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24 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1986–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Magnus Homes, LLC v. DeRosagreen2 sentences2018Id. at 406 (3), 765 S.E.2d 472 . 14 See generally Division 2, infra. 15 Doles-Smith Enterp. , 337 Ga. App. at 575 , 789 S.E.2d 194 . 16 Id. at 575-576 , 789 S.E.2d 194 . 17 (Emphasis in original.) 18 Allen v. Santana , 303 Ga. App. 844 , 845, 695 S.E.2d 314 (2010) (punctuation and footnote omitted). 19 In its brief, Legacy refers to its motion for a directed verdict as a "request for involuntary dismissal," citing Magnus Homes v. DeRosa , 248 Ga. App. 31 (1), n. 2, 545 S.E.2d 166 (2001) ("In a bench trial, where there is no verdict by a jury, a motion for directed verdict is treated as a reque 2018Id. at 406 (3), 765 S.E.2d 472 . 14 See generally Division 2, infra. 15 Doles-Smith Enterp. , 337 Ga. App. at 575 , 789 S.E.2d 194 . 16 Id. at 575-576 , 789 S.E.2d 194 . 17 (Emphasis in original.) 18 Allen v. Santana , 303 Ga. App. 844 , 845, 695 S.E.2d 314 (2010) (punctuation and footnote omitted). 19 In its brief, Legacy refers to its motion for a directed verdict as a "request for involuntary dismissal," citing Magnus Homes v. DeRosa , 248 Ga. App. 31 (1), n. 2, 545 S.E.2d 166 (2001) ("In a bench trial, where there is no verdict by a jury, a motion for directed verdict is treated as a reque | 2 | 2 |
Smith v. GEORGIA KAOLIN CO., INCgreen2 sentences2013See Smith v. Ga. Kaolin Co., 269 Ga. 475, 476 (1) ( 498 SE2d 266 ) (1998) (“[T]he trial court involuntarily dismissed [the] complaint sua sponte. 2013See Smith v. Ga. Kaolin Co., 269 Ga. 475, 476 (1) ( 498 SE2d 266 ) (1998) (“[T]he trial court involuntarily dismissed [the] complaint sua sponte. | 2 | 2 |
Troup v. Chambersgreen2 sentences2012Troup, 280 Ga. App. at 393 (reversing grant of motion to dismiss third complaint when dismissal of federal suit for lack of jurisdiction over remaining state law claims was involuntary). 4 2. 2012Troup, 280 Ga. App. at 393 (reversing grant of motion to dismiss third complaint when dismissal of federal suit for lack of jurisdiction over remaining state law claims was involuntary). 2. | 2 | 2 |
Hamil v. Stanfordgreen2 sentences2010Hamil v. Stanford, 264 Ga. 801, 802 (1) ( 449 SE2d 118 ) (1994). 2010Hamil v. Stanford, 264 Ga. 801, 802 (1) ( 449 SE2d 118 ) (1994). | 2 | 2 |
CENTURY 21 MARY CARR & ASSOCIATES, INC. v. Jonesgreen2 sentences1998Century 21 Mary Carr &c. v. Jones, 204 Ga. App. 96, 97 ( 418 SE2d 435 ) (1992). 1998Century 21 Mary Carr &c. v. Jones, 204 Ga. App. 96, 97 ( 418 SE2d 435 ) (1992). | 2 | 2 |
Chamlee v. Department of Transportationgreen2 sentences1992“A motion for directed verdict in a non-jury trial is procedurally incorrect and the motion will be treated as one for involuntary dismissal under OCGA § 9-11-41 (b). [Cits.]” Chamlee v. DOT, 182 Ga. App. 120 (1) ( 354 SE2d 701 ) (1987). 1992“A motion for directed verdict in a non-jury trial is procedurally incorrect and the motion will be treated as one for involuntary dismissal under OCGA § 9-11-41 (b). [Cits.]” Chamlee v. DOT, 182 Ga. App. 120 (1) ( 354 SE2d 701 ) (1987). | 1 | 2 |
