charged violation in Texas

2015The jury is Bound by the evidences and should therefore be limited to those included offenses in which a reasonable view of the evidence will sustain., as such juror or no[t] to be free to pick and choose what offense the accused should be found guilty of—and cannot be given the freedom to legally convict the accused of a lesser included offense merely out of sympathy or for the purposes of reaching a verdict , the charge here on /"Unlawful Restraint" only invitated juror to more or less come to a compromise and Unwarranted verdict after reviewing the evidence in the light must favorable to th

2015The jury is Bound by the evidences and should therefore be limited to those included offenses in which a reasonable view of the evidence will sustain., as such juror or no[t] to be free to pick and choose what offense the accused should be found guilty of—and cannot be given the freedom to legally convict the accused of a lesser included offense merely out of sympathy or for the purposes of reaching a verdict , the charge here on /"Unlawful Restraint" only invitated juror to more or less come to a compromise and Unwarranted verdict after reviewing the evidence in the light must favorable to th

1986In Matte v. State, 572 S.W.2d 547 (Tex. Cr.App.1978), it was held that the conclusory allegation in the motion to revoke probation that probationer made a "false written statement" to a licensed firearm dealer, in violation of federal law was not sufficient, in the face of his timely motion to quash the revocation motion, to give the probationer sufficient notice to afford him an opportunity to defend against the charged violation, in that it did not inform him of the nature of the statement made, and thus probation was thus denied due process.

1986In Matte v. State, 572 S.W.2d 547 (Tex.Cr.App.1978), it was held that the concluso-ry allegation in the motion to revoke probation that probationer made a “false written statement” to a licensed firearm dealer, in violation of federal law was not sufficient, in the face of his timely motion to quash the revocation motion, to give the probationer sufficient notice to afford him an opportunity to defend against the charged violation, in that it did not inform him of the nature of the statement made, and thus probation was thus denied due process.

1986See also Amaya v. State, 551 S.W.2d 385 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Garrett v. State, 68 S.W.2d 507 (Tex.Cr.App.1934).

1986See also Amaya v. State, 551 S.W.2d 385 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Garrett v. State, 68 S.W.2d 507 (Tex.Cr.App.1934).

1981The attorney explained that in view of the not guilty plea the filing of the motion for probation would be like telling the jury “you can be just a little bit pregnant.” In Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 , 100 S.Ct. 1708 , 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980), the Supreme Court wrote: “A proper respect for the Sixth Amendment disarms petitioner’s contention that defendants who retain their own lawyers are entitled to less protection than defendants for whom the State appoints counsel ...

1981The attorney explained that in view of the not guilty plea the filing of the motion for probation would be like telling the jury “you can be just a little bit pregnant.” In Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 , 100 S.Ct. 1708 , 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980), the Supreme Court wrote: “A proper respect for the Sixth Amendment disarms petitioner’s contention that defendants who retain their own lawyers are entitled to less protection than defendants for whom the State appoints counsel ...

1981In Dempsey v. State, 159 Tex.Cr.App. 602 , 266 S.W.2d 875 (1954), this court, speaking through Judge Woodley, said: “The defense may offer testimony as to any specific act of violence or misconduct which evidences the violent character of the deceased under the following conditions: “If offered for the purpose of showing the reasonableness of defendant’s claim of apprehension of danger, it must further appear that the acts of violence or misconduct were known to the defendant at the time of the homicide.

1981In Dempsey v. State, 159 Tex.Cr.App. 602 , 266 S.W.2d 875 (1954), this court, speaking through Judge Woodley, said: “The defense may offer testimony as to any specific act of violence or misconduct which evidences the violent character of the deceased under the following conditions: “If offered for the purpose of showing the reasonableness of defendant’s claim of apprehension of danger, it must further appear that the acts of violence or misconduct were known to the defendant at the time of the homicide.

1956In Day v. State, 21 Tex.App. 213 , 17 S.W. 262 , the Court of Appeals held that a charge on the presumption of innocence such as paragraph 2 above was sufficient charge on the burden of proof.

1956In Day v. State, 21 Tex. App. 213, 17 S.W. 262 , the Texas Court of Appeals held that a charge on the presumption of innocence, such as paragraph 2 above, was sufficient charge on the burden of proof.

1943R. 482 , 145 S. W. (2d) 887 , that “In the first place it was appellant’s duty to stop, regardless of whether or not anyone was injured, — see Garcia v. State, 96 S. W. (2d) 977 ; Bevil v. State, 141 S. W. (2d) 363 .” We think it would not have been necessary to charge any further in the indictment than a failure to stop after the striking of Mr. Breedlove, the remaining portion of the statute, Art. 1150, P. C., being called into action only if aid or assistance should then be shown to be necessary; that such failure alone would have constituted a violation of the law; that all further allegat

1943R. 482 , 145 S. W. (2d) 887 , that “In the first place it was appellant’s duty to stop, regardless of whether or not anyone was injured, — see Garcia v. State, 96 S. W. (2d) 977 ; Bevil v. State, 141 S. W. (2d) 363 .” We think it would not have been necessary to charge any further in the indictment than a failure to stop after the striking of Mr. Breedlove, the remaining portion of the statute, Art. 1150, P. C., being called into action only if aid or assistance should then be shown to be necessary; that such failure alone would have constituted a violation of the law; that all further allegat