section 537.600.1 waiver of sovereign immunity in Missouri

2016Patterson v. Meramec Valley R-III School Dist., 864 S.W.2d 14, 15 (Mo.App. 1993). • Lackey’s waiver theory is that District’s “property was in dangerous condition at the time of the injury [and] that the injury directly resulted from the dangerous condition,” i.e., the “dangerous condition” exception to sovereign immunity under § 537.600.1(2). 1 Our review is confined to the Rule 74.04(c) summary judgment record, Holzhausen v. Bi-State Dev.

2016Patterson v. Meramec Valley R-III School Dist., 864 S.W.2d 14, 15 (Mo. App.1993). • Lackey’s waiver theory is that District’s “property was in dangerous condition at the time of the injury [and] that the injury-directly resulted from the dangerous condition,” i.e., the “dangerous condition” exception to sovereign immunity under § 537.600.1(2). • Lackey must plead and prove such waiver as part of his case in chief.

2019See Southers, 263 S.W.3d at 609 (concluding the same for actions to recover damages pursuant to the motor vehicle sovereign immunity waiver found in section 537.600.1(1)).

2017Section 537.600.1 waives sovereign immunity “for injuries (1) ‘directly resulting from the negligent acts or omissions by public employees arising out of the operation of motor vehicles or motorized vehicles in the course of their employment’ and (2) resulting from- the dangerous condition of public property.” Southers, 263 S.W.3d at 609 (quoting section 537.600.1).

2009Hensley v. Jackson County, 227 S.W.3d 491, 496 (Mo. banc 2007) (citation omitted).

2008Louis, 823 S.W.2d 22, 24-25 (Mo.App.1991) (suggesting that section 537.600 constitutes a separate waiver of immunity even in those situations in which the public duty rule might otherwise apply to deny a civil action for damages for negligence arising out of duties to the general public), overruled on unrelated grounds by Hensley v. Jackson County, 227 S.W.3d 491 (Mo. banc 2007).

2025These exceptions are known as the "motor vehicle exception" and the "dangerous condition exception." Kraus v. Hy-Vee, Inc., 147 S.W.3d 907, 914 (Mo. App. W.D. 2004).

2025The Byrom II Court made clear that loss of use resulting from odor and other impacts of a nuisance is not damages, rather it is a part of analyzing “what the property is fairly worth for the time during which it is held[.]” Byrom II, 16 S.W.3d at 577 (quoting City of Cape Girardeau v. Hunze, 284 S.W. 471, 480 (Mo. 1926)).

2021While these statutes clearly 4 In Findley v. City of Kansas City, 782 S.W.2d 393, 394-98 (Mo. banc 1990), the Missouri Supreme Court held Section 82.210 was constitutional and “statutorily cloaks municipalities in a limited immunity for defects in certain publicly maintained property.” However, in Jones the Court emphasized that notice statutes were in derogation of the common law because the city’s liability was premised in a proprietary and not sovereign capacity which requires narrow construction in favor of Plaintiff and against the city.

2021As we have already explained, officers and employees of public entities do not enjoy the protection of section 537.600.1 sovereign immunity; of section 537.610.2's "cap" on recovery for claims as to which sovereign immunity has been waived; or of section 537.610.3's prohibition on punitive damages. "[T]he limitation on liability where sovereign immunity is waived applies only to the public entity and not to an agent of the entity." Cottey, 24 S.W.3d at 129 (citing Trimble, 745 S.W.2d at 675 ).

2021Cravens, 234 S.W.3d at 449 (holding that sovereign immunity "bars holding the government or its political subdivisions liable for the torts of its officers or agents unless such immunity is expressly waived"); Cottey, 24 S.W.3d at 129 (holding that "the limitation on liability where sovereign immunity is waived applies only to the public entity and not to an agent of the entity" (citing Trimble, 745 S.W.2d at 675 )).

2021Cravens, 234 S.W.3d at 449 (holding that sovereign immunity "bars holding the government or its political subdivisions liable for the torts of its officers or agents unless such immunity is expressly waived"); Cottey, 24 S.W.3d at 129 (holding that "the limitation on liability where sovereign immunity is waived applies only to the public entity and not to an agent of the entity" (citing Trimble, 745 S.W.2d at 675 )).

2017See Richardson, 863 S.W.2d at 880 .

2016Agency, 414 S.W.3d 488, 493-94 (Mo.App. 2013), viewed favorably to Lackey and giving him the benefit of all reasonable inferences.

2016Maune v. City of Rolla, 203 S.W.3d 802, 804 (Mo.App.2006). • District was entitled to summary judgment if Lackey, having had adequate time for discovery, could not show that he could get to the jury on this element of his claim.

2008Louis, 823 S.W.2d 22, 24-25 (Mo.App.1991) (suggesting that section 537.600 constitutes a separate waiver of immunity even in those situations in which the public duty rule might otherwise apply to deny a civil action for damages for negligence arising out of duties to the general public), overruled on unrelated grounds by Hensley v. Jackson County, 227 S.W.3d 491 (Mo. banc 2007).

2008Cases discussing the phrase in Section 537.600.1(2) that sovereign immunity is waived for “injuries caused by the condition of a public entity’s property” examine whether the public entity had “ownership of a property interest which allows a public entity to control the property.” Dorlon v. City of Springfield, 843 S.W.2d 934, 938 (Mo.App.

2008See Oberkramer v. City of Ellisville, 650 S.W.2d 286, 296-97 (Mo.App.1983) (finding acts or omissions of supervisory personnel not present in vehicle was not operation of the vehicle); Plummer v. Dace, 818 S.W.2d 317, 319 (Mo.App.1991) (finding operation of motor vehicle does not include training bus drivers or designating bus stops). 26 .

2008See Oberkramer v. City of Ellisville, 650 S.W.2d 286, 296-97 (Mo.App.1983) (finding acts or omissions of supervisory personnel not present in vehicle was not operation of the vehicle); Plummer v. Dace, 818 S.W.2d 317, 319 (Mo.App.1991) (finding operation of motor vehicle does not include training bus drivers or designating bus stops). 26 .

2008S.D.1992)(stating that the reference to a public entity’s property for purposes of sovereign immunity “clearly refers to ownership of a property interest which allows a public entity to control the property.”); see also Terry v. McIntosh, 941 S.W.2d 595, 598 (Mo.App.

2008The legislature has resolved this issue by waiving sovereign immunity for injuries arising out of the negligent operation of motor vehicles or for dangerous conditions of public property- In deference to the statutory waiver of sovereign immunity provided by section 537.600.1, this Court is no longer willing to apply the judicially-created protections of the public duty doctrine in a way that would insulate government entities from tort liability where the legislature has expressly abolished such immunity. 12 See Warren v. State, 939 S.W.2d 950, 957-58 (Mo.App.1997) (finding that the public du