section 775.084(1) violent career criminal in Florida

2000We reverse his sentence as a violent career criminal under section 775.084(1)(c), based on State v. Thompson, 750 So.2d 643 (Fla.1999).

2000The trial court sentenced Webb after orally finding that Webb qualified as a violent career criminal under section 775.084(l)(c), Florida Statutes (Supp.1996). 1 Webb argues that the Florida Supreme Court’s recent decision in State v. Thompson, 750 So.2d 643 (Fla.1999), which held that chapter 95-182, which amended section 775.084(l)(c), is unconstitutional as a violation of the single subject requirement of article III, section 6, of the Florida Constitution, requires resentencing.

1999See State v. Johnson, 616 So.2d 1, 2 (Fla.1993); Scott v. State, 721 So.2d 1245 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).

1999See State v. Johnson, 616 So.2d 1, 2 (Fla.1993); Scott v. State, 721 So.2d 1245 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).

2018Under section 775.084, a trial court “shall sentence the violent career criminal . . . [i]n the case of a felony of the third degree, for a term of years not exceeding 15, with a mandatory minimum term of 10 years’ imprisonment.” § 775.084(4)(d), Fla. Stat. (2017). “[T]o be sentenced as a violent career criminal, a defendant must have been previously incarcerated in state or federal prison, must have been convicted three times as an adult of certain violent felonies (listed in the statute), and must have committed another such offense within the above time frame.” Clines v. State, 912 So. 2d 5

2008As in Calderon v. State, 745 So.2d 535, 536 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999), the record shows that the trial court mistakenly believed that a violent career criminal sentence was mandatory.

2003See, e.g., Woody v. State, 847 So.2d 566 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (holding that "non-violent burglaries ... counted as qualifying offenses"); Delsol v. State, 837 So.2d 428 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (holding that non-violent burglaries could be considered *841 forcible felonies under section 775.084 as qualifying offenses); see also Spikes v. State, 851 So.2d 252 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (confirming that conviction for burglary of an unoccupied conveyance qualifies a defendant as a violent career criminal under section 775.084(1)(c)).

2003See, e.g., Woody v. State, 847 So.2d 566 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (holding that "non-violent burglaries ... counted as qualifying offenses"); Delsol v. State, 837 So.2d 428 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (holding that non-violent burglaries could be considered *841 forcible felonies under section 775.084 as qualifying offenses); see also Spikes v. State, 851 So.2d 252 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (confirming that conviction for burglary of an unoccupied conveyance qualifies a defendant as a violent career criminal under section 775.084(1)(c)).

2002See Walters v. State, 790 So.2d 483 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001).

2001Such statutes neither alter the maximum penalty for the crime committed nor create a separate offense; they operate "solely to limit the sentencing court's discretion in selecting a penalty within the range already available to it without the special finding of visible possession of a firearm." Kijewski v. State, 773 So.2d 124, 125 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)(discussing Prison Releasee Reoffender statute).

1999See also Aaron v. State, 284 So.2d 673, 677 (Fla. 1973) ("The right of persons accused of serious offenses to know, before trial, the specific nature and detail of crimes they are charged with committing is a basic right guaranteed by our Federal and State Constitutions.") Accordingly, since the evidence produced at trial was not sufficient to prove the charge alleged in count V of the information, we reverse Rallo's conviction of count V. *841 Rallo also argues that he was improperly sentenced as a violent career criminal pursuant to section 775.084(c), Florida Statutes (1995), because one of