Meacham v. Franklin-Heard County Water Authoritygreen2 sentences2025See Meacham v. Franklin-Heard County Water Auth., 302 Ga. App. 69, 74 (1) ( 690 SE2d 186 ) (2009) (“A motion for a directed verdict in a non-jury case will be construed as one for involuntary dismissal under OCGA § 9-11-41 (b)[.]”) (citation omitted). 4 the Secretary had only a one-time, temporal duty to ensure EAC certification “prior to [the] purchase, lease, or acquisition” of the voting system and a similar one-time duty to certify that system as “safe and practicable for use” in advance of the system being used in elections. 2025See Meacham v. Franklin-Heard County Water Auth., 302 Ga. App. 69, 74 (1) ( 690 SE2d 186 ) (2009) (“A motion for a directed verdict in a non-jury case will be construed as one for involuntary dismissal under OCGA § 9-11-41 (b)[.]”) (citation omitted). 4 the Secretary had only a one-time, temporal duty to ensure EAC certification “prior to [the] purchase, lease, or acquisition” of the voting system and a similar one-time duty to certify that system as “safe and practicable for use” in advance of the system being used in elections. | 1 | 1 |
GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Allengreen2 sentences2025As a threshold matter, “[t]he writ of quo warranto may issue to inquire into the right of any person to any public office the duties of which he is in fact discharging[, but i]t may be granted only after the application by some person either claiming the office or interested therein.” OCGA § 9-6-60.7 Relevant to this case, and as we have noted, OCGA § 20-2-51 (c) (4) (A) provides that “[n]o person who has an immediate family member . . . serving as . . . system administrative staff in the local school system shall be eligible to serve as a member of such local board of education.” The statute 2025As a threshold matter, “[t]he writ of quo warranto may issue to inquire into the right of any person to any public office the duties of which he is in fact discharging[, but i]t may be granted only after the application by some person either claiming the office or interested therein.” OCGA § 9-6-60.7 Relevant to this case, and as we have noted, OCGA § 20-2-51 (c) (4) (A) provides that “[n]o person who has an immediate family member . . . serving as . . . system administrative staff in the local school system shall be eligible to serve as a member of such local board of education.” The statute | 1 | 1 |
Jones v. Board of Regents of the University Systemgreen2 sentences2023Sys. of Ga., 262 Ga. App. 75, 79 (3) ( 585 SE2d 138 ) (2003) (deeming issue not argued on appeal abandoned). 22 OCGA § 9-11-41 (b) provides that “[a]fter the plaintiff, in an action tried by the court without a jury, has completed the presentation of his evidence, the defendant, without waiving his right to offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief.”42 And here, the record shows that after Francis presented evidence at the final hearing on the question of damages, Alexan 2023Sys. of Ga., 262 Ga. App. 75, 79 (3) ( 585 SE2d 138 ) (2003) (deeming issue not argued on appeal abandoned). 22 OCGA § 9-11-41 (b) provides that “[a]fter the plaintiff, in an action tried by the court without a jury, has completed the presentation of his evidence, the defendant, without waiving his right to offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief.”42 And here, the record shows that after Francis presented evidence at the final hearing on the question of damages, Alexan | 1 | 1 |
