section 236(b) marital property in New York

2025The vast majority of marital assets are held in the Trusts, including the family homes ( Torkin , 236 AD3d 1082; Yerushalmi , 136 AD3d 812).

2025The vast majority of marital assets are held in the Trusts, including the family homes ( Torkin , 236 AD3d 1082 ; Yerushalmi , 136 AD3d 812 ).

2025The vast majority of marital assets are held in the Trusts, including the family homes ( Torkin , 236 AD3d 1082; Yerushalmi , 136 AD3d 812).

2025The vast majority of marital assets are held in the Trusts, including the family homes ( Torkin , 236 AD3d 1082 ; Yerushalmi , 136 AD3d 812 ).

2016In insisting that the Christian standard must be employed here, the dissent relies on Goldman v Goldman ( 118 AD2d 498 [1st Dept 1986]), which does not provide any support for its point.

2016In insisting that the Christian standard must be employed here, the dissent relies on Goldman v Goldman ( 118 AD2d 498 [1st Dept 1986]), which does not provide any support for its point.

2004These are matters of equity (see, Mandel v Mandel, 109 Misc 2d 1 [1981]).

2000The trial court properly exercised its discretion in concluding that it was appropriate to award the plaintiff 50% of the defendant’s enhanced earning capacity (see, O’Brien v O’Brien, 66 NY2d 576 ; Vainchenker v Vainchenker, 242 AD2d 620 ; Rosenberg v Rosenberg, 155 AD2d 428 ; cf., Duspiva v Duspiva, 181 AD2d 810 ), especially in light of" the plaintiff’s substantial economic as well as noneconomic contributions to the defendant’s acquisition of his medical degree and license.

2000The trial court properly exercised its discretion in concluding that it was appropriate to award the plaintiff 50% of the defendant’s enhanced earning capacity (see, O’Brien v O’Brien, 66 NY2d 576 ; Vainchenker v Vainchenker, 242 AD2d 620 ; Rosenberg v Rosenberg, 155 AD2d 428 ; cf., Duspiva v Duspiva, 181 AD2d 810 ), especially in light of" the plaintiff’s substantial economic as well as noneconomic contributions to the defendant’s acquisition of his medical degree and license.

2000The trial court properly exercised its discretion in concluding that it was appropriate to award the plaintiff 50% of the defendant’s enhanced earning capacity (see, O’Brien v O’Brien, 66 NY2d 576 ; Vainchenker v Vainchenker, 242 AD2d 620 ; Rosenberg v Rosenberg, 155 AD2d 428 ; cf., Duspiva v Duspiva, 181 AD2d 810 ), especially in light of" the plaintiff’s substantial economic as well as noneconomic contributions to the defendant’s acquisition of his medical degree and license.

1996Mtge. v Goldsmith, 154 Misc 2d 853 ).

1996The question of whether the Middle Patent Farm and its contents constituted "marital” property under Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) was irrelevant to the third-party creditor, since the former husband could only have had an inchoate right to such property, which could only mature "into a true ownership interest when the equitable distribution judgment terminated the action” (McDermott v McDermott, 119 AD2d 370, 379 ; Arbor Natl.

1995While defendant was undoubtedly under an obligation to fully inform plaintiff as to the existence of his pension benefits (see, Abbate v Abbate, supra), which he did, this court cannot read into that requirement an additional obligation that defendant proffer his opinion as to whether those benefits are marital property under Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B).

