section 402(a) suitable work in Pennsylvania

1992Cf. General Motors Corp., Fisher Body Division v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 14 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 537, 322 A.2d 762 (1974); MacDonald v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 17 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 494, 333 A.2d 199 (1975) (cases wherein this Court held that rigid interpretation of notice requirements in administrative regulations formulated by the Bureau with regard to the form of the employer’s notice could not be utilized to grant benefits to one who had refused suitable work under Section 402(a)).

1978Cf. General Motors Corp., Fisher Body Division v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 14 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 537 , 322 A.2d 762 (1974); MacDonald v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 17 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 494 , 333 A.2d 199 (1975) (cases wherein this Court held that rigid interpretation of notice requirements in administrative regulations formulated by the Bureau with regard to the form of the employer’s notice could not be utilized to grant benefits to one who had refused suitable work under Section 402(a)).

1992Cf. General Motors Corp., Fisher Body Division v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 14 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 537, 322 A.2d 762 (1974); MacDonald v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 17 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 494, 333 A.2d 199 (1975) (cases wherein this Court held that rigid interpretation of notice requirements in administrative regulations formulated by the Bureau with regard to the form of the employer’s notice could not be utilized to grant benefits to one who had refused suitable work under Section 402(a)).

1978Cf. General Motors Corp., Fisher Body Division v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 14 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 537 , 322 A.2d 762 (1974); MacDonald v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 17 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 494 , 333 A.2d 199 (1975) (cases wherein this Court held that rigid interpretation of notice requirements in administrative regulations formulated by the Bureau with regard to the form of the employer’s notice could not be utilized to grant benefits to one who had refused suitable work under Section 402(a)).

2025It is the opposite of a 11 discharge, dismissal[,] or layoff by the employer or other [a]ction by the employer severing relations with [its] employes . . . .’ Labor [&] Indus[.] [Dep’t] v. Unemployment Comp[.] [Bd.] of Rev[.], . . . 3 A.2d 211, 213 , . . . ([Pa. Super.] 1938). . . .

2024Id.

2014While Claimant adduced some evidence to this 10 Further, an ARD is statutorily defined as a “prior offense” for purposes of the ignition interlock statute, Whalen, 32 A.3d at 685 , and as a “conviction” for sentencing purposes on subsequent DUIs.

1992Id. 36 Pa.Cmwlth. 325, at 331 , 387 A.2d 1324, at 1328 .

1992Id. 36 Pa.Cmwlth. 325, at 331 , 387 A.2d 1324, at 1328 .

1987Season All Industries, 41 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at 273 , 398 A.2d at 1094 .

1987Season All Industries, 41 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at 273 , 398 A.2d at 1094 .

1984Since, however, this is a willful misconduct case under Section 402(e) and not a work stoppage case under Section 402(d), the federal distinctions are not greatly material to this case. [13] In Unemployment Compensation Board of Review v. Sun Oil Co., 476 Pa. 589 , 383 A.2d 519 (1978), appeal dismissed, 440 U.S. 977 , 99 S.Ct. 1782 , 60 L.Ed.2d 237 (1979), this Court, after a review of pertinent federal law, rejected a preemption challenge to Section 402(d) holding that the provision did not violate the Supremacy Clause by allowing unemployment compensation benefits to "locked out" employees w

1984Since, however, this is a willful misconduct case under Section 402(e) and not a work stoppage case under Section 402(d), the federal distinctions are not greatly material to this case. [13] In Unemployment Compensation Board of Review v. Sun Oil Co., 476 Pa. 589 , 383 A.2d 519 (1978), appeal dismissed, 440 U.S. 977 , 99 S.Ct. 1782 , 60 L.Ed.2d 237 (1979), this Court, after a review of pertinent federal law, rejected a preemption challenge to Section 402(d) holding that the provision did not violate the Supremacy Clause by allowing unemployment compensation benefits to "locked out" employees w

1984Since, however, this is a willful misconduct case under Section 402(e) and not a work stoppage case under Section 402(d), the federal distinctions are not greatly material to this case. [13] In Unemployment Compensation Board of Review v. Sun Oil Co., 476 Pa. 589 , 383 A.2d 519 (1978), appeal dismissed, 440 U.S. 977 , 99 S.Ct. 1782 , 60 L.Ed.2d 237 (1979), this Court, after a review of pertinent federal law, rejected a preemption challenge to Section 402(d) holding that the provision did not violate the Supremacy Clause by allowing unemployment compensation benefits to "locked out" employees w

1984Since, however, this is a willful misconduct case under Section 402(e) and not a work stoppage case under Section 402(d), the federal distinctions are not greatly material to this case. [13] In Unemployment Compensation Board of Review v. Sun Oil Co., 476 Pa. 589 , 383 A.2d 519 (1978), appeal dismissed, 440 U.S. 977 , 99 S.Ct. 1782 , 60 L.Ed.2d 237 (1979), this Court, after a review of pertinent federal law, rejected a preemption challenge to Section 402(d) holding that the provision did not violate the Supremacy Clause by allowing unemployment compensation benefits to "locked out" employees w

