section 16-1-7(b) first prosecution in Georgia

2023There thus appears to be no dispute that the two newly added counts of conviction for enticing a minor and aggravated child molestation “arose from the same conduct” as the original two counts because the four charges all arose from the same course of conduct between Mathis and N. P. See Nicely v. State, 305 Ga. App. 387, 389 (1) ( 699 SE2d 774 ) (2010) (traffic violation and charge of possession of cocaine both discovered as part of the same traffic stop were part of the same transaction and course of conduct such that they were required to be brought in the same prosecution under OCGA § 16-1

2023There thus appears to be no dispute that the two newly added counts of conviction for enticing a minor and aggravated child molestation “arose from the same conduct” as the original two counts because the four charges all arose from the same course of conduct between Mathis and N. P. See Nicely v. State, 305 Ga. App. 387, 389 (1) ( 699 SE2d 774 ) (2010) (traffic violation and charge of possession of cocaine both discovered as part of the same traffic stop were part of the same transaction and course of conduct such that they were required to be brought in the same prosecution under OCGA § 16-1

2026“In other words, a second prosecution is barred under OCGA § 16- 1-8(b)(1) if it is for crimes which should have been brought in the first prosecution under OCGA § 16-1-7(b).” Maxwell v. State, 311 Ga. 673, 677 (2021) (cleaned up).

2026In other words, “a second prosecution is barred ... if it is for crimes which 5 should have been brought in the first prosecution under OCGA § 16-1-7(b).” Maxwell, 311 Ga. at 677 (cleaned up).

2024See Brown v. State, 251 Ga. App. 569, 571-572 ( 554 SE2d 760 ) (2001) (defendant was not subject to former prosecution by virtue of having paid a fine for a seat belt violation); Collins v. State, 177 Ga. App. 758 (1) ( 341 SE2d 288 ) (1986) (defendant not subject to former prosecution after clerk accepted payment of fine for speeding ticket).

2024See Brown v. State, 251 Ga. App. 569, 571-572 ( 554 SE2d 760 ) (2001) (defendant was not subject to former prosecution by virtue of having paid a fine for a seat belt violation); Collins v. State, 177 Ga. App. 758 (1) ( 341 SE2d 288 ) (1986) (defendant not subject to former prosecution after clerk accepted payment of fine for speeding ticket).

2024See Brown v. State, 251 Ga. App. 569, 571-572 ( 554 SE2d 760 ) (2001) (defendant was not subject to former prosecution by virtue of having paid a fine for a seat belt violation); Collins v. State, 177 Ga. App. 758 (1) ( 341 SE2d 288 ) (1986) (defendant not subject to former prosecution after clerk accepted payment of fine for speeding ticket).

2024See Brown v. State, 251 Ga. App. 569, 571-572 ( 554 SE2d 760 ) (2001) (defendant was not subject to former prosecution by virtue of having paid a fine for a seat belt violation); Collins v. State, 177 Ga. App. 758 (1) ( 341 SE2d 288 ) (1986) (defendant not subject to former prosecution after clerk accepted payment of fine for speeding ticket).

2020In order for this procedural aspect of double jeopardy to prohibit a prosecution, all three prongs must be satisfied.3 Offenses occur as a result of the same conduct and therefore constitute procedural double jeopardy, if the crimes . . . arise from the same transaction or continuing course of conduct, occur at the same scene, occur on the same date, and occur without a break in the action; additionally, if it is necessary to present evidence of the one crime in order to prove the other, then the State must prosecute those charges at the same time.4 “The appellate standard of review of a grant

2020In order for this procedural aspect of double jeopardy to prohibit a prosecution, all three prongs must be satisfied.3 Offenses occur as a result of the same conduct and therefore constitute procedural double jeopardy, if the crimes . . . arise from the same transaction or continuing course of conduct, occur at the same scene, occur on the same date, and occur without a break in the action; additionally, if it is necessary to present evidence of the one crime in order to prove the other, then the State must prosecute those charges at the same time.4 “The appellate standard of review of a grant

2011Although the State suggests that a probate court solicitor is not a “prosecuting officer,” the phrase “proper prosecuting officer” refers to “the prosecuting attorney for the State.” (Citation, punctuation and emphasis omitted.) Price v. State, 206 Ga. App. 161, 162 (1) ( 424 SE2d 841 ) (1992).