Atlantic Title Insurance v. Aegis Funding Corp.green2 sentences2011Co. v. Aegis Funding Corp., 287 Ga. App. 392, 396 (1) ( 651 SE2d 507 ) (2007) (Rather than paying insured’s claims, insurer sued the insured, “relying on fanciful allegations of factual conflict to delay or avoid legitimate claims payment.”) (punctuation and footnote omitted). 19 Although Chicago Title moved for directed verdict, in a nonjury case such motions are treated as motions for an involuntary dismissal under OCGA § 9-11-41 (b). 2011Co. v. Aegis Funding Corp., 287 Ga. App. 392, 396 (1) ( 651 SE2d 507 ) (2007) (Rather than paying insured’s claims, insurer sued the insured, “relying on fanciful allegations of factual conflict to delay or avoid legitimate claims payment.”) (punctuation and footnote omitted). 19 Although Chicago Title moved for directed verdict, in a nonjury case such motions are treated as motions for an involuntary dismissal under OCGA § 9-11-41 (b). | 1 | 1 |
Chambers v. Greengreen2 sentences2009See also Chambers v. Green, 245 Ga. App. 814, 816 ( 539 SE2d 181 ) (2000) (an order granting a motion for involuntary dismissal under OCGA § 9-11-41 (b) “will be reversed only when the evidence demands a contrary finding”) (footnote omitted). 2. 2009See also Chambers v. Green, 245 Ga. App. 814, 816 ( 539 SE2d 181 ) (2000) (an order granting a motion for involuntary dismissal under OCGA § 9-11-41 (b) “will be reversed only when the evidence demands a contrary finding”) (footnote omitted). 2. | 1 | 1 |
Ryland Group v. Daleygreen2 sentences2001Pichulik v. Air Conditioning &c., 123 Ga. App. 195, 196 (2) ( 180 SE2d 286 ) (1971). 3 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Williams Tile &c. v. RA-LIN & Assoc., 206 Ga. App. 750, 751-752 (4) ( 426 SE2d 598 ) (1992). 4 See Ryland Group v. Daley, 245 Ga. App. 496, 502 (7), fn. 18 and accompanying text ( 537 SE2d 732 ) (2000); Ray v. Strawsma, 183 Ga. App. 622, 623-624 (1) ( 359 SE2d 376 ) (1987). 2001Pichulik v. Air Conditioning &c., 123 Ga. App. 195, 196 (2) ( 180 SE2d 286 ) (1971). 3 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Williams Tile &c. v. RA-LIN & Assoc., 206 Ga. App. 750, 751-752 (4) ( 426 SE2d 598 ) (1992). 4 See Ryland Group v. Daley, 245 Ga. App. 496, 502 (7), fn. 18 and accompanying text ( 537 SE2d 732 ) (2000); Ray v. Strawsma, 183 Ga. App. 622, 623-624 (1) ( 359 SE2d 376 ) (1987). | 1 | 1 |
Ray v. Strawsmagreen2 sentences2001Pichulik v. Air Conditioning &c., 123 Ga. App. 195, 196 (2) ( 180 SE2d 286 ) (1971). 3 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Williams Tile &c. v. RA-LIN & Assoc., 206 Ga. App. 750, 751-752 (4) ( 426 SE2d 598 ) (1992). 4 See Ryland Group v. Daley, 245 Ga. App. 496, 502 (7), fn. 18 and accompanying text ( 537 SE2d 732 ) (2000); Ray v. Strawsma, 183 Ga. App. 622, 623-624 (1) ( 359 SE2d 376 ) (1987). 2001Pichulik v. Air Conditioning &c., 123 Ga. App. 195, 196 (2) ( 180 SE2d 286 ) (1971). 3 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Williams Tile &c. v. RA-LIN & Assoc., 206 Ga. App. 750, 751-752 (4) ( 426 SE2d 598 ) (1992). 4 See Ryland Group v. Daley, 245 Ga. App. 496, 502 (7), fn. 18 and accompanying text ( 537 SE2d 732 ) (2000); Ray v. Strawsma, 183 Ga. App. 622, 623-624 (1) ( 359 SE2d 376 ) (1987). | 1 | 1 |
