section 9-11-52(a) conclusions of law in Georgia

2025See Payson, 274 Ga. at 235 (2) (holding that a request for factual findings and conclusions of law under OCGA § 9-11-52 (a) was timely if made before the judgment was entered).

2021And because the husband made his request for findings of fact and conclusions of law under OCGA § 9-11-52 (a) before the trial court entered its judgment, his request was timely.3 See Payson v. Payson, 274 Ga. 231, 235 (2) ( 552 SE2d 839 ) (2001) (concluding that “a party’s 9-11-52 (a) request for findings and 3 It is true that OCGA § 19-9-3 (a) (8) provides that upon request by a party “on or before the close of evidence in a contested hearing,” the trial court is required to set forth specific findings of fact in a permanent court order awarding child custody.

2017Gold Kist, Inc. v. Wilson, 220 Ga.App. 426, 428 (1) ( 469 SE2d 504 ) (1996).

2017Gold Kist, Inc. v. Wilson, 220 Ga.App. 426, 428 (1) ( 469 SE2d 504 ) (1996).

2023See 7 VanVlerah, supra, 359 Ga. App. at 579-580 (1) (a) (holding that a pre-judgment request for findings of fact and conclusions of law in a contested family law action was timely and thus the trial court was required to make findings of fact and conclusions of law under OCGA § 9-11-52 (a)); Sadler, supra, 338 Ga. App. 550 -551 (1) (same).5 Consequently, “[b]ecause the trial court erred by not including findings of fact and conclusions of law in its [temporary order], we vacate the judgment and remand with direction that the court make sufficient findings and conclusions to support its ruling

2021(Emphasis supplied.) But that statute is not the exclusive statutory avenue for requesting findings and conclusions in cases involving child custody. “[F]ollowing the enactment of OCGA § 19-9-3 (a) (8), Georgia courts have continued to apply OCGA § 9-11-52 to contested family law matters, including child custody cases.” Sadler, 338 Ga. App. at 551 (1). 5 conclusions in a bench trial is timely if made before the judgment is entered”); Sadler, 338 Ga. App. at 550 (1) (concluding that request for findings and conclusions under OCGA § 9-11-52 (a) was timely when made prior to trial court’s written

2023See 7 VanVlerah, supra, 359 Ga. App. at 579-580 (1) (a) (holding that a pre-judgment request for findings of fact and conclusions of law in a contested family law action was timely and thus the trial court was required to make findings of fact and conclusions of law under OCGA § 9-11-52 (a)); Sadler, supra, 338 Ga. App. 550 -551 (1) (same).5 Consequently, “[b]ecause the trial court erred by not including findings of fact and conclusions of law in its [temporary order], we vacate the judgment and remand with direction that the court make sufficient findings and conclusions to support its ruling

2023See 7 VanVlerah, supra, 359 Ga. App. at 579-580 (1) (a) (holding that a pre-judgment request for findings of fact and conclusions of law in a contested family law action was timely and thus the trial court was required to make findings of fact and conclusions of law under OCGA § 9-11-52 (a)); Sadler, supra, 338 Ga. App. 550 -551 (1) (same).5 Consequently, “[b]ecause the trial court erred by not including findings of fact and conclusions of law in its [temporary order], we vacate the judgment and remand with direction that the court make sufficient findings and conclusions to support its ruling

2023See Warren v. Smith, 336 Ga. App. 342, 343-345 ( 785 SE2d 25 ) (2016) (holding that the trial court failed to make findings of fact and conclusions of law under OCGA § 9-11-52 where the father made a timely oral request for findings of fact and conclusions of law following a hearing on his petition for change in custody).

2023See Warren v. Smith, 336 Ga. App. 342, 343-345 ( 785 SE2d 25 ) (2016) (holding that the trial court failed to make findings of fact and conclusions of law under OCGA § 9-11-52 where the father made a timely oral request for findings of fact and conclusions of law following a hearing on his petition for change in custody).

2020Auth. of Fulton County, 320 Ga. App. 689, 693 (1) ( 740 SE2d 663 ) (2013) (holding that “summary conclusions that contain no hint about the evidence or analysis the court relied on to arrive at them,” and that “cite no legal authority and contain no analysis that explains them,” fail to qualify as findings of fact and 11 conclusions of law under OCGA § 9-11-52 (a));5 In the Interest of D.

