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20 Florida opinions name it 2 courts 1985–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Miller v. Stategreen2 sentences2010See Miller v. State, 460 So.2d 373, 374 (Fla.1984); see also § 775.082(3)(b), Fla. Stat. (2009). 2005See Miller v. State, 460 So.2d 373, 374 (Fla.1984); Henry v. State, 857 So.2d 344, 345 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (attempted second-degree murder is a second-degree felony, properly reclassified as a first-degree felony based on use of a weapon); Badia v. State, 770 So.2d 300 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000); Goutier v. State, 692 So.2d 978 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997); Harris v. State, 660 So.2d 409, 410 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); Maynoldi v. State, 456 So.2d 587, 588 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). | 2 | 3 |
Lareau v. Stategreen2 sentences2006See Lareau v. State, 573 So.2d 813 (Fla.1991); Hayward v. State, 590 So.2d 976, 978 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) (stating that facts of a criminal case that would support enhancement of aggravated battery to a first-degree felony under section 775.087(1) include “a battery in which the defendant intentionally or knowingly causes great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement and uses a weapon”); see also Thompson v. State, 636 So.2d 599 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994) (holding that where the verdict provided that the defendant was guilty of aggravated battery causing great bodily harm with a w 1991Lareau v. State, 573 So.2d 813 (Fla.1991.); Bell v. State, 394 So.2d 570 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981); Senterfitt v. State, 515 So.2d 411 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987), rev. denied, 523 So.2d 578 (Fla. 1988); see also, State v. Perez, 449 So.2d 818 (Fla.1984); Pinkerton v. State, 534 So.2d 425 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988). | 1 | 2 |
Cortez Hatten v. State of Floridagreen1 sentence2019Wiley, 125 So. 3d at 240-41; see also Hatten v. State, 203 So. 3d 142 (Fla. 2016) (approving the holding in Wiley that a court cannot impose a sentence beyond the mandatory minimum term imposed under the 10/20/life statute unless the sentence is authorized by another statute). | 1 | 1 |
Roberts v. Stategreen1 sentence2017See Minor v. State, 707 So.2d 1184, 1184 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (finding that the defendant’s conviction for the lesser included offense of manslaughter with a firearm was subject to reclassification as a first-degree felony under section 775.087(1) of the Florida Statutes where a firearm was used “[bjecause the use of a weapon or firearm is not an element of the offense of manslaughter”); see also Roberts v. State, 923 So.2d 578, 581 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (“[I]t is clear that there is no double jeopardy prohibition against applying a habitual offender enhancement to a felony already reclassified un | 1 | 1 |
Minor v. Stategreen1 sentence2017See Minor v. State, 707 So.2d 1184, 1184 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (finding that the defendant’s conviction for the lesser included offense of manslaughter with a firearm was subject to reclassification as a first-degree felony under section 775.087(1) of the Florida Statutes where a firearm was used “[bjecause the use of a weapon or firearm is not an element of the offense of manslaughter”); see also Roberts v. State, 923 So.2d 578, 581 (Fla. 5th DCA 2006) (“[I]t is clear that there is no double jeopardy prohibition against applying a habitual offender enhancement to a felony already reclassified un | 1 | 1 |
Mitchell v. Stategreen2 sentences2015Relying on Ray, this Court concluded in Mitchell v. State, 689 So.2d 1118, 1120 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997), that no fundamental error had occurred in the reclassification of Mitchell’s manslaughter conviction from a second degree felony to a first degree felony under section 775.087(1), the weapon reclassification statute, where Mitchell did not object to the jury instructions or verdict form, the jury found the offense was committed with a firearm, and Mitchell was not convicted of an offense greater in degree or penalty than the charged offense. 2015Relying on Ray, this Court concluded in Mitchell v. State, 689 So. 2d 1118, 1120 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997), that no fundamental error had occurred in the reclassification of Mitchell’s manslaughter conviction from a second degree felony to a first degree felony under section 775.087(1), the weapon reclassification statute, where Mitchell did not object to the jury instructions or verdict form, the jury found the offense was committed with a firearm, and Mitchell was not convicted of an offense greater in degree or penalty than the charged offense. | 1 | 1 |
