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17 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1985–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Leach v. Stategreen2 sentences2018See Leach v. State , 259 Ga. 33 , 34 (2), 376 S.E.2d 667 (1989) (rejecting the appellant's assertion that the trial court erred in failing to grant a pre-trial motion to prevent the State from seeking the death penalty "on the ground that the state's case, as he then understood it, did not adequately present any statutory aggravating circumstances, and that the state was seeking the death penalty merely to inflame the minds of the jury against [him] through voir dire so as to enhance its chances of a favorable guilt-innocence verdict"); State v. Terry , 257 Ga. 473 (1), 360 S.E.2d 588 (1987) ( 2018See Leach v. State , 259 Ga. 33 , 34 (2), 376 S.E.2d 667 (1989) (rejecting the appellant's assertion that the trial court erred in failing to grant a pre-trial motion to prevent the State from seeking the death penalty "on the ground that the state's case, as he then understood it, did not adequately present any statutory aggravating circumstances, and that the state was seeking the death penalty merely to inflame the minds of the jury against [him] through voir dire so as to enhance its chances of a favorable guilt-innocence verdict"); State v. Terry , 257 Ga. 473 (1), 360 S.E.2d 588 (1987) ( | 2 | 2 |
Tarver v. Stategreen2 sentences2012Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979); Tarver v. State, 278 Ga. 358 (5) ( 602 SE2d 627 ) (2004) (evidence sufficient to find aggravating circumstances under OCGA § 17-10-30 (b)). 2. 2012Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979); Tarver v. State, 278 Ga. 358 (5) ( 602 SE2d 627 ) (2004) (evidence sufficient to find aggravating circumstances under OCGA § 17-10-30 (b)). 2. | 1 | 2 |
Crawford v. Stategreen2 sentences1998Crawford v. State, 254 Ga. 435 (5) ( 330 SE2d 567 ) (1985). 1998Crawford v. State, 254 Ga. 435 (5) ( 330 SE2d 567 ) (1985). | 1 | 2 |
Manzano v. Stategreen2 sentences2017The fact that further steps must be taken before the crime can be completed does not preclude such a finding that the steps already undertaken are substantial.” (punctuation omitted)). 14 Dennard, 243 Ga. App. at 873 (1) (c); accord Massey v. State, 267 Ga. App. 482, 483 ( 600 SE2d 437 ) (2004). 15 See OCGA § 16-6-4 (a) (“A person commits the offense of child molestation when such person: (1) Does any immoral or indecent act to or in the presence of or with any child under the age of 16 years with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the person; or (2) By m 2017The fact that further steps must be taken before the crime can be completed does not preclude such a finding that the steps already undertaken are substantial.” (punctuation omitted)). 14 Dennard, 243 Ga. App. at 873 (1) (c); accord Massey v. State, 267 Ga. App. 482, 483 ( 600 SE2d 437 ) (2004). 15 See OCGA § 16-6-4 (a) (“A person commits the offense of child molestation when such person: (1) Does any immoral or indecent act to or in the presence of or with any child under the age of 16 years with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the person; or (2) By m | 1 | 1 |
Dennard v. Stategreen2 sentences2017The fact that further steps must be taken before the crime can be completed does not preclude such a finding that the steps already undertaken are substantial.” (punctuation omitted)). 14 Dennard, 243 Ga. App. at 873 (1) (c); accord Massey v. State, 267 Ga. App. 482, 483 ( 600 SE2d 437 ) (2004). 15 See OCGA § 16-6-4 (a) (“A person commits the offense of child molestation when such person: (1) Does any immoral or indecent act to or in the presence of or with any child under the age of 16 years with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the person; or (2) By m 2017See generally Patterson v. State, 299 Ga. 491, 495 ( 789 SE2d 175 ) (2016) (holding that OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (2) does not require that a defendant in tend to place a victim in reasonable apprehension of receiving a violent injury, and noting that the General Assembly certainly knew how to phrase a statute to include such a requirement as shown by its simultaneous enactment of another criminal statute, which included an intent requirement); Fair v. State, 284 Ga. 165, 168 (2) (b) ( 664 SE2d 227 ) (2008) (noting that if the General Assembly had intended to require knowledge of the victim’s status | 1 | 1 |
