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20 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 2012–2026 9 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Rivera v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2024See also Rivera v. Washington, 298 Ga. 770, 778 ( 784 SE2d 775 ) (2016) (“[A] defendant asserting an immunity defense may move to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (1), on consideration of which, the trial court may hear evidence and make relevant factual findings to decide the threshold issue.”). 2 stopped at an intersection at the time, turned to follow the Marquis, immediately activated his blue lights, and attempted to execute a traffic stop based on the seat belt violation.3 Prosser noticed the passenger “sit up and then quickly sit back,” and he not 2024See also Rivera v. Washington, 298 Ga. 770, 778 ( 784 SE2d 775 ) (2016) (“[A] defendant asserting an immunity defense may move to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (1), on consideration of which, the trial court may hear evidence and make relevant factual findings to decide the threshold issue.”). 2 stopped at an intersection at the time, turned to follow the Marquis, immediately activated his blue lights, and attempted to execute a traffic stop based on the seat belt violation.3 Prosser noticed the passenger “sit up and then quickly sit back,” and he not | 3 | 4 |
Department of Transportation v. Dupreegreen2 sentences2021See Ga. Dept. of Labor v. RTT Assoc., Inc., 299 Ga. 78, 81 (1) (786 SE2d 840) (2016) (“The burden of demonstrating a waiver of sovereign immunity rests upon the party asserting it.” (citations omitted)); Ga. Dept. of Transp. v. Dupree, 256 Ga. App. 668, 671 (1) (570 SE2d 1) (2002) (“Under OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (1), a defendant can raise a plea in abatement, which is not an adjudication on the merits, that raises the issue of the lack of subject matter jurisdiction in the trial court . . . .”), overruled in part on other grounds, Ga. Dept. of Transp. v. Thompson, 354 Ga. App. 200, 207 (1) n.6 (840 2021See Ga. Dept. of Labor v. RTT Assoc., Inc., 299 Ga. 78, 81 (1) (786 SE2d 840) (2016) (“The burden of demonstrating a waiver of sovereign immunity rests upon the party asserting it.” (citations omitted)); Ga. Dept. of Transp. v. Dupree, 256 Ga. App. 668, 671 (1) (570 SE2d 1) (2002) (“Under OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (1), a defendant can raise a plea in abatement, which is not an adjudication on the merits, that raises the issue of the lack of subject matter jurisdiction in the trial court . . . .”), overruled in part on other grounds, Ga. Dept. of Transp. v. Thompson, 354 Ga. App. 200, 207 (1) n.6 (840 | 2 | 2 |
Georgia Department of Transportation v. Carol Joy Thompsongreen2 sentences2021See generally Thompson, 354 Ga. App. at 205-206 (1) (noting that trial court serves as finder of fact in ruling on a motion to dismiss under OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (1)). 2021See Ga. Dept. of Labor v. RTT Assoc., Inc., 299 Ga. 78, 81 (1) (786 SE2d 840) (2016) (“The burden of demonstrating a waiver of sovereign immunity rests upon the party asserting it.” (citations omitted)); Ga. Dept. of Transp. v. Dupree, 256 Ga. App. 668, 671 (1) (570 SE2d 1) (2002) (“Under OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (1), a defendant can raise a plea in abatement, which is not an adjudication on the merits, that raises the issue of the lack of subject matter jurisdiction in the trial court . . . .”), overruled in part on other grounds, Ga. Dept. of Transp. v. Thompson, 354 Ga. App. 200, 207 (1) n.6 (840 | 2 | 2 |
Bobick v. Community & Southern Bankgreen2 sentences2017Ga. 2015).1 “A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (1) can allege either a facial challenge, in which the court accepts as true the allegations on the face of the complaint . . . or a factual challenge, which requires consideration of evidence beyond the face of the complaint. . . .” (Citations, punctuation, and footnote omitted.) Bobick v. Community & Southern Bank, 321 Ga. App. 855, 860 (3), n. 4 ( 743 SE2d 518 ) (2013).2 On appeal, we review “de novo a trial court’s grant of a motion to dismiss” due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 2017Ga. 2015).1 “A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (1) can allege either a facial challenge, in which the court accepts as true the allegations on the face of the complaint . . . or a factual challenge, which requires consideration of evidence beyond the face of the complaint. . . .” (Citations, punctuation, and footnote omitted.) Bobick v. Community & Southern Bank, 321 Ga. App. 855, 860 (3), n. 4 ( 743 SE2d 518 ) (2013).2 On appeal, we review “de novo a trial court’s grant of a motion to dismiss” due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction. | 2 | 2 |
