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20 Georgia opinions name it 1 courts 1986–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ross v. Haglergreen2 sentences2008OCGA § 13-6-11 allows recovery of attorney fees “where the defendant has acted in bad faith, has been stubbornly litigious, or has caused the plaintiff unnecessary trouble and expense.” See also Ross v. Hagler, *505 209 Ga. App. 201, 204 (3) ( 433 SE2d 124 ) (1993). 2008OCGA § 13-6-11 allows recovery of attorney fees “where the defendant has acted in bad faith, has been stubbornly litigious, or has caused the plaintiff unnecessary trouble and expense.” See also Ross v. Hagler, *505 209 Ga. App. 201, 204 (3) ( 433 SE2d 124 ) (1993). | 2 | 2 |
Ginsberg v. Termottogreen2 sentences1998See Ginsberg v. Termotto, 175 Ga. App. 265, 267 (3) ( 333 SE2d 120 ) (1985). 1998See Ginsberg v. Termotto, 175 Ga. App. 265, 267 (3) ( 333 SE2d 120 ) (1985). | 2 | 2 |
Shelley v. Town of Tyronegreen1 sentence2025And again, the court did not consider the merits of the Kinnairds’ underlying claims, which could give rise to recovery under OCGA § 13-6- (2023) (“When reviewing a homeowners association’s decisions, the only judicial issues are whether the exercise of that authority was procedurally fair and reasonable, and whether the substantive decision was made in good faith, and is reasonable and not arbitrary and capricious.” (punctuation omitted)). 17 See Hiller, 310 Ga. App. at 205 n.2 (“[W]e have no jurisdiction to address the claim because the trial court never ruled upon it in its summary judgment | 1 | 1 |
Water's Edge Plantation Homeowner's Ass'n v. Relifordgreen2 sentences2022OCGA § 13-6-11 allows the recovery of attorney fees “where the defendant has acted in bad faith, has been stubbornly litigious, or has caused the plaintiff unnecessary trouble and expense.” As we have noted, “if a plaintiff in its 20 original complaint puts the defendant on notice that it is seeking attorney fees and expenses under OCGA § 13-6-11 as part of the relief prayed for in the case, and if a default judgment is subsequently entered against the defendant for failing to answer the complaint, then the plaintiff is entitled to an award of attorney fees and expenses as a matter of law[.]” 2022OCGA § 13-6-11 allows the recovery of attorney fees “where the defendant has acted in bad faith, has been stubbornly litigious, or has caused the plaintiff unnecessary trouble and expense.” As we have noted, “if a plaintiff in its 20 original complaint puts the defendant on notice that it is seeking attorney fees and expenses under OCGA § 13-6-11 as part of the relief prayed for in the case, and if a default judgment is subsequently entered against the defendant for failing to answer the complaint, then the plaintiff is entitled to an award of attorney fees and expenses as a matter of law[.]” | 1 | 1 |
Allen v. Brackettgreen2 sentences2019Allen v. Brackett, 165 Ga. App. 415, 421 (3) ( 301 SE2d 486 ) (1983). 2019Allen v. Brackett, 165 Ga. App. 415, 421 (3) ( 301 SE2d 486 ) (1983). | 1 | 1 |
Williams Tile & Marble Co. v. Ra-Lin & Associates, Inc.green2 sentences2010Co. v. Ra-Lin & Assoc., 206 Ga. App. 750, 752 (5) ( 426 SE2d 598 ) (1992) (“The existence of. . . abona fide controversy would preclude a recovery of OCGA § 13-6-11 attorney’s fees on the theory that appellant had been stubbornly litigious or caused appellee unnecessary expense, notwithstanding that the jury ultimately resolved that controversy in favor of appellee.”). 2010Co. v. Ra-Lin & Assoc., 206 Ga. App. 750, 752 (5) ( 426 SE2d 598 ) (1992) (“The existence of. . . abona fide controversy would preclude a recovery of OCGA § 13-6-11 attorney’s fees on the theory that appellant had been stubbornly litigious or caused appellee unnecessary expense, notwithstanding that the jury ultimately resolved that controversy in favor of appellee.”). | 1 | 1 |
Driggers v. Campbellgreen2 sentences2008Driggers v. Campbell, 247 Ga. App. 300, 304 (4) ( 543 SE2d 787 ) (2000). 2008Driggers v. Campbell, 247 Ga. App. 300, 304 (4) ( 543 SE2d 787 ) (2000). | 1 | 1 |