Diaz-Gonzalez v. Stategreen2 sentences2015See also Diaz-Gonzalez v. State, 932 So.2d 528, 529-30 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (citing Ray and declining to address on appeal the alleged defect in the charging document where the defendant failed to raise the issue at trial). 2015See also Diaz- Gonzalez v. State, 932 So. 2d 528, 529-30 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (citing Ray and declining to address on appeal the alleged defect in the charging document where the defendant failed to raise the issue at trial). | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Stategreen1 sentence2012See Denizard v. State, 79 So.3d 159 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012); Williams v. State, 850 So.2d 656, 658 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). . | 1 | 1 |
Denizard v. Stategreen1 sentence2012See Denizard v. State, 79 So.3d 159 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012); Williams v. State, 850 So.2d 656, 658 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). . | 1 | 1 |
Perry v. Stategreen1 sentence2011The trial *351 court erred by classifying Oliver’s offense as a first-degree felony under section 775.087(1) because it is unclear from the record whether or not the use of a deadly weapon, an automobile, was an essential element of the jury’s finding of “aggravated battery causing great bodily harm with a deadly weapon.” See Cabral v. State, 944 So.2d 1026, 1027 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006); Perry v. State, 858 So.2d 1270, 1271 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). | 1 | 1 |
Cabral v. Stategreen1 sentence2011The trial *351 court erred by classifying Oliver’s offense as a first-degree felony under section 775.087(1) because it is unclear from the record whether or not the use of a deadly weapon, an automobile, was an essential element of the jury’s finding of “aggravated battery causing great bodily harm with a deadly weapon.” See Cabral v. State, 944 So.2d 1026, 1027 (Fla. 1st DCA 2006); Perry v. State, 858 So.2d 1270, 1271 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003). | 1 | 1 |
Hayward v. Stategreen1 sentence2006See Lareau v. State, 573 So.2d 813 (Fla.1991); Hayward v. State, 590 So.2d 976, 978 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) (stating that facts of a criminal case that would support enhancement of aggravated battery to a first-degree felony under section 775.087(1) include “a battery in which the defendant intentionally or knowingly causes great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement and uses a weapon”); see also Thompson v. State, 636 So.2d 599 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994) (holding that where the verdict provided that the defendant was guilty of aggravated battery causing great bodily harm with a w | 1 | 1 |
Thompson v. Stategreen1 sentence2006See Lareau v. State, 573 So.2d 813 (Fla.1991); Hayward v. State, 590 So.2d 976, 978 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) (stating that facts of a criminal case that would support enhancement of aggravated battery to a first-degree felony under section 775.087(1) include “a battery in which the defendant intentionally or knowingly causes great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement and uses a weapon”); see also Thompson v. State, 636 So.2d 599 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994) (holding that where the verdict provided that the defendant was guilty of aggravated battery causing great bodily harm with a w | 1 | 1 |
Maynoldi v. Stategreen1 sentence2005See Miller v. State, 460 So.2d 373, 374 (Fla.1984); Henry v. State, 857 So.2d 344, 345 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (attempted second-degree murder is a second-degree felony, properly reclassified as a first-degree felony based on use of a weapon); Badia v. State, 770 So.2d 300 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000); Goutier v. State, 692 So.2d 978 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997); Harris v. State, 660 So.2d 409, 410 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); Maynoldi v. State, 456 So.2d 587, 588 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). | 1 | 1 |
Harris v. Stategreen1 sentence2005See Miller v. State, 460 So.2d 373, 374 (Fla.1984); Henry v. State, 857 So.2d 344, 345 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (attempted second-degree murder is a second-degree felony, properly reclassified as a first-degree felony based on use of a weapon); Badia v. State, 770 So.2d 300 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000); Goutier v. State, 692 So.2d 978 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997); Harris v. State, 660 So.2d 409, 410 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); Maynoldi v. State, 456 So.2d 587, 588 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). | 1 | 1 |