Massey v. Stategreen2 sentences2017The fact that further steps must be taken before the crime can be completed does not preclude such a finding that the steps already undertaken are substantial.” (punctuation omitted)). 14 Dennard, 243 Ga. App. at 873 (1) (c); accord Massey v. State, 267 Ga. App. 482, 483 ( 600 SE2d 437 ) (2004). 15 See OCGA § 16-6-4 (a) (“A person commits the offense of child molestation when such person: (1) Does any immoral or indecent act to or in the presence of or with any child under the age of 16 years with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the person; or (2) By m 2017The fact that further steps must be taken before the crime can be completed does not preclude such a finding that the steps already undertaken are substantial.” (punctuation omitted)). 14 Dennard, 243 Ga. App. at 873 (1) (c); accord Massey v. State, 267 Ga. App. 482, 483 ( 600 SE2d 437 ) (2004). 15 See OCGA § 16-6-4 (a) (“A person commits the offense of child molestation when such person: (1) Does any immoral or indecent act to or in the presence of or with any child under the age of 16 years with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the person; or (2) By m | 1 | 1 |
Rhodes v. Stategreen2 sentences2017The fact that further steps must be taken before the crime can be completed does not preclude such a finding that the steps already undertaken are substantial.” (punctuation omitted)). 14 Dennard, 243 Ga. App. at 873 (1) (c); accord Massey v. State, 267 Ga. App. 482, 483 ( 600 SE2d 437 ) (2004). 15 See OCGA § 16-6-4 (a) (“A person commits the offense of child molestation when such person: (1) Does any immoral or indecent act to or in the presence of or with any child under the age of 16 years with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the person; or (2) By m 2017The fact that further steps must be taken before the crime can be completed does not preclude such a finding that the steps already undertaken are substantial.” (punctuation omitted)). 14 Dennard, 243 Ga. App. at 873 (1) (c); accord Massey v. State, 267 Ga. App. 482, 483 ( 600 SE2d 437 ) (2004). 15 See OCGA § 16-6-4 (a) (“A person commits the offense of child molestation when such person: (1) Does any immoral or indecent act to or in the presence of or with any child under the age of 16 years with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the person; or (2) By m | 1 | 1 |
Fair v. Stategreen2 sentences2017See generally Patterson v. State, 299 Ga. 491, 495 ( 789 SE2d 175 ) (2016) (holding that OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (2) does not require that a defendant in tend to place a victim in reasonable apprehension of receiving a violent injury, and noting that the General Assembly certainly knew how to phrase a statute to include such a requirement as shown by its simultaneous enactment of another criminal statute, which included an intent requirement); Fair v. State, 284 Ga. 165, 168 (2) (b) ( 664 SE2d 227 ) (2008) (noting that if the General Assembly had intended to require knowledge of the victim’s status 2017See generally Patterson v. State, 299 Ga. 491, 495 ( 789 SE2d 175 ) (2016) (holding that OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (2) does not require that a defendant in tend to place a victim in reasonable apprehension of receiving a violent injury, and noting that the General Assembly certainly knew how to phrase a statute to include such a requirement as shown by its simultaneous enactment of another criminal statute, which included an intent requirement); Fair v. State, 284 Ga. 165, 168 (2) (b) ( 664 SE2d 227 ) (2008) (noting that if the General Assembly had intended to require knowledge of the victim’s status | 1 | 1 |
English v. Stategreen2 sentences2017See generally Patterson v. State, 299 Ga. 491, 495 ( 789 SE2d 175 ) (2016) (holding that OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (2) does not require that a defendant in tend to place a victim in reasonable apprehension of receiving a violent injury, and noting that the General Assembly certainly knew how to phrase a statute to include such a requirement as shown by its simultaneous enactment of another criminal statute, which included an intent requirement); Fair v. State, 284 Ga. 165, 168 (2) (b) ( 664 SE2d 227 ) (2008) (noting that if the General Assembly had intended to require knowledge of the victim’s status 2017See generally Patterson v. State, 299 Ga. 491, 495 ( 789 SE2d 175 ) (2016) (holding that OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (2) does not require that a defendant in tend to place a victim in reasonable apprehension of receiving a violent injury, and noting that the General Assembly certainly knew how to phrase a statute to include such a requirement as shown by its simultaneous enactment of another criminal statute, which included an intent requirement); Fair v. State, 284 Ga. 165, 168 (2) (b) ( 664 SE2d 227 ) (2008) (noting that if the General Assembly had intended to require knowledge of the victim’s status | 1 | 1 |