Pulte Home Corp. v. Woodland Nursery & Landscapes, Inc.green2 sentences1998The agreement defined the purchase price to include a calculation of “the product of 200 times 1.18 multiplied by the book value of each share of stock in Citizens Bank & Trust Company as shown on its most recent call report filed with the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta (or its successor).” The parties’ dispute centered around what was meant by the term “book value.” Smith contended that the term should be interpreted under FDIC requirements in existence at the time the agreement was signed in 1985, while the Stuckeys and Citizens contended that the term should be interpreted under current FD 1998The agreement defined the purchase price to include a calculation of “the product of 200 times 1.18 multiplied by the book value of each share of stock in Citizens Bank & Trust Company as shown on its most recent call report filed with the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta (or its successor).” The parties’ dispute centered around what was meant by the term “book value.” Smith contended that the term should be interpreted under FDIC requirements in existence at the time the agreement was signed in 1985, while the Stuckeys and Citizens contended that the term should be interpreted under current FD | 1 | 1 |
Citizens & Southern Trust Co. v. Hicksgreen2 sentences1997“Bad faith warranting an award of attorney fees ‘must have arisen out of the transaction on which the cause of action is predicated.’ [Cit.]” It may be found in defendant’s “ ‘carrying out the provisions of the contract,’ ” that is, in how defendant “ ‘ “acted ... in his dealing with the plaintiff.”’” Burlington Air Express v. Ga.-Pacific Corp., 217 Ga. App. 312, 313 ( 457 SE2d 219 ) (1995). “ ‘Bad faith other than mere refusal to pay a just debt’ ” is sufficient, “ ‘provided it is not prompted by an honest mistake as to one’s rights or duties but by some interested or sinister motive. . . .’ 1997“Bad faith warranting an award of attorney fees ‘must have arisen out of the transaction on which the cause of action is predicated.’ [Cit.]” It may be found in defendant’s “ ‘carrying out the provisions of the contract,’ ” that is, in how defendant “ ‘ “acted ... in his dealing with the plaintiff.”’” Burlington Air Express v. Ga.-Pacific Corp., 217 Ga. App. 312, 313 ( 457 SE2d 219 ) (1995). “ ‘Bad faith other than mere refusal to pay a just debt’ ” is sufficient, “ ‘provided it is not prompted by an honest mistake as to one’s rights or duties but by some interested or sinister motive. . . .’ | 1 | 1 |
Burlington Air Express, Inc. v. Georgia-Pacific Corp.green2 sentences1997“Bad faith warranting an award of attorney fees ‘must have arisen out of the transaction on which the cause of action is predicated.’ [Cit.]” It may be found in defendant’s “ ‘carrying out the provisions of the contract,’ ” that is, in how defendant “ ‘ “acted ... in his dealing with the plaintiff.”’” Burlington Air Express v. Ga.-Pacific Corp., 217 Ga. App. 312, 313 ( 457 SE2d 219 ) (1995). “ ‘Bad faith other than mere refusal to pay a just debt’ ” is sufficient, “ ‘provided it is not prompted by an honest mistake as to one’s rights or duties but by some interested or sinister motive. . . .’ 1997“Bad faith warranting an award of attorney fees ‘must have arisen out of the transaction on which the cause of action is predicated.’ [Cit.]” It may be found in defendant’s “ ‘carrying out the provisions of the contract,’ ” that is, in how defendant “ ‘ “acted ... in his dealing with the plaintiff.”’” Burlington Air Express v. Ga.-Pacific Corp., 217 Ga. App. 312, 313 ( 457 SE2d 219 ) (1995). “ ‘Bad faith other than mere refusal to pay a just debt’ ” is sufficient, “ ‘provided it is not prompted by an honest mistake as to one’s rights or duties but by some interested or sinister motive. . . .’ | 1 | 1 |
