37 New York opinions name it 6 courts 1857–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New York courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Howard v. New York Timesgreen2 sentences2015As a preliminary matter, we note that petitioner’s “guilty plea, standing alone, is ‘sufficient to provide a rational basis for the finding of guilt as to the charged violation [s]’ ” (Matter of Ramos v New York State Div. of Parole, 300 AD2d 852, 854 [2002]; see Matter of Fuller v Goord, 299 AD2d 849, 849-850 [2002], lv dismissed 100 NY2d 531 [2003]). 2015As a preliminary matter, we note that petitioner’s “guilty plea, standing alone, is ‘sufficient to provide a rational basis for the finding of guilt as to the charged violation [s]’ ” (Matter of Ramos v New York State Div. of Parole, 300 AD2d 852, 854 [2002]; see Matter of Fuller v Goord, 299 AD2d 849, 849-850 [2002], lv dismissed 100 NY2d 531 [2003]). | 3 | 3 |
Fuller v. Goordgreen2 sentences2015As a preliminary matter, we note that petitioner’s “guilty plea, standing alone, is ‘sufficient to provide a rational basis for the finding of guilt as to the charged violation [s]’ ” (Matter of Ramos v New York State Div. of Parole, 300 AD2d 852, 854 [2002]; see Matter of Fuller v Goord, 299 AD2d 849, 849-850 [2002], lv dismissed 100 NY2d 531 [2003]). 2015As a preliminary matter, we note that petitioner’s “guilty plea, standing alone, is ‘sufficient to provide a rational basis for the finding of guilt as to the charged violation [s]’ ” (Matter of Ramos v New York State Div. of Parole, 300 AD2d 852, 854 [2002]; see Matter of Fuller v Goord, 299 AD2d 849, 849-850 [2002], lv dismissed 100 NY2d 531 [2003]). | 3 | 3 |
Ramos v. New York State Division of Parolegreen2 sentences2015As a preliminary matter, we note that petitioner’s “guilty plea, standing alone, is ‘sufficient to provide a rational basis for the finding of guilt as to the charged violation [s]’ ” (Matter of Ramos v New York State Div. of Parole, 300 AD2d 852, 854 [2002]; see Matter of Fuller v Goord, 299 AD2d 849, 849-850 [2002], lv dismissed 100 NY2d 531 [2003]). 2015As a preliminary matter, we note that petitioner’s “guilty plea, standing alone, is ‘sufficient to provide a rational basis for the finding of guilt as to the charged violation [s]’ ” (Matter of Ramos v New York State Div. of Parole, 300 AD2d 852, 854 [2002]; see Matter of Fuller v Goord, 299 AD2d 849, 849-850 [2002], lv dismissed 100 NY2d 531 [2003]). | 2 | 3 |
People v. Oskrobagreen2 sentences2007In any event, defendant’s contention lacks merit because the record establishes that defendant was “afforded the requisite opportunity to be heard concerning the charged violation^] of probation, i.e., ‘an opportunity to attack or deny the charge[s]’ ” (People v Matos, 28 AD3d 1120 , 1122 [2006], quoting People v Oskroba, 305 NY 113, 117 [1953], rearg denied 305 NY 696 [1953]). 2006Defendant thereby was afforded the requisite opportunity to be heard concerning the charged violation of probation, i.e., “an opportunity to attack or deny the charge” (People v Oskroba, 305 NY 113, 117 [1953], rearg denied 305 NY 696 [1953]; see People v Donato, 112 AD2d 535 [1985], lv denied 66 NY2d 918 [1985]; People v Petersen, 53 AD2d 935, 935-936 [1976]). | 2 | 2 |
Carney v. New York State Division of Parolegreen2 sentences2002Notably, at no point did petitioner dispute the existence of the Florida conviction and, in any event, his guilty plea, standing alone, is “sufficient to provide a rational basis for the finding of guilt as to the charged violation” (Matter of McCloud v New York State Div. of Parole, 277 AD2d 627, 628 , lv denied 96 NY2d 702 ; see Matter of Carney v New York State Div. of Parole, 244 AD2d 746, 746 ). 2000Petitioner’s guilty plea to the special condition involving motor vehicle use was sufficient to provide a rational basis for the finding of guilt as to the charged violation (see, Matter of Carney v New York State Div. of Parole, 244 AD2d 746 ). | 1 | 2 |
Wolff v. McDonnellgreen2 sentences1988The minimal due process requirements for an inmate charged with misconduct are met if he receives "at least 24 hours advance written notice of the charged violation, and a written statement of the fact finders as to the evidence relied upon and the reasons for the action taken” (Matter of Amato v Ward, 41 NY2d 469 , 472; see, Wolff v McDonnell, 418 US 539, 563-564 ). 1978In Wolff v McDonnell (supra), the United States Supreme Court set forth two basic requirements of due process which must be available to prison inmates charged with misconduct: at least 24 hours’ advance written notice of the charged violation and a written statement of the fact finder concerning the evidence relied upon and the action taken. | 1 | 2 |