1991Among the factors which courts have held should be considered before determining whether a spouse’s conduct amounts to wasteful dissipation of marital property are the following: (a) the intent involved in the commission of the act; (b) concealment of a wasting of assets (Lenczycki v Lenczycki, 152 AD2d 621, 624 [2d Dept 1989]); (c) use of the asset by one spouse only or by both spouses for marital purposes (Seeley v Seeley, 135 AD2d 703 [2d Dept 1987]); (d) joint dissipation of property, regardless of purpose (supra); (e) time of commission of act, i.e., before or after commencement of action

1991Among the factors which courts have held should be considered before determining whether a spouse’s conduct amounts to wasteful dissipation of marital property are the following: (a) the intent involved in the commission of the act; (b) concealment of a wasting of assets (Lenczycki v Lenczycki, 152 AD2d 621, 624 [2d Dept 1989]); (c) use of the asset by one spouse only or by both spouses for marital purposes (Seeley v Seeley, 135 AD2d 703 [2d Dept 1987]); (d) joint dissipation of property, regardless of purpose (supra); (e) time of commission of act, i.e., before or after commencement of action

1988Rather, I find nothing in O’Brien which overrules the Conner court’s holding that "we may not indulge in the fiction that an academic degree can be evaluated as reified marital property” (Conner v Conner, supra, at 102 ).

1988I note, in any event, that contrary to the conclusion reached by the majority, I am of the view that an academic degree, unlike a professional license, is not property susceptible of distribution pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (Conner v Conner, 97 AD2d 88 ; Cronin v Cronin, 131 Misc 2d 879 ).

1988Supreme Court properly based the value of the credit to defendant for the marital residence on its value at the time of the marriage, and not its future sale, since any appreciation in its value was taken out of the narrow separate property exception in Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (1) (d) (3) by plaintiff’s contributions as parent, homemaker and helpmate (see, Price v Price, 69 NY2d 8, 15-18 , supra; Brennan v Brennan, 103 AD2d 48 ).

1988I note, in any event, that contrary to the conclusion reached by the majority, I am of the view that an academic degree, unlike a professional license, is not property susceptible of distribution pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (Conner v Conner, 97 AD2d 88 ; Cronin v Cronin, 131 Misc 2d 879 ).

1986Specifically, the court overlooked the critical consideration of essential fairness and equity, which is incorporated as part of the "catch-all” factor in section 236 (B) (5) (d) (10), enumerated with the other factors in the statute (see, Cappiello v Cappiello, 110 AD2d 608, 609 , affd 66 NY2d 107 ).

1986It must, therefore, be concluded that the Legislature did not intend generally that one who intentionally or recklessly (and not by accident or in self-defense) causes the death of his spouse with requisite conscious awareness of the consequences (Matter of Wells, 76 Misc 2d 458 , affd 45 AD2d 993 ) should be permitted to retain title to property which would otherwise have been distributed to the decedent as an equitable share of marital property pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 236.

1986Specifically, the court overlooked the critical consideration of essential fairness and equity, which is incorporated as part of the "catch-all” factor in section 236 (B) (5) (d) (10), enumerated with the other factors in the statute (see, Cappiello v Cappiello, 110 AD2d 608, 609 , affd 66 NY2d 107 ).

1986This theory has been applied to prevent a person who kills another from taking under the victim’s will (Riggs v Palmer, supra), succeeding to a share of the victim’s estate in intestacy (Bierbrauer v Moran, 244 App Div 87 ; Matter of Sengillo, 206 Misc 751 ), receiving the proceeds of an insurance policy on the life of the victim (Boatwright v Hartford Ins.

1986This theory has been applied to prevent a person who kills another from taking under the victim’s will (Riggs v Palmer, supra), succeeding to a share of the victim’s estate in intestacy (Bierbrauer v Moran, 244 App Div 87 ; Matter of Sengillo, 206 Misc 751 ), receiving the proceeds of an insurance policy on the life of the victim (Boatwright v Hartford Ins.

1986This theory has been applied to prevent a person who kills another from taking under the victim’s will (Riggs v Palmer, supra), succeeding to a share of the victim’s estate in intestacy (Bierbrauer v Moran, 244 App Div 87 ; Matter of Sengillo, 206 Misc 751 ), receiving the proceeds of an insurance policy on the life of the victim (Boatwright v Hartford Ins.

1983But dissolution of the family unit is not a prerequisite to the exercise of the power afforded this court by sections 234 and 252 of the Domestic Relations Law (cf. Kahn v Kahn, 43 NY2d 203 ) and this court perceives no reason why it should be.