Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
20 Maine opinions name it 2 courts 1990–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maine courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Darling v. Augusta Mental Health Institutegreen2 sentences2019See Grossman v. Richards, 1999 ME 9 , ¶ 9, 722 A.2d 371 (“the ‘bad faith’ provision in section 8111(1)(E) does not apply to discretionary act immunity under section 8111(1)(C)); see also Darling, 535 A.2d at 425 (explaining purpose for the rule). 2011Our construction of section 8111(1)(C) has long afforded immunity from tort liability “associated with a plan or policy developed at a high level of government.” Tolliver, 2008 ME 83, ¶ 19 , 948 A.2d 1223 (citing Darling, 535 A.2d at 426 ). | 5 | 7 |
Grossman v. Richardsgreen2 sentences2019See Grossman v. Richards, 1999 ME 9 , ¶ 9, 722 A.2d 371 (“the ‘bad faith’ provision in section 8111(1)(E) does not apply to discretionary act immunity under section 8111(1)(C)); see also Darling, 535 A.2d at 425 (explaining purpose for the rule). 2011See Grossman, 1999 ME 9 , ¶ 8, 722 A.2d 371 (quoting the trial court’s reasoning that elected alderman’s public comments at a city council meeting were “ill-informed, ill-advised, and otherwise actionable” but not in excess of section 8111(1)(C) immunity). | 3 | 6 |
Leach v. Bettersgreen2 sentences2014See generally Leach v. Betters, 599 A.2d 424, 426 (Me.1991) (assuming without deciding that the MTCA’s discretionary immunity provisions did not apply to shield defendant police officers from a claim alleging a violation of a statute that prohibited wanton and oppressive conduct in connection with making an arrest). [¶ 51] While the absolute immunity provision of section 8111(1) of the MTCA would bar a claim against Dr. Kem-merer, even perhaps an MCRA claim, based on negligence or carelessness, it does not bar this particular MCRA claim alleging violation of and disregard for the statutory man 1999See Grossman, 1999 ME 9 , ¶ 3, 722 A.2d at 373 . [¶ 6] The MTCA applies a policy of broad liability to governmental employees, subject to the exceptions enumerated in the immunity provisions of 14 M.R.S.A. § 8111(1). 3 See Leach v. Betters, 599 A.2d 424, 425 (Me.1991) (“[Gjovernmental employees remain hable for their tortious conduct unless immunity is specifically granted.”); Moore v. City of Lewiston, 596 A.2d 612, 614-15 (Me.1991). | 3 | 3 |
Day's Auto Body, Inc. v. Town of Medwaygreen2 sentences2018Day's Auto Body, Inc. v. Town of Medway , 2016 ME 121 , ¶ 20, 145 A.3d 1030 . [¶ 22] Title 14 M.R.S. § 8111(1)(E) further provides that "such immunity does not exist in any case in which an employee's actions are found to have been in bad faith." We have stated that the "bad faith" language does not apply to negate the absolute immunities of 14 M.R.S. § 8111(1)(A)-(D). 2018Day's Auto Body, Inc. v. Town of Medway , 2016 ME 121 , ¶ 20, 145 A.3d 1030 . [¶ 22] Title 14 M.R.S. § 8111(1)(E) further provides that "such immunity does not exist in any case in which an employee's actions are found to have been in bad faith." We have stated that the "bad faith" language does not apply to negate the absolute immunities of 14 M.R.S. § 8111(1)(A)-(D). | 1 | 3 |
Selby v. Cumberland Countygreen2 sentences2013We have indicated that discretionary function immunity does not extend to actions 'that so clearly exceed the scope of the official's authority that the official cannot be said to be acting in an official capacity."' Selby v. Cumberland County, 2002 ME 80 , <J[ 6 n.5, 796 A.2d 678 . 2013We have indicated that discretionary function immunity does not extend to actions 'that so clearly exceed the scope of the official's authority that the official cannot be said to be acting in an official capacity."' Selby v. Cumberland County, 2002 ME 80 , <J[ 6 n.5, 796 A.2d 678 . | 1 | 2 |
Tolliver v. Department of Transportationgreen2 sentences2011Our construction of section 8111(1)(C) has long afforded immunity from tort liability “associated with a plan or policy developed at a high level of government.” Tolliver, 2008 ME 83, ¶ 19 , 948 A.2d 1223 (citing Darling, 535 A.2d at 426 ). 2011Our construction of section 8111(1)(C) has long afforded immunity from tort liability “associated with a plan or policy developed at a high level of government.” Tolliver, 2008 ME 83, ¶ 19 , 948 A.2d 1223 (citing Darling, 535 A.2d at 426 ). | 1 | 1 |
Taylor v. Herstgreen1 sentence2004Ctr., 559 A.2d 358, 360 (Me.1989); Taylor v. Herst, 537 A.2d 1163, 1165 (Me.1988). | 1 | 1 |
Clark v. Maine Medical Centergreen1 sentence2004Ctr., 559 A.2d 358, 360 (Me.1989); Taylor v. Herst, 537 A.2d 1163, 1165 (Me.1988). | 1 | 1 |