Adams v. Stategreen2 sentences2017The fact that further steps must be taken before the crime can be completed does not preclude such a finding that the steps already undertaken are substantial.” (punctuation omitted)). 14 Dennard, 243 Ga. App. at 873 (1) (c); accord Massey v. State, 267 Ga. App. 482, 483 ( 600 SE2d 437 ) (2004). 15 See OCGA § 16-6-4 (a) (“A person commits the offense of child molestation when such person: (1) Does any immoral or indecent act to or in the presence of or with any child under the age of 16 years with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the person; or (2) By m 2017The fact that further steps must be taken before the crime can be completed does not preclude such a finding that the steps already undertaken are substantial.” (punctuation omitted)). 14 Dennard, 243 Ga. App. at 873 (1) (c); accord Massey v. State, 267 Ga. App. 482, 483 ( 600 SE2d 437 ) (2004). 15 See OCGA § 16-6-4 (a) (“A person commits the offense of child molestation when such person: (1) Does any immoral or indecent act to or in the presence of or with any child under the age of 16 years with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the person; or (2) By m | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. Stategreen2 sentences2017The fact that further steps must be taken before the crime can be completed does not preclude such a finding that the steps already undertaken are substantial.” (punctuation omitted)). 14 Dennard, 243 Ga. App. at 873 (1) (c); accord Massey v. State, 267 Ga. App. 482, 483 ( 600 SE2d 437 ) (2004). 15 See OCGA § 16-6-4 (a) (“A person commits the offense of child molestation when such person: (1) Does any immoral or indecent act to or in the presence of or with any child under the age of 16 years with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the person; or (2) By m 2017The fact that further steps must be taken before the crime can be completed does not preclude such a finding that the steps already undertaken are substantial.” (punctuation omitted)). 14 Dennard, 243 Ga. App. at 873 (1) (c); accord Massey v. State, 267 Ga. App. 482, 483 ( 600 SE2d 437 ) (2004). 15 See OCGA § 16-6-4 (a) (“A person commits the offense of child molestation when such person: (1) Does any immoral or indecent act to or in the presence of or with any child under the age of 16 years with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the person; or (2) By m | 1 | 1 |
Lopez v. Stategreen2 sentences2017The fact that further steps must be taken before the crime can be completed does not preclude such a finding that the steps already undertaken are substantial.” (punctuation omitted)). 14 Dennard, 243 Ga. App. at 873 (1) (c); accord Massey v. State, 267 Ga. App. 482, 483 ( 600 SE2d 437 ) (2004). 15 See OCGA § 16-6-4 (a) (“A person commits the offense of child molestation when such person: (1) Does any immoral or indecent act to or in the presence of or with any child under the age of 16 years with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the person; or (2) By m 2017The fact that further steps must be taken before the crime can be completed does not preclude such a finding that the steps already undertaken are substantial.” (punctuation omitted)). 14 Dennard, 243 Ga. App. at 873 (1) (c); accord Massey v. State, 267 Ga. App. 482, 483 ( 600 SE2d 437 ) (2004). 15 See OCGA § 16-6-4 (a) (“A person commits the offense of child molestation when such person: (1) Does any immoral or indecent act to or in the presence of or with any child under the age of 16 years with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the person; or (2) By m | 1 | 1 |
Castaneira v. Stategreen2 sentences2017The fact that further steps must be taken before the crime can be completed does not preclude such a finding that the steps already undertaken are substantial.” (punctuation omitted)). 14 Dennard, 243 Ga. App. at 873 (1) (c); accord Massey v. State, 267 Ga. App. 482, 483 ( 600 SE2d 437 ) (2004). 15 See OCGA § 16-6-4 (a) (“A person commits the offense of child molestation when such person: (1) Does any immoral or indecent act to or in the presence of or with any child under the age of 16 years with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the person; or (2) By m 2017The fact that further steps must be taken before the crime can be completed does not preclude such a finding that the steps already undertaken are substantial.” (punctuation omitted)). 14 Dennard, 243 Ga. App. at 873 (1) (c); accord Massey v. State, 267 Ga. App. 482, 483 ( 600 SE2d 437 ) (2004). 15 See OCGA § 16-6-4 (a) (“A person commits the offense of child molestation when such person: (1) Does any immoral or indecent act to or in the presence of or with any child under the age of 16 years with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the person; or (2) By m | 1 | 1 |