Bonner v. Petersongreen2 sentences2026See Bonner v. Peterson, 301 Ga. App. 443, 443 ( 687 SE2d 676 ) (2009) (contrasting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under OCGA § 9-11-12(b)(6) with a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under OCGA § 9-11-12(b)(1)). 2026See Bonner v. Peterson, 301 Ga. App. 443, 443 ( 687 SE2d 676 ) (2009) (contrasting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under OCGA § 9-11-12(b)(6) with a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under OCGA § 9-11-12(b)(1)). | 1 | 2 |
Cox Enterprises, Inc. v. Nixgreen2 sentences2026Under these circumstances, we must reverse the trial court’s order in this regard and remand the 12 Cox Enters., Inc. v. Nix, 273 Ga. 152, 153 ( 538 SE2d 449 ) (2000). 2026Under these circumstances, we must reverse the trial court’s order in this regard and remand the 12 Cox Enters., Inc. v. Nix, 273 Ga. 152, 153 ( 538 SE2d 449 ) (2000). | 1 | 1 |
KENNETH MCCLOUD v. LOWNDES COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERSgreen2 sentences2026See McCloud v. Lowndes County Bd. of Commissioners, 369 Ga. App. 756 , 759(1) ( 894 SE2d 505 ) (2023) (“[A] defendant asserting an immunity defense may move to dismiss for lack of subject[-]matter jurisdiction under OCGA § 9-11-12(b)(1), on consideration of which, the trial court may hear evidence and make relevant factual findings to decide the threshold issue.”). 6 pleadings, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment.”12 But on the other hand, [i]n considering a motion to dismiss for lack of subject[-]matter jurisdiction on sovereign immunity grounds under OCGA § 9-11-12(b)(1), 2026See McCloud v. Lowndes County Bd. of Commissioners, 369 Ga. App. 756 , 759(1) ( 894 SE2d 505 ) (2023) (“[A] defendant asserting an immunity defense may move to dismiss for lack of subject[-]matter jurisdiction under OCGA § 9-11-12(b)(1), on consideration of which, the trial court may hear evidence and make relevant factual findings to decide the threshold issue.”). 6 pleadings, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment.”12 But on the other hand, [i]n considering a motion to dismiss for lack of subject[-]matter jurisdiction on sovereign immunity grounds under OCGA § 9-11-12(b)(1), | 1 | 1 |
Lee v. Searsgreen2 sentences2024Co., 363 Ga. App. 126 , 127 ( 871 SE2d 8 ) (2022); accord Douglas Cnty., 340 Ga. App. at 801 . 21 See supra note 1 & accompanying text. 7 Turning to the WCA, as a general matter, this statute is the exclusive remedy for a worker or next of kin who sustains an “injury” arising out of and in the course of employment.22 Further, whether an injury “arises out of and in the course of employment is generally a mixed question of law and fact,”23 and these two prerequisites are “independent and distinct[.]”24 And while the WCA is intended to have broad application,25 there are exceptions to this sweep 2024Co., 363 Ga. App. 126 , 127 ( 871 SE2d 8 ) (2022); accord Douglas Cnty., 340 Ga. App. at 801 . 21 See supra note 1 & accompanying text. 7 Turning to the WCA, as a general matter, this statute is the exclusive remedy for a worker or next of kin who sustains an “injury” arising out of and in the course of employment.22 Further, whether an injury “arises out of and in the course of employment is generally a mixed question of law and fact,”23 and these two prerequisites are “independent and distinct[.]”24 And while the WCA is intended to have broad application,25 there are exceptions to this sweep | 1 | 1 |
