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228 Texas opinions name it 3 courts 1942–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Texas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Jackson v. Virginiared2 sentences2002When determining whether the evidence is legally sufficient to sustain a conviction we employ the standard of Jackson v. Virginia and ask "whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). 2001Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. at 318-19 , 99 S.Ct. at 2788-2789 . | 3 | 6 |
Garza v. Alviargreen2 sentences1996See Garza v. Alviar, 395 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex.1965); Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex.1986) (op. on reh’g). 1996See Garza v. Alviar, 395 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex.1965); Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex.1986) (op. on reh'g). | 3 | 4 |
Cohn v. Stategreen2 sentences2009Court of Appeals On appeal, the appellant’s first point of error was that “the evidence constituted improper bolstering of the complainant’s testimony.” He argued (Brief at 17-18, emphasis added): Bolstering occurs “when one item of evidence is improperly used by a party to add credence or weight to some earlier unimpeached piece of evidence offered by the same party.” Cohn v. State, 849 S.W.2d 817, 819 (Tex.Crim.App.1993) (quoting Sledge v. State, 686 S.W.2d 127, 129 (Tex.Crim.App.1984)). 2009Court of Appeals On appeal, the appellant’s first point of error was that “the evidence constituted improper bolstering of the complainant’s testimony.” He argued (Brief at 17-18, emphasis added): Bolstering occurs “when one item of evidence is improperly used by a party to add credence or weight to some earlier unimpeached piece of evidence offered by the same party.” Cohn v. State, 849 S.W.2d 817, 819 (Tex. Crim. | 3 | 3 |
Sledge v. Stategreen2 sentences2009Court of Appeals On appeal, the appellant’s first point of error was that “the evidence constituted improper bolstering of the complainant’s testimony.” He argued (Brief at 17-18, emphasis added): Bolstering occurs “when one item of evidence is improperly used by a party to add credence or weight to some earlier unimpeached piece of evidence offered by the same party.” Cohn v. State, 849 S.W.2d 817, 819 (Tex.Crim.App.1993) (quoting Sledge v. State, 686 S.W.2d 127, 129 (Tex.Crim.App.1984)). 2009App. 1993) (quoting Sledge v. State, 686 S.W.2d 127, 129 (Tex. Crim. | 3 | 3 |
In the Interest of S.A.V.green2 sentences2009See S.A.V. , 837 S.W.2d at 85 . 2002See S.A.V., 837 S.W.2d at 85 . | 3 | 3 |
State v. Cullengreen2 sentences2007We abated the appeal and instructed the court to make and file findings of fact and conclusions of law consistent with the holding of the court of criminal appeals in State v. Cullen, 195 S.W.3d 696, 699 (Tex.Crim. 2007We abated the appeal and instructed the court to make and file findings of fact and conclusions of law consistent with the holding of the court of criminal appeals in State v. Cullen, 195 S.W.3d 696, 699 (Tex.Crim.App.2006). | 3 | 3 |
Pool v. Ford Motor Co.green2 sentences1996See Garza v. Alviar, 395 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex.1965); Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex.1986) (op. on reh’g). 1996See Garza v. Alviar, 395 S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex.1965); Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex.1986) (op. on reh'g). | 3 | 3 |
Webber v. Stategreen2 sentences2009See Escobar v. State, 28 S.W.3d 767, 774 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2000, pet. ref’d); Johnson v. State, 6 S.W.3d 709, 711 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. ref’d); Brewer 12 v. State, 852 S.W.2d 643, 647 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1993, pet. ref’d); Webber v. State, 757 S.W.2d 51, 53-55 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, pet. ref’d).3 JURY CHARGE In his second point of error, appellant urges that the “trial court erred in failing to properly instruct the jury regarding the State’s requirement to prove appellant criminally responsible for the aggravating element and was harmful to appellant.” 2009See Escobar v. State , 28 S.W.3d 767, 774 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 2000, pet. ref'd); Johnson v. State , 6 S.W.3d 709, 711 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. ref'd); Brewer v. State , 852 S.W.2d 643, 647 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1993, pet. ref'd); Webber v. State , 757 S.W.2d 51, 53-55 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, pet. ref'd). (3) JURY CHARGE In his second point of error, appellant urges that the "trial court erred in failing to properly instruct the jury regarding the State's requirement to prove appellant criminally responsible for the aggravating element and was harmful to app | 2 | 2 |