1984Since, however, this is a willful misconduct case under Section 402(e) and not a work stoppage case under Section 402(d), the federal distinctions are not greatly material to this case. [13] In Unemployment Compensation Board of Review v. Sun Oil Co., 476 Pa. 589 , 383 A.2d 519 (1978), appeal dismissed, 440 U.S. 977 , 99 S.Ct. 1782 , 60 L.Ed.2d 237 (1979), this Court, after a review of pertinent federal law, rejected a preemption challenge to Section 402(d) holding that the provision did not violate the Supremacy Clause by allowing unemployment compensation benefits to "locked out" employees w

1982The general test to be applied in determining whether a work stoppage is a strike or a lockout is that which the Supreme Court articulated in Vrotney Unemployment Compensation Case, 400 Pa. 440, 444-45 , 163 A.2d 91, 93-94 (I960). 6 The test was refined by the Supreme Court in Philco, 430 Pa. at 103-04 , 242 A.2d at 455 , stating: Since the purpose of our unemployment compensation system is to compensate an individual when work has been denied him through no fault of his own, logically the test of whether a work stoppage resulted from a strike-or a lockout requires us to determine which side,

1982The general test to be applied in determining whether a work stoppage is a strike or a lockout is that which the Supreme Court articulated in Vrotney Unemployment Compensation Case, 400 Pa. 440, 444-45 , 163 A.2d 91, 93-94 (I960). 6 The test was refined by the Supreme Court in Philco, 430 Pa. at 103-04 , 242 A.2d at 455 , stating: Since the purpose of our unemployment compensation system is to compensate an individual when work has been denied him through no fault of his own, logically the test of whether a work stoppage resulted from a strike-or a lockout requires us to determine which side,

1981In Labor and Industry Department v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 133 Pa. Superior Ct. 518, 521 , 3 A.2d 211, 213 (1938), cited with approval in Hammerstone v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 32 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 256 , 378 A.2d 1040 (1977), the court stated: [t]he phrase ‘voluntarily leaving work’ in Section 402(b)(1) means that ‘he left of his own motion; he was not discharged.

1981In Labor and Industry Department v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 133 Pa. Superior Ct. 518, 521 , 3 A.2d 211, 213 (1938), cited with approval in Hammerstone v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 32 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 256 , 378 A.2d 1040 (1977), the court stated: [t]he phrase ‘voluntarily leaving work’ in Section 402(b)(1) means that ‘he left of his own motion; he was not discharged.

1980Remington v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 36 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 380 , 387 A.2d 1343 (1978).

1980Remington v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 36 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 380 , 387 A.2d 1343 (1978).

1978This result is in accord with the rule of construction as set forth in Kowell Motor Vehicle Registration Case, 209 Pa. Superior Ct. 386, 389-90 , 228 A.2d 50, 52 (1967), quoting from Allegheny County v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 192 Pa. Superior Ct. 100 , 159 A.2d 227 (1960), that “ ‘[w]hen time and manner are not the essence of the thing required to be done, the statute will be regarded as directory and proceedings under it will be held valid, even though the command of the statute as to form and time has not been strictly obeyed. . . .’ ” See Limekiln Golf Course, Inc. v. Zonin

1978This result is in accord with the rule of construction as set forth in Kowell Motor Vehicle Registration Case, 209 Pa. Superior Ct. 386, 389-90 , 228 A.2d 50, 52 (1967), quoting from Allegheny County v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 192 Pa. Superior Ct. 100 , 159 A.2d 227 (1960), that “ ‘[w]hen time and manner are not the essence of the thing required to be done, the statute will be regarded as directory and proceedings under it will be held valid, even though the command of the statute as to form and time has not been strictly obeyed. . . .’ ” See Limekiln Golf Course, Inc. v. Zonin

1978This result is in accord with the rule of construction as set forth in Kowell Motor Vehicle Registration Case, 209 Pa. Superior Ct. 386, 389-90 , 228 A.2d 50, 52 (1967), quoting from Allegheny County v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 192 Pa. Superior Ct. 100 , 159 A.2d 227 (1960), that “ ‘[w]hen time and manner are not the essence of the thing required to be done, the statute will be regarded as directory and proceedings under it will be held valid, even though the command of the statute as to form and time has not been strictly obeyed. . . .’ ” See Limekiln Golf Course, Inc. v. Zonin

1978This result is in accord with the rule of construction as set forth in Kowell Motor Vehicle Registration Case, 209 Pa. Superior Ct. 386, 389-90 , 228 A.2d 50, 52 (1967), quoting from Allegheny County v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 192 Pa. Superior Ct. 100 , 159 A.2d 227 (1960), that “ ‘[w]hen time and manner are not the essence of the thing required to be done, the statute will be regarded as directory and proceedings under it will be held valid, even though the command of the statute as to form and time has not been strictly obeyed. . . .’ ” See Limekiln Golf Course, Inc. v. Zonin