Carroll v. City of Portlandgreen2 sentences2003In keeping with the statutory language, in Carroll v. City of Portland, we expressly noted that “[njotwithstanding the immunity waiver provisions of section 8104-A, section 8104-B expressly retains certain types of immunity for governmental entities, including discretionary function immunity.” 1999 ME 131 , ¶ 6 n. 3, 736 A.2d 279, 282 (emphasis added). [¶ 13] Moreover, 14 M.R.S.A. § 8111(1)(C) provides absolute immunity to Hall for performing or failing to perform any discretionary function or duty, regardless of whether or not she abuses that discretion. 2003In keeping with the statutory language, in Carroll v. City of Portland, we expressly noted that “[njotwithstanding the immunity waiver provisions of section 8104-A, section 8104-B expressly retains certain types of immunity for governmental entities, including discretionary function immunity.” 1999 ME 131 , ¶ 6 n. 3, 736 A.2d 279, 282 (emphasis added). [¶ 13] Moreover, 14 M.R.S.A. § 8111(1)(C) provides absolute immunity to Hall for performing or failing to perform any discretionary function or duty, regardless of whether or not she abuses that discretion. | 1 | 1 |
Dall v. Carongreen1 sentence1999See Dall v. Caron, 628 A.2d 117, 119 (Me.1993). | 1 | 1 |
Cook v. Lisbon School Committeegreen1 sentence1999See Cook, 682 A.2d at 676 . | 1 | 1 |
Moore v. City of Lewistongreen2 sentences1999See Grossman, 1999 ME 9 , ¶ 3, 722 A.2d at 373 . [¶ 6] The MTCA applies a policy of broad liability to governmental employees, subject to the exceptions enumerated in the immunity provisions of 14 M.R.S.A. § 8111(1). [3] See Leach v. Betters, 599 A.2d 424, 425 (Me.1991) ("[G]overnmental employees remain liable for their tortious conduct unless immunity is specifically granted."); Moore v. City of Lewiston, 596 A.2d 612, 614-15 (Me.1991). 1999See Grossman, 1999 ME 9 , ¶ 3, 722 A.2d at 373 . [¶ 6] The MTCA applies a policy of broad liability to governmental employees, subject to the exceptions enumerated in the immunity provisions of 14 M.R.S.A. § 8111(1). 3 See Leach v. Betters, 599 A.2d 424, 425 (Me.1991) (“[Gjovernmental employees remain hable for their tortious conduct unless immunity is specifically granted.”); Moore v. City of Lewiston, 596 A.2d 612, 614-15 (Me.1991). | 1 | 1 |
True v. Ladnerred1 sentence1996The Act provides discretionary immunity to government employees for conduct that is within the scope of their employment. 5 As we have noted before, such immunity “insulates from personal liability a government employee who has been legislatively authorized to perform some discretionary function and ‘has acted, or has failed to act, pursuant to that authorization.’ ” Darling, 535 A.2d at 425 (quoting True v. Ladner, 513 A.2d 257, 260 (Me.1986)). | 1 | 1 |
Jensen v. Augusta Mental Health Institutegreen1 sentence1992Cf. Jensen v. Augusta Mental Health Inst., 574 A.2d 885, 886 (Me.1990); Darling v. Augusta Mental Health Inst., 535 A.2d 421, 424 (Me.1987). *791 Brooks also contends that the State employees in this case are not protected by immunity despite the provisions of 14 M.R.S.A. § 8111(1)(C) (Supp.1991). 3 It is unclear from the complaint whether Commissioner Glover is sued in his official capacity or in his individual capacity. | 1 | 1 |
Miller v. Szelenyigreen1 sentence1990Id.; see also Miller v. Szelenyi, 546 A.2d 1013, 1021-22 (Me.1988) (no evidence medical personnel acted outside scope of employment); Darling, 535 A.2d at 425 (immunity applies only to government employees whose conduct is “within the scope of their employment”). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maine. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Morgan v. Kooistra
green
2 sentences2016“Conduct that is within the scope of employment is the type of conduct the employee was hired to perform; occurs within the time and space of the employment; and is undertaken, at least partially, to serve the employee’s master.” Morgan v. Kooistra, 2008 ME 26, ¶ 21 , 941 A.2d 447 . [¶ 21] Here, the summary judgment record confirms that ELS’s alleged conduct meets all of the requirements for intentional act immunity pursuant to section 8111(1)(E). 2016“Conduct that is within the scope of employment is the type of conduct the employee was hired to perform; occurs within the time and space of the employment; and is undertaken, at least partially, to serve the employee’s master.” Morgan v. Kooistra, 2008 ME 26, ¶ 21 , 941 A.2d 447 . [¶ 21] Here, the summary judgment record confirms that ELS’s alleged conduct meets all of the requirements for intentional act immunity pursuant to section 8111(1)(E). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Beaulieu v. the Aube Corp.
green
2 sentences2014Beaulieu v. Aube Corp., 2002 ME 79, ¶ 19 , 796 A.2d 683 . 2014Beaulieu v. Aube Corp., 2002 ME 79, ¶ 19 , 796 A.2d 683 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Lever v. Acadia Hospital Corp.
green
1 sentence2013Corp., 2004 ME 35 , (When medical personnel of private hospitals are evaluating individuals to determine if they should be involuntarily committed to a psychiatric hospital pursuant to state law, they are acting as state employees, entitled to discretionary function immunity pursuant to section 8111 of the Maine Tort Claims Act.) The language of Doe v. Graham, suggests that "[n]ot all actions taken by physicians or hospital employees during the course of an involuntary commitment evaluation are automatically immunized from suit. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.