Brewer v. Stategreen2 sentences2009See Escobar v. State, 28 S.W.3d 767, 774 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2000, pet. ref’d); Johnson v. State, 6 S.W.3d 709, 711 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. ref’d); Brewer 12 v. State, 852 S.W.2d 643, 647 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1993, pet. ref’d); Webber v. State, 757 S.W.2d 51, 53-55 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, pet. ref’d).3 JURY CHARGE In his second point of error, appellant urges that the “trial court erred in failing to properly instruct the jury regarding the State’s requirement to prove appellant criminally responsible for the aggravating element and was harmful to appellant.” 2009See Escobar v. State , 28 S.W.3d 767, 774 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 2000, pet. ref'd); Johnson v. State , 6 S.W.3d 709, 711 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. ref'd); Brewer v. State , 852 S.W.2d 643, 647 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1993, pet. ref'd); Webber v. State , 757 S.W.2d 51, 53-55 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, pet. ref'd). (3) JURY CHARGE In his second point of error, appellant urges that the "trial court erred in failing to properly instruct the jury regarding the State's requirement to prove appellant criminally responsible for the aggravating element and was harmful to app | 2 | 2 |
Escobar v. Stategreen2 sentences2009See Escobar v. State, 28 S.W.3d 767, 774 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2000, pet. ref’d); Johnson v. State, 6 S.W.3d 709, 711 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. ref’d); Brewer 12 v. State, 852 S.W.2d 643, 647 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1993, pet. ref’d); Webber v. State, 757 S.W.2d 51, 53-55 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, pet. ref’d).3 JURY CHARGE In his second point of error, appellant urges that the “trial court erred in failing to properly instruct the jury regarding the State’s requirement to prove appellant criminally responsible for the aggravating element and was harmful to appellant.” 2009See Escobar v. State , 28 S.W.3d 767, 774 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 2000, pet. ref'd); Johnson v. State , 6 S.W.3d 709, 711 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. ref'd); Brewer v. State , 852 S.W.2d 643, 647 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1993, pet. ref'd); Webber v. State , 757 S.W.2d 51, 53-55 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, pet. ref'd). (3) JURY CHARGE In his second point of error, appellant urges that the "trial court erred in failing to properly instruct the jury regarding the State's requirement to prove appellant criminally responsible for the aggravating element and was harmful to app | 2 | 2 |
Johnson v. Stategreen2 sentences2009See Escobar v. State, 28 S.W.3d 767, 774 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2000, pet. ref’d); Johnson v. State, 6 S.W.3d 709, 711 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. ref’d); Brewer 12 v. State, 852 S.W.2d 643, 647 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1993, pet. ref’d); Webber v. State, 757 S.W.2d 51, 53-55 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, pet. ref’d).3 JURY CHARGE In his second point of error, appellant urges that the “trial court erred in failing to properly instruct the jury regarding the State’s requirement to prove appellant criminally responsible for the aggravating element and was harmful to appellant.” 2009See Escobar v. State , 28 S.W.3d 767, 774 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 2000, pet. ref'd); Johnson v. State , 6 S.W.3d 709, 711 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, pet. ref'd); Brewer v. State , 852 S.W.2d 643, 647 (Tex. App.--Dallas 1993, pet. ref'd); Webber v. State , 757 S.W.2d 51, 53-55 (Tex. App.--Houston [14th Dist.] 1988, pet. ref'd). (3) JURY CHARGE In his second point of error, appellant urges that the "trial court erred in failing to properly instruct the jury regarding the State's requirement to prove appellant criminally responsible for the aggravating element and was harmful to app | 2 | 2 |