2011Although the State suggests that a probate court solicitor is not a “prosecuting officer,” the phrase “proper prosecuting officer” refers to “the prosecuting attorney for the State.” (Citation, punctuation and emphasis omitted.) Price v. State, 206 Ga. App. 161, 162 (1) ( 424 SE2d 841 ) (1992).

1999Hill v. State, 234 Ga. App. 173, 175 ( 507 SE2d 3 ) (1998). *136 Honea contends that when the state court prosecuting officer (the solicitor general) commenced the theft by receiving prosecution in the state court, he knew of the facts which supported the felony theft by receiving charge subsequently brought in the superior court accusation.

1999Hill v. State, 234 Ga. App. 173, 175 ( 507 SE2d 3 ) (1998). *136 Honea contends that when the state court prosecuting officer (the solicitor general) commenced the theft by receiving prosecution in the state court, he knew of the facts which supported the felony theft by receiving charge subsequently brought in the superior court accusation.

1998In Baker v. State, 257 Ga. 567, 569 ( 361 SE2d 808 ) (1987), the Supreme Court held that OCGA § 16-1-7 (b) applies “ ‘only to such crimes which are actually known to the prosecuting officer actually handling the proceedings.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Subsequent decisions of this Court have held that since a prosecution is commenced with the return of the indictment or the filing of the accusation (OCGA § 16-1-3 (14)), “the prosecuting officer actually handling the proceedings” refers to the attorney who initiates the case, either by filing the accusation or achieving a return of the indictmen

1998In Baker v. State, 257 Ga. 567, 569 ( 361 SE2d 808 ) (1987), the Supreme Court held that OCGA § 16-1-7 (b) applies “ ‘only to such crimes which are actually known to the prosecuting officer actually handling the proceedings.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Subsequent decisions of this Court have held that since a prosecution is commenced with the return of the indictment or the filing of the accusation (OCGA § 16-1-3 (14)), “the prosecuting officer actually handling the proceedings” refers to the attorney who initiates the case, either by filing the accusation or achieving a return of the indictmen

1997McCannon v. State, 252 Ga. 515, 518 ( 315 SE2d 413 ) (1984).

1997McCannon v. State, 252 Ga. 515, 518 ( 315 SE2d 413 ) (1984).

1991The phrase ‘the same conduct’ in this statute has been used interchangeably with the phrase ‘the same transaction.’ [Cit.]” Harrell v. State, 196 Ga. App. 101, 102-103 (1, 2) ( 395 SE2d 598 ) (1990).

1991The phrase ‘the same conduct’ in this statute has been used interchangeably with the phrase ‘the same transaction.’ [Cit.]” Harrell v. State, 196 Ga. App. 101, 102-103 (1, 2) ( 395 SE2d 598 ) (1990).

1986As stated in Smith v. State, 173 Ga. App. 728, 730 ( 327 SE2d 839 ) (1985), “[w]e reject any contention that when one steals a vehicle, every act however unrelated and independent which he commits while in possession of that vehicle is, by virtue of that single fact, of the same conduct and same continuing transaction as the theft of the vehicle.” Accordingly, we find no violation of the federal constitutional bar against double jeopardy and no impermissible multiple or successive prosecution under OCGA §§ 16-1-7 (b) or 16-1-8 (b). 2.

1986As stated in Smith v. State, 173 Ga. App. 728, 730 ( 327 SE2d 839 ) (1985), “[w]e reject any contention that when one steals a vehicle, every act however unrelated and independent which he commits while in possession of that vehicle is, by virtue of that single fact, of the same conduct and same continuing transaction as the theft of the vehicle.” Accordingly, we find no violation of the federal constitutional bar against double jeopardy and no impermissible multiple or successive prosecution under OCGA §§ 16-1-7 (b) or 16-1-8 (b). 2.