section 13 statutory in Alabama

2006In Sheffield v. State, 708 So.2d 899 (Ala.Crim.App.1997), this court addressed the statutory mandate of § 13A-1-6, Ala.Code 1975, which requires all provisions of the Alabama Criminal Code to be construed "according to the fair import of their terms to promote justice and to effect the objects of the law. . . ." We stated: "The focus in § 13A-1-6 on the `fair import of [a penal statute's] terms' is the legislature's manifestation of its `preference for the meaning of the statute over legislative intent as a criterion of interpretation.' `The reference to a "meaning of the statute" which is jux

2006In Sheffield v. State, 708 So.2d 899 (Ala.Crim.App.1997), this court addressed the statutory mandate of § 13A-1-6, Ala.Code 1975, which requires all provisions of the Alabama Criminal Code to be construed “according to the fair import of their terms to promote justice and to effect the objects of the law We stated: “The focus in § 13A-1-6 on the ‘fair import of [a penal statute’s] terms’ is the legislature’s manifestation of its ‘preference for the meaning of the statute over legislative intent as a criterion of interpretation.’ ‘The reference to a “meaning of the statute” which is juxtaposed

1999Thus, in Tucker v. State, 537 So.2d 59 (Ala.Cr.App.1988), this court held that an indictment that charged the capital murder of a police officer in alternative language complied with the statutory language of § 13A-6-2(a)(1) and § 13A-5-40(a)(5), Code of Alabama 1975.

1992Thus, in Tucker v. State, 537 So.2d 59 (Ala.Cr.App.1988), this court held that an indictment that charged the capital murder of a police officer in alternative language complied with the statutory language of § 13A-6-2(a)(1) and § 13A-5-40(a)(5), Code of Alabama 1975.

2008Therefore, he was at all times represented by the counsel to which he was entitled, see Whitehead and Robitaille, supra; thus, there was no basis upon which to declare a mistrial.

2003See also the following cases reviewing statutes similar in pertinent part to the “attempt” provision of § 13A-6-23: People v. Stout, 193 Colo. 466 , 568 P.2d 52 (1977); State v. Garcias, 296 Or. 688 , 679 P.2d 1354 (1984).

2003See also the following cases reviewing statutes similar in pertinent part to the “attempt” provision of § 13A-6-23: People v. Stout, 193 Colo. 466 , 568 P.2d 52 (1977); State v. Garcias, 296 Or. 688 , 679 P.2d 1354 (1984).

2003See also the following cases reviewing statutes similar in pertinent part to the “attempt” provision of § 13A-6-23: People v. Stout, 193 Colo. 466 , 568 P.2d 52 (1977); State v. Garcias, 296 Or. 688 , 679 P.2d 1354 (1984).

2003See also the following cases reviewing statutes similar in pertinent part to the “attempt” provision of § 13A-6-23: People v. Stout, 193 Colo. 466 , 568 P.2d 52 (1977); State v. Garcias, 296 Or. 688 , 679 P.2d 1354 (1984).

1997In Teske v. State, 507 So.2d 569 (Ala. Crim.App.1987), this court held: "`It has been pointed out that "courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver" of fundamental constitutional rights and that we "do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights." A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.

1997In addition, the appellant admits that, in Freeman v. State , 555 So.2d 196 (Ala.Cr.App. 1988), aff'd , 555 So.2d 215 (Ala. 1989), cert. denied , 496 U.S. 912 , 110 S.Ct. 2604 , 110 L.Ed.2d 284 (1990), this Court found that a similar error with respect to juvenile adjudications was harmless because the appellant also had adult criminal convictions.

1997In addition, the appellant admits that, in Freeman v. State , 555 So.2d 196 (Ala.Cr.App. 1988), aff'd , 555 So.2d 215 (Ala. 1989), cert. denied , 496 U.S. 912 , 110 S.Ct. 2604 , 110 L.Ed.2d 284 (1990), this Court found that a similar error with respect to juvenile adjudications was harmless because the appellant also had adult criminal convictions.