Henry v. Stategreen1 sentence2005See Miller v. State, 460 So.2d 373, 374 (Fla.1984); Henry v. State, 857 So.2d 344, 345 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (attempted second-degree murder is a second-degree felony, properly reclassified as a first-degree felony based on use of a weapon); Badia v. State, 770 So.2d 300 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000); Goutier v. State, 692 So.2d 978 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997); Harris v. State, 660 So.2d 409, 410 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); Maynoldi v. State, 456 So.2d 587, 588 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). | 1 | 1 |
Cargle v. Stategreen1 sentence2004Cargle v. State, 829 So.2d 366, 367 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002). | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. Stategreen1 sentence2004See Crawford v. State, 858 So.2d 1131, 1132 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Brown v. State, 806 So.2d 576, 577 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). | 1 | 1 |
Crawford v. Stategreen1 sentence2004See Crawford v. State, 858 So.2d 1131, 1132 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003); Brown v. State, 806 So.2d 576, 577 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). | 1 | 1 |
Tripp v. Stategreen1 sentence2003See Tripp v. State, 610 So.2d 1311, 1312 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), aff'd, 642 So.2d 728 (Fla.1994); see also § 775.087(1), Fla. Stat. (1977). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Trippgreen1 sentence2003See Tripp v. State, 610 So.2d 1311, 1312 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), aff'd, 642 So.2d 728 (Fla.1994); see also § 775.087(1), Fla. Stat. (1977). | 1 | 1 |
Harris v. Stategreen1 sentence2000See Baque v. State, 653 So.2d 1105, 1106 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995); Harris v. State, 650 So.2d 639, 641 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). | 1 | 1 |
Baque v. Stategreen1 sentence2000See Baque v. State, 653 So.2d 1105, 1106 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995); Harris v. State, 650 So.2d 639, 641 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Perezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Houck
green
2 sentences2018Id. 2018Id. | 2 | 2017–2018 |
Hurry v. State
green
1 sentence2024The trial court denied the claim under the authority of Perry v. State, 313 So. 3d 961 (Fla. 1st DCA 2021); Jones v. State, 279 So. 3d 84 (Fla. 1st DCA 2019); and Hurry v. State, 978 So. 2d 854 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Anderson v. State
green
1 sentence2024Anderson, 988 So. 2d at 146 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Adam Lloyd Shepard v. State of Florida
green
2 sentences2018The district court disagreed and held that “an automobile, when used in the manner [Shepard] used it, constitutes a weapon in the common and ordinary meaning of the word.” Id. at 748 . 2018The district court disagreed and held that "an automobile, when used in the manner [Shepard] used it, constitutes a weapon in the common and ordinary meaning of the word." Id. at 748 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Wooden v. State
green
1 sentence2010We agree, concluding that this court’s holding in Wooden v. State, 42 So.3d 837 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010), is controlling. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Goutier v. State
green
1 sentence2005See Miller v. State, 460 So.2d 373, 374 (Fla.1984); Henry v. State, 857 So.2d 344, 345 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (attempted second-degree murder is a second-degree felony, properly reclassified as a first-degree felony based on use of a weapon); Badia v. State, 770 So.2d 300 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000); Goutier v. State, 692 So.2d 978 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997); Harris v. State, 660 So.2d 409, 410 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); Maynoldi v. State, 456 So.2d 587, 588 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Badia v. State
green
1 sentence2005See Miller v. State, 460 So.2d 373, 374 (Fla.1984); Henry v. State, 857 So.2d 344, 345 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (attempted second-degree murder is a second-degree felony, properly reclassified as a first-degree felony based on use of a weapon); Badia v. State, 770 So.2d 300 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000); Goutier v. State, 692 So.2d 978 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997); Harris v. State, 660 So.2d 409, 410 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); Maynoldi v. State, 456 So.2d 587, 588 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Webb v. State green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Senterfitt v. State green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Pinkerton v. State green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Bell v. State green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Cooper v. State green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.