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10 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1907–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Maggard v. Stategreen2 sentences2015See also Maggard v. State, 259 Ga. 291, 293 (2) ( 380 SE2d 259 ) (1989) (“If, for example, the evidence is being presented to prove the identity of the perpetrator of the offense charged, a long list of similarities between or among the crimes might be necessary to show that the crime on trial bears the defendant’s ‘criminal signature’ ”) (emphasis in original). 2015See also Maggard v. State, 259 Ga. 291, 293 (2) ( 380 SE2d 259 ) (1989) (“If, for example, the evidence is being presented to prove the identity of the perpetrator of the offense charged, a long list of similarities between or among the crimes might be necessary to show that the crime on trial bears the defendant’s ‘criminal signature’ ”) (emphasis in original). | 2 | 2 |
Lacy v. Lacygreen2 sentences2024In such a case it must be alleged and proved that the contemnor had actual notice of the order for disobedience of which he is sought to be punished.’”), quoting Spence v. Woodman Co., 213 Ga. 573, 576 (3) ( 100 SE2d 435 ) (1957); In re Ragas, 359 Ga. App. 670 , 674 (3) (a) ( 859 SE2d 827 ) (2021) (“It must be alleged and proved that the [nonparty] contemnor had actual notice of the order for disobedience of which he is sought to be punished and that the nonparty be in privity with, aid and abet, or act in concert with the named party in acts constituting a violation of the order.”) (punctuati 2024In such a case it must be alleged and proved that the contemnor had actual notice of the order for disobedience of which he is sought to be punished.’”), quoting Spence v. Woodman Co., 213 Ga. 573, 576 (3) ( 100 SE2d 435 ) (1957); In re Ragas, 359 Ga. App. 670 , 674 (3) (a) ( 859 SE2d 827 ) (2021) (“It must be alleged and proved that the [nonparty] contemnor had actual notice of the order for disobedience of which he is sought to be punished and that the nonparty be in privity with, aid and abet, or act in concert with the named party in acts constituting a violation of the order.”) (punctuati | 1 | 1 |
Baskin v. Halegreen2 sentences2024In such a case it must be alleged and proved that the contemnor had actual notice of the order for disobedience of which he is sought to be punished.’”), quoting Spence v. Woodman Co., 213 Ga. 573, 576 (3) ( 100 SE2d 435 ) (1957); In re Ragas, 359 Ga. App. 670 , 674 (3) (a) ( 859 SE2d 827 ) (2021) (“It must be alleged and proved that the [nonparty] contemnor had actual notice of the order for disobedience of which he is sought to be punished and that the nonparty be in privity with, aid and abet, or act in concert with the named party in acts constituting a violation of the order.”) (punctuati 2024In such a case it must be alleged and proved that the contemnor had actual notice of the order for disobedience of which he is sought to be punished.’”), quoting Spence v. Woodman Co., 213 Ga. 573, 576 (3) ( 100 SE2d 435 ) (1957); In re Ragas, 359 Ga. App. 670 , 674 (3) (a) ( 859 SE2d 827 ) (2021) (“It must be alleged and proved that the [nonparty] contemnor had actual notice of the order for disobedience of which he is sought to be punished and that the nonparty be in privity with, aid and abet, or act in concert with the named party in acts constituting a violation of the order.”) (punctuati | 1 | 1 |
Spence v. THE WOODMAN CO., INC.green2 sentences2024In such a case it must be alleged and proved that the contemnor had actual notice of the order for disobedience of which he is sought to be punished.’”), quoting Spence v. Woodman Co., 213 Ga. 573, 576 (3) ( 100 SE2d 435 ) (1957); In re Ragas, 359 Ga. App. 670 , 674 (3) (a) ( 859 SE2d 827 ) (2021) (“It must be alleged and proved that the [nonparty] contemnor had actual notice of the order for disobedience of which he is sought to be punished and that the nonparty be in privity with, aid and abet, or act in concert with the named party in acts constituting a violation of the order.”) (punctuati 2024In such a case it must be alleged and proved that the contemnor had actual notice of the order for disobedience of which he is sought to be punished.’”), quoting Spence v. Woodman Co., 213 Ga. 573, 576 (3) ( 100 SE2d 435 ) (1957); In re Ragas, 359 Ga. App. 670 , 674 (3) (a) ( 859 SE2d 827 ) (2021) (“It must be alleged and proved that the [nonparty] contemnor had actual notice of the order for disobedience of which he is sought to be punished and that the nonparty be in privity with, aid and abet, or act in concert with the named party in acts constituting a violation of the order.”) (punctuati | 1 | 1 |
