section 13-703 determine prior convictions in Arizona

2005In Ring III, we held that the Sixth Amendment does not require a jury to determine aggravating circumstances for prior convictions under section 13-703.F.1 and F.2. 204 Ariz. at 556 ¶ 55, 65 P.3d at 937 .

2005In Ring III, we held that the Sixth Amendment does not require a jury to determine aggravating circumstances for prior convictions under section 13-703.F.1 and F.2. 204 Ariz. at 556 ¶ 55, 65 P.3d at 937 .

1996This sentence was followed by a cf. cite to State v. Lopez, 163 Ariz. 108, 114 , 786 P.2d 959, 965 (1990).

1996This sentence was followed by a cf. cite to State v. Lopez, 163 Ariz. 108, 114 , 786 P.2d 959, 965 (1990).

2018See State v. Diaz, 224 Ariz. 322, 324-25, ¶ 16 (2010) ("[A]bsent an express exclusion in a separate provision of our statutory sentencing scheme, the State may pursue enhanced penalties against a repetitive offender under A.R.S. § 13-703."). ¶16 Smith further argues that, on remand, the court may not sentence him as a category-three offender on the child-prostitution charges because his prior marijuana conviction had become "stale" as to those offenses and therefore did not qualify as an historical prior conviction under § 13-703(C).

2016First, § 13-105 provides that its definitions are to control “unless the context otherwise requires.” In State v. Thues, we found that “the context otherwise requires” a different definition of felony when determining that “possession of drug paraphernalia for personal use remains a felony when an offender is sentenced under Proposition 200.” 203 Ariz. 339, 341, ¶ 9 , 54 P.3d 368, 370 (App. 2002).

2016First, § 13-105 provides that its definitions are to control “unless the context otherwise requires.” In State v. Thues, we found that “the context otherwise requires” a different definition of felony when determining that “possession of drug paraphernalia for personal use remains a felony when an offender is sentenced under Proposition 200.” 203 Ariz. 339, 341, ¶ 9 , 54 P.3d 368, 370 (App. 2002).

2016See State v. Guerra, 161 Ariz. 289, 293 (1989). 2 STATE v. ZAMORA Decision of the Court existence of historical non-dangerous felony convictions pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-703. ¶5 At trial, a jury found Zamora guilty of possession of a narcotic drug.

2016See State v. Guerra, 161 Ariz. 289, 293 (1989). 2 STATE v. ZAMORA Decision of the Court existence of historical non-dangerous felony convictions pursuant to A.R.S. § 13-703. ¶5 At trial, a jury found Zamora guilty of possession of a narcotic drug.

2004See Phillips, 205 Ariz. at 147, ¶ 5 , 67 P.3d at 1230 (noting that “[i]n Ring III, we held ‘that the Sixth Amendment does not require a jury to determine prior convictions under sections 13-703 [ (F)(1) ] and [ (F)(2) ]’ ” (quoting Ring III, 204 Ariz. at 556-57, ¶ 55, 65 P.3d at 936-37 )). ¶ 55 On the same day Murdaugh pled guilty to the first degree murder and kidnapping of Reynolds, he also pled guilty to the first degree murder and kidnapping of Eg-gert.

2004See Phillips, 205 Ariz. at 147, ¶ 5 , 67 P.3d at 1230 (noting that “[i]n Ring III, we held ‘that the Sixth Amendment does not require a jury to determine prior convictions under sections 13-703 [ (F)(1) ] and [ (F)(2) ]’ ” (quoting Ring III, 204 Ariz. at 556-57, ¶ 55, 65 P.3d at 936-37 )). ¶ 55 On the same day Murdaugh pled guilty to the first degree murder and kidnapping of Reynolds, he also pled guilty to the first degree murder and kidnapping of Eg-gert.

2003See, e.g., State v. Trostle, 191 Ariz. 4, 17-18 , 951 P.2d 869, 882-83 (1997) (Defendant convicted of felony murder based on armed robbery and kidnapping; the state apparently alleged pecuniary gain, A.R.S. section 13-703(F)(5), and that the murder was committed in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner, A.R.S. section 13-703(F)(6), as aggravating factors, but not as previous serious convictions under A.R.S. section 13-703(F)(2)); State v. Dickens, 187 Ariz. 1, 23-25 , 926 P.2d 468, 490-92 (1996) (Defendant convicted of felony murder based on armed robbery; the state appeared to have

2003See, e.g., State v. Trostle, 191 Ariz. 4, 17-18 , 951 P.2d 869, 882-83 (1997) (Defendant convicted of felony murder based on armed robbery and kidnapping; the state apparently alleged pecuniary gain, A.R.S. section 13-703(F)(5), and that the murder was committed in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner, A.R.S. section 13-703(F)(6), as aggravating factors, but not as previous serious convictions under A.R.S. section 13-703(F)(2)); State v. Dickens, 187 Ariz. 1, 23-25 , 926 P.2d 468, 490-92 (1996) (Defendant convicted of felony murder based on armed robbery; the state appeared to have

2003See, e.g., State v. Trostle, 191 Ariz. 4, 17-18 , 951 P.2d 869, 882-83 (1997) (Defendant convicted of felony murder based on armed robbery and kidnapping; the state apparently alleged pecuniary gain, A.R.S. section 13-703(F)(5), and that the murder was committed in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner, A.R.S. section 13-703(F)(6), as aggravating factors, but not as previous serious convictions under A.R.S. section 13-703(F)(2)); State v. Dickens, 187 Ariz. 1, 23-25 , 926 P.2d 468, 490-92 (1996) (Defendant convicted of felony murder based on armed robbery; the state appeared to have

2003See, e.g., State v. Trostle, 191 Ariz. 4, 17-18 , 951 P.2d 869, 882-83 (1997) (Defendant convicted of felony murder based on armed robbery and kidnapping; the state apparently alleged pecuniary gain, A.R.S. section 13-703(F)(5), and that the murder was committed in an especially heinous, cruel, or depraved manner, A.R.S. section 13-703(F)(6), as aggravating factors, but not as previous serious convictions under A.R.S. section 13-703(F)(2)); State v. Dickens, 187 Ariz. 1, 23-25 , 926 P.2d 468, 490-92 (1996) (Defendant convicted of felony murder based on armed robbery; the state appeared to have

2002See State v. Lee, 189 Ariz. 590, 604 , 944 P.2d 1204, 1218 (1997) (“A sentencing court may consider any convictions entered previously without regard to the order of the underlying crimes.”). ¶ 62 The sentencing court also found that the murder of B.C. was committed in an especially cruel manner, under section 13-703(F)(6).

2002See State v. Lee, 189 Ariz. 590, 604 , 944 P.2d 1204, 1218 (1997) (“A sentencing court may consider any convictions entered previously without regard to the order of the underlying crimes.”). ¶ 62 The sentencing court also found that the murder of B.C. was committed in an especially cruel manner, under section 13-703(F)(6).

1996It quotes the Arnett definition of violence, but then departs from it with the now infamous sentence, "[i]n determining whether a defendant's prior convictions under § 13-703(F)(2) warrant aggravating a life sentence to death, only those felony convictions in which force was employed or threatened with the intent to injure or abuse will be considered in aggravation." Id. at 549, 804 P.2d at 82 (emphasis added).

1996It quotes the Arnett definition of violence, but then departs from it with the now infamous sentence, “[i]n determining whether a defendant’s prior convictions under § 13-703(F)(2) warrant aggravating a life sentence to death, only those felony convictions in which force was employed or threatened with the intent to injure or abuse will be considered in aggravation.” Id. at 549, 804 P.2d at 82 (emphasis added).