section 19(k) attorney fees in Illinois

2016“Penalties for delayed payment are not intended to inhibit contests of liability *** by employers who honestly believe an employee not entitled to compensation; they are intended to promote the prompt payment of compensation where due and to deter those occasional employers or insurance carriers who might withhold payment from other than legitimate motives.” Id. at 301-02 , 412 N.E.2d at 470 . ¶ 34 The standard for awarding penalties under section 19(l) differs from the standard for awarding penalties and attorney fees under sections 19(k) and 16.

2016“Penalties for delayed payment are not intended to inhibit contests of liability *** by employers who honestly believe an employee not entitled to compensation; they are intended to promote the prompt payment of compensation where due and to deter those occasional employers or insurance carriers who might withhold payment from other than legitimate motives.” Id. at 301-02 , 412 N.E.2d at 470 . ¶ 34 The standard for awarding penalties under section 19(l) differs from the standard for awarding penalties and attorney fees under sections 19(k) and 16.

2016Jacobo, 2011 IL App (3d) 100807WC, ¶ 22 , 959 N.E.2d 772 . -9- ¶ 49 The standard for awarding penalties and attorney fees under sections 19(k) and 16 is higher than the standard for awarding penalties under section 19(l) because sections 19(k) and 16 require more than an “unreasonable delay” in payment of benefits.

2015Jacobo, 2011 IL App (3d) 100807WC ¶ 22 , 959 N.E.2d 772 . ¶ 49 The standard for awarding penalties and attorney fees under sections 19(k) and 16 is higher than the standard for awarding penalties under section 19(l) because sections 19(k) and (16) require more than an "unreasonable delay" in payment of benefits.

1997The imposition of penalties under section 19(k) is discretionary (see Smith , 170 Ill.

1997The imposition of penalties under section 19(k) is discretionary (see Smith, 170 Ill.

1997While it is true that prior to the supreme court’s decision in Board of Education ( 93 Ill. 2d 1 , 442 N.E.2d 861 ), penalties under section 19(k) and attorney fees could be assessed only after an award, this apparently is no longer the case.

1997While it is true that prior to the supreme court’s decision in Board of Education ( 93 Ill. 2d 1 , 442 N.E.2d 861 ), penalties under section 19(k) and attorney fees could be assessed only after an award, this apparently is no longer the case.

2012Gentleman, 260 Ill. at 320 .

2011Williams, 336 Ill.App.3d at 516 , 271 Ill.Dec. 178 , 784 N.E.2d at 399 . ¶ 23 An award of penalties and attorney fees pursuant to sections 19(k) and 16 are "intended to promote the prompt payment of compensation where due and to deter those occasional employers or insurance carriers who might withhold payment from other than legitimate motives." McMahan v. Industrial Comm'n, 289 Ill.

2011Williams, 336 Ill.App.3d at 516 , 271 Ill.Dec. 178 , 784 N.E.2d at 399 . ¶ 23 An award of penalties and attorney fees pursuant to sections 19(k) and 16 are "intended to promote the prompt payment of compensation where due and to deter those occasional employers or insurance carriers who might withhold payment from other than legitimate motives." McMahan v. Industrial Comm'n, 289 Ill.

2005Additionally, the Commission stated as follows: “Based on the entire record the Commission finds [employer’s] liability for [claimant’s TTD] and medical benefits was clear, and that these benefits were primarily denied because [employer’s] two insurance carriers could not determine which one was responsible therefor.” The Commission, citing Bunnow v. Industrial Comm’n, 327 Ill.

2002Navistar International Transportation Corp. v. Industrial Comm’n, 331 Ill.

2002In an opinion filed April 9, 1998, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s judgment in the section 19(g) proceeding, specifically finding that “[bjecause the defendant refused to pay the award of the Commission for over nine months, the plaintiff was entitled to reasonable attorney fees and costs.” Preston, 295 Ill.

2002In an opinion *1187 filed April 9, 1998, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment in the section 19(g) proceeding, specifically finding that "[b]ecause the defendant refused to pay the award of the Commission for over nine months, the plaintiff was entitled to reasonable attorney fees and costs." Preston, 295 Ill.App.3d at 662 , 230 Ill.Dec. 377 , 693 N.E.2d at 508 .

1992In Evans, the court stated: “Here, the record does not affirmatively establish that the respondent ever refused to pay the award so that petitioner was compelled to incur additional expenses.” ( 207 Ill.

1990Lastly, the Commission determined that this cause should be remanded to the arbitrator for further proceedings for a determination of the claimant’s entitlement to permanent disability in accordance with the holding of Thomas v. Industrial Comm’n (1980), 78 Ill. 2d 327 , 399 N.E.2d 1322 .

1990Lastly, the Commission determined that this cause should be remanded to the arbitrator for further proceedings for a determination of the claimant’s entitlement to permanent disability in accordance with the holding of Thomas v. Industrial Comm’n (1980), 78 Ill. 2d 327 , 399 N.E.2d 1322 .

1989App. 3d 876 , 536 N.E.2d 773 , in which we noted that the Commission’s award of penalties under section 19(k) and attorney fees under section 16 were unwarranted because the claimant had never presented those issues properly to the Commission.

1984Howlett v. Scott (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 135, 143 .

1984(Wood v. First National Bank (1943), 383 Ill. 515, 522 .)” (Johnston v. City of Bloomington (1979), 77 Ill. 2d 108, 112 .) Plaintiff’s allegation that the courts which approved the fees under section 19 lacked jurisdiction merely reasserts the invalidity of the statute and gives no basis to question that the court in the prior instances had jurisdiction over the parties or subject matter.

1984(Wood v. First National Bank (1943), 383 Ill. 515, 522 .)” (Johnston v. City of Bloomington (1979), 77 Ill. 2d 108, 112 .) Plaintiff’s allegation that the courts which approved the fees under section 19 lacked jurisdiction merely reasserts the invalidity of the statute and gives no basis to question that the court in the prior instances had jurisdiction over the parties or subject matter.

1982It argues that it is unduly harsh to require *12 employers to pay benefits before there is an adjudication of liability, as the employer does not know in advance how much he will be liable for even in those cases where he can reasonably predict that he will be held liable for some compensation, and cites Brinkmann v. Industrial Com. (1980), 82 Ill.2d 462 , for the proposition that penalties under section 19(k) and attorney fees under section 16 must be based on an existing award of benefits, the payment of which is delayed.

1982It argues that it is unduly harsh to require employers to pay benefits before there is an adjudication of liability, as the employer does not know in advance how much he will be liable for even in those cases where he can reasonably predict that he will be held liable for some compensation, and cites Brinkmann v. Industrial Com. (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 462 , for the proposition that penalties under section 19(k) and attorney fees under section 16 must be based on an existing award of benefits, the payment of which is delayed.