Matter of Graham v. New Hampton Fire Dist.green2 sentences2026The ruling on this charge is therefore arbitrary and capricious. ( See Matter of Graham v New Hampton Fire Dist. , 131 AD3d 1168, 1169 [2d Dept 2015] [annulling a misconduct determination on one disciplinary specification as duplicative of the misconduct determination on another specification].) [FN48] Charge 11 (violation of Rule 443 [14], "disrupts a University function or renders its continuation impossible"): The evidence does not rationally support the UJB's finding that petitioners are responsible for this charged violation. 2026The ruling on this charge is therefore arbitrary and capricious. ( See Matter of Graham v New Hampton Fire Dist. , 131 AD3d 1168, 1169 [2d Dept 2015] [annulling a misconduct determination on one disciplinary specification as duplicative of the misconduct determination on another specification].) [FN48] Charge 11 (violation of Rule 443 [14], "disrupts a University function or renders its continuation impossible"): The evidence does not rationally support the UJB's finding that petitioners are responsible for this charged violation. | 1 | 1 |
Claim of Howard v. Stature Electric, Inc.green1 sentence2024"Claimant must be provided an ample opportunity to address the issue of whether he knowingly misrepresented material facts sufficient to establish the charged violation" and, based upon his counsel's representations at the time of the hearing, the Board found that he was then unavailable to do so ( Matter of Howard v Stature Elec., Inc. , 72 AD3d at 1170 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). | 1 | 1 |
Slavenburg Corp. v. Opus Apparel, Inc.green1 sentence2015Pursuant to Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1111-b (d), “[a] certificate, sworn to or affirmed by a technician employed by Nassau county in which the charged violation occurred . . . based upon inspection of photographs, microphotographs, videotape or other recorded images produced by a traffic-control signal photo violation-monitoring system, shall be prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein.” To be effective such a certificate must be sworn to or affirmed before a notary public or other authorized official (CPLR 2309 [a]; see Slavenburg Corp. v Opus Apparel, 53 NY2d 799, 800 [1981]). | 1 | 1 |
McCants v. Travisgreen1 sentence2013Porter v Smith, 71 AD2d 1056 [4th Dept 1979]) but is merely a factor to be considered “in mitigation of, or as an excuse for, the charged violation” (Matter of McCants v Travis, 291 AD2d 594, 596 [3d Dept 2002]). | 1 | 1 |
Claim of Robbins v. Jerusalemgreen1 sentence2010The question of whether claimant committed the charged conduct, though decisive in determining whether he violated Workers’ Compensation Law § 114-a, was not determinéd in the criminal action. 3 Thus, the requirement of identicality was not. met, and collateral estoppel does not apply (see Matter of Halyalkar v Board of Regents of State of N.Y., 72 NY2d at 267 ; Kaufman v Eli Lilly & Co., 65 NY2d at 456). 4 Claimant must be provided an “ample opportunity to address the issue of whether he knowingly misrepresented material facts” sufficient to establish the charged violation (Matter of Robbins | 1 | 1 |
People v. Petersengreen1 sentence2006Defendant thereby was afforded the requisite opportunity to be heard concerning the charged violation of probation, i.e., “an opportunity to attack or deny the charge” (People v Oskroba, 305 NY 113, 117 [1953], rearg denied 305 NY 696 [1953]; see People v Donato, 112 AD2d 535 [1985], lv denied 66 NY2d 918 [1985]; People v Petersen, 53 AD2d 935, 935-936 [1976]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Donatogreen1 sentence2006Defendant thereby was afforded the requisite opportunity to be heard concerning the charged violation of probation, i.e., “an opportunity to attack or deny the charge” (People v Oskroba, 305 NY 113, 117 [1953], rearg denied 305 NY 696 [1953]; see People v Donato, 112 AD2d 535 [1985], lv denied 66 NY2d 918 [1985]; People v Petersen, 53 AD2d 935, 935-936 [1976]). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Torresgreen1 sentence2006Also contrary to the contentions of defendant in appeal No. 1, he was not deprived of a fair trial by prosecutorial misconduct on summation (see People v Torturica [appeal No. 2], 23 AD3d 1040, 1041 [2005]; People v Torres, 17 AD3d 1046, 1047 [2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 811 [2005]), nor did the court take judicial notice of an element of the charged violation of speeding when it instructed the jury that the speed limit was 40 miles per hour at the location at issue. | 1 | 1 |
People v. Torturicagreen1 sentence2006Also contrary to the contentions of defendant in appeal No. 1, he was not deprived of a fair trial by prosecutorial misconduct on summation (see People v Torturica [appeal No. 2], 23 AD3d 1040, 1041 [2005]; People v Torres, 17 AD3d 1046, 1047 [2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 811 [2005]), nor did the court take judicial notice of an element of the charged violation of speeding when it instructed the jury that the speed limit was 40 miles per hour at the location at issue. | 1 | 1 |