Maloof v. Maloofgreen2 sentences2024In such a case it must be alleged and proved that the contemnor had actual notice of the order for disobedience of which he is sought to be punished.’”), quoting Spence v. Woodman Co., 213 Ga. 573, 576 (3) ( 100 SE2d 435 ) (1957); In re Ragas, 359 Ga. App. 670 , 674 (3) (a) ( 859 SE2d 827 ) (2021) (“It must be alleged and proved that the [nonparty] contemnor had actual notice of the order for disobedience of which he is sought to be punished and that the nonparty be in privity with, aid and abet, or act in concert with the named party in acts constituting a violation of the order.”) (punctuati 2024In such a case it must be alleged and proved that the contemnor had actual notice of the order for disobedience of which he is sought to be punished.’”), quoting Spence v. Woodman Co., 213 Ga. 573, 576 (3) ( 100 SE2d 435 ) (1957); In re Ragas, 359 Ga. App. 670 , 674 (3) (a) ( 859 SE2d 827 ) (2021) (“It must be alleged and proved that the [nonparty] contemnor had actual notice of the order for disobedience of which he is sought to be punished and that the nonparty be in privity with, aid and abet, or act in concert with the named party in acts constituting a violation of the order.”) (punctuati | 1 | 1 |
MURPHY Et Al. v. MURPHYgreen2 sentences2024In such a case it must be alleged and proved that the contemnor had actual notice of the order for disobedience of which he is sought to be punished.’”), quoting Spence v. Woodman Co., 213 Ga. 573, 576 (3) ( 100 SE2d 435 ) (1957); In re Ragas, 359 Ga. App. 670 , 674 (3) (a) ( 859 SE2d 827 ) (2021) (“It must be alleged and proved that the [nonparty] contemnor had actual notice of the order for disobedience of which he is sought to be punished and that the nonparty be in privity with, aid and abet, or act in concert with the named party in acts constituting a violation of the order.”) (punctuati 2024In such a case it must be alleged and proved that the contemnor had actual notice of the order for disobedience of which he is sought to be punished.’”), quoting Spence v. Woodman Co., 213 Ga. 573, 576 (3) ( 100 SE2d 435 ) (1957); In re Ragas, 359 Ga. App. 670 , 674 (3) (a) ( 859 SE2d 827 ) (2021) (“It must be alleged and proved that the [nonparty] contemnor had actual notice of the order for disobedience of which he is sought to be punished and that the nonparty be in privity with, aid and abet, or act in concert with the named party in acts constituting a violation of the order.”) (punctuati | 1 | 1 |
Williams v. Stategreen2 sentences1997Williams v. State, 257 Ga. 186, 187 (2) ( 356 SE2d 872 ) (1987); Lofton v. State, 237 Ga. 275 ( 227 SE2d 327 ) (1976). 1997Williams v. State, 257 Ga. 186, 187 (2) ( 356 SE2d 872 ) (1987); Lofton v. State, 237 Ga. 275 ( 227 SE2d 327 ) (1976). | 1 | 1 |
Wallace v. Rameygreen2 sentences1990Chadwick v. Miller, 169 Ga. App. 338, 339 (1) ( 312 SE2d 835 ) (1983); Wallace v. Ramey, 191 Ga. App. 293, 294 (2) ( 381 SE2d 434 ) (1989); Martini v. Nixon, 185 Ga. App. 328 (2) ( 364 SE2d 49 ) (1987). 1990Chadwick v. Miller, 169 Ga. App. 338, 339 (1) ( 312 SE2d 835 ) (1983); Wallace v. Ramey, 191 Ga. App. 293, 294 (2) ( 381 SE2d 434 ) (1989); Martini v. Nixon, 185 Ga. App. 328 (2) ( 364 SE2d 49 ) (1987). | 1 | 1 |
Chadwick v. Millergreen2 sentences1990Chadwick v. Miller, 169 Ga. App. 338, 339 (1) ( 312 SE2d 835 ) (1983); Wallace v. Ramey, 191 Ga. App. 293, 294 (2) ( 381 SE2d 434 ) (1989); Martini v. Nixon, 185 Ga. App. 328 (2) ( 364 SE2d 49 ) (1987). 1990Chadwick v. Miller, 169 Ga. App. 338, 339 (1) ( 312 SE2d 835 ) (1983); Wallace v. Ramey, 191 Ga. App. 293, 294 (2) ( 381 SE2d 434 ) (1989); Martini v. Nixon, 185 Ga. App. 328 (2) ( 364 SE2d 49 ) (1987). | 1 | 1 |
Colonial Stores Inc. v. Cokergreen2 sentences1962Under this principle, the jury might have considered that the plaintiff was somewhat negligent but the defendant was more negligent, and have apportioned the damages accordingly.” Colonial Stores v. Coker, 77 Ga. App. 227, 234 (9) ( 48 SE2d 150 ). 1962Under this principle, the jury might have considered that the plaintiff was somewhat negligent but the defendant was more negligent, and have apportioned the damages accordingly.” Colonial Stores v. Coker, 77 Ga. App. 227, 234 (9) ( 48 SE2d 150 ). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Atlanta Railway & Power Co. v. Gaston
neutral
