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37 Mississippi opinions name it 2 courts 1986–2013 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Mississippi courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hill v. Dunawaygreen2 sentences2013Mississippi Supreme Court precedent holds that “the refusal of a timely requested and correctly phrased jury instruction on a genuine issue of material fact is proper” only if “no hypothetical ... reasonable jury could find the facts in accordance with the theory of the requested instruction.” Hill v. Dunaway, 487 So.2d 807, 809 (Miss.1986); see also Church v. Massey, 697 So.2d 407, 410-11 (Miss.1997). 2008In Ellis v. State, 790 So.2d 813, 815-16 (¶ 6) (Miss.2001) (quoting Hill v. Dunaway, 487 So.2d 807, 809 (Miss.1986)), the Mississippi Supreme Court held that: The refusal of a timely requested and correctly phrased jury instruction on a genuine issue of material fact is proper, only if the trial court-and this Court on appeal-can say, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the party requesting the instruction, and considering all reasonable favorable inferences which may be drawn from the evidence in favor of the requesting party, that no hypothetical, reasonable jury could find th | 22 | 27 |
McGee v. Stategreen2 sentences2003The standard for determining the propriety of refusing a tendered instruction was reiterated in Ferrill v. State, 643 So.2d 501, 505 (Miss.1994): The refusal of a timely requested and correctly phrased jury instruction on a genuine issue of material fact is proper, only if the trial court—and this Court on appeal—can say, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the party requesting the instruction, and considering all reasonable favorable inferences which may be drawn from the evidence in favor of the requesting party, that no hypothetical, reasonable jury could find the facts in ac 2001In Hill v. Dunaway, 487 So.2d 807, 809 (Miss.1986), we held: The refusal of a timely requested and correctly phrased jury instruction on a genuine issue of material fact is proper, only if the trial court—and this Court on appeal—can say, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the party requesting the instruction, and considering *816 all reasonable favorable inferences which may be drawn from the evidence in favor of the requesting party, that no hypothetical, reasonable jury could find the facts in accordance with the theory of the requested instruction. (quoted in McGee v. State | 5 | 7 |
Ferrill v. Stategreen2 sentences2003The standard for determining the propriety of refusing a tendered instruction was reiterated in Ferrill v. State, 643 So.2d 501, 505 (Miss.1994): The refusal of a timely requested and correctly phrased jury instruction on a genuine issue of material fact is proper, only if the trial court—and this Court on appeal—can say, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the party requesting the instruction, and considering all reasonable favorable inferences which may be drawn from the evidence in favor of the requesting party, that no hypothetical, reasonable jury could find the facts in ac 2001The standard for determining the propriety of refusing a tendered instruction was reiterated in Ferrill v. State, 643 So. 2d 501, 505 (Miss. 1994): The refusal of a timely requested and correctly phrased jury instruction on a genuine issue of material fact is proper, only if the trial court--and this Court on appeal--can say, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the party requesting the instruction, and considering all reasonable favorable inferences which may be drawn from the evidence in favor of the requesting party, that no hypothetical, reasonable jury could find the facts i | 5 | 6 |
Fairchild v. Stategreen2 sentences1997Cf. Lee v. State, 469 So.2d 1225, 1230-31 (Miss. 1985); Fairchild v. State, 459 So.2d 793, 801 (Miss. 1984). 1995Lee v. State, 469 So.2d 1225, 1230-32 (Miss. 1985); Fairchild v. State, 459 So.2d 793, 801 (Miss. 1984). | 5 | 6 |