Vogtle v. Colemangreen2 sentences1992Attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation pursuant to OCGA § 13-6-11 are “ ‘not available to a defendant in the absence of a “viable independent counterclaim asserting (a) claim for relief independent of the assertion of the (plaintiff’s) harassment, litigiousness and bad faith in bringing . . . suit.” [Cit.]’ ” Vogtle v. Coleman, 259 Ga. 115, 117 (3) ( 376 SE2d 861 ) (1989). 1992Attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation pursuant to OCGA § 13-6-11 are “ ‘not available to a defendant in the absence of a “viable independent counterclaim asserting (a) claim for relief independent of the assertion of the (plaintiff’s) harassment, litigiousness and bad faith in bringing . . . suit.” [Cit.]’ ” Vogtle v. Coleman, 259 Ga. 115, 117 (3) ( 376 SE2d 861 ) (1989). | 1 | 1 |
DeKalb County v. Danielsgreen2 sentences1990Further, we have also recognized that in such an action separate from the condemnation, the attorney fee award is based upon OCGA § 13-6-11. “ ‘[While] a condemnee, as a defendant in a condemnation case, could not take advantage of the provisions of OCGA § 13-6-11 allowing the recovery of attorney fees . . . , ‘where the condemnee can leap the versus barrier (i.e., be a plaintiff) he may in a proper case ... , recover his expenses of litigation.’ ” DeKalb County v. Daniels, 174 Ga. App. 319, 321 (6) ( 329 SE2d 620 ) (1985). 1990Further, we have also recognized that in such an action separate from the condemnation, the attorney fee award is based upon OCGA § 13-6-11. “ ‘[While] a condemnee, as a defendant in a condemnation case, could not take advantage of the provisions of OCGA § 13-6-11 allowing the recovery of attorney fees . . . , ‘where the condemnee can leap the versus barrier (i.e., be a plaintiff) he may in a proper case ... , recover his expenses of litigation.’ ” DeKalb County v. Daniels, 174 Ga. App. 319, 321 (6) ( 329 SE2d 620 ) (1985). | 1 | 1 |
Batchelor v. Tuckergreen2 sentences1990"Since there can be no recovery under OCGA § 13-6-11 for expenses incurred in the defense of a claim ([cit.]), and [appellee] failed to prove the attorney['s] fees involved in pursuit of his [main action, the trial court's failure to direct] a verdict in favor of [appellant] was [erroneous]. [Cits.]" Batchelor v. Tucker, 184 Ga. App. 761, 763 (2) ( 362 SE2d 493 ) (1987). 1990"Since there can be no recovery under OCGA § 13-6-11 for expenses incurred in the defense of a claim ([cit.]), and [appellee] failed to prove the attorney['s] fees involved in pursuit of his [main action, the trial court's failure to direct] a verdict in favor of [appellant] was [erroneous]. [Cits.]" Batchelor v. Tucker, 184 Ga. App. 761, 763 (2) ( 362 SE2d 493 ) (1987). | 1 | 1 |
Computer Communications Specialists, Inc. v. Hallgreen2 sentences1990However, “[i]t is well settled that the ‘bad faith’ contemplated by [OCGA § 13-6-11] is bad faith connected with ‘the transaction and dealings out of which the cause of action arose,’ rather than bad faith in defending or resisting the claim after the cause of action has already arisen. [Cits.]” Computer Communications Specialists v. Hall, 188 Ga. App. 545, 547 (3) ( 373 SE2d 630 ) (1988). 1990However, “[i]t is well settled that the ‘bad faith’ contemplated by [OCGA § 13-6-11] is bad faith connected with ‘the transaction and dealings out of which the cause of action arose,’ rather than bad faith in defending or resisting the claim after the cause of action has already arisen. [Cits.]” Computer Communications Specialists v. Hall, 188 Ga. App. 545, 547 (3) ( 373 SE2d 630 ) (1988). | 1 | 1 |
Ponce De Leon Condominiums v. DiGirolamogreen2 sentences1988Ponce de Leon Condominiums v. DiGirolamo, 238 Ga. 188, 190 (2) ( 232 SE2d 62 ) (1977). 1988Ponce de Leon Condominiums v. DiGirolamo, 238 Ga. 188, 190 (2) ( 232 SE2d 62 ) (1977). | 1 | 1 |
First Bank of Clayton County v. Dollargreen2 sentences1987See First Bank of Clayton County v. Dollar, 159 Ga. App. 815 (4) ( 285 SE2d 203 ) (1981); Eways v. Ga. R. 1987See First Bank of Clayton County v. Dollar, 159 Ga. App. 815 (4) ( 285 SE2d 203 ) (1981); Eways v. Ga. R. | 1 | 1 |
Altamaha Convalescent Center, Inc. v. Godwingreen2 sentences1986It is only necessary to the plaintiff’s recovery that he show any one of these three conditions exists. [Cit.]” Altamaha Convalescent Center v. Godwin, 137 Ga. App. 394, 395 ( 224 SE2d 76 ) (1976). 1986It is only necessary to the plaintiff’s recovery that he show any one of these three conditions exists. [Cit.]” Altamaha Convalescent Center v. Godwin, 137 Ga. App. 394, 395 ( 224 SE2d 76 ) (1976). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Georgia Neurology & Rehabilitation, P.C. v. Hiller
