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16 Idaho opinions name it 2 courts 1995–2026 7 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Idaho courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. McCoolgreen2 sentences2007See State v. Parker, 143 Idaho 165, 169 , 139 P.3d 767, 771 (Ct.App.2006) (holding that orders for restitution under I.C. § 19-5304(2) are distinct from orders for compensation of the victim that may be included as terms of probation under I.C. § 19-2601(2)); see also State v. McCool, 139 Idaho 804, 806 , 87 P.3d 291, 293 (2004). 2007See State v. Parker, 143 Idaho 165, 169 , 139 P.3d 767, 771 (Ct.App.2006) (holding that orders for restitution under I.C. § 19-5304(2) are distinct from orders for compensation of the victim that may be included as terms of probation under I.C. § 19-2601(2)); see also State v. McCool, 139 Idaho 804, 806 , 87 P.3d 291, 293 (2004). | 3 | 3 |
State v. Parkergreen2 sentences2007See State v. Parker, 143 Idaho 165, 169 , 139 P.3d 767, 771 (Ct.App.2006) (holding that orders for restitution under I.C. § 19-5304(2) are distinct from orders for compensation of the victim that may be included as terms of probation under I.C. § 19-2601(2)); see also State v. McCool, 139 Idaho 804, 806 , 87 P.3d 291, 293 (2004). 2007See State v. Parker, 143 Idaho 165, 169 , 139 P.3d 767, 771 (Ct.App.2006) (holding that orders for restitution under I.C. § 19-5304(2) are distinct from orders for compensation of the victim that may be included as terms of probation under I.C. § 19-2601(2)); see also State v. McCool, 139 Idaho 804, 806 , 87 P.3d 291, 293 (2004). | 2 | 3 |
State v. Garciagreen2 sentences2023Cf. State v. Garcia, 170 Idaho 708, 714-15 , 516 P.3d 578, 584-85 (2022) (holding trial court did not err in awarding $162,285.27 in restitution under I.C. § 19-5304(7) when defendant had paid $2,267.90 via garnishments of his inmate account, had worked for five years in the “trailer manufacturing industry,” and would be incarcerated for at least twenty-five years). 2023Cf. State v. Garcia, 170 Idaho 708, 714-15 , 516 P.3d 578, 584-85 (2022) (holding trial court did not err in awarding $162,285.27 in restitution under I.C. § 19-5304(7) when defendant had paid $2,267.90 via garnishments of his inmate account, had worked for five years in the “trailer manufacturing industry,” and would be incarcerated for at least twenty-five years). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Waidelichgreen2 sentences2014Because the puppy-boarding expenses were an attempt to prevent a future harm, we determined they were “not a proper item of restitution under Idaho Code § 19-5304 .” Id. at 624 , 97 P.3d at 491 . 2013See State v. Straub, 153 Idaho 882, 890 , 292 P.3d 273, 281 (2013); State v. Waidelich, 140 Idaho 622, 624 , 97 P.3d 489, 491 (Ct.App.2004). | 1 | 4 |
State v. Daniel Ryan Straubgreen2 sentences2014We conclude that Struhs is correct. 2 The issue is governed by our Supreme Court’s recent decision in State v. Straub, 153 Idaho 882 , 292 P.3d 273 (2013), where the Court identified certain limits upon restitution awardable under I.C. § 19-5304. 2014We conclude that Struhs is correct. 2 The issue is governed by our Supreme Court’s recent decision in State v. Straub, 153 Idaho 882 , 292 P.3d 273 (2013), where the Court identified certain limits upon restitution awardable under I.C. § 19-5304. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Wageniusgreen2 sentences2006The latter statute authorizes a trial court to place a defendant on probation “under such terms and conditions as it deems necessary and expedient.” Section 19-2601(2) is designed to give courts “maximum flexibility to fashion the sentence most appropriate to the individual defendant.” State v. McCool, 139 Idaho 804, 807 , 87 P.3d 291, 294 (2004); State v. Wagenius, 99 Idaho 273, 279 , 581 P.2d 319, 325 (1978). 2006The latter statute authorizes a trial court to place a defendant on probation “under such terms and conditions as it deems necessary and expedient.” Section 19-2601(2) is designed to give courts “maximum flexibility to fashion the sentence most appropriate to the individual defendant.” State v. McCool, 139 Idaho 804, 807 , 87 P.3d 291, 294 (2004); State v. Wagenius, 99 Idaho 273, 279 , 581 P.2d 319, 325 (1978). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Idaho. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Garcia
green
2 sentences2026Garcia, 166 Idaho at 669 , 462 P.3d at 1133 . 2026Garcia, 166 Idaho at 669 , 462 P.3d at 1133 . | 3 | 2021–2026 |
State v. Oxford
green
2 sentences2024Oxford, 167 Idaho at 526 , 473 P.3d at 795 . 2024Oxford, 167 Idaho at 526 , 473 P.3d at 795 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Foeller
green
2 sentences2022Id. at 890 , 489 P.3d at 801 . 9 Here, like Foeller, Young agreed, pursuant to her plea agreement, to pay restitution “if applicable per statute.” Also similar to Foeller, Young concedes that Amy and GEICO were victims under the restitution statute, their economic losses were a result of her criminal conduct, and the restitution amounts ordered by the district court accurately represent their economic losses.5 During the restitution hearing, Young’s trial counsel argued the restitution in this case falls into two categories: (1) economic loss restitution pursuant to I.C. § 19-5304; and (2) chi 2022Id. at 890 , 489 P.3d at 801 . 9 Here, like Foeller, Young agreed, pursuant to her plea agreement, to pay restitution “if applicable per statute.” Also similar to Foeller, Young concedes that Amy and GEICO were victims under the restitution statute, their economic losses were a result of her criminal conduct, and the restitution amounts ordered by the district court accurately represent their economic losses.5 During the restitution hearing, Young’s trial counsel argued the restitution in this case falls into two categories: (1) economic loss restitution pursuant to I.C. § 19-5304; and (2) chi | 1 | 2022–2022 |
International Equipment Service, Inc. v. Pocatello Industrial Park Co.
green
2 sentences1995The legislature was not unmindful of the issue of insurance, as it addressed the issue in subsection (2), which reads, "The existence of a policy of insurance covering the victim's loss shall not absolve the defendant of the obligation to pay restitution." Based on the foregoing, we are compelled to conclude that the legislature did not intend to include insurers and similar entities in its definition of victim. *625 Relying on International Equipment Service, Inc. v. Pocatello Industrial Park Co., 107 Idaho 1116 , 695 P.2d 1255 (1985), Blue Cross further posits that even if it is not included 1995The legislature was not unmindful of the issue of insurance, as it addressed the issue in subsection (2), which reads, "The existence of a policy of insurance covering the victim's loss shall not absolve the defendant of the obligation to pay restitution." Based on the foregoing, we are compelled to conclude that the legislature did not intend to include insurers and similar entities in its definition of victim. *625 Relying on International Equipment Service, Inc. v. Pocatello Industrial Park Co., 107 Idaho 1116 , 695 P.2d 1255 (1985), Blue Cross further posits that even if it is not included | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.