Finley v. Maygreen2 sentences2007Failure to file answer As noted, the Browns filed the underlying suit on May 27, 2003 , and, on July 11, the BNE defendants filed a motion to transfer venue and motion to declare the Browns vexatious 3 The BNE defendants’ motion to transfer venue was not included in the original clerk’s record. 2007Failure to file answer As noted, the Browns filed the underlying suit on May 27, 2003 , and, on July 11, the BNE defendants filed a motion to transfer venue and motion to declare the Browns vexatious litigants. | 2 | 2 |
Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Nueces Countygreen2 sentences2006“The mootness doctrine limits courts to deciding cases in which an actual controversy exists.” F.D.I.C. v. Nueces County , 886 S.W.2d 766, 767 (Tex. 1994) (citing Camarena v. Tex. Employment Comm’n , 754 S.W.2d 149, 151 (Tex. 1988)). 2006“The mootness doctrine limits courts to deciding cases in which an actual controversy exists.” F.D.I.C. v. Nueces County, 886 S.W.2d 766, 767 (Tex.1994) (citing Camarena v. Tex. Employment Comm’n, 754 S.W.2d 149, 151 (Tex.1988)). | 2 | 2 |
Camarena v. Texas Employment Commissiongreen2 sentences2006“The mootness doctrine limits courts to deciding cases in which an actual controversy exists.” F.D.I.C. v. Nueces County , 886 S.W.2d 766, 767 (Tex. 1994) (citing Camarena v. Tex. Employment Comm’n , 754 S.W.2d 149, 151 (Tex. 1988)). 2006“The mootness doctrine limits courts to deciding cases in which an actual controversy exists.” F.D.I.C. v. Nueces County, 886 S.W.2d 766, 767 (Tex.1994) (citing Camarena v. Tex. Employment Comm’n, 754 S.W.2d 149, 151 (Tex.1988)). | 2 | 2 |
Sharp v. Stategreen2 sentences2006See Sharp, 707 S.W.2d at 614 . any circumstances. 9 No one advances the thought that “T.W.” was an attempt to write the word “two.” 14 The trial court may accept or reject any of the evidence presented, and may resolve, as the trier of fact, all conflicts in the evidence. 2006See Sharp , 707 S.W.2d at 614 . | 2 | 2 |
Amason v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co.green2 sentences2003"The Texas land condemnation scheme is a two-part procedure involving first, an administrative proceeding, and then if necessary, a judicial proceeding." Amason v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 682 S.W.2d 240, 241 (Tex. 1984). 2003“The Texas land condemnation scheme is a two-part procedure involving first, an administrative proceeding, and then if necessary, a judicial proceeding.” Amason v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 682 S.W.2d 240, 241 (Tex.1984). | 2 | 2 |
Mata v. Stategreen2 sentences2002ARetrograde extrapolation is the computation back in time of the blood alcohol level that estimates the blood alcohol level at the time of driving on a test from some later time.@ Mata v. State, 46 S.W.3d 902, 908-09 (Tex. Crim. 2002"Retrograde extrapolation is the computation back in time of the blood alcohol level that estimates the blood alcohol level at the time of driving on a test from some later time." Mata v. State , 46 S.W.3d 902, 908-09 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 2 |
Hernandez v. Stategreen2 sentences2001Ineffective Assistance of Counsel In his second point of error, appellant claims he "received ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal from counsel's failure to object to the trial court's setting of an untimely motion for a new trial hearing." The standard of review of the effectiveness of counsel, either retained or appointed, is the two-pronged test of Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668 , adopted in Texas by Hernandez v. State , 726 S.W.2d 53, 57 (Tex. Crim. 2001Ineffective Assistance of Counsel In his second point of error, appellant claims he “received ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal from counsel’s failure to object to the trial court’s setting of an untimely motion for a new trial hearing.” 7 The standard of review of the effectiveness of counsel, either retained or appointed, is the two-pronged test of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , adopted in Texas by Hernandez v. State, 726 S.W.2d 53, 57 (Tex. Crim. | 2 | 2 |
| Magill v. Magillgreen | 2 | 2 |
| Worthey v. Stategreen | 2 | 2 |
| Terry v. Ohiogreen | 2 | 2 |
| Gooch v. American Sling Co., Inc.green | 2 | 2 |
| Croucher v. Crouchergreen | 2 | 2 |
| Pizzitola v. Pizzitolagreen | 2 | 2 |
| Marroquin v. Stategreen | 2 | 2 |