green
1 sentence2025And again, the court did not consider the merits of the Kinnairds’ underlying claims, which could give rise to recovery under OCGA § 13-6- (2023) (“When reviewing a homeowners association’s decisions, the only judicial issues are whether the exercise of that authority was procedurally fair and reasonable, and whether the substantive decision was made in good faith, and is reasonable and not arbitrary and capricious.” (punctuation omitted)). 17 See Hiller, 310 Ga. App. at 205 n.2 (“[W]e have no jurisdiction to address the claim because the trial court never ruled upon it in its summary judgment | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Brazeal v. Newpoint Media Group, LLC
green
1 sentence2025And again, the court did not consider the merits of the Kinnairds’ underlying claims, which could give rise to recovery under OCGA § 13-6- (2023) (“When reviewing a homeowners association’s decisions, the only judicial issues are whether the exercise of that authority was procedurally fair and reasonable, and whether the substantive decision was made in good faith, and is reasonable and not arbitrary and capricious.” (punctuation omitted)). 17 See Hiller, 310 Ga. App. at 205 n.2 (“[W]e have no jurisdiction to address the claim because the trial court never ruled upon it in its summary judgment | 1 | 2025–2025 |
A. P. S. S., Inc. v. Clary & Associates, Inc.
green
2 sentences1997A. P. S. S., Inc. v. Clary & Assoc., 178 Ga. App. 131 (2) ( 342 SE2d 375 ) (1986). 1997A. P. S. S., Inc. v. Clary & Assoc., 178 Ga. App. 131 (2) ( 342 SE2d 375 ) (1986). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Southern Cellular Telecom v. Banks
green
2 sentences1997Accordingly, I would adhere to the principle initially recognized in Southern Cellular Telecom v. Banks, 209 Ga. App. 401, 402 , supra, that possible deficiencies, suppressions and sources of error which may lie within attorney billing records are tested best by confrontation and cross-examination. 1997Accordingly, I would adhere to the principle initially recognized in Southern Cellular Telecom v. Banks, 209 Ga.App. 401, 402 , 433 S.E.2d 606 , supra, that possible deficiencies, suppressions and sources of error which may lie within attorney billing records are tested best by confrontation and cross-examination. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Buffalo Cab Co. v. Williams
green
2 sentences1990The issue of the actual legal basis which authorized the plaintiff’s recovery under OCGA § 13-6-11 was addressed in an entirely separate division of the opinion: “The factual situation in the instant case is very similar to that in Buffalo Cab Co. v. Williams, 126 Ga. App. 522 ( 191 SE2d 317 ) (1972). . . .” U-Haul of Western Ga. v. Ford, supra at 746 (4). 1990The issue of the actual legal basis which authorized the plaintiff’s recovery under OCGA § 13-6-11 was addressed in an entirely separate division of the opinion: “The factual situation in the instant case is very similar to that in Buffalo Cab Co. v. Williams, 126 Ga. App. 522 ( 191 SE2d 317 ) (1972). . . .” U-Haul of Western Ga. v. Ford, supra at 746 (4). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
DuBose v. Box
green
2 sentences1987Since there can be no recovery under OCGA § 13-6-11 for expenses incurred in the defense of a claim (DuBose v. Box, 246 Ga. 660 (5) ( 273 SE2d 101 ) (1980)), and Tucker failed to prove the attorney fees involved in pursuit of his counterclaim, direction of a verdict in favor of Batchelor was appropriate. 1987Since there can be no recovery under OCGA § 13-6-11 for expenses incurred in the defense of a claim (DuBose v. Box, 246 Ga. 660 (5) ( 273 SE2d 101 ) (1980)), and Tucker failed to prove the attorney fees involved in pursuit of his counterclaim, direction of a verdict in favor of Batchelor was appropriate. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.