Pichulik v. Air Conditioning & Heating Service Co.green2 sentences2001Pichulik v. Air Conditioning &c., 123 Ga. App. 195, 196 (2) ( 180 SE2d 286 ) (1971). 3 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Williams Tile &c. v. RA-LIN & Assoc., 206 Ga. App. 750, 751-752 (4) ( 426 SE2d 598 ) (1992). 4 See Ryland Group v. Daley, 245 Ga. App. 496, 502 (7), fn. 18 and accompanying text ( 537 SE2d 732 ) (2000); Ray v. Strawsma, 183 Ga. App. 622, 623-624 (1) ( 359 SE2d 376 ) (1987). 2001Pichulik v. Air Conditioning &c., 123 Ga. App. 195, 196 (2) ( 180 SE2d 286 ) (1971). 3 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Williams Tile &c. v. RA-LIN & Assoc., 206 Ga. App. 750, 751-752 (4) ( 426 SE2d 598 ) (1992). 4 See Ryland Group v. Daley, 245 Ga. App. 496, 502 (7), fn. 18 and accompanying text ( 537 SE2d 732 ) (2000); Ray v. Strawsma, 183 Ga. App. 622, 623-624 (1) ( 359 SE2d 376 ) (1987). | 1 | 1 |
Williams Tile & Marble Co. v. Ra-Lin & Associates, Inc.green2 sentences2001Pichulik v. Air Conditioning &c., 123 Ga. App. 195, 196 (2) ( 180 SE2d 286 ) (1971). 3 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Williams Tile &c. v. RA-LIN & Assoc., 206 Ga. App. 750, 751-752 (4) ( 426 SE2d 598 ) (1992). 4 See Ryland Group v. Daley, 245 Ga. App. 496, 502 (7), fn. 18 and accompanying text ( 537 SE2d 732 ) (2000); Ray v. Strawsma, 183 Ga. App. 622, 623-624 (1) ( 359 SE2d 376 ) (1987). 2001Pichulik v. Air Conditioning &c., 123 Ga. App. 195, 196 (2) ( 180 SE2d 286 ) (1971). 3 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Williams Tile &c. v. RA-LIN & Assoc., 206 Ga. App. 750, 751-752 (4) ( 426 SE2d 598 ) (1992). 4 See Ryland Group v. Daley, 245 Ga. App. 496, 502 (7), fn. 18 and accompanying text ( 537 SE2d 732 ) (2000); Ray v. Strawsma, 183 Ga. App. 622, 623-624 (1) ( 359 SE2d 376 ) (1987). | 1 | 1 |
O'NEAL v. Wilkesgreen2 sentences1995In a virtual adoption case, a contract for adoption must be proven and “[t]he first essential of a contract for adoption is that it be made between persons competent to contract for the disposition of the child. [Cits.]” (Emphasis supplied.) O’Neal v. Wilkes, supra at 851 (1). 1995In a virtual adoption case, a contract for adoption must be proven and "[t]he first essential of a contract for adoption is that it be made between persons competent to contract for the disposition of the child. [Cits.]" (Emphasis supplied.) O'Neal v. Wilkes, supra at 851 (1). | 1 | 1 |
Kennery v. Mostellergreen2 sentences1986Kennery v. Mosteller, 133 Ga. App. 879, 880 ( 212 SE2d 447 ) (1975). 1986Kennery v. Mosteller, 133 Ga. App. 879, 880 ( 212 SE2d 447 ) (1975). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hertz Corp. v. McCray
green
2 sentences2002Thus, it is procedurally incorrect to move for a directed verdict; and such motion, as well as the grant thereof, will be construed as one for involuntary dismissal under OCGA § 9-11-41 (b). [Cit.]” Hertz Corp. v. McCray, 198 Ga. App. 484 (1) ( 402 SE2d 298 ) (1991). 2002Thus, it is procedurally incorrect to move for a directed verdict; and such motion, as well as the grant thereof, will be construed as one for involuntary dismissal under OCGA § 9-11-41 (b). [Cit.]” Hertz Corp. v. McCray, 198 Ga. App. 484 (1) ( 402 SE2d 298 ) (1991). | 3 | 1994–2002 |
Legacy Academy, Inc. v. JLK, Inc.
