty may be imposed when the "offense of murder ... [is] committed by a person with a prior record of conviction for a capital felony." [3] We also reiterate that, as a re

1993The appeal was docketed in this Court on October 30, 1992, and the Court heard oral arguments on January 19, 1993. [2] See also State v. Terry, 257 Ga. 473 ( 360 SE2d 588 ) (1987), in which we held that a defendant's prior conviction of a capital felony need not precede commission of a subsequent offense of murder in order for the state to seek the death penalty under OCGA § 17-10-30 (b) (1), which provides that the death penalty may be imposed when the "offense of murder ... [is] committed by a person with a prior record of conviction for a capital felony." [3] We also reiterate that, as a re

1993In Edwards v. State, 260 Ga. 121, 122 ( 390 SE2d 580 ), the Supreme Court noted that in Hendrixson, supra, it “indicated that before the state can seek a life sentence under § 16-13-30 (d), the state must give notice before trial under § 17-10-2 (a) of the conviction the state plans to use in aggravation.” (Emphasis supplied.) This language expresses the Supreme Court’s own reluctance to hold or to say that it has held that advance notice is required when the sentence is mandatory under § 16-13-30.

1993In Edwards v. State, 260 Ga. 121, 122 ( 390 SE2d 580 ), the Supreme Court noted that in Hendrixson, supra, it “indicated that before the state can seek a life sentence under § 16-13-30 (d), the state must give notice before trial under § 17-10-2 (a) of the conviction the state plans to use in aggravation.” (Emphasis supplied.) This language expresses the Supreme Court’s own reluctance to hold or to say that it has held that advance notice is required when the sentence is mandatory under § 16-13-30.

1993As we pointed out in Grant v. State, 258 Ga. 299, 300 ( 368 SE2d 737 ) (1988), citing Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S. 263, 284-285 (100 SC 1133, 63 LE2d 382) (1980), the purpose of a recidivist statute is to deter repeat offenders, and, at some point, to segregate those offenders from the rest of society for an extended period of time.

1993As we pointed out in Grant v. State, 258 Ga. 299, 300 ( 368 SE2d 737 ) (1988), citing Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U. S. 263, 284-285 (100 SC 1133, 63 LE2d 382) (1980), the purpose of a recidivist statute is to deter repeat offenders, and, at some point, to segregate those offenders from the rest of society for an extended period of time.