Patterson v. Stategreen2 sentences2017See generally Patterson v. State, 299 Ga. 491, 495 ( 789 SE2d 175 ) (2016) (holding that OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (2) does not require that a defendant in tend to place a victim in reasonable apprehension of receiving a violent injury, and noting that the General Assembly certainly knew how to phrase a statute to include such a requirement as shown by its simultaneous enactment of another criminal statute, which included an intent requirement); Fair v. State, 284 Ga. 165, 168 (2) (b) ( 664 SE2d 227 ) (2008) (noting that if the General Assembly had intended to require knowledge of the victim’s status 2017See generally Patterson v. State, 299 Ga. 491, 495 ( 789 SE2d 175 ) (2016) (holding that OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (2) does not require that a defendant in tend to place a victim in reasonable apprehension of receiving a violent injury, and noting that the General Assembly certainly knew how to phrase a statute to include such a requirement as shown by its simultaneous enactment of another criminal statute, which included an intent requirement); Fair v. State, 284 Ga. 165, 168 (2) (b) ( 664 SE2d 227 ) (2008) (noting that if the General Assembly had intended to require knowledge of the victim’s status | 1 | 1 |
Logan v. Stategreen2 sentences2017The fact that further steps must be taken before the crime can be completed does not preclude such a finding that the steps already undertaken are substantial.” (punctuation omitted)). 14 Dennard, 243 Ga. App. at 873 (1) (c); accord Massey v. State, 267 Ga. App. 482, 483 ( 600 SE2d 437 ) (2004). 15 See OCGA § 16-6-4 (a) (“A person commits the offense of child molestation when such person: (1) Does any immoral or indecent act to or in the presence of or with any child under the age of 16 years with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the person; or (2) By m 2017The fact that further steps must be taken before the crime can be completed does not preclude such a finding that the steps already undertaken are substantial.” (punctuation omitted)). 14 Dennard, 243 Ga. App. at 873 (1) (c); accord Massey v. State, 267 Ga. App. 482, 483 ( 600 SE2d 437 ) (2004). 15 See OCGA § 16-6-4 (a) (“A person commits the offense of child molestation when such person: (1) Does any immoral or indecent act to or in the presence of or with any child under the age of 16 years with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the person; or (2) By m | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Stategreen2 sentences2017The fact that further steps must be taken before the crime can be completed does not preclude such a finding that the steps already undertaken are substantial.” (punctuation omitted)). 14 Dennard, 243 Ga. App. at 873 (1) (c); accord Massey v. State, 267 Ga. App. 482, 483 ( 600 SE2d 437 ) (2004). 15 See OCGA § 16-6-4 (a) (“A person commits the offense of child molestation when such person: (1) Does any immoral or indecent act to or in the presence of or with any child under the age of 16 years with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the person; or (2) By m 2017The fact that further steps must be taken before the crime can be completed does not preclude such a finding that the steps already undertaken are substantial.” (punctuation omitted)). 14 Dennard, 243 Ga. App. at 873 (1) (c); accord Massey v. State, 267 Ga. App. 482, 483 ( 600 SE2d 437 ) (2004). 15 See OCGA § 16-6-4 (a) (“A person commits the offense of child molestation when such person: (1) Does any immoral or indecent act to or in the presence of or with any child under the age of 16 years with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the person; or (2) By m | 1 | 1 |
The State v. Harlachergreen2 sentences2017The fact that further steps must be taken before the crime can be completed does not preclude such a finding that the steps already undertaken are substantial.” (punctuation omitted)). 14 Dennard, 243 Ga. App. at 873 (1) (c); accord Massey v. State, 267 Ga. App. 482, 483 ( 600 SE2d 437 ) (2004). 15 See OCGA § 16-6-4 (a) (“A person commits the offense of child molestation when such person: (1) Does any immoral or indecent act to or in the presence of or with any child under the age of 16 years with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the person; or (2) By m 2017The fact that further steps must be taken before the crime can be completed does not preclude such a finding that the steps already undertaken are substantial.” (punctuation omitted)). 14 Dennard, 243 Ga. App. at 873 (1) (c); accord Massey v. State, 267 Ga. App. 482, 483 ( 600 SE2d 437 ) (2004). 15 See OCGA § 16-6-4 (a) (“A person commits the offense of child molestation when such person: (1) Does any immoral or indecent act to or in the presence of or with any child under the age of 16 years with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the person; or (2) By m | 1 | 1 |