1997"Thus appears a clear legislative purpose to depart from the parent act[s]," Ivey v. Railway Fuel Co. , 218 Ala. 407 , 409 , 118 So. 583 (1928), which explicitly included real property.

1997"Thus appears a clear legislative purpose to depart from the parent act[s]," Ivey v. Railway Fuel Co. , 218 Ala. 407 , 409 , 118 So. 583 (1928), which explicitly included real property.

1997In addition, the appellant admits that, in Freeman v. State , 555 So.2d 196 (Ala.Cr.App. 1988), aff'd , 555 So.2d 215 (Ala. 1989), cert. denied , 496 U.S. 912 , 110 S.Ct. 2604 , 110 L.Ed.2d 284 (1990), this Court found that a similar error with respect to juvenile adjudications was harmless because the appellant also had adult criminal convictions.

1991The trial court's oral sentencing of the appellant states that "[t]he Court has considered the circumstances in this case and finds that the aggravating circumstances enumerated herein to be present and outweigh the mitigating circumstances offered by the defendant." " 'Without knowing what the trial judge did, [this Court will be] unable to properly review his sentencing decision.' [ Ex parte ] Cochran , 500 So.2d 1179 (Ala. 1985)." Murry v. State , supra, at 1359.

1991Cf. Ex parte Henderson , 584 So.2d 862 (Ala. 1991) (wherein the Alabama Supreme Court remanded a death case to this court, where this court failed to follow the statutory mandate of § 13A-5-53 , Code of Alabama 1975).

1991The offense of unlawful distribution of a controlled substance is defined in § 13A-12-211, Code of Alabama 1975, as follows: “A person commits the crime of unlawful distribution of controlled substances if, except as otherwise authorized, he sells, furnishes, gives away, manufactures, delivers or distributes a controlled substance enumerated in schedules I through V.” In Ex parte Harper, [Ms. 1901019, Sept. 27, 1991], 1991 WL 189276 (Ala.1991), the Supreme Court held that an indictment that tracked the statutory language of § 13A-12-211, Code of Alabama 1975, was not void for failing to allege

1987Section 13A-6-43, Code of Alabama 1975 provides in the relevant part as follows: “(a) A person commits the crime of kidnapping in the first degree if he abducts another person with intent to * * * “(4) Inflict physical injury upon him or to violate him sexually;” * * * In Guess v. State, 507 So.2d 546 (Ala. Crim.App.1986) aff’d 507 So.2d 551 (Ala. 1987) states: “Pursuant to the new kidnapping statute, the State must prove two intents: The first deriving from the abduction element and the second from the statutory subdivisions of § 13A-6-43(a)(lH6).” quoting Owens v. State, [Ms. 4 Div. 536 , Fe

1987Section 13A-6-43, Code of Alabama 1975 provides in the relevant part as follows: “(a) A person commits the crime of kidnapping in the first degree if he abducts another person with intent to * * * “(4) Inflict physical injury upon him or to violate him sexually;” * * * In Guess v. State, 507 So.2d 546 (Ala. Crim.App.1986) aff’d 507 So.2d 551 (Ala. 1987) states: “Pursuant to the new kidnapping statute, the State must prove two intents: The first deriving from the abduction element and the second from the statutory subdivisions of § 13A-6-43(a)(lH6).” quoting Owens v. State, [Ms. 4 Div. 536 , Fe

1983See, Marvin v. State , 407 So.2d 576 (Ala.Cr.App. 1981); Petty v. State , 414 So.2d 182 (Ala.Cr.App. 1982).

1983See, Marvin v. State, 407 So.2d 576 (Ala.Cr.App.1981); Petty v. State, 414 So.2d 182 (Ala.Cr.App.1982).

1922Co. v. Cruise, supra, and Montgomery v. Kelly, 142 Ala. 552 , 38 South. 67 , 70 L.