2020Auth. of Fulton County, 320 Ga. App. 689, 693 (1) ( 740 SE2d 663 ) (2013) (holding that “summary conclusions that contain no hint about the evidence or analysis the court relied on to arrive at them,” and that “cite no legal authority and contain no analysis that explains them,” fail to qualify as findings of fact and 11 conclusions of law under OCGA § 9-11-52 (a));5 In the Interest of D.

2020G., 212 Ga. App. 353, 353 (1) ( 442 SE2d 11 ) (1994) (concluding that when making findings of fact and conclusions of law required under OCGA § 9-11-52 (a), “[t]he trial judge is to ascertain the facts and to state not only the end result of that inquiry but the process by which it was reached.

2020G., 212 Ga. App. 353, 353 (1) ( 442 SE2d 11 ) (1994) (concluding that when making findings of fact and conclusions of law required under OCGA § 9-11-52 (a), “[t]he trial judge is to ascertain the facts and to state not only the end result of that inquiry but the process by which it was reached.

2017See, e.g., SN Intl., Inc. v. Smart Properties, Inc., 311 Ga. App. 434, 437 ( 715 SE2d 826 ) (2011) (vacating and remanding where the trial court failed to make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law to explain its judgment when such an omission made meaningful appellate review virtually impossible).4 Accordingly, we vacate and remand with directions for the trial court to find the facts and state its conclusions of law, including whether the Bylaws, 4 We echo the caution previously issued by our Court of Appeals on this issue: We caution, however, that our decision is not to be read

2017See, e.g., SN Intl., Inc. v. Smart Properties, Inc., 311 Ga. App. 434, 437 ( 715 SE2d 826 ) (2011) (vacating and remanding where the trial court failed to make specific findings of fact and conclusions of law to explain its judgment when such an omission made meaningful appellate review virtually impossible).4 Accordingly, we vacate and remand with directions for the trial court to find the facts and state its conclusions of law, including whether the Bylaws, 4 We echo the caution previously issued by our Court of Appeals on this issue: We caution, however, that our decision is not to be read

2013He also specifically requested that the court make “factual findings regarding the evidence presented regarding the valuation of the proposed leasehold estate according to the Harris factors, as required under Sherman I.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 350 (4) (a).

2013Sherman II arose out of a bond validation proceeding similar to the one at issue here. 10 As in this case, Sherman became a party to the proceeding and “requested that the trial court provide an order setting forth findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-52 (a).” 317 Ga. App. at 346 .

2012Compare Griffin v. Wallace, 260 Ga. App. 857 ( 581 SE2d 375 ) (2003) (when the trial court hears testimony and is called upon to act as the finder of fact regarding a motion to enforce a settlement, the clearly erroneous standard is used); Morrow v. Vineville United Methodist Church, 227 Ga. App. 313, 317 (2) ( 489 SE2d 310 ) (1997) (following a nonjury trial on the motion to enforce the settlement, the trial court made findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-52 (a)).

2012Compare Griffin v. Wallace, 260 Ga. App. 857 ( 581 SE2d 375 ) (2003) (when the trial court hears testimony and is called upon to act as the finder of fact regarding a motion to enforce a settlement, the clearly erroneous standard is used); Morrow v. Vineville United Methodist Church, 227 Ga. App. 313, 317 (2) ( 489 SE2d 310 ) (1997) (following a nonjury trial on the motion to enforce the settlement, the trial court made findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-52 (a)).

2012Compare Griffin v. Wallace, 260 Ga. App. 857 ( 581 SE2d 375 ) (2003) (when the trial court hears testimony and is called upon to act as the finder of fact regarding a motion to enforce a settlement, the clearly erroneous standard is used); Morrow v. Vineville United Methodist Church, 227 Ga. App. 313, 317 (2) ( 489 SE2d 310 ) (1997) (following a nonjury trial on the motion to enforce the settlement, the trial court made findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-52 (a)).