Barreto v. Goordgreen1 sentence2003While testimony has been found relevant when it could prove “a possible justification defense to the charged violation” (Matter of Coleman v Coombe, 65 NY2d 777 , 780 [1985]) or mitigate the penalty (see id. at 780; Matter of Anderson v Morrow, 268 AD2d 638, 639 [2000]), where, as here, their exclusion was based upon “their lack of direct knowledge of the facts giving rise to [that] proceeding” (Matter of Nijman v Goord, 294 AD2d 737, 738 [2002]), the determination was proper (see Matter of Joyce v Goord, 246 AD2d 926, 928 [1998]; Matter of Barreto v Goord, 244 AD2d 610, 611 [1997]). | 1 | 1 |
Joyce v. Goordgreen1 sentence2003While testimony has been found relevant when it could prove “a possible justification defense to the charged violation” (Matter of Coleman v Coombe, 65 NY2d 777 , 780 [1985]) or mitigate the penalty (see id. at 780; Matter of Anderson v Morrow, 268 AD2d 638, 639 [2000]), where, as here, their exclusion was based upon “their lack of direct knowledge of the facts giving rise to [that] proceeding” (Matter of Nijman v Goord, 294 AD2d 737, 738 [2002]), the determination was proper (see Matter of Joyce v Goord, 246 AD2d 926, 928 [1998]; Matter of Barreto v Goord, 244 AD2d 610, 611 [1997]). | 1 | 1 |
Anderson v. Morrowgreen1 sentence2003While testimony has been found relevant when it could prove “a possible justification defense to the charged violation” (Matter of Coleman v Coombe, 65 NY2d 777 , 780 [1985]) or mitigate the penalty (see id. at 780; Matter of Anderson v Morrow, 268 AD2d 638, 639 [2000]), where, as here, their exclusion was based upon “their lack of direct knowledge of the facts giving rise to [that] proceeding” (Matter of Nijman v Goord, 294 AD2d 737, 738 [2002]), the determination was proper (see Matter of Joyce v Goord, 246 AD2d 926, 928 [1998]; Matter of Barreto v Goord, 244 AD2d 610, 611 [1997]). | 1 | 1 |
Nijman v. Goordgreen1 sentence2003While testimony has been found relevant when it could prove “a possible justification defense to the charged violation” (Matter of Coleman v Coombe, 65 NY2d 777 , 780 [1985]) or mitigate the penalty (see id. at 780; Matter of Anderson v Morrow, 268 AD2d 638, 639 [2000]), where, as here, their exclusion was based upon “their lack of direct knowledge of the facts giving rise to [that] proceeding” (Matter of Nijman v Goord, 294 AD2d 737, 738 [2002]), the determination was proper (see Matter of Joyce v Goord, 246 AD2d 926, 928 [1998]; Matter of Barreto v Goord, 244 AD2d 610, 611 [1997]). | 1 | 1 |
| Newcomb v. New York State Board of Parolegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Townsend v. Hoodgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hobson v. Coughlingreen | 1 | 1 |
| Garcia v. LeFevregreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New York. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
People v. Oskroba
green
2 sentences2007In any event, defendant’s contention lacks merit because the record establishes that defendant was “afforded the requisite opportunity to be heard concerning the charged violation^] of probation, i.e., ‘an opportunity to attack or deny the charge[s]’ ” (People v Matos, 28 AD3d 1120 , 1122 [2006], quoting People v Oskroba, 305 NY 113, 117 [1953], rearg denied 305 NY 696 [1953]). 2006Defendant thereby was afforded the requisite opportunity to be heard concerning the charged violation of probation, i.e., “an opportunity to attack or deny the charge” (People v Oskroba, 305 NY 113, 117 [1953], rearg denied 305 NY 696 [1953]; see People v Donato, 112 AD2d 535 [1985], lv denied 66 NY2d 918 [1985]; People v Petersen, 53 AD2d 935, 935-936 [1976]). | 2 | 2006–2007 |
Williams v. City of New York
green
1 sentence2018This evidence supported the defendants' reasonable belief in the Trustees' ownership of the land, and thus, the plaintiffs' guilt of the charged violation ( see generally Williams v City of New York , 114 AD3d at 854 ; Covert v County of Westchester , 202 AD2d 384, 385 ). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Bruzzano v. Osorio
neutral
1 sentence2018This evidence supported the defendants' reasonable belief in the Trustees' ownership of the land, and thus, the plaintiffs' guilt of the charged violation ( see generally Williams v City of New York , 114 AD3d at 854 ; Covert v County of Westchester , 202 AD2d 384, 385 ). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Jones v. Maphey
green
1 sentence2013Porter v Smith, 71 AD2d 1056 [4th Dept 1979]) but is merely a factor to be considered “in mitigation of, or as an excuse for, the charged violation” (Matter of McCants v Travis, 291 AD2d 594, 596 [3d Dept 2002]). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Lopez v. Evans
green
1 sentence2013However, in Lopez, the Appellate Division, First Department, rejected this “older” line of cases and held that “the basic requirements of due process applicable to a parole revocation proceeding” require a predicate determination of competence before the revocation proceeding may commence (Lopez v Evans, 104 AD3d at 108 ). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Halyalkar v. Board of Regents
green