green
1 sentence2018Id. at 406 (3), 765 S.E.2d 472 . 14 See generally Division 2, infra. 15 Doles-Smith Enterp. , 337 Ga. App. at 575 , 789 S.E.2d 194 . 16 Id. at 575-576 , 789 S.E.2d 194 . 17 (Emphasis in original.) 18 Allen v. Santana , 303 Ga. App. 844 , 845, 695 S.E.2d 314 (2010) (punctuation and footnote omitted). 19 In its brief, Legacy refers to its motion for a directed verdict as a "request for involuntary dismissal," citing Magnus Homes v. DeRosa , 248 Ga. App. 31 (1), n. 2, 545 S.E.2d 166 (2001) ("In a bench trial, where there is no verdict by a jury, a motion for directed verdict is treated as a reque | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Allen v. Santana
green
2 sentences2018Id. at 406 (3), 765 S.E.2d 472 . 14 See generally Division 2, infra. 15 Doles-Smith Enterp. , 337 Ga. App. at 575 , 789 S.E.2d 194 . 16 Id. at 575-576 , 789 S.E.2d 194 . 17 (Emphasis in original.) 18 Allen v. Santana , 303 Ga. App. 844 , 845, 695 S.E.2d 314 (2010) (punctuation and footnote omitted). 19 In its brief, Legacy refers to its motion for a directed verdict as a "request for involuntary dismissal," citing Magnus Homes v. DeRosa , 248 Ga. App. 31 (1), n. 2, 545 S.E.2d 166 (2001) ("In a bench trial, where there is no verdict by a jury, a motion for directed verdict is treated as a reque 2018Id. at 406 (3), 765 S.E.2d 472 . 14 See generally Division 2, infra. 15 Doles-Smith Enterp. , 337 Ga. App. at 575 , 789 S.E.2d 194 . 16 Id. at 575-576 , 789 S.E.2d 194 . 17 (Emphasis in original.) 18 Allen v. Santana , 303 Ga. App. 844 , 845, 695 S.E.2d 314 (2010) (punctuation and footnote omitted). 19 In its brief, Legacy refers to its motion for a directed verdict as a "request for involuntary dismissal," citing Magnus Homes v. DeRosa , 248 Ga. App. 31 (1), n. 2, 545 S.E.2d 166 (2001) ("In a bench trial, where there is no verdict by a jury, a motion for directed verdict is treated as a reque | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Legacy Academy, Inc. v. Doles-Smith Enterprises, Inc.
green
2 sentences2018Id. at 406 (3), 765 S.E.2d 472 . 14 See generally Division 2, infra. 15 Doles-Smith Enterp. , 337 Ga. App. at 575 , 789 S.E.2d 194 . 16 Id. at 575-576 , 789 S.E.2d 194 . 17 (Emphasis in original.) 18 Allen v. Santana , 303 Ga. App. 844 , 845, 695 S.E.2d 314 (2010) (punctuation and footnote omitted). 19 In its brief, Legacy refers to its motion for a directed verdict as a "request for involuntary dismissal," citing Magnus Homes v. DeRosa , 248 Ga. App. 31 (1), n. 2, 545 S.E.2d 166 (2001) ("In a bench trial, where there is no verdict by a jury, a motion for directed verdict is treated as a reque 2018Id. at 406 (3), 765 S.E.2d 472 . 14 See generally Division 2, infra. 15 Doles-Smith Enterp. , 337 Ga. App. at 575 , 789 S.E.2d 194 . 16 Id. at 575-576 , 789 S.E.2d 194 . 17 (Emphasis in original.) 18 Allen v. Santana , 303 Ga. App. 844 , 845, 695 S.E.2d 314 (2010) (punctuation and footnote omitted). 19 In its brief, Legacy refers to its motion for a directed verdict as a "request for involuntary dismissal," citing Magnus Homes v. DeRosa , 248 Ga. App. 31 (1), n. 2, 545 S.E.2d 166 (2001) ("In a bench trial, where there is no verdict by a jury, a motion for directed verdict is treated as a reque | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State of Georgia v. Hamm
neutral
2 sentences1991State of Ga. v. Hamm, 193 Ga. App. 184 ( 387 SE2d 344 ). “ ‘Under Sec. 41 (b), a trial judge in a non-jury case expressly has the power to adjudicate the case on the merits at the conclusion of plaintiff’s case. 1991State of Ga. v. Hamm, 193 Ga. App. 184 ( 387 SE2d 344 ). “ ‘Under Sec. 41 (b), a trial judge in a non-jury case expressly has the power to adjudicate the case on the merits at the conclusion of plaintiff’s case. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.