2 sentences1907In reaching our conclusion that the exception to the charge in the present case was not well taken, we have not overlooked the ease of Atlanta Railway & Power Co. v. Gaston, 118 Ga. 418 ( 45 S. E. 508 ), where the court charged on the doctrine of comparative negligence, and also that “the defendant might relieve itself of the statutory presumption by showing that its agents exercised .all proper care and diligence to avoid the injury; or that the damage was caused by the negligence of the plaintiff; or that the plaintiff could have, by the exercise of ordinary care, avoided the injury caused b 1907In reaching our conclusion that the exception to the charge in the present case was not well taken, we have not overlooked the ease of Atlanta Railway & Power Co. v. Gaston, 118 Ga. 418 ( 45 S. E. 508 ), where the court charged on the doctrine of comparative negligence, and also that “the defendant might relieve itself of the statutory presumption by showing that its agents exercised .all proper care and diligence to avoid the injury; or that the damage was caused by the negligence of the plaintiff; or that the plaintiff could have, by the exercise of ordinary care, avoided the injury caused b | 2 | 1907–1907 |
Neal-Millard Co. v. Owens
neutral
2 sentences1907In reaching our conclusion that the exception to the charge in the present case was not well taken, we have not overlooked the ease of Atlanta Railway & Power Co. v. Gaston, 118 Ga. 418 ( 45 S. E. 508 ), where the court charged on the doctrine of comparative negligence, and also that “the defendant might relieve itself of the statutory presumption by showing that its agents exercised .all proper care and diligence to avoid the injury; or that the damage was caused by the negligence of the plaintiff; or that the plaintiff could have, by the exercise of ordinary care, avoided the injury caused b 1907In reaching our conclusion that the exception to the charge in the present case was not well taken, we have not overlooked the ease of Atlanta Railway & Power Co. v. Gaston, 118 Ga. 418 ( 45 S. E. 508 ), where the court charged on the doctrine of comparative negligence, and also that “the defendant might relieve itself of the statutory presumption by showing that its agents exercised .all proper care and diligence to avoid the injury; or that the damage was caused by the negligence of the plaintiff; or that the plaintiff could have, by the exercise of ordinary care, avoided the injury caused b | 2 | 1907–1907 |
Lofton v. State
green
2 sentences1997Williams v. State, 257 Ga. 186, 187 (2) ( 356 SE2d 872 ) (1987); Lofton v. State, 237 Ga. 275 ( 227 SE2d 327 ) (1976). 1997Williams v. State, 257 Ga. 186, 187 (2) ( 356 SE2d 872 ) (1987); Lofton v. State, 237 Ga. 275 ( 227 SE2d 327 ) (1976). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Martini v. Nixon
green
2 sentences1990Chadwick v. Miller, 169 Ga. App. 338, 339 (1) ( 312 SE2d 835 ) (1983); Wallace v. Ramey, 191 Ga. App. 293, 294 (2) ( 381 SE2d 434 ) (1989); Martini v. Nixon, 185 Ga. App. 328 (2) ( 364 SE2d 49 ) (1987). 1990Chadwick v. Miller, 169 Ga. App. 338, 339 (1) ( 312 SE2d 835 ) (1983); Wallace v. Ramey, 191 Ga. App. 293, 294 (2) ( 381 SE2d 434 ) (1989); Martini v. Nixon, 185 Ga. App. 328 (2) ( 364 SE2d 49 ) (1987). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Hosch v. State
green
2 sentences1982Davis v. State, supra. The challenged charge on malice presents a more difficult problem, however, as it contains the language “the law will imply malice.” We cautioned against the use of similar language in Hosch v. State, 246 Ga. 417 (3) ( 271 SE2d 817 ) (1980) (decided after the defendant’s trial and convictions). 1982Davis v. State, supra. The challenged charge on malice presents a more difficult problem, however, as it contains the language “the law will imply malice.” We cautioned against the use of similar language in Hosch v. State, 246 Ga. 417 (3) ( 271 SE2d 817 ) (1980) (decided after the defendant’s trial and convictions). | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Rewis v. State
neutral
1 sentence1949In Quick v. State, 62 Ga. App. 551 (2) ( 8 S. E. 2d, 733 ), this court said: “Evidence may be sufficient to sustain a finding that the defendant was careless or guilty of ordinary negligence, in killing an animal, and still *585 be insufficient to find, that it was maliciously killed.” The killing must have been done with malice or an evil design and the evidence must show that the killing was done purposely or that the killing was done “under circumstances which bespeak a mind disposed to the commission of mischief”; that is, that the killing was done with such recklessness as to imply malice | 1 | 1949–1949 |
Quick v. State
neutral
1 sentence1949In Quick v. State, 62 Ga. App. 551 (2) ( 8 S. E. 2d, 733 ), this court said: “Evidence may be sufficient to sustain a finding that the defendant was careless or guilty of ordinary negligence, in killing an animal, and still *585 be insufficient to find, that it was maliciously killed.” The killing must have been done with malice or an evil design and the evidence must show that the killing was done purposely or that the killing was done “under circumstances which bespeak a mind disposed to the commission of mischief”; that is, that the killing was done with such recklessness as to imply malice | 1 | 1949–1949 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.