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20 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1978–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Doe Ex Rel. Fein v. District of Columbiagreen2 sentences2025“The content requirements of any notice under section 12-309 are to be interpreted liberally, and in close cases doubts are to be resolved in favor of compliance.” Doe by Fein v. District of Columbia, 697 A.2d 23, 27 (D.C. 1997). 2010Although the “content requirements of any notice under section 12-309 are to be interpreted liberally, and in close cases doubts are to be resolved in favor of compliance,” Doe by Fein, 697 A.2d at 27 , “the requirement that the notice be given, and within the time specified, and to the proper officers” is strictly construed. | 3 | 4 |
Washington v. District of Columbiagreen2 sentences2014Because I believe that the officers acted at least in part in furtherance of MPD’s business, I must reach the District’s threshold and main argument that it is “entitled to judgment because plaintiffs failed to comply with the notice-of-claim requirements of D.C.Code § 12-309.” The notice statute provides that “within six months after the injury or damage was sustained, the claimant, his agent or attorney” must “give[ ] notice in writing to the Mayor of the District of Columbia of the approximate time, place, cause, and circumstances of the injury or damage.” D.C.Code § 12-309 (2012 Repl.); se 2010Wharton, 666 A.2d at 1230 (citing Washington v. District of Columbia, 429 A.2d 1362 , 1365 n. 9 (D.C.1981)); see also DeKine v. District of Columbia, 422 A.2d 981, 985 (D.C.1980) (letter received one day late fails to satisfy § 12-309). | 2 | 3 |
Wharton v. District of Columbiagreen2 sentences2010Wharton, 666 A.2d at 1230 (citing Washington v. District of Columbia, 429 A.2d 1362 , 1365 n. 9 (D.C.1981)); see also DeKine v. District of Columbia, 422 A.2d 981, 985 (D.C.1980) (letter received one day late fails to satisfy § 12-309). 2004Although the content requirements of a notice under § 12-309 are to be interpreted liberally, see, e.g., Wharton v. District of Columbia, 666 A.2d 1227, 1230 (D.C.1995), we require “specificity with respect to the cause and circumstances of the injury.” Doe, supra, 697 A.2d at 27 . | 2 | 3 |
Giardino v. District of Columbiagreen2 sentences2012Compare Giardino v. District of Columbia, 252 F.R.D. 18, 24 (D.D.C.2008) (declining to resolve whether § 12-309 is jurisdictional and/or waivable, because failure to timely raise the defense did not result in prejudice), with Sperling ex rel. 2010Aug. 13, 2008) (dismissing claims for unliquidated damages under the DCHRA because plaintiffs failed to comply with mandatory notice requirements of § 12-309); Giardino v. District of Columbia, 252 F.R.D. 18, 24 (D.D.C.2008) ("Because the plaintiffs failed to comply with *1088 § 12-309, their claims against the District based on the DCHRA will be dismissed.”). 3 . | 2 | 2 |
Pitts v. District of Columbiagreen2 sentences2010Pitts v. District of Columbia, 391 A.2d 803, 807 (D.C.1978) (“[T]he section was designed to aid the District of Columbia in the defense of the public interest where claims are filed within the applicable statute of limitations but so long after the event that it is impossible for the city to obtain evidence for use in litigation which may result.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Jenkins v. District of Columbia, 379 A.2d 1177, 1178 (D.C.1977); Wilson v. District of Columbia, 338 A.2d 437, 438 (D.C.1975). 1981See Pitts v. District of Columbia, D.C.App., 391 A.2d 803 (1978). | 2 | 2 |
District of Columbia v. Dunmoregreen2 sentences2010In Dunmore we were asked, in the context of a medical malpractice claim against the District of Columbia, to extend our holding in Bums and apply the discovery rule to the notice requirement of § 12-309 as well. 662 A.2d at 1359-60 . 2004In District of Columbia v. Dunmore, 662 A.2d 1356 (D.C.1995), a case of alleged medical malpractice at the District of Columbia General Hospital, we held that the so-called “discovery rule” 1 does not apply to the notice requirement of § 12-309. | 1 | 3 |
Gwinn v. District of Columbiagreen2 sentences2010Id. at 1360 (quoting Gwinn, 434 A.2d at 1378 ). 1990See (William) Campbell v. District of Columbia, 568 A.2d 1076, 1078 (D.C.1990); see also Gwinn v. District of Columbia, 434 A.2d 1376, 1378 (D.C.1981) (“notice under § 12-309 is a ‘condition precedent' to filing a suit against the District”). | 1 | 2 |