Batson v. Kentuckygreen2 sentences1996In his argument on the first point of error, Reese also alleges that the trial court’s action violated the principles enunciated in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), and its progeny in Texas. 1996In his argument on the first point of error, Reese also alleges that the trial court’s action violated the principles enunciated in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), and its progeny in Texas. | 1 | 5 |
Strickland v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2001Ineffective Assistance of Counsel In his second point of error, appellant claims he "received ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal from counsel's failure to object to the trial court's setting of an untimely motion for a new trial hearing." The standard of review of the effectiveness of counsel, either retained or appointed, is the two-pronged test of Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668 , adopted in Texas by Hernandez v. State , 726 S.W.2d 53, 57 (Tex. Crim. 2001Ineffective Assistance of Counsel In his second point of error, appellant claims he “received ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal from counsel’s failure to object to the trial court’s setting of an untimely motion for a new trial hearing.” 7 The standard of review of the effectiveness of counsel, either retained or appointed, is the two-pronged test of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , adopted in Texas by Hernandez v. State, 726 S.W.2d 53, 57 (Tex. Crim. | 1 | 4 |
In Re King's Estategreen2 sentences1982We need not pass upon the factually insufficient points 5 under In re Kings Estate, 150 Tex. 662 , 244 S.W.2d 660 (1951) or the points challenging the instructions and definitions given to the jury, 6 for our disposition of the beneficiaries’ first point of error already requires a remand for new trial. 1982We need not pass upon the factually insufficient points 5 under In re Kings Estate, 150 Tex. 662 , 244 S.W.2d 660 (1951) or the points challenging the instructions and definitions given to the jury, 6 for our disposition of the beneficiaries’ first point of error already requires a remand for new trial. | 1 | 4 |
City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Authoritygreen2 sentences1986City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Authority, 589 S.W.2d 671, 678 (Tex.1979); TEX.R.CIV.P. 166-A. In so holding we overrule the first point of error: that the trial court erred in striking the response as untimely filed and in not considering the late-filed pleadings. 1980Sugar Creek Homes Association v. Berry, supra; City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Authority, supra. Finding sufficient evidence to support the summary judgment and no evidence raising a fact issue as to any of the proof offered, we overrule the appellants’ first point of error. | 1 | 3 |
Stoner v. Thompsongreen2 sentences2016A default judgment may be erroneous "if (1) the petition ... does not attempt to state a cause of action within the jurisdiction of the court, or (2) the petition .,. does not give fair notice to the defendant of the claim asserted, or (3) the petition affirmatively discloses the invalidity of such claim.” Stoner v. Thompson, 578 S.W.2d 679, 684-85 (Tex.1979); see McLeod v. Gyr, 439 S.W.3d 639, 651 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2014, pet. denied). 5 . 1983Stoner v. Thompson, 578 S.W.2d 679 (Tex.1979); Tex. R.Civ.P. 90. | 1 | 2 |
| Watson v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Leongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Torres v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Curry v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Arizona v. Evansgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bruce B. McLeod, III v. Alfred Gyrgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Allen Tercerogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Davis v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gold v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Munozgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Texas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences1994NOTES [1] Since we held, in response to the first point of error, that Raffaelli's detention was lawful, we need not address the illegal detention argument under this point of error. [2] Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). 1994NOTES [1] Since we held, in response to the first point of error, that Raffaelli's detention was lawful, we need not address the illegal detention argument under this point of error. [2] Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). | 3 | 1993–2010 |