2012Compare Griffin v. Wallace, 260 Ga. App. 857 ( 581 SE2d 375 ) (2003) (when the trial court hears testimony and is called upon to act as the finder of fact regarding a motion to enforce a settlement, the clearly erroneous standard is used); Morrow v. Vineville United Methodist Church, 227 Ga. App. 313, 317 (2) ( 489 SE2d 310 ) (1997) (following a nonjury trial on the motion to enforce the settlement, the trial court made findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-52 (a)).

2011Regardless, the outcome of this appeal remains the same. 5 Notably, in its appellate brief, Smart Properties acknowledges that appellate consideration of Karim’s enumerated errors will require this Court to review specific factual determinations made by the trial court. 6 See also Zumpano Enterprises v. Ga. Tile Distrib., 200 Ga. App. 563, 564 ( 408 SE2d 813 ) (1991) (vacating the judgment and remanding the case after finding that the judgment entered by the trial court was deficient in that it failed to address the plaintiff s unjust enrichment claim and contained insufficient findings of fac

2011Teamsters Local Union No. 528 v. Allied Foods, 228 Ga. 479, 480 (1) ( 186 SE2d 527 ) (1971) (noting that the purposes of having the trial court affirmatively state its findings of fact and conclusions of law under OCGA § 9-11-52 include the following: to serve as an aid in the trial judge’s process of adjudication; for purposes of res judicata and estoppel by judgment; and to serve as an aid to the appellate court on review). 2 See OCGA § 9-11-52 (a); see also OCGA § 9-11-52 (b) (exceptions to the mandatory provisions of subsection (a)). 3 For example, Smart Properties argued that, if the cour

2011Teamsters Local Union No. 528 v. Allied Foods, 228 Ga. 479, 480 (1) ( 186 SE2d 527 ) (1971) (noting that the purposes of having the trial court affirmatively state its findings of fact and conclusions of law under OCGA § 9-11-52 include the following: to serve as an aid in the trial judge’s process of adjudication; for purposes of res judicata and estoppel by judgment; and to serve as an aid to the appellate court on review). 2 See OCGA § 9-11-52 (a); see also OCGA § 9-11-52 (b) (exceptions to the mandatory provisions of subsection (a)). 3 For example, Smart Properties argued that, if the cour

2011Regardless, the outcome of this appeal remains the same. 5 Notably, in its appellate brief, Smart Properties acknowledges that appellate consideration of Karim’s enumerated errors will require this Court to review specific factual determinations made by the trial court. 6 See also Zumpano Enterprises v. Ga. Tile Distrib., 200 Ga. App. 563, 564 ( 408 SE2d 813 ) (1991) (vacating the judgment and remanding the case after finding that the judgment entered by the trial court was deficient in that it failed to address the plaintiff s unjust enrichment claim and contained insufficient findings of fac

2011Regardless, the outcome of this appeal remains the same. 5 Notably, in its appellate brief, Smart Properties acknowledges that appellate consideration of Karim’s enumerated errors will require this Court to review specific factual determinations made by the trial court. 6 See also Zumpano Enterprises v. Ga. Tile Distrib., 200 Ga. App. 563, 564 ( 408 SE2d 813 ) (1991) (vacating the judgment and remanding the case after finding that the judgment entered by the trial court was deficient in that it failed to address the plaintiff s unjust enrichment claim and contained insufficient findings of fac

2002Greene County v. North Shore Resort &c., 238 Ga. App. 236, 240 (2) ( 517 SE2d 553 ) (1999).

2002Greene County v. North Shore Resort &c., 238 Ga. App. 236, 240 (2) ( 517 SE2d 553 ) (1999).

1997Those factual findings “shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” OCGA § 9-11-52 (a); Tranakos v. Miller, 220 Ga. App. 829, 832 (1) ( 470 SE2d 440 ) (1996).

1997Those factual findings “shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” OCGA § 9-11-52 (a); Tranakos v. Miller, 220 Ga. App. 829, 832 (1) ( 470 SE2d 440 ) (1996).

1984See in this regard Cunnane v. Cunnane, 237 Ga. 650 (1) ( 229 SE2d 431 ).

1984See in this regard Cunnane v. Cunnane, 237 Ga. 650 (1) ( 229 SE2d 431 ).