Conrad v. Conradgreen2 sentences2024A motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (1) can “allege either a facial challenge, in which the court accepts as true the allegations on the face of the complaint or a factual challenge, which requires 14 See supra note 12. 15 See supra note 12. 6 consideration of evidence beyond the face of the complaint.”16 Such a motion “may be heard and determined before trial[.]”17 And at such a hearing, factual issues “shall be determined by the trial court[,]” and they “will be reversed only where the evidence demands a contrary finding[.]”18 When the trial j 2024A motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (1) can “allege either a facial challenge, in which the court accepts as true the allegations on the face of the complaint or a factual challenge, which requires 14 See supra note 12. 15 See supra note 12. 6 consideration of evidence beyond the face of the complaint.”16 Such a motion “may be heard and determined before trial[.]”17 And at such a hearing, factual issues “shall be determined by the trial court[,]” and they “will be reversed only where the evidence demands a contrary finding[.]”18 When the trial j | 1 | 1 |
Douglas County v. Hamilton State Bankgreen2 sentences2024A motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (1) can “allege either a facial challenge, in which the court accepts as true the allegations on the face of the complaint or a factual challenge, which requires 14 See supra note 12. 15 See supra note 12. 6 consideration of evidence beyond the face of the complaint.”16 Such a motion “may be heard and determined before trial[.]”17 And at such a hearing, factual issues “shall be determined by the trial court[,]” and they “will be reversed only where the evidence demands a contrary finding[.]”18 When the trial j 2024A motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (1) can “allege either a facial challenge, in which the court accepts as true the allegations on the face of the complaint or a factual challenge, which requires 14 See supra note 12. 15 See supra note 12. 6 consideration of evidence beyond the face of the complaint.”16 Such a motion “may be heard and determined before trial[.]”17 And at such a hearing, factual issues “shall be determined by the trial court[,]” and they “will be reversed only where the evidence demands a contrary finding[.]”18 When the trial j | 1 | 1 |
Kil v. Legend Bros., LLCgreen2 sentences2024Co., 363 Ga. App. 126 , 127 ( 871 SE2d 8 ) (2022); accord Douglas Cnty., 340 Ga. App. at 801 . 21 See supra note 1 & accompanying text. 7 Turning to the WCA, as a general matter, this statute is the exclusive remedy for a worker or next of kin who sustains an “injury” arising out of and in the course of employment.22 Further, whether an injury “arises out of and in the course of employment is generally a mixed question of law and fact,”23 and these two prerequisites are “independent and distinct[.]”24 And while the WCA is intended to have broad application,25 there are exceptions to this sweep 2024Co., 363 Ga. App. 126 , 127 ( 871 SE2d 8 ) (2022); accord Douglas Cnty., 340 Ga. App. at 801 . 21 See supra note 1 & accompanying text. 7 Turning to the WCA, as a general matter, this statute is the exclusive remedy for a worker or next of kin who sustains an “injury” arising out of and in the course of employment.22 Further, whether an injury “arises out of and in the course of employment is generally a mixed question of law and fact,”23 and these two prerequisites are “independent and distinct[.]”24 And while the WCA is intended to have broad application,25 there are exceptions to this sweep | 1 | 1 |
Champion Windows of Chattanooga, LLC v. Edwardsgreen2 sentences2022See Champion Windows of Chattanooga v. Edwards, 326 Ga. App. 232, 242 (2), n. 9 ( 756 SE2d 314 ) (2014) (“Issues and objections not raised in the trial court and ruled on by the trial court are deemed waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal”) (citation and punctuation omitted).Second, Ramos’s argument overlooks the fact that Owens moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (1), not for failure to state a claim pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (6). 2022See Champion Windows of Chattanooga v. Edwards, 326 Ga. App. 232, 242 (2), n. 9 ( 756 SE2d 314 ) (2014) (“Issues and objections not raised in the trial court and ruled on by the trial court are deemed waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal”) (citation and punctuation omitted).Second, Ramos’s argument overlooks the fact that Owens moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (1), not for failure to state a claim pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (6). | 1 | 1 |