1975The Supreme Court also stated, however, that it was only considering the meaning of “stoppage of work” in section 402(b)(1) and that, if it was faced with the question of the meaning of “stoppage” of work in section 402(d), it might have reached a “different conclusion.” The Superior Court chose to treat the Supreme Court’s statements in Melchick, supra, as dicta, and, therefore, the Superior Court continued to interpret “stoppage of work” in both sections 402(d) and 402(b)(1) to mean a “plant stoppage.” See Mattson Unemployment Compensation Case, 194 Pa. Superior Ct. 307 , 167 A.2d 321 (1961)

1975The Supreme Court also stated, however, that it was only considering the meaning of “stoppage of work” in section 402(b)(1) and that, if it was faced with the question of the meaning of “stoppage” of work in section 402(d), it might have reached a “different conclusion.” The Superior Court chose to treat the Supreme Court’s statements in Melchick, supra, as dicta, and, therefore, the Superior Court continued to interpret “stoppage of work” in both sections 402(d) and 402(b)(1) to mean a “plant stoppage.” See Mattson Unemployment Compensation Case, 194 Pa. Superior Ct. 307 , 167 A.2d 321 (1961)

1975The more recent Superior Court cases dealing with section 402(d) interpret “stoppage of work” to mean “plant stoppage.” See Conroy Unemloyment Compensation Case, 215 Pa. Superior Ct. 83 , 257 A.2d 65 (1969); Pulver Unemployment Compensation Case, 207 Pa. Superior Ct. 112 , 215 A.2d 269 (1965).

1975The more recent Superior Court cases dealing with section 402(d) interpret “stoppage of work” to mean “plant stoppage.” See Conroy Unemloyment Compensation Case, 215 Pa. Superior Ct. 83 , 257 A.2d 65 (1969); Pulver Unemployment Compensation Case, 207 Pa. Superior Ct. 112 , 215 A.2d 269 (1965).

1975The more recent Superior Court cases dealing with section 402(d) interpret “stoppage of work” to mean “plant stoppage.” See Conroy Unemloyment Compensation Case, 215 Pa. Superior Ct. 83 , 257 A.2d 65 (1969); Pulver Unemployment Compensation Case, 207 Pa. Superior Ct. 112 , 215 A.2d 269 (1965).

1975The more recent Superior Court cases dealing with section 402(d) interpret “stoppage of work” to mean “plant stoppage.” See Conroy Unemloyment Compensation Case, 215 Pa. Superior Ct. 83 , 257 A.2d 65 (1969); Pulver Unemployment Compensation Case, 207 Pa. Superior Ct. 112 , 215 A.2d 269 (1965).

1954The situation of an employe on vacation without pay was first considered at length in Mattey Unemployment Compensation Case, 164 Pa. Superior Ct. 36 , 63 A. 2d 429 .

1954The situation of an employe on vacation without pay was first considered at length in Mattey Unemployment Compensation Case, 164 Pa. Superior Ct. 36 , 63 A. 2d 429 .

1949Phillips Unemployment Compensation Case, 163 Pa. Superior Ct. 374, 377 , 62 A. 2d 84 ; McGann Unemployment Compensation Case, supra, 163 Pa. Superior Ct. 379, 382 , 62 A. 2d 87 ; Stillman Unemployment Compensation Case, supra, 161 Pa. Superior Ct. 569, 572 , 56 A. 2d 380 .

1949Phillips Unemployment Compensation Case, 163 Pa. Superior Ct. 374, 377 , 62 A. 2d 84 ; McGann Unemployment Compensation Case, supra, 163 Pa. Superior Ct. 379, 382 , 62 A. 2d 87 ; Stillman Unemployment Compensation Case, supra, 161 Pa. Superior Ct. 569, 572 , 56 A. 2d 380 .

1949Phillips Unemployment Compensation Case, 163 Pa. Superior Ct. 374, 377 , 62 A. 2d 84 ; McGann Unemployment Compensation Case, supra, 163 Pa. Superior Ct. 379, 382 , 62 A. 2d 87 ; Stillman Unemployment Compensation Case, supra, 161 Pa. Superior Ct. 569, 572 , 56 A. 2d 380 .

1949Phillips Unemployment Compensation Case, 163 Pa. Superior Ct. 374, 377 , 62 A. 2d 84 ; McGann Unemployment Compensation Case, supra, 163 Pa. Superior Ct. 379, 382 , 62 A. 2d 87 ; Stillman Unemployment Compensation Case, supra, 161 Pa. Superior Ct. 569, 572 , 56 A. 2d 380 .

1949Phillips Unemployment Compensation Case, 163 Pa. Superior Ct. 374, 377 , 62 A. 2d 84 ; McGann Unemployment Compensation Case, supra, 163 Pa. Superior Ct. 379, 382 , 62 A. 2d 87 ; Stillman Unemployment Compensation Case, supra, 161 Pa. Superior Ct. 569, 572 , 56 A. 2d 380 .

1949Phillips Unemployment Compensation Case, 163 Pa. Superior Ct. 374, 377 , 62 A. 2d 84 ; McGann Unemployment Compensation Case, supra, 163 Pa. Superior Ct. 379, 382 , 62 A. 2d 87 ; Stillman Unemployment Compensation Case, supra, 161 Pa. Superior Ct. 569, 572 , 56 A. 2d 380 .