John Mazor v. Elizabeth Farrellgreen1 sentence2024See, e.g., Mazor v. Farrell, 186 A.3d 829, 835 (D.C. 2018) (citing Dist. | 1 | 1 |
Creative Consolidation, LLC d/b/a Masseria Rest. v. Erie Insurance Exchangegreen1 sentence2024Looking to the record and assuming, as we must, that the facts alleged in appellants’ complaint are true for the purposes of this appeal, see, e.g., Creative Consolidation, 311 A.3d at 905, appellants suffered emotional distress as they set out to purchase their first homes and were soon faced with the kind of structural issues that made their units uninhabitable. | 1 | 1 |
cluster 789701green1 sentence2012Bd., 402 F.3d at 477-78 (holding Virginia notice-of-claim requirement inapplicable to claim under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act). 66 .There is no merit to appellant’s argument that § 12-309’s notice requirements do not apply in this case because he named the PSC as a defendant. | 1 | 1 |
Wilson v. District of Columbiagreen1 sentence2010Pitts v. District of Columbia, 391 A.2d 803, 807 (D.C.1978) (“[T]he section was designed to aid the District of Columbia in the defense of the public interest where claims are filed within the applicable statute of limitations but so long after the event that it is impossible for the city to obtain evidence for use in litigation which may result.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Jenkins v. District of Columbia, 379 A.2d 1177, 1178 (D.C.1977); Wilson v. District of Columbia, 338 A.2d 437, 438 (D.C.1975). | 1 | 1 |
Jenkins v. District of Columbiagreen1 sentence2010Pitts v. District of Columbia, 391 A.2d 803, 807 (D.C.1978) (“[T]he section was designed to aid the District of Columbia in the defense of the public interest where claims are filed within the applicable statute of limitations but so long after the event that it is impossible for the city to obtain evidence for use in litigation which may result.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Jenkins v. District of Columbia, 379 A.2d 1177, 1178 (D.C.1977); Wilson v. District of Columbia, 338 A.2d 437, 438 (D.C.1975). | 1 | 1 |
DeKine v. District of Columbiagreen1 sentence2010Wharton, 666 A.2d at 1230 (citing Washington v. District of Columbia, 429 A.2d 1362 , 1365 n. 9 (D.C.1981)); see also DeKine v. District of Columbia, 422 A.2d 981, 985 (D.C.1980) (letter received one day late fails to satisfy § 12-309). | 1 | 1 |
Dingwall v. District of Columbia Water & Sewer Authoritygreen2 sentences2002The majority remarks that if the legislature had intended § 12-309 to apply to WASA, it “could readily have included a provision comparable to § 12-309 in the WASA statute.” Dingwall v. District of Columbia, 766 A.2d 974, 979 (D.C.2001). 2002The majority remarks that if the legislature had intended § 12-309 to apply to WASA, it "could readily have included a provision comparable to § 12-309 in the WASA statute." Dingwall v. District of Columbia, 766 A.2d 974, 979 (D.C.2001). | 1 | 1 |
District of Columbia v. OWENS-CORNING FIBERGLAS CORPORATIONgreen2 sentences2002Although the question of what immunity the District in fact possesses is a complex one, see District of Columbia v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 572 A.2d 394, 400, 403-04 (D.C.1989), the court has consistently held the notice requirements of § 12-309 to be part and parcel of the District’s self-imposed liability for tortious acts of its agents. 2002Although the question of what immunity the District in fact possesses is a complex one, see District of Columbia v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 572 A.2d 394, 400, 403-04 (D.C.1989), the court has consistently held the notice requirements of § 12-309 to be part and parcel of the District's self-imposed liability for tortious acts of its agents. | 1 | 1 |
Johnson-El v. District of Columbiagreen1 sentence1999See Johnson-El v. District of Columbia, 579 A.2d 163, 170 (D.C.1990). 14 . | 1 | 1 |
Campbell v. District of Columbiagreen1 sentence1990See (William) Campbell v. District of Columbia, 568 A.2d 1076, 1078 (D.C.1990); see also Gwinn v. District of Columbia, 434 A.2d 1376, 1378 (D.C.1981) (“notice under § 12-309 is a ‘condition precedent' to filing a suit against the District”). | 1 | 1 |