City of Gainesville v. Doddgreen2 sentences2022See generally City of Gainesville v. Dodd, 275 Ga. 834, 838-839 ( 573 SE2d 369 ) (2002) (holding that appellate courts retain discretion in determining whether to apply the right-for-any-reason rule and consider alternative legal theories not addressed by the trial court, or to vacate order and remand for the trial court to consider alternative legal theories in the first instance). 2022See generally City of Gainesville v. Dodd, 275 Ga. 834, 838-839 ( 573 SE2d 369 ) (2002) (holding that appellate courts retain discretion in determining whether to apply the right-for-any-reason rule and consider alternative legal theories not addressed by the trial court, or to vacate order and remand for the trial court to consider alternative legal theories in the first instance). | 1 | 1 |
Georgia Department of Labor v. Rtt Associates, Inc.green2 sentences2021See Ga. Dept. of Labor v. RTT Assoc., Inc., 299 Ga. 78, 81 (1) (786 SE2d 840) (2016) (“The burden of demonstrating a waiver of sovereign immunity rests upon the party asserting it.” (citations omitted)); Ga. Dept. of Transp. v. Dupree, 256 Ga. App. 668, 671 (1) (570 SE2d 1) (2002) (“Under OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (1), a defendant can raise a plea in abatement, which is not an adjudication on the merits, that raises the issue of the lack of subject matter jurisdiction in the trial court . . . .”), overruled in part on other grounds, Ga. Dept. of Transp. v. Thompson, 354 Ga. App. 200, 207 (1) n.6 (840 2021See Ga. Dept. of Labor v. RTT Assoc., Inc., 299 Ga. 78, 81 (1) (786 SE2d 840) (2016) (“The burden of demonstrating a waiver of sovereign immunity rests upon the party asserting it.” (citations omitted)); Ga. Dept. of Transp. v. Dupree, 256 Ga. App. 668, 671 (1) (570 SE2d 1) (2002) (“Under OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (1), a defendant can raise a plea in abatement, which is not an adjudication on the merits, that raises the issue of the lack of subject matter jurisdiction in the trial court . . . .”), overruled in part on other grounds, Ga. Dept. of Transp. v. Thompson, 354 Ga. App. 200, 207 (1) n.6 (840 | 1 | 1 |
Ga. Dep't of Transp. v. Balamogreen1 sentence2020See Balamo, 343 Ga. App. at 171 (1). | 1 | 1 |
Collins v. Athens Orthopedic Clinicgreen1 sentence2019See Collins, 347 Ga. App. at 23 (1) n.11 (McFadden, P. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). | 1 | 1 |
James v. Georgia Department of Public Safetygreen2 sentences2017James , 337 Ga. App. at 865 (1), 789 S.E.2d 236 . 2017James , 337 Ga. App. at 865 (1), 789 S.E.2d 236 . | 1 | 1 |
Georgia Power Co. v. Harrisongreen2 sentences2017Bd. v. Holsey , 266 Ga. App. 385 , 385-386, 597 S.E.2d 489 (2004) ; Miller v. Dept. of Public Safety , 221 Ga. App. 280 , 281, 470 S.E.2d 773 (1996). 2 With respect to the DPS's facial challenge to subject matter jurisdiction under OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (1), we find that the factors (as set forth above in Harrison , 253 Ga. at 214-215 (2), 318 S.E.2d 306 ) controlling the trial court's exercise of discretion under OCGA § 9-11-12 (d) are clearly balanced in favor of prompt pre-trial determination of the motion. 2017Bd. v. Holsey , 266 Ga. App. 385 , 385-386, 597 S.E.2d 489 (2004) ; Miller v. Dept. of Public Safety , 221 Ga. App. 280 , 281, 470 S.E.2d 773 (1996). 2 With respect to the DPS's facial challenge to subject matter jurisdiction under OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (1), we find that the factors (as set forth above in Harrison , 253 Ga. at 214-215 (2), 318 S.E.2d 306 ) controlling the trial court's exercise of discretion under OCGA § 9-11-12 (d) are clearly balanced in favor of prompt pre-trial determination of the motion. | 1 | 1 |
Pinnacle Benning, LLC v. Clark Realty Capital, LLCgreen2 sentences2013Amotion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (1) “can allege either a facial challenge, in which the court accepts as true the allegations on the face of the complaint [or counterclaim], or a factual challenge, which requires consideration of evidence beyond the face of the complaint [or counterclaim].” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Pinnacle Banning v. Clark Realty Capital, 314 Ga. App. 609, 618 (2) (a), n. 37 ( 724 SE2d 894 ) (2012). 2013Amotion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (1) “can allege either a facial challenge, in which the court accepts as true the allegations on the face of the complaint [or counterclaim], or a factual challenge, which requires consideration of evidence beyond the face of the complaint [or counterclaim].” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Pinnacle Banning v. Clark Realty Capital, 314 Ga. App. 609, 618 (2) (a), n. 37 ( 724 SE2d 894 ) (2012). | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Georgia Department of Transportationgreen2 sentences2012See Bd. of Regents &c. v. Canas, 295 Ga. App. 505, 507 (1) ( 672 SE2d 471 ) (2009) (under collateral order doctrine, this Court has jurisdiction over direct appeal of denial of motion to dismiss, where order is based on conclusive determination that state defendant is not immune from suit by reason of sovereign immunity). 2 OCGA § 50-21-20 et seq. 3 See Coosa Valley Technical College v. West, 299 Ga. App. 171, 174 (1) ( 682 SE2d 187 ) (2009) (whole court) (state defendant’s motion to dismiss on ground of sovereign immunity was a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under O 2012See Bd. of Regents &c. v. Canas, 295 Ga. App. 505, 507 (1) ( 672 SE2d 471 ) (2009) (under collateral order doctrine, this Court has jurisdiction over direct appeal of denial of motion to dismiss, where order is based on conclusive determination that state defendant is not immune from suit by reason of sovereign immunity). 2 OCGA § 50-21-20 et seq. 3 See Coosa Valley Technical College v. West, 299 Ga. App. 171, 174 (1) ( 682 SE2d 187 ) (2009) (whole court) (state defendant’s motion to dismiss on ground of sovereign immunity was a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under O | 1 | 1 |
COOSA VALLEY TECHNICAL COLLEGE v. Westgreen2 sentences2012See Bd. of Regents &c. v. Canas, 295 Ga. App. 505, 507 (1) ( 672 SE2d 471 ) (2009) (under collateral order doctrine, this Court has jurisdiction over direct appeal of denial of motion to dismiss, where order is based on conclusive determination that state defendant is not immune from suit by reason of sovereign immunity). 2 OCGA § 50-21-20 et seq. 3 See Coosa Valley Technical College v. West, 299 Ga. App. 171, 174 (1) ( 682 SE2d 187 ) (2009) (whole court) (state defendant’s motion to dismiss on ground of sovereign immunity was a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under O 2012See Bd. of Regents &c. v. Canas, 295 Ga. App. 505, 507 (1) ( 672 SE2d 471 ) (2009) (under collateral order doctrine, this Court has jurisdiction over direct appeal of denial of motion to dismiss, where order is based on conclusive determination that state defendant is not immune from suit by reason of sovereign immunity). 2 OCGA § 50-21-20 et seq. 3 See Coosa Valley Technical College v. West, 299 Ga. App. 171, 174 (1) ( 682 SE2d 187 ) (2009) (whole court) (state defendant’s motion to dismiss on ground of sovereign immunity was a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under O | 1 | 1 |
Board of Regents v. Canasgreen2 sentences2012See Bd. of Regents &c. v. Canas, 295 Ga. App. 505, 507 (1) ( 672 SE2d 471 ) (2009) (under collateral order doctrine, this Court has jurisdiction over direct appeal of denial of motion to dismiss, where order is based on conclusive determination that state defendant is not immune from suit by reason of sovereign immunity). 2 OCGA § 50-21-20 et seq. 3 See Coosa Valley Technical College v. West, 299 Ga. App. 171, 174 (1) ( 682 SE2d 187 ) (2009) (whole court) (state defendant’s motion to dismiss on ground of sovereign immunity was a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under O 2012See Bd. of Regents &c. v. Canas, 295 Ga. App. 505, 507 (1) ( 672 SE2d 471 ) (2009) (under collateral order doctrine, this Court has jurisdiction over direct appeal of denial of motion to dismiss, where order is based on conclusive determination that state defendant is not immune from suit by reason of sovereign immunity). 2 OCGA § 50-21-20 et seq. 3 See Coosa Valley Technical College v. West, 299 Ga. App. 171, 174 (1) ( 682 SE2d 187 ) (2009) (whole court) (state defendant’s motion to dismiss on ground of sovereign immunity was a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under O | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Keondrae Stillwell v. Topa Insurance Company
green