1 sentence2010The question of whether claimant committed the charged conduct, though decisive in determining whether he violated Workers’ Compensation Law § 114-a, was not determinéd in the criminal action. 3 Thus, the requirement of identicality was not. met, and collateral estoppel does not apply (see Matter of Halyalkar v Board of Regents of State of N.Y., 72 NY2d at 267 ; Kaufman v Eli Lilly & Co., 65 NY2d at 456). 4 Claimant must be provided an “ample opportunity to address the issue of whether he knowingly misrepresented material facts” sufficient to establish the charged violation (Matter of Robbins | 1 | 2010–2010 |
People v. Neal
green
1 sentence2007In any event, defendant’s contention lacks merit because the record establishes that defendant was “afforded the requisite opportunity to be heard concerning the charged violation^] of probation, i.e., ‘an opportunity to attack or deny the charge[s]’ ” (People v Matos, 28 AD3d 1120 , 1122 [2006], quoting People v Oskroba, 305 NY 113, 117 [1953], rearg denied 305 NY 696 [1953]). | 1 | 2007–2007 |
People v. Vail
green
1 sentence2006Also contrary to the contentions of defendant in appeal No. 1, he was not deprived of a fair trial by prosecutorial misconduct on summation (see People v Torturica [appeal No. 2], 23 AD3d 1040, 1041 [2005]; People v Torres, 17 AD3d 1046, 1047 [2005], lv denied 5 NY3d 811 [2005]), nor did the court take judicial notice of an element of the charged violation of speeding when it instructed the jury that the speed limit was 40 miles per hour at the location at issue. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
People v. Harris
green
1 sentence2006Moreover, the jury verdict established by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant had committed an additional crime while on probation (see CPL 410.70 [3]) and thus had violated an essential condition of the terms of his probation (see CPL 410.10 [2]; Baucom, 154 AD2d at 689 ; Harris, 145 AD2d at 436 ). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
People v. Baucom
green
1 sentence2006Moreover, the jury verdict established by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant had committed an additional crime while on probation (see CPL 410.70 [3]) and thus had violated an essential condition of the terms of his probation (see CPL 410.10 [2]; Baucom, 154 AD2d at 689 ; Harris, 145 AD2d at 436 ). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| People ex rel. Newcomb v. Metz green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
McCloud v. New York State Division of Parole
green
1 sentence2002Notably, at no point did petitioner dispute the existence of the Florida conviction and, in any event, his guilty plea, standing alone, is “sufficient to provide a rational basis for the finding of guilt as to the charged violation” (Matter of McCloud v New York State Div. of Parole, 277 AD2d 627, 628 , lv denied 96 NY2d 702 ; see Matter of Carney v New York State Div. of Parole, 244 AD2d 746, 746 ). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| De Leon v. Goord green | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| Morrissey v. Brewer green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Smith v. Senkowski green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| McBride v. Selsky green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Talbot v. Goord green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Green v. Selsky green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Garcia v. Goord neutral | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Webb v. McGinnis green | 1 | 2000–2000 |
| Nina v. Coombe neutral | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Murphy v. Selsky neutral | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Grant v. Goord green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| In re the Claim of Powell neutral | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Cole v. New York State Department of Education green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Tinsley v. New York State Board of Parole neutral | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Kaplan v. Board of Regents of University green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Fischman v. Ambach neutral | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Wilson v. Wilson neutral | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Saleem v. Commissioner of Education neutral | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| Erdman v. Ingraham green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Merrick v. Merrick neutral | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Byrd v. Nassau Hospital green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Martin v. Coughlin neutral | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| In re the Claim of La Rocca green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| De Mauro v. LeFevre green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| Cook v. Coughlin neutral | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| People v. Brown neutral | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| People v. Hoag green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Feigenblum v. Commission On Human Rights green | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.