Metz v. Stategreen2 sentences2010See also Metz v. State, 284 Ga. 614 (1) ( 669 SE2d 121 ) (2008) (party to crime may be charged and convicted of its commission under OCGA § 16-2-20 (a)). (b) Appellant was convicted of and sentenced for both the malice murders of the two victims and the aggravated assaults of those victims. 2010See also Metz v. State, 284 Ga. 614 (1) ( 669 SE2d 121 ) (2008) (party to crime may be charged and convicted of its commission under OCGA § 16-2-20 (a)). (b) Appellant was convicted of and sentenced for both the malice murders of the two victims and the aggravated assaults of those victims. | 1 | 1 |
Collier v. Stategreen2 sentences2005See also Collier v. State, 244 Ga. 553, 566 (10) ( 261 SE2d 364 ) (1979) (holding that, “[b]y their terms, [the Georgia statutory double jeopardy provisions] do not apply to aggravating circumstances but to crimes”), disapproved on other grounds, Satterfield v. State, 248 Ga. 538, 541 ( 285 SE2d 3 ) (1981). 2005See also Collier v. State, 244 Ga. 553, 566 (10) ( 261 SE2d 364 ) (1979) (holding that, “[b]y their terms, [the Georgia statutory double jeopardy provisions] do not apply to aggravating circumstances but to crimes”), disapproved on other grounds, Satterfield v. State, 248 Ga. 538, 541 ( 285 SE2d 3 ) (1981). | 1 | 1 |
Spraggins v. Stategreen2 sentences2005Although the statutory aggravating circumstances enumerated in OCGA § 17-10-30 (b) may function as elements of the “greater” offense of capital murder for the limited purpose of implicating the constitutional right of trial by jury, they are “not offenses, but rather they are procedural standards designed to control a jury’s discretion in capital cases in order to ensure against capricious and arbitrary enforcement of the death penalty.” Spraggins v. State, 255 Ga. 195, 201 (3) (a) ( 336 SE2d 227 ) (1985). 2005Although the statutory aggravating circumstances enumerated in OCGA § 17-10-30 (b) may function as elements of the “greater” offense of capital murder for the limited purpose of implicating the constitutional right of trial by jury, they are “not offenses, but rather they are procedural standards designed to control a jury’s discretion in capital cases in order to ensure against capricious and arbitrary enforcement of the death penalty.” Spraggins v. State, 255 Ga. 195, 201 (3) (a) ( 336 SE2d 227 ) (1985). | 1 | 1 |
Satterfield v. Stategreen2 sentences2005See also Collier v. State, 244 Ga. 553, 566 (10) ( 261 SE2d 364 ) (1979) (holding that, “[b]y their terms, [the Georgia statutory double jeopardy provisions] do not apply to aggravating circumstances but to crimes”), disapproved on other grounds, Satterfield v. State, 248 Ga. 538, 541 ( 285 SE2d 3 ) (1981). 2005See also Collier v. State, 244 Ga. 553, 566 (10) ( 261 SE2d 364 ) (1979) (holding that, “[b]y their terms, [the Georgia statutory double jeopardy provisions] do not apply to aggravating circumstances but to crimes”), disapproved on other grounds, Satterfield v. State, 248 Ga. 538, 541 ( 285 SE2d 3 ) (1981). | 1 | 1 |
Simpkins v. Stategreen2 sentences1998See Simpkins v. State, 268 Ga. 219 (2) ( 486 SE2d 833 ) (1997). (c) Jenkins argues that four of the statutory aggravating circumstances cannot stand because the aggravating offense listed on the jury verdict form is “kidnapping” and not “kidnapping with bodily injury.” Simple kidnapping cannot serve as a statutory aggravating circumstance under OCGA § 17-10-30 (b) (2). 1998See Simpkins v. State, 268 Ga. 219 (2) ( 486 SE2d 833 ) (1997). (c) Jenkins argues that four of the statutory aggravating circumstances cannot stand because the aggravating offense listed on the jury verdict form is “kidnapping” and not “kidnapping with bodily injury.” Simple kidnapping cannot serve as a statutory aggravating circumstance under OCGA § 17-10-30 (b) (2). | 1 | 1 |
Lonchar v. Stategreen2 sentences1997Drane v. State, 265 Ga. at 259; Lonchar v. State, 258 Ga. 447, 453 (6) ( 369 SE2d 749 ) (1988). 1997Drane v. State, 265 Ga. at 259; Lonchar v. State, 258 Ga. 447, 453 (6) ( 369 SE2d 749 ) (1988). | 1 | 1 |
Lynd v. Stategreen2 sentences1995See Lynd v. State, 262 Ga. 58, 59-60 ( 414 SE2d 5 ) (1992). 1995See Lynd v. State, 262 Ga. 58, 59-60 ( 414 SE2d 5 ) (1992). | 1 | 1 |