Lee v. Stategreen2 sentences1997Cf. Lee v. State, 469 So.2d 1225, 1230-31 (Miss. 1985); Fairchild v. State, 459 So.2d 793, 801 (Miss. 1984). 1995Lee v. State, 469 So.2d 1225, 1230-32 (Miss. 1985); Fairchild v. State, 459 So.2d 793, 801 (Miss. 1984). | 5 | 6 |
Church v. Masseygreen2 sentences2013Mississippi Supreme Court precedent holds that “the refusal of a timely requested and correctly phrased jury instruction on a genuine issue of material fact is proper” only if “no hypothetical ... reasonable jury could find the facts in accordance with the theory of the requested instruction.” Hill v. Dunaway, 487 So.2d 807, 809 (Miss.1986); see also Church v. Massey, 697 So.2d 407, 410-11 (Miss.1997). 2005John, 856 So.2d 304, 311 (¶ 17) (Miss.2003) (citing Church v. Massey, 697 So.2d 407, 410 (Miss.1997); Hill v. Dunaway, 487 So.2d 807, 809 (Miss.1986)). | 4 | 4 |
Willard v. Paracelsus Health Care Corp.green2 sentences1999Willard v. Paracelsus Health Care Corp., 681 So.2d 539, 543 (Miss.1996) ( quoting Hill v. Dunaway, 487 So.2d 807, 809 (Miss. 1986) (citations omitted)). 1999Willard v. Paracelsus Health Care Corp., 681 So.2d 539, 543 (Miss.1996) (quoting Hill v. Dunaway, 487 So.2d 807, 809 (Miss.1986) (citations omitted)). | 3 | 3 |
Ellis v. Stategreen1 sentence2008In Ellis v. State, 790 So.2d 813, 815-16 (¶ 6) (Miss.2001) (quoting Hill v. Dunaway, 487 So.2d 807, 809 (Miss.1986)), the Mississippi Supreme Court held that: The refusal of a timely requested and correctly phrased jury instruction on a genuine issue of material fact is proper, only if the trial court-and this Court on appeal-can say, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the party requesting the instruction, and considering all reasonable favorable inferences which may be drawn from the evidence in favor of the requesting party, that no hypothetical, reasonable jury could find th | 1 | 1 |
Busick v. St. Johngreen1 sentence2005John, 856 So.2d 304, 311 (¶ 17) (Miss.2003) (citing Church v. Massey, 697 So.2d 407, 410 (Miss.1997); Hill v. Dunaway, 487 So.2d 807, 809 (Miss.1986)). | 1 | 1 |
DeLaughter v. Lawrence County Hosp.green1 sentence2002DeLaughter v. Lawrence County Hosp., 601 So.2d 818, 824 (Miss.1992). | 1 | 1 |
Copeland v. City of Jacksongreen1 sentence1992Hill v. Dunaway, 487 So.2d 807, 809 (Miss. 1986); see also, Stewart v. Davis, 571 So.2d 926, 929 (Miss. 1990); Copeland v. City of Jackson, 548 So.2d 970, 972 (Miss. 1989). | 1 | 1 |
Stewart v. Davisgreen1 sentence1992Hill v. Dunaway, 487 So.2d 807, 809 (Miss. 1986); see also, Stewart v. Davis, 571 So.2d 926, 929 (Miss. 1990); Copeland v. City of Jackson, 548 So.2d 970, 972 (Miss. 1989). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Mississippi. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Boyd v. State
green
2 sentences1994This Court can say that taking the evidence of his unlawful arrest in the light most favorable to Bogan, who requested Instruction D-3, and considering all reasonable favorable inferences which we might draw from that evidence in Bogan's favor, "no hypothetical reasonable jury could find the facts [that Agent George did not twice order Bogan to stop] in accordance with the theory of the requested instruction[, which was that George had no probable cause to arrest Bogan]." Bogan relies on Boyd v. State, 406 So. 2d 824 (Miss. 1981), which he argues is indistinguishable from the case sub judice. 1994This Court can say that taking the evidence of his unlawful arrest in the light most favorable to Bogan, who requested Instruction D-3, and considering all reasonable favorable inferences which we might draw from that evidence in Bogan's favor, "no hypothetical reasonable jury could find the facts [that Agent George did not twice order Bogan to stop] in accordance with the theory of the requested instruction[, which was that George had no probable cause to arrest Bogan]." Bogan relies on Boyd v. State, 406 So. 2d 824 (Miss. 1981), which he argues is indistinguishable from the case sub judice. | 2 | 1994–1994 |
Finley v. State
green
1 sentence2002Finley v. State, 725 So.2d 226 (¶ 14) (Miss. 1998) (citations omitted). ¶ 29. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.