Rieser v. District of Columbiagreen2 sentences1978In Rieser v. District of Columbia, 183 U.S.App.D.C. 375, 380 , 563 F.2d 462, 467 (1977), the police reports had provided the District with notice of the time and place of the injury, as in the instant case. 1978In Rieser v. District of Columbia, 183 U.S.App.D.C. 375, 380 , 563 F.2d 462, 467 (1977), the police reports had provided the District with notice of the time and place of the injury, as in the instant case. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Shehyn v. District of Columbia
green
1 sentence2025In that case, we held that Section 12-309’s notice requirement did not apply to claims that arose from the District’s own conduct as a corporate entity, as opposed to that of a District employee, where in addition the District was “necessarily on notice of . . . the resulting injury.” Id. at 1014 . | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Salem Media v. Awan
green
2 sentences2024Even if appellants were able to establish that they satisfied the procedural notice requirements under Section 12-309, their complaint does not sufficiently plead an IIED claim on the merits. 7 A prima facie IIED claim “must 7 Because we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of appellants’ IIED claim for insufficiently pleading that the District’s conduct was extreme and outrageous, we 27 show (1) extreme and outrageous conduct on the part of the defendants, which (2) intentionally or recklessly (3) causes the plaintiff severe emotional distress.” Salem Media Grp., Inc. v. Awan, 301 A.3d 633 , 65 2024Even if appellants were able to establish that they satisfied the procedural notice requirements under Section 12-309, their complaint does not sufficiently plead an IIED claim on the merits. 7 A prima facie IIED claim “must 7 Because we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of appellants’ IIED claim for insufficiently pleading that the District’s conduct was extreme and outrageous, we 27 show (1) extreme and outrageous conduct on the part of the defendants, which (2) intentionally or recklessly (3) causes the plaintiff severe emotional distress.” Salem Media Grp., Inc. v. Awan, 301 A.3d 633 , 65 | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Ruiz v. Herrera
green
1 sentence2001For the proposition that § 12-309 is applicable to claims against medical employees who are eligible for indemnification under § 1—1215(b), the District also relies upon two cases from the New York courts, Ruiz v. Herrera, 745 F.Supp. 940 (S.D.N.Y.1990) and Fitzgerald v. Lyons, 39 A.D.2d 473 , 336 N.Y.S.2d 940 (1972). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Fitzgerald v. Lyons
green
2 sentences2001For the proposition that § 12-309 is applicable to claims against medical employees who are eligible for indemnification under § 1—1215(b), the District also relies upon two cases from the New York courts, Ruiz v. Herrera, 745 F.Supp. 940 (S.D.N.Y.1990) and Fitzgerald v. Lyons, 39 A.D.2d 473 , 336 N.Y.S.2d 940 (1972). 2001For the proposition that § 12-309 is applicable to claims against medical employees who are eligible for indemnification under § 1—1215(b), the District also relies upon two cases from the New York courts, Ruiz v. Herrera, 745 F.Supp. 940 (S.D.N.Y.1990) and Fitzgerald v. Lyons, 39 A.D.2d 473 , 336 N.Y.S.2d 940 (1972). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
District of Columbia v. Campbell
green
1 sentence1999In District of Columbia v. Campbell, 580 A.2d 1295 (D.C.1990), however, we held that compliance with § 12-309’s notice requirement, is not a prerequisite to a claim *881 in contract against the District of Columbia. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Burns v. Bell
green
1 sentence1995TERRY, Associate Judge: We are called upon in this case to decide whether the discovery rule adopted in Burns v. Bell, 409 A.2d 614 (D.C.1979), applies to the notice requirement of D.C.Code § 12-309 (1989) 1 in suits brought against the District of Columbia. | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Davidson v. Bronx Municipal Hospital
green
2 sentences1990Unlike a similar New York statute discussed in Davidson v. Bronx Municipal Hospital, 64 N.Y.2d 59 , 473 N.E.2d 761 , 484 N.Y.S.2d 533 (1984), § 12-309 has no mandatory waiting period between the giving of notice and the filing of a complaint. 1990Unlike a similar New York statute discussed in Davidson v. Bronx Municipal Hospital, 64 N.Y.2d 59 , 473 N.E.2d 761 , 484 N.Y.S.2d 533 (1984), § 12-309 has no mandatory waiting period between the giving of notice and the filing of a complaint. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.