Keeton v. State
green
2 sentences2019We overrule the first point of error. 5 5 In his brief, Adams directs us to Keeton v. State, 749 S.W.2d 861 (Tex. Crim. 1989After granting petition for discretionary review, the Court of Criminal Appeals remanded the appeal to this court for reconsideration of the first point of error in light of Henry v. State, 729 S.W.2d 732 (Tex.Crim.App.1987); Keeton v. State, 724 S.W.2d 58 (Tex.Crim.App.1987) and Keeton v. State, 749 S.W.2d 861 (Tex.Crim.App.1988) (opinion after remand). | 2 | 1989–2019 |
Ruffin v. State
green
2 sentences2002Ruffin v. State , 3 S.W.3d at 145 . 2002Ruffin v. State, 3 S.W.3d at 145 . | 2 | 2002–2002 |
Ochoa v. State
green
2 sentences2001Murray, 24 S.W.3d at 889 (citing Ochoa, 982 S.W.2d at 908 ).12 The first point of error is overruled. 12 We believe that the same result would be reached under the Blockburger-Parrish test, although the precondition for employing that test (that the two offenses involve the same conduct) is absent. 2001Murray , 24 S.W.3d at 889 (citing Ochoa , 982 S.W.2d at 908 ). (12) The first point of error is overruled. | 2 | 2001–2001 |
State v. Mayorga
green
2 sentences2001Still further, even if the requested instruction on article 38.23 had been timely presented, the trial court would not have erred in denying the same under the circumstances presented and discussed in the first point of error and in light of Mayorga, 901 S.W.2d at 946 . 2001Still further, even if the requested instruction on article 38.23 had been timely presented, the trial court would not have erred in denying the same under the circumstances presented and discussed in the first point of error and in light of Mayorga , 901 S.W.2d at 946 . | 2 | 2001–2001 |
Murray v. State
green
2 sentences2001Murray, 24 S.W.3d at 889 (citing Ochoa, 982 S.W.2d at 908 ).12 The first point of error is overruled. 12 We believe that the same result would be reached under the Blockburger-Parrish test, although the precondition for employing that test (that the two offenses involve the same conduct) is absent. 2001Murray , 24 S.W.3d at 889 (citing Ochoa , 982 S.W.2d at 908 ). (12) The first point of error is overruled. | 2 | 2001–2001 |
Oregon v. Kennedy
green
2 sentences2000By its second point, the State contends the trial court erred in following the recklessness standard set out in Bauder, and should have, instead, followed the federal intentional standard of Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 , 102 S.Ct. 2083 , 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982) (federal constitution double jeopardy clause bars retrial only when mistrial results from intentional prosecutorial misconduct). 2000By its second point, the State contends the trial court erred in following the recklessness standard set out in Bauder, and should have, instead, followed the federal intentional standard of Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667 , 102 S.Ct. 2083 , 72 L.Ed.2d 416 (1982) (federal constitution double jeopardy clause bars retrial only when mistrial results from intentional prosecutorial misconduct). | 2 | 2000–2000 |
| Greene v. Massey green | 2 | 1987–1990 |
| Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc. green | 2 | 1964–1990 |
| FRYMIRE ENGINEERING COMPANY INC. v. Grantham green | 2 | 1978–1987 |
| Truck Insurance Exchange v. Seelbach green | 2 | 1968–1969 |
| Elliott v. State green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| in Re State of Texas Ex Rel. David Escamilla, Travis County Attorney green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Davis v. United States green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Martin Suarez Juarez v. State green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Haley Diana Forsyth v. State green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Roop v. State green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| State v. Ester Aboytes Anderson green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| O'RARDEN v. State green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Brady v. Maryland green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Ladd v. State green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| American Employers' Insurance v. Aiken green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Wells v. American States Preferred Insurance Co. green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Castaneda v. State green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| State v. Sheppard green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.