charged error in Indiana

1964Judge Kelley, speaking for this court, in Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Lilly Paint Products (1963), 135 Ind. App. 46 , 188 N. E. 2d 278 , at page 280, (Transfer denied), stated: “Where asserted or claimed errors are dependent upon documentary evidence, such as exhibits, a failure to set forth such exhibits, in material substance or by copy, in the condensed recital of the evidence in the brief, is held to be a waiver of the charged error, except where the same are supplied in the opposing brief.” See also: Coats et ux. v. Clanin et ux. (9858), 128 Ind. App. 195 , 147 N. E. 2d 555 .

1964Judge Kelley, speaking for this court, in Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Lilly Paint Products (1963), 135 Ind. App. 46 , 188 N. E. 2d 278 , at page 280, (Transfer denied), stated: “Where asserted or claimed errors are dependent upon documentary evidence, such as exhibits, a failure to set forth such exhibits, in material substance or by copy, in the condensed recital of the evidence in the brief, is held to be a waiver of the charged error, except where the same are supplied in the opposing brief.” See also: Coats et ux. v. Clanin et ux. (9858), 128 Ind. App. 195 , 147 N. E. 2d 555 .

1977The court also rejected the argument that the preliminary hearing was necessary to afford notice to the probationer, stating that “a defendant’s right to reasonable notice of the nature of the charged violation and an opportunity to meet the evidence offered against him can be satisfied by means other than a preliminary hearing.” 531 F.2d at 847 . *81 The court in Pearson v. State (Minn. 1976), 241 N.W.2d 490, 493 , stated: “The only justification for requiring a preliminary hearing in a case such as this is that the defendant should not have to spend considerable time in jail awaiting a revoc

1977The fact that this type of situation was not mentioned in either case does not compel a contrary conclusion; in neither case was the petitioner incarcerated subject to a final conviction at the time of attempted revocation.” 524 F.2d at 78 .

1977The court also rejected the argument that the preliminary hearing was necessary to afford notice to the probationer, stating that “a defendant’s right to reasonable notice of the nature of the charged violation and an opportunity to meet the evidence offered against him can be satisfied by means other than a preliminary hearing.” 531 F.2d at 847 . *81 The court in Pearson v. State (Minn. 1976), 241 N.W.2d 490, 493 , stated: “The only justification for requiring a preliminary hearing in a case such as this is that the defendant should not have to spend considerable time in jail awaiting a revoc

1977The court also rejected the argument that the preliminary hearing was necessary to afford notice to the probationer, stating that “a defendant’s right to reasonable notice of the nature of the charged violation and an opportunity to meet the evidence offered against him can be satisfied by means other than a preliminary hearing.” 531 F.2d at 847 . *81 The court in Pearson v. State (Minn. 1976), 241 N.W.2d 490, 493 , stated: “The only justification for requiring a preliminary hearing in a case such as this is that the defendant should not have to spend considerable time in jail awaiting a revoc

1977The court also rejected the argument that the preliminary hearing was necessary to afford notice to the probationer, stating that “a defendant’s right to reasonable notice of the nature of the charged violation and an opportunity to meet the evidence offered against him can be satisfied by means other than a preliminary hearing.” 531 F.2d at 847 . *81 The court in Pearson v. State (Minn. 1976), 241 N.W.2d 490, 493 , stated: “The only justification for requiring a preliminary hearing in a case such as this is that the defendant should not have to spend considerable time in jail awaiting a revoc

1963Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company v. Lilly Paint Products, Inc. (1963), 135 Ind. App. 46 , 188 N. E. 2d 278, 280, 281 , pt. 5; Motorists Mutual Insurance Company v. Johnson (1963), 192 N. E. 2d 769, 770 , pt. 3.

1921In Banks v. State (1919), 188 Ind. 353 , 123 N. E. 691 , this court, in considering a charged violation of Acts 1917 p. 15, §4, supra, said: “The statute under consideration. does not make it unlawful for a person to have intoxicating liquor in his possession in this state for his own use, and it expressly provides that it does not prohibit a person having liquor in his possession from giving it to a guest in his own home; but it was apparently the intention of the legislature to make it impossible for a person to obtain possession of liquor in this state. * * * Once a person has obtained poss

1921In Banks v. State (1919), 188 Ind. 353 , 123 N. E. 691 , this court, in considering a charged violation of Acts 1917 p. 15, §4, supra, said: “The statute under consideration. does not make it unlawful for a person to have intoxicating liquor in his possession in this state for his own use, and it expressly provides that it does not prohibit a person having liquor in his possession from giving it to a guest in his own home; but it was apparently the intention of the legislature to make it impossible for a person to obtain possession of liquor in this state. * * * Once a person has obtained poss