McCleskey v. Kempgreen1 sentence1994Although a reasonable juror might very well determine that there was no torture in this case, see Jones v. Kemp, supra at 1562, it is premature to rule on whether the evidence adduced by the state at the resentencing trial will be sufficient to justify instructing the jury regarding the crucial element of aggravating circumstance under OCGA § 17-10-30 (b) (7). 6. | 1 | 1 |
| Fugitt v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Horton v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Jackson v. Virginia
red
2 sentences2012Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979); Tarver v. State, 278 Ga. 358 (5) ( 602 SE2d 627 ) (2004) (evidence sufficient to find aggravating circumstances under OCGA § 17-10-30 (b)). 2. 2010Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979); Griffin v. State, 280 Ga. 683 ( 631 SE2d 671 ) (2006) (evidence sufficient to find aggravating circumstances under OCGA § 17-10-30 (b)). | 7 | 2006–2012 |
Griffin v. State
green
2 sentences2010Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979); Griffin v. State, 280 Ga. 683 ( 631 SE2d 671 ) (2006) (evidence sufficient to find aggravating circumstances under OCGA § 17-10-30 (b)). 2010Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979); Griffin v. State, 280 Ga. 683 ( 631 SE2d 671 ) (2006) (evidence sufficient to find aggravating circumstances under OCGA § 17-10-30 (b)). | 5 | 2006–2010 |
State v. Terry
green
2 sentences2018See Leach v. State , 259 Ga. 33 , 34 (2), 376 S.E.2d 667 (1989) (rejecting the appellant's assertion that the trial court erred in failing to grant a pre-trial motion to prevent the State from seeking the death penalty "on the ground that the state's case, as he then understood it, did not adequately present any statutory aggravating circumstances, and that the state was seeking the death penalty merely to inflame the minds of the jury against [him] through voir dire so as to enhance its chances of a favorable guilt-innocence verdict"); State v. Terry , 257 Ga. 473 (1), 360 S.E.2d 588 (1987) ( 2018See Leach v. State , 259 Ga. 33 , 34 (2), 376 S.E.2d 667 (1989) (rejecting the appellant's assertion that the trial court erred in failing to grant a pre-trial motion to prevent the State from seeking the death penalty "on the ground that the state's case, as he then understood it, did not adequately present any statutory aggravating circumstances, and that the state was seeking the death penalty merely to inflame the minds of the jury against [him] through voir dire so as to enhance its chances of a favorable guilt-innocence verdict"); State v. Terry , 257 Ga. 473 (1), 360 S.E.2d 588 (1987) ( | 2 | 2018–2018 |
McIntosh v. State
neutral
2 sentences2017The fact that further steps must be taken before the crime can be completed does not preclude such a finding that the steps already undertaken are substantial.” (punctuation omitted)). 14 Dennard, 243 Ga. App. at 873 (1) (c); accord Massey v. State, 267 Ga. App. 482, 483 ( 600 SE2d 437 ) (2004). 15 See OCGA § 16-6-4 (a) (“A person commits the offense of child molestation when such person: (1) Does any immoral or indecent act to or in the presence of or with any child under the age of 16 years with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the person; or (2) By m 2017The fact that further steps must be taken before the crime can be completed does not preclude such a finding that the steps already undertaken are substantial.” (punctuation omitted)). 14 Dennard, 243 Ga. App. at 873 (1) (c); accord Massey v. State, 267 Ga. App. 482, 483 ( 600 SE2d 437 ) (2004). 15 See OCGA § 16-6-4 (a) (“A person commits the offense of child molestation when such person: (1) Does any immoral or indecent act to or in the presence of or with any child under the age of 16 years with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the person; or (2) By m | 1 | 2017–2017 |
Anthony v. State
neutral
1 sentence2017The fact that further steps must be taken before the crime can be completed does not preclude such a finding that the steps already undertaken are substantial.” (punctuation omitted)). 14 Dennard, 243 Ga. App. at 873 (1) (c); accord Massey v. State, 267 Ga. App. 482, 483 ( 600 SE2d 437 ) (2004). 15 See OCGA § 16-6-4 (a) (“A person commits the offense of child molestation when such person: (1) Does any immoral or indecent act to or in the presence of or with any child under the age of 16 years with the intent to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the person; or (2) By m | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Waters v. State green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Zant v. Stephens green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.