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17 Florida opinions name it 3 courts 1975–2015 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Florida courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Battle v. Stategreen1 sentence2015Regarding the attempted felony murder statute, the supreme court has explained: “[I]n order to avoid the problems set forth in Gray , the Legislature added an additional element to the crime — that the defendant commit an ‘intentional act that is not an essential element of the felony and that could, but does not, cause the death of another.’ ” Milton v. State, 161 So.3d 1246 (Fla.2014) (holding that the “act of discharging a firearm can[not] satisfy the ‘intentional act’ element of attempted felony murder when the underlying felony is attempted murder and the same individuals are the victims | 1 | 1 |
Mesa v. Stategreen1 sentence1996See generally Mesa v. State, 632 So.2d 1094, 1097 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) (possession of a firearm is "an essential element of the crime charged," which "must be alleged in the indictment or information," before enhancement is permitted pursuant to section 775.087, Florida Statutes). | 1 | 1 |
Pugh v. Stategreen1 sentence1993See Pugh v. State, 624 So.2d 277 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Abreaugreen1 sentence1983That is, the jury, if so instructed, could conceivably have exercised what the Florida Supreme Court referred to in State v. Abreau, 363 So.2d 1063, 1064 (Fla. 1978), as "its inherent pardon power." That so-called pardon power is a well recognized misnomer which generally means that a jury may, in a proper case, convict a defendant of a lesser offense when the jury finds that the acts of the defendant fit the statutory definitions of more than one offense. | 1 | 1 |
Goodwin v. Stategreen1 sentence1981See also Goodwin v. State, 405 So.2d 170 (Fla. 1981). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Carrollgreen1 sentence1975See also State v. Carroll, 287 So.2d 304 (Fla. 1973). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Florida. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Dene
green
2 sentences1995State v. Dene, 533 So.2d 265 (Fla.1988). . 1994State v. Dene, 533 So.2d 265 (Fla.1988). | 2 | 1994–1995 |
Brooks v. State
yellow
1 sentence2010Contrary to the majority’s view, this was not the holding in Brooks v. State, 918 So.2d 181 (Fla.2005), for one simple reason: the majority in Brooks declined to vacate the first-degree felony murder conviction for the single stabbing of the child. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Standard Jury Instructions in Crim. Cases
green
1 sentence2007Cases, 639 So.2d 602 (Fla. 1994) (omitting listing lesser included offenses for third-degree attempted felony murder pursuant to section 782.04(1)(a)); In re Std. | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Pena v. State
green
1 sentence2006If the defendant unlawfully distributes an illegal drug and the distribution results in a death caused by the drug, then the defendant is guilty of first-degree murder under section 782.04(1)(a)(3). 829 So.2d at 294 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Knight v. State
green
1 sentence1997However, the state may not seek to go *739 outside of the indictment by altering the contents so as to charge an additional or different offense from that found by the grand jury. * * * * * * In the instant case, then, the state is limited to trying the defendant only on the charge brought by the grand jury, premeditated murder (or, pursuant to Knight [v. State, 338 So.2d 201 (Fla.1976),] felony murder under Section 782.04(1)(a)2, Florida Statutes) "by strangling Wendy Prior." Brief for Respondent at 8, State v. Ingleton, 653 So.2d 443 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (No. 94-2584) (emphasis in original) ( | 1 | 1997–1997 |
State v. Ingleton
neutral
1 sentence1997However, the state may not seek to go *739 outside of the indictment by altering the contents so as to charge an additional or different offense from that found by the grand jury. * * * * * * In the instant case, then, the state is limited to trying the defendant only on the charge brought by the grand jury, premeditated murder (or, pursuant to Knight [v. State, 338 So.2d 201 (Fla.1976),] felony murder under Section 782.04(1)(a)2, Florida Statutes) "by strangling Wendy Prior." Brief for Respondent at 8, State v. Ingleton, 653 So.2d 443 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995) (No. 94-2584) (emphasis in original) ( | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Day v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.
green
1 sentence1996Co., 328 So.2d 560 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976)): 1. whose life was terminated by the intentional act of another (Ashley told the police she intended to hurt the baby); and 2. which act was not: a. justifiable homicide under either section 782.02, Florida Statutes (1993), or chapter 766, Florida Statutes; b. excusable homicide under section 782.03, Florida Statutes (1993) (accident); c. murder under section 782.04, Florida Statutes (1993); or d. suicide or death by natural causes. | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Hite v. State
green
1 sentence1988In Hite v. State, 364 So.2d 771 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978), cert. denied, 372 So.2d 471 (Fla. 1979), overruled in part, State v. Lowery, 419 So.2d 621 (Fla. 1982), the accused was charged and convicted of first-degree felony murder under section 782.04 (Fla. 1975). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
State v. Lowery
green
1 sentence1988In Hite v. State, 364 So.2d 771 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978), cert. denied, 372 So.2d 471 (Fla. 1979), overruled in part, State v. Lowery, 419 So.2d 621 (Fla. 1982), the accused was charged and convicted of first-degree felony murder under section 782.04 (Fla. 1975). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
State v. Hegstrom
red
1 sentence1982In State v. Hegstrom, 401 So.2d 1343 (Fla. 1981), the supreme court held that section 775.021(4) (which provides: (4) Whoever, in the course of one criminal transaction or episode, commits an act or acts constituting a violation of two or more criminal statutes, upon conviction and adjudication of guilt, shall be sentenced separately for each criminal offense, excluding lesser included offenses, committed during said criminal episode, and the sentencing judge may order the sentences to be served concurrently or consecutively.) only prohibits multiple sentences, not multiple convictions. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Mikenas v. State
green
1 sentence1980Even though the deceased was Presley's accomplice in the robbery, and not an "innocent victim," Presley can be charged with second degree murder under section 782.04(3), Florida Statutes (1975). [3] Mikenas v. State, 367 So.2d 606 (Fla. 1979). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Adams v. State
yellow
1 sentence1978In discussing the felony-murder rule in a recent case the Florida Supreme Court stated in Adams v. State, 341 So.2d 765 (1976), at page 767 — In its most basic form, the historic felony murder rule mechanically defines as murder any homicide committed while perpetrating or attempting a felony. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
State v. Dixon
red
1 sentence1975The contentions raised by the appellant alleging the vagueness of the felony murder provisions of Section 782.04, Florida Statutes, are without merit and have been answered by this Court in State v. Dixon, 283 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1973). | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.