2 sentences2024Co., 363 Ga. App. 126 , 127 ( 871 SE2d 8 ) (2022); accord Douglas Cnty., 340 Ga. App. at 801 . 21 See supra note 1 & accompanying text. 7 Turning to the WCA, as a general matter, this statute is the exclusive remedy for a worker or next of kin who sustains an “injury” arising out of and in the course of employment.22 Further, whether an injury “arises out of and in the course of employment is generally a mixed question of law and fact,”23 and these two prerequisites are “independent and distinct[.]”24 And while the WCA is intended to have broad application,25 there are exceptions to this sweep 2024Co., 363 Ga. App. 126 , 127 ( 871 SE2d 8 ) (2022); accord Douglas Cnty., 340 Ga. App. at 801 . 21 See supra note 1 & accompanying text. 7 Turning to the WCA, as a general matter, this statute is the exclusive remedy for a worker or next of kin who sustains an “injury” arising out of and in the course of employment.22 Further, whether an injury “arises out of and in the course of employment is generally a mixed question of law and fact,”23 and these two prerequisites are “independent and distinct[.]”24 And while the WCA is intended to have broad application,25 there are exceptions to this sweep | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Owens v. State
green
2 sentences2020She did not enumerate this ruling as error in her initial brief and, generally, an appellant’s “failure to raise . . . matters in [her] enumeration of errors and initial brief precludes appellate review.” Owens v. State, 241 Ga. App. 140 (4) ( 525 SE2d 150 ) (1999). 2020She did not enumerate this ruling as error in her initial brief and, generally, an appellant’s “failure to raise . . . matters in [her] enumeration of errors and initial brief precludes appellate review.” Owens v. State, 241 Ga. App. 140 (4) ( 525 SE2d 150 ) (1999). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Oconee Community Service Board v. Holsey
green
2 sentences2017Bd. v. Holsey , 266 Ga. App. 385 , 385-386, 597 S.E.2d 489 (2004) ; Miller v. Dept. of Public Safety , 221 Ga. App. 280 , 281, 470 S.E.2d 773 (1996). 2 With respect to the DPS's facial challenge to subject matter jurisdiction under OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (1), we find that the factors (as set forth above in Harrison , 253 Ga. at 214-215 (2), 318 S.E.2d 306 ) controlling the trial court's exercise of discretion under OCGA § 9-11-12 (d) are clearly balanced in favor of prompt pre-trial determination of the motion. 2017Bd. v. Holsey , 266 Ga. App. 385 , 385-386, 597 S.E.2d 489 (2004) ; Miller v. Dept. of Public Safety , 221 Ga. App. 280 , 281, 470 S.E.2d 773 (1996). 2 With respect to the DPS's facial challenge to subject matter jurisdiction under OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (1), we find that the factors (as set forth above in Harrison , 253 Ga. at 214-215 (2), 318 S.E.2d 306 ) controlling the trial court's exercise of discretion under OCGA § 9-11-12 (d) are clearly balanced in favor of prompt pre-trial determination of the motion. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Miller v. Department of Public Safety
green
2 sentences2017Bd. v. Holsey , 266 Ga. App. 385 , 385-386, 597 S.E.2d 489 (2004) ; Miller v. Dept. of Public Safety , 221 Ga. App. 280 , 281, 470 S.E.2d 773 (1996). 2 With respect to the DPS's facial challenge to subject matter jurisdiction under OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (1), we find that the factors (as set forth above in Harrison , 253 Ga. at 214-215 (2), 318 S.E.2d 306 ) controlling the trial court's exercise of discretion under OCGA § 9-11-12 (d) are clearly balanced in favor of prompt pre-trial determination of the motion. 2017Bd. v. Holsey , 266 Ga. App. 385 , 385-386, 597 S.E.2d 489 (2004) ; Miller v. Dept. of Public Safety , 221 Ga. App. 280 , 281, 470 S.E.2d 773 (1996). 2 With respect to the DPS's facial challenge to subject matter jurisdiction under OCGA § 9-11-12 (b) (1), we find that the factors (as set forth above in Harrison , 253 Ga. at 214-215 (2), 318 S.E.2d 306 ) controlling the trial court's exercise of discretion under OCGA § 9-11-12 (d) are clearly balanced in favor of prompt pre-trial determination of the motion. | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Parker v. Crider Poultry, Inc.
neutral
1 sentence2016See Dept. of Transp. v. Dupree, 256 Ga. App. 668, 671-675 (1) (a), (b) ( 570 SE2d 668 ) (2002). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Cameron v. Lang
green
2 sentences2013The trial court found that Murphy was entitled to official immunity from suit as a court-appointed receiver, citing Cameron v. Lang, 274 Ga. 122 ( 549 SE2d 341 ) (2001), and dismissed the complaint. 2013The trial court found that Murphy was entitled to official immunity from suit as a court-appointed receiver, citing Cameron v. Lang, 274 Ga. 122 ( 549 SE2d 341 ) (